The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government Volume II Part 8

"On the day we left Williamsburg, after the battle, we worked hard to get our artillery and some we had captured over the sloughs about four miles distant. On account of the tortuous course of the road, we could not bring a single gun to bear upon the enemy who were pursuing us, and sh.e.l.ling the road as they advanced. Fortunately, we found in a mud-hole a broken-down ammunition-wagon containing five loaded sh.e.l.ls. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra sh.e.l.ls, and they exploded with terrific effect.

"The force behind halted for three days, and finally turned off from the road, doubtless under the apprehension that it was mined throughout. Thus our rear was relieved of the enemy. No soldier will march over mined land, and a corps of sappers, each man having two ten-inch sh.e.l.ls, two primers, and a mule to carry them, could stop any army."

Accounts, contemporaneously published at the North, represent the terror inspired by these sh.e.l.ls, extravagantly describe the number of them, and speak of the necessity of leaving the road to avoid them.

The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg, Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, being those there engaged, followed in the line of retreat, Stuart's cavalry moving after them-- they marched that day about twelve miles. In the mean time Franklin's division had gone up the York River, and landed a short distance below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. Two brigades of General G. W. Smith's division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driving him through the wood to the protection of his gunboats in York River.

On the next morning the rear divisions joined those in advance at Barhamsville, and the retreat of the whole army was resumed--Smith's and Magruder's divisions moving by the New Kent Court-House to the Baltimore Cross Roads, and Longstreet's and Hill's to the Long Bridge, where the whole army remained in line facing to the east for five days.

The retreat had been successfully conducted. In the princ.i.p.al action, that at Williamsburg, our forces, after General Hill's division had been brought back to the support of General Longstreet, did not exceed, probably was not equal to, one half that of the enemy. Yet, as has been seen, the position was held as long as was necessary for the removal of our trains, and our troops slept upon the field of battle. The loss of the enemy greatly exceeded our own, which was about twelve hundred; while General Hooker, commanding one division of the Federal army, in his testimony stated the loss in his division to have been seventeen hundred.[31]

Among the gallant and much regretted of those lost by us, was Colonel Ward, of Florida, whose conduct at Yorktown has been previously noticed, and of whom General Early, in his report of the battle of Williamsburg, says:

"On the list of the killed in the Second Florida Regiment is found the name of its colonel, George T. Ward, as true a gentleman and as gallant a soldier as has drawn a sword in this war, and whose conduct under fire it was my fortune to witness on another occasion. His loss to his regiment, to his State, and to the Confederacy can not be easily compensated."

Colonel Ward, with his regiment, had been detached from General Early's command in the early part of the action. I regret that I have not access to the report of General Longstreet, where, no doubt, may also be found due notice of Colonel Christopher Mott, whom I knew personally. In his youth he served in the regiment commanded by me during the war with Mexico. He was brave, cheerful, prompt, and equal to every trial to which he was subjected, giving early promise of high soldierly capacity. He afterward held various places of honor and trust in civil life, and there were many in Mississippi who, like myself, deeply lamented his death in the height of his usefulness.

General Huger, commanding at Norfolk, and Captain Lee, commanding the navy-yard, by the authority of the Secretaries of War and Navy, delayed the evacuation of both, as stated by General Randolph, Secretary of War, for about a week after General Johnston sent orders to General Huger to leave immediately. While he was employed in removing the valuable stores and machinery, as we learn from the work of the Comte de Paris, President Lincoln and his Secretary of War arrived at Fortress Monroe, and on the 8th of May an expedition against Norfolk by the troops under General Wool was contemplated. He writes:

"Being apprised by the columns of smoke which rose on the horizon that the propitious moment had arrived, Wool proposed to the President to undertake an expedition against Norfolk. Max Weber's brigade was speedily embarked, and, to protect his descent, Commodore Goldsborough's fleet was ordered to escort it. But the Confederate batteries, not yet having been abandoned, fired a few shots in reply, while the Virginia, which, since the wounding of the brave Buchanan, had been commanded by Commodore Tatnall, showed her formidable sh.e.l.l, and the expedition was countermanded. Two more days were consumed in waiting. Finally, on the morning of the 10th, Weber disembarked east of Sewell's Point. This time the enemy's artillery was silent. There was found an intrenched camp mounting a few guns, but absolutely deserted. General Wool reached the city of Norfolk, which had been given up to its peaceful inhabitants the day previous, and hastened to place a military governor there." [32]

Reposing on these cheaply won laurels, the expedition returned to Fortress Monroe, leaving Brigadier-General Viele, with some troops brought from the north side of the river, to hold the place. The navy-yard and workshops had been set on fire before our troops withdrew, so as to leave little to the enemy save the glory of capturing an undefended town. The troops at Fortress Monroe were numerically superior to the command of General Huger, and could have been readily combined, with the forces at and about Roanoke Island, for a forward movement on the south side of the James River. In view of this probability, General Huger, with the main part of his force, was halted for a time at Petersburg, but, as soon as it was ascertained that no preparations were being made by the enemy for that campaign, so palpably advantageous to him, General Huger's troops were moved to the north side of the James River to make a junction with the army of General Johnston.

Previously, detachments had been sent from the force withdrawn from Norfolk to strengthen the command of Brigadier-General J. B.

Anderson, who was placed in observation before General McDowell, then at Fredericksburg, threatening to advance with a force four or five times as great as that under General Anderson, and another detachment had been sent to the aid of Brigadier-General Branch, who, with his brigade, had recently been brought up from North Carolina and sent forward to Gordonsville, for the like purpose as that for which General Anderson was placed near Fredericksburg.

[Footnote 20: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 10-12, 309-311.]

[Footnote 21: See "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 319. Letter of President Lincoln to General McClellan, April 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 22: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, p. 320.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid., p. 321.]

[Footnote 24: "Report on the Conduct of the War," Part I, pp. 601, 602.]

[Footnote 25: "Life of Commodore Tatnall," pp. 166, 167.]

[Footnote 26: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 340.]

[Footnote 27: On April 6, 1862, President Lincoln wrote to General McClellan as follows: "You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can."--("Report on the Conduct of the War," pp. 319, 320.)]

[Footnote 28: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 324.]

[Footnote 29: "Report on the Conduct of the War," pp. 323, 324.]

[Footnote 30: "Army of the Potomac," Swinton, p. 117.]

[Footnote 31: "Report on the Conduct of the War," p. 579.]

[Footnote 32: "History of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris, vol.

ii, p. 30.]

CHAPTER XXI.

A New Phase to our Military Problem.--General Johnston's Position.-- Defenses of James River.--Attack on Fort Drury.--Johnston crosses the Chickahominy.--Position of McClellan.--Position of McDowell.-- Strength of Opposing Forces.--Jackson's Expedition down the Shenandoah Valley.--Panic at Was.h.i.+ngton and the North.--Movements to intercept Jackson.--His Rapid Movements.--Repulses Fremont.-- Advance of s.h.i.+elds.--Fall of Ashby.--Port Republic, Battle of.-- Results of this Campaign.

The withdrawal of our army to the Chickahominy, the abandonment of Norfolk, the destruction of the Virginia, and opening of the lower James River, together with the fact that McClellan's army, by changing his base to the head of York River, was in a position to cover the approach to Was.h.i.+ngton, and thus to remove the objections which had been made to sending the large force, retained for the defense of that city, to make a junction with McClellan, all combined to give a new phase to our military problem.

Soon after, General Johnston took position on the north side of the Chickahominy; accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his headquarters in the field, in order that by conversation with him we might better understand his plans and expectations. He came in after we arrived, saying that he had been riding around his lines to see how his position could be improved. A long conversation followed, which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to Richmond, reference was naturally made to the conversation of the previous evening and night, when General Lee confessed himself, as I was, unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the policy was to improve his position as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gunboats, so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on the land.

In consequence of the opening of the James River to the enemy's fleet, the attempts to utilize this channel for transportation, so as to approach directly to Richmond, soon followed. We had then no defenses on the James River below Drury's Bluff, about seven miles distant from Richmond. There an earthwork had been constructed and provided with an armament of four guns. Rifle-pits had been made in front of the fort, and obstructions had been placed in the river by driving piles, and sinking some vessels. The crew of the Virginia, after her destruction, had been sent to this fort, which was then in charge of Commander Farrand, Confederate States Navy.

On the 15th of April the enemy's fleet of five s.h.i.+ps of war, among the number, their much-vaunted Monitor, took position and opened fire upon the fort between seven and eight o'clock. Our small vessel, the Patrick Henry, was lying above the obstruction, and cooperated with the fort in its defense--the Monitor and ironclad Galena steamed up to about six hundred yards' distance; the others, wooden vessels, were kept at long range.

The armor of the flag-s.h.i.+p Galena was badly injured, and many of the crew killed or wounded. The Monitor was struck repeatedly, but the shot only bent her plates. At about eleven o'clock the fleet abandoned the attack, returning discomfited whence they came. The commander of the Monitor, Lieutenant Jeffers, in his report, says that "the action was most gallantly fought against great odds, and with the usual effect against earthworks." ... He adds, "It was impossible to reduce such works, except with the aid of a land force." The enemy in their reports recognized the efficiency of our fire by both artillery and riflemen, the sincerity of which was made manifest in the failure to renew the attempt.

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Davis House, at Richmond.]

The small garrison at Fort Drury, only adequate to the service it had performed, that of repelling an attempt by the fleet to pa.s.s up James River, was quite insufficient to prevent the enemy from landing below the fort, or to resist an attack by infantry. To guard against its sudden capture by such means, the garrison was increased by the addition of Bryan's regiment of Georgia Rifles.

After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drury's Bluff, I wrote to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee, an officer of the highest intelligence and reputation-- referring to him for full information in regard to the affair at Drury's Bluff, as well as to the positions and strength of our forces on the south side of the James River. After some speculations on the probable course of the enemy, and expressions of confidence, I informed the General that my aide would communicate freely to him and bring back to me any information with which he might be intrusted.

Not receiving any definite reply, I soon thereafter rode out to visit General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised in the suburbs of Richmond, viz., on the other side of Gillis's Creek, to meet a portion of light artillery, and to learn that the whole army had crossed the Chickahominy.

General Johnston's explanation to this (to me) unexpected movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy, and had directed the troops to cross and halt at the first good water on the southern side, which he supposed would be found near to the river. He also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather than in the rear of him--an advantage certainly obvious enough, if the line was to be near to it on either of its banks.

The considerations which induced General McClellan to make his base on the York River had at least partly ceased to exist. From the corps for which he had so persistently applied, he had received the division which he most valued, and the destruction of the Virginia had left the James River open to his fleet and transports as far up as Drury's Bluff, and the withdrawal of General Johnston across the Chickahominy made it quite practicable for him to transfer his army to the James River, the south side of which had then but weak defenses, and thus by a short march to gain more than all the advantages which, at a later period of the war, General Grant obtained at the sacrifice of a hecatomb of soldiers.

Referring, again, to the work of the Comte de Paris, who may be better authority in regard to what occurred in the army of the enemy than when he writes about Confederate affairs, it appears that this change of base was considered and not adopted because of General McClellan's continued desire to have McDowell's corps with him. The Count states:

"The James River, which had been closed until then by the presence of the Virginia, as York River had been by the cannon of Yorktown, was opened by the destruction of that s.h.i.+p, just as York River had been by the evacuation of the Confederate fortress. But it was only open as far as Drury's Bluff; in order to overcome this last obstacle interposed between Richmond and the Federal gunboats, the support of the land forces was necessary. On the 19th of May Commodore Goldsborough had a conference with General McClellan regarding the means to be employed for removing that obstacle... . General McClellan, as we have stated above, might have continued to follow the railway line, and preserved his depots at Whitehouse, on the Pamunkey, ... but he could also now go to reestablish his base of operations on James River, which the Virginia had hitherto prevented him from doing. By crossing the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, and some other fords situated lower down, ... could have reached the borders of the James in two or three days... . This flank march effected at a sufficient distance from the enemy, and covered by a few demonstrations along the upper Chickahominy, offered him great advantages without involving any risk... . If McClellan could have foreseen how deceptive were the promises of reenforcement made to him at the time, he would undoubtedly have declined the uncertain support of McDowell, to carry out the plan of campaign which offered the best chances of success with the troops which were absolutely at his disposal." [33]

Without feeling under any obligations for kind intentions on the part of the Government of the North, it was fortunate for us that it did, as its friend the Comte de Paris represents, deceive General McClellan, and prevent him from moving to the south side of the James River, so as not only to secure the cooperation of his gunboats in an attack upon Richmond, but to make his a.s.sault on the side least prepared for resistance, and where it would have been quite possible to cut our line of communication with the more Southern States on which we chiefly depended for supplies and reenforcements.

It is hardly just to treat the failure to fulfill the a.s.surance given by President Lincoln about reenforcements as "deceptive promises,"

for, as will be seen, the operations in the Valley by General Jackson, who there exhibited a rapidity of movement equal to the unyielding tenacity which had in the first great battle won for him the familiar name "Stonewall," had created such an alarm in Was.h.i.+ngton, as, if it had been better founded, would have justified the refusal to diminish the force held for the protection of their capital. Indeed, our cavalry, in observation near Fredericksburg, reported that on the 24th McDowell's troops started southward, but General Stuart found that night that they were returning. This indicated that the antic.i.p.ated junction was not to be made, and of this the Prince of Joinville writes:

"It needed only an effort of the will: the two armies were united, and in the possession of Richmond certain! Alas! this effort was not made. I can not recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of the heart." [34]

General McClellan, in his testimony December 10, 1862, before the court-martial in the case of General McDowell, said:

"I have no doubt, for it has ever been my opinion, that the Army of the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps of General McDowell been separated from it. It is also my opinion that, had the command of General McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the month of May, by the way of Hanover Court-House, from Fredericksburg, we would have had Richmond within a week after the junction." [35]

Let us first inquire what was the size of this army so crippled for want of reenforcement, and then what the strength of that to which it was opposed. On the 30th of April, 1862, the official report of McClellan's army gives the aggregate present for duty as 112,392;[36]

that of the 20th of June--omitting the army corps of General Dix, then, as previously, stationed at Fortress Monroe, and including General McCall's division, which had recently joined, the strength of which was reported to be 9,514--gives the aggregate present for duty as 105,825, and the total, present and absent, as 156,838.[37]