The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke Volume VIII Part 9

Barwell as his a.s.sistant, at a salary of about four hundred pounds a year. Against this extraordinary act General Clavering and Mr. Francis entered a protest.

So early as the 6th of the following January the appointment of these gentlemen was communicated in a letter to the Court of Directors, without any sort of color, apology, or explanation. That court found a servant removed from his station without complaint, contrary to the tenor of one of their standing injunctions. They allow, however, and with reason, that, "if it were possible to suppose that a saving, &c, had been his motive, they would have approved his proceeding. But that when immediately afterwards two persons, with _two_ salaries, had been appointed to execute the office which had been filled with reputation by Mr. Fowke alone, and that Mr. Graham enjoys all the emoluments annexed to the office of Mr. Fowke,"--they properly conclude that Mr. Fowke was removed without just cause, to make way for Mr. Graham, and strictly enjoin that the former be reinstated in his office of Resident as Post-master of Benares. In the same letter they a.s.sert their rights in a tone of becoming firmness, and declare, that "on no account we can permit our orders to be disobeyed or our authority disregarded."

It was now to be seen which of the parties was to give way. The orders were clear and precise, and enforced by a strong declaration of the resolution of the Court to make itself obeyed. Mr. Hastings fairly joined issue upon this point with his masters, and, having disobeyed the general instructions of the Company, determined to pay no obedience to their special order.

On the 21st July, 1778, he moved, and succeeded in his proposition, that the execution of these orders should be suspended. The reason he a.s.signed for this suspension lets in great light upon the true character of all these proceedings: "That his consent to the recall of Mr. Graham would be adequate to his own resignation of the service, as it would inflict such a wound on _his authority and influence_ that he could not maintain it."

If that had been his opinion, he ought to have resigned, and not disobeyed: because it was not necessary that he should hold his office; but it was necessary, that, whilst he hold it, he should obey his superiors, and submit to the law. Much more truly was his conduct a virtual resignation of his lawful office, and at the same time an usurpation of a situation which did not belong to him, to hold a subordinate office, and to refuse to act according to its duties. Had his authority been self-originated, it would have been wounded by his submission; but in this case the true nature of his authority was affirmed, not injured, by his obedience, because it was a power derived from others, and, by its essence, to be executed according to their directions.

In this determined disobedience he was supported by Mr. Barwell, who on that occasion delivered the dangerous doctrine to which your Committee have lately adverted. Mr. Fowke, who had a most material interest in this determination, applied by letter to be informed concerning it. An answer was sent, acquainting him coldly, and without any reason a.s.signed, of what had been resolved relative to his office. This communication was soon followed by another letter from Mr. Fowke, with great submission and remarkable decency a.s.serting his right to his office under the authority of the Court of Directors, and for solid reasons, grounded on the Company's express orders, praying to be informed of the charge against him. This letter appears to have been received by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell very loftily. Mr. Hastings said, "that such applications were irregular; that they are not accountable to Mr. Fowke for their resolution respecting him. The reasons for suspending the execution of the orders of the Court of Directors contain _no charge, nor the slightest imputation of a charge_, against Mr. Fowke; _but I see no reason why the board should condescend to tell him so_." Accordingly, the proposition of Mr. Francis and Mr.

Wheler, to inform Mr. Fowke "that they had no reason to be dissatisfied with his conduct," on the previous question was rejected.

By this resolution Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell discovered another principle, and no less dangerous than the first: namely, that persons deriving a valuable interest under the Company's orders, so far from being heard in favor of their right, are not so much as to be informed of the grounds on which they are deprived of it.

The arrival soon after of Sir Eyre Coote giving another opportunity of trial, the question for obedience to the Company's orders was again[13]

brought on by Mr. Francis, and again received a negative. Sir Eyre Coote, though present, and declaring, that, had he been at the original consultation, he should have voted for the immediate execution of the Company's orders, yet he was resolved to avoid what he called _any kind of retrospect_. His neutrality gained the question in favor of this, the third resolution for disobedience to orders.

The resolution in Bengal being thus decisively taken, it came to the turn of the Court of Directors to act their part. They did act their part exactly in their old manner: they had recourse to their old remedy of repeating orders which had been disobeyed. The Directors declare to Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, though without any apparent reason, that "they have read _with astonishment their formal resolution_ to suspend the execution of their orders; that they shall take such measures as appear necessary for _preserving the authority of the Court of Directors_, and for preventing _such instances of direct and wilful_ disobedience in their servants in time to come." They then renew their directions concerning Mr. Fowke. The event of this _sole_ measure taken to preserve their authority, and to prevent instances of direct and wilful disobedience, your Committee will state in its proper place,--taking into consideration, for the present, the proceedings relative to Mr. Bristow, and to Mahomed Reza Khan, which were altogether in the same spirit; but as they were diversified in the circ.u.mstances of disobedience, as well from the case of Mr. Fowke as from one another, and as these circ.u.mstances tend to discover other dangerous principles of abuse, and the general prostrate condition of the authority of Parliament in Bengal, your Committee proceed first to make some observations upon them.

The province of Oude, enlarged by the accession of several extensive and once flouris.h.i.+ng territories, that is, by the country of the Rohillas, the district of Corah and Allahabad, and other provinces betwixt the Ganges and Jumna, is under the nominal dominion of one of the princes of the country, called Asoph ul Dowlah. But a body of English troops is kept up in his country; and the greatest part of his revenues are, by one description or another, substantially under the administration of English subjects. He is to all purposes a dependent prince. The person to be employed in his dominions to act for the Committee [Company?] was therefore of little consequence in his capacity of negotiator; but he was vested with a trust, great and critical, in all pecuniary affairs.

These provinces of dependence lie out of the system of the Company's ordinary administration, and transactions there cannot be so readily brought under the cognizance of the Court of Directors. This renders it the more necessary that the Residents in such places should be persons not disapproved of by the Court of Directors. They are to manage a permanent interest, which is not, like a matter of political negotiation, variable, and which, from circ.u.mstances, might possibly excuse some degree of discretionary lat.i.tude in construing their orders.

During the lifetime of General Clavering and Colonel Monson, Mr.

Bristow was appointed to this Presidency, and that appointment, being approved and confirmed by the Court of Directors, became in effect their own. Mr. Bristow appears to have shown himself a man of talents and activity. He had been princ.i.p.ally concerned in the negotiations by which the Company's interest in the higher provinces had been established; and those services were considered by the Presidency of Calcutta as so meritorious, that they voted him ten thousand pounds as a reward, with many expressions of esteem and honor.

Mr. Bristow, however, was recalled by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, who had then acquired the majority, without any complaint having been a.s.signed as the cause of his removal, and Mr. Middleton was sent in his stead to reside at the capital of Oude. The Court of Directors, as soon as they could be apprised of this extraordinary step, in their letter of the 4th of July, 1777, express their strongest disapprobation of it: they order Mr. Middleton to be recalled, and Mr. Bristow to be reinstated in his office. In December, 1778, they repeat their order. Of these repeated orders no notice was taken. Mr. Bristow, fatigued with unsuccessful private applications, which met with a constant refusal, did at length, on the 1st of May, 1780, address a letter to the board, making his claim of right, ent.i.tling himself to his offices [office?]

under the authority of the Court of Directors, and complaining of the hards.h.i.+ps which he suffered by the delay in admitting him to the exercise of it. This letter your Committee have inserted at large in the Fifth Report, having found nothing whatsoever exceptionable in it, although it seems to have excited the warmest resentment in Mr.

Hastings.

This claim of the party gave no new force to the order of the Directors, which remained without any attention from the board from Mr. Bristow's arrival until the 1st of May, and with as little from the 1st of May to the 2nd of October following. On that day, Mr. Francis, after having caused the repeated orders of the Court of Directors to be first read, moved that Mr. Bristow should be reinstated in his office. This motion, in itself just and proper in the highest degree, and in which no fault could be found, but that it was not made more early, was received by Mr.

Hastings with the greatest marks of resentment and indignation. He declares in his minute, that, "were the most determined adversary of the British nation to possess, by whatever means, a share in the administration, he could not devise a measure in _itself_ so pernicious, or _time_ it so effectually for the _ruin_ of the British interests in India." Then turning to the object of the motion, he says, "I will ask, Who is Mr. Bristow, that a member of the administration should, at such a time, hold him forth, as _an instrument for the degradation of the first executive member of this government?_ What are the professed objects of his appointment? What are the _merits_ and services, or what the _qualifications_, which ent.i.tle him to such uncommon distinction? Is it for his superior _integrity_, or from his eminent _abilities_, that he is to be dignified at such hazard of every consideration that ought to influence the members of this administration? Of the former (his integrity) I know _no proofs_; I am sure it is not an evidence of it, that he has been _enabled_ to make himself the princ.i.p.al in such a _compet.i.tion:_ and for the test of his abilities I appeal to the letter which he has _dared_ to write to this board, and which I am ashamed to say we have _suffered_. I desire that a copy of it may be inserted in this day's proceedings, that it may stand before the eyes of every member of the board, when he shall give his vote upon a question for giving their confidence to a man, _their servant_, who has publicly insulted _them, his masters_, and the members of the government to whom he owes _his obedience_,--who, a.s.suming an a.s.sociation with the Court of Directors, and erecting himself into a _tribunal_, has _arraigned_ them for _disobedience_ of orders, _pa.s.sed judgment_ upon them, _and condemned or acquitted them, as their magistrate or superior_. Let the board consider, whether a man possessed of so _independent_ a spirit, who has already shown a _contempt_ of their authority, who has shown himself _so wretched an advocate for his own cause and negotiator for his own interest_, is fit to be trusted with the guardians.h.i.+p of _their_ honor, the execution of _their_ measures, and as _their_ confidential manager and negotiator with the princes of India. As the motion has been unaccompanied by any reasons which should induce the board to pa.s.s their acquiescence in it, I presume the motion which preceded it, for _reading the orders of the Court of Directors, was intended to serve as an argument for it, as well as an introduction to it_. The last of those was dictated the 23rd December, 1778, almost two years past. They were dictated at a time when, I am sorry to say, the Court of Directors were in _the habit of casting reproach upon my conduct and heaping indignities upon my station_."

Had the language and opinions which prevail throughout this part of the minute, as well as in all the others to which your Committee refer, been uttered suddenly and in a pa.s.sion, however unprovoked, some sort of apology might be made for the Governor-General. But when it was produced five months after the supposed offence, and then delivered in writing, which always implies the power of a greater degree of recollection and self-command, it shows how deeply the principles of disobedience had taken root in his mind, and of an a.s.sumption to himself of exorbitant powers, which he chooses to distinguish by the t.i.tle of "_his prerogative_." In this also will be found an obscure hint of the cause of his disobedience, which your Committee conceive to allude to the main cause of the disorders in the government of India,--namely, an underhand communication with Europe.

Mr. Hastings, by his confidence in the support derived from this source, or from the habits of independent power, is carried to such a length as to consider a motion to obey the Court of Directors as a degradation of the executive government in his person. He looks upon a claim under that authority, and a complaint that it has produced no effect, as a piece of daring insolence which he is ashamed that the board has suffered. The behavior which your Committee consider as so intemperate and despotic he regards as a culpable degree of patience and forbearance. Major Scott, his agent, enters so much into the principles of Mr. Hastings's conduct as to tell your Committee that in his opinion Lord Clive would have sent home Mr. Bristow a prisoner upon such an occasion. It is worthy of remark, that, in the very same breath that Mr. Hastings so heavily condemns a junior officer in the Company's service (not a _servant_ of the Council, as he hazards to call him, but _their fellow-servant_) for merely complaining of a supposed injury and requiring redress, he so far forgets his own subordination as to reject the orders of the Court of Directors even as an _argument_ in favor of appointing a person to an office, to presume to censure _his_ undoubted masters, and to accuse them of having been "in a habit of casting reproaches upon him, and heaping indignities on _his_ station." And it is to be observed, that this censure was not for the purpose of seeking or obtaining redress for any injury, but appeared rather as a reason for refusing to obey their lawful commands. It is plainly implied in that minute, that no servant of the Company, in Mr. Bristow's rank, would dare to act in such a manner, if he had not by indirect means obtained a premature fortune.

This alone is sufficient to show the situation of the Company's servants in the subordinate situations, when the mere claim of a right, derived from the sovereign legal power, becomes fatal not only to the objects which they pursue, but deeply wounds that reputation both for ability and integrity by which alone they are to be qualified for any other.

If anything could add to the disagreeable situation of those who are submitted to an authority conducted on such principles, it is this: The Company has ordered that no complaint shall be made in Europe against any of the Council without being previously communicated to them: a regulation formed upon grave reasons; and it was certainly made in _favor_ of that board. But if a person, having ground of complaint against the Council, by making use of the mode prescribed in favor of that very Council, and by complaining to themselves, commits an offence for which he may be justly punished, the Directors have not regulated the mode of complaint, they have actually forbidden it; they have, on that supposition, renounced their authority; and the whole system of their officers is delivered over to the arbitrary will of a few of their chief servants.

During the whole day of that deliberation things wore a decided face.

Mr. Hastings stood to his principles in their full extent, and seemed resolved upon unqualified disobedience. But as the debate was adjourned to the day following, time was given for expedients; and such an expedient was. .h.i.t upon by Mr. Hastings as will, no doubt, be unexpected by the House; but it serves to throw new lights upon the motives of all his struggles with the authority of the legislature.

The next day the Council met upon the adjournment. Then Mr. Hastings proposed, as a compromise, a division of the object in question. One half was to be surrendered to the authority of the Court of Directors, the other was reserved for his dignity. But the choice he made of his own share in this part.i.tion is very worthy of notice. He had taken his _sole_ ground of objection against Mr. Bristow on the supposed ill effect that such an appointment would have on the minds of the Indian powers. He said, "that these powers could have no dependence on his fulfilling his engagements, _or maintaining the faith of treaties_ which he might offer for their acceptance, if they saw him treated with such contempt." Mr. Bristow's appearing in a political character was the _whole_ of his complaint; yet, when he comes to a voluntary distribution of the duties of the office, he gives Mr. Bristow those very political negotiations of which but the day before he had in such strong terms declared him personally incapable, whose appointment he considered to be fatal to those negotiations, and which he then spoke of as a measure in _itself_ such as the bitterest adversary to Great Britain would have proposed. But having thus yielded his whole ground of ostensible objection, he reserved to his own appointment the entire management of the pecuniary trust. Accordingly he named Mr. Bristow for the former, and Mr. Middleton for the latter. On his own principles he ought to have done the very reverse. On every justifiable principle he ought to have done so; for a servant who for a long time resists the orders of his masters, and when he reluctantly gives way obeys them by halves, ought to be remarkably careful to make his actions correspond with his words, and to put himself out of all suspicion with regard to the purity of his motives. It was possible that the political reasons, which were solely a.s.signed against Mr. Bristow's appointment, might have been the real motives of Mr. Hastings's opposition. But these he totally abandons, and holds fast to the pecuniary department. Now, as it is notorious that most of the abuses of India grow out of money-dealing, it was peculiarly unfit for a servant, delicate with regard to his reputation, to require a _personal_ and confidential agent in a situation merely official, in which secrecy and personal connections could be of no possible use, and could only serve to excite distrust. Matters of account cannot be made too public; and it is not the most confidential agent, but the most responsible, who is the fittest for the management of pecuniary trusts.

That man was the fittest at once to do the duty, and to remove all suspicions from the Governor-General's character, whom, by not being of his appointment, he could not be supposed to favor for private purposes, who must naturally stand in awe of his inspection, and whose misconduct could not possibly be imputable to him. Such an agency in a pecuniary trust was the very last on which Mr. Hastings ought to have risked his disobedience to the orders of the Direction,--or, what is even worse for his motives, a direct contradiction to all the principles upon which he had attempted to justify that bold measure.

The conduct of Mr. Hastings in the affair of Mahomed Reza Khan was an act of disobedience of the same character, but wrought by other instruments. When the Duanne (or universal perception, and management of the revenues) of Bengal was acquired to the Company, together with the command of the army, the Nabob, or governor, naturally fell into the rank rather of a subject than that even of a dependent prince. Yet the preservation of such a power in such a degree of subordination, with the criminal jurisdiction, and the care of the public order annexed to it, was a wise and laudable policy. It preserved a portion of the government in the hands of the natives; it kept them in respect; it rendered them quiet on the change; and it prevented that vast kingdom from wearing the dangerous appearance, and still more from sinking into the terrible state, of a country of conquest. Your Committee has already reported the manner in which the Company (it must be allowed, upon pretences that will not bear the slightest examination) diverted from its purposes a great part of the revenues appropriated to the country government; but they were very properly anxious that what remained should be well administered. In the lifetime of General Clavering and Colonel Monson, Mahomed Reza Khan, a man of rank among the natives, was judged by them the fittest person to conduct the affairs of the Nabob, as his Naib, or deputy: an office well known in the ancient const.i.tution of these provinces, at a time when the princ.i.p.al magistrates, by nature and situation, were more efficient. This appointment was highly approved, and in consequence confirmed, by the Court of Directors. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, however, thought proper to remove him. To the authority of the Court of Directors they opposed the request of the Nabob, stating that he was arrived at the common age of maturity, and stood _in no need of a deputy to manage his affairs_. On former occasions Mr. Hastings conceived a very low opinion of the condition of the person whom he thus set up against the authority of his masters. "On a former occasion," as the Directors tell him, "and to serve a very different purpose, he had not scrupled to declare it as visible as the sun that the Nabob was a mere pageant, without even _the shadow of authority_." But on this occasion he became more substantial. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell yielded to his representation that a deputy was not necessary, and accordingly Mahomed Reza Khan was removed from his office.

However, lest any one should so far mistrust their understanding as to conceive them the dupes of this pretext, they who had disobeyed the Company's orders under color that _no deputy was necessary_ immediately appoint another deputy. This independent prince, who, as Mr. Hastings said, "had an incontestable right to his situation, and that it was his by inheritance," suddenly shrunk into his old state of insignificance, and was even looked upon in so low a light as to receive a severe reprimand from Mr. Hastings for _interposing_ in the duties of his (the deputy's) office.

The Company's orders, censuring this transaction in the strongest terms, and ordering Mahomed Reza Khan to be immediately restored to the office of Naib Subahdar, were received in Calcutta in November, 1779. Mr.

Hastings acted on this with the firmness which he had shown on other occasions; but in his principles he went further. Thinking himself a.s.sured of some extraordinary support, suitable to the open and determined defiance with which he was resolved to oppose the lawful authority of his superiors, and to exercise a despotic power, he no longer adhered to Mr. Barwell's distinction of the orders which had a tendency to bring his government into disrepute. This distinction afforded sufficient lat.i.tude to disobedience; but here he disdained all sorts of colors and distinctions. He directly set up an independent right to administer the government according to his pleasure; and he went so far as to bottom his claim to act independently of the Court of Directors on the very statute which commanded his obedience to them.

He declared roundly, "that he should _not_ yield to the authority of the Court of Directors in _any_ instance in which it should require his concession of the rights which he held under an act of Parliament." It is too clear to stand in need of proof, that he neither did or could hold any authority that was not subject, in every particle of it, and in every instance in which it could be exercised, to the orders of the Court of Directors.

He therefore refused to back the Company's orders with any requisition from himself to the Nabob, but merely suffered them to be transmitted to him, leaving it to him to do just as he thought proper. The Nabob, who called Mr. Hastings "his patron, and declared he would never do anything without his consent and approbation," perfectly understood this kind of signification. For the second time the Nabob recovered from his trance of pageantry and insignificance, and collected courage enough to write to the Council in these terms: "I administer the affairs of the Nizamut, (the government,) which are the affairs of _my own family_, by _my own authority_, and shall do so; and I never can _on any account agree_ to the appointment of the Nabob Mahomed Reza Khan to the Naib Subahs.h.i.+p."

Here was a second independent power in Bengal. This answer from that power proved as satisfactory as it was resolute. No further notice was taken of the orders of the Court of Directors, and Mahomed Reza Khan found their protection much more of a shadow than the pageant of power of which he aspired to be the representative.

This act of disobedience differs from the others in one particular which, in the opinion of your Committee, rather aggravates than extenuates the offence. In the others, Messrs. Hastings and Barwell took the responsibility on themselves; here they held up the pretext of the country government. However, they obtained thereby one of the objects which they appear to have systematically pursued. As they had in the other instances shown to the British servants of the Company that the Directors were not able to protect them, here the same lesson was taught to the natives. Whilst the matter lay between the native power and the servants, the former was considered by Mr. Hastings in the most contemptible light. When the question was between the servants and the Court of Directors, the native power was a.s.serted to be a self-derived, hereditary, uncontrollable authority, and encouraged to act as such.

In this manner the authority of the British legislature was at that time treated with every mark of reprobation and contempt. But soon after a most unexpected change took place, by which the persons in whose favor the Court of Directors had in vain interposed obtained specific objects which had been refused to them; things were, however, so well contrived, that legal authority was nearly as much affronted by the apparent compliance with their orders as by the real resistance they had before met with. After long and violent controversies, an agreement took place between Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis. It appears that Mr. Hastings, embarra.s.sed with the complicated wars and ruinous expenses into which his measures had brought him, began to think of procuring peace at home.

The agreement originated in a conversation held on Christmas-Day, 1779, between Major Scott, then aide-de-camp, and now agent, to Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Ducarrel, a gentleman high in the Company's service at Calcutta.

Mr. Scott, in consequence of this conversation, was authorized to make overtures to Mr. Francis through Mr. Ducarrel: to declare Mr. Hastings tired of controversy; expressing his wish to have the Mahratta war entirely left to him; that there were certain points _he could not give up_; that he could _not_ (for reasons he then a.s.signed) _submit_ to the restoration of Mr. Fowke, Mahomed Reza Khan, and Mr. Bristow; that _he had not the smallest personal objection to them_, and would willingly provide for them in any other line. Mr. Francis in this treaty insisted on those very points which Mr. Hastings declared he could never give up, and that his conditions were the Company's orders,--that is, the restoration of the persons whom they had directed to be restored. The event of this negotiation was, that Mr. Hastings at length submitted to Mr. Francis, and that Mr. Fowke and Mahomed Reza Khan were reinstated in their situations.

Your Committee observe on this part of the transaction of Mr. Hastings, that as long as the question stood upon his obedience to his lawful superiors, so long he considered the restoration of these persons as a gross indignity, the submitting to which would destroy all his credit and influence in the country; but when it was to accommodate his own occasions in a treaty with a fellow-servant, all these difficulties instantly vanish, and he finds it perfectly consistent with his dignity, credit, and influence, to do for Mr. Francis what he had refused to the strict and reiterated injunctions of the Court of Directors.

Tranquillity was, however, for a time restored by this measure, though it did not continue long. In about three months an occasion occurred in which Mr. Francis gave some opposition to a measure proposed by Mr.

Hastings, which brought on a duel, upon the mischievous effects of which your Committee have already made their observations.

The departure of Mr. Francis soon after for Europe opened a new scene, and gave rise to a third revolution. Lest the arrangement with the servants of the Company should have the least appearance of being mistaken for obedience to their superiors, Mr. Francis was little more than a month gone, when Mr. Fowke was again recalled from Benares, _and Mr. Bristow soon after from Oude_. In these measures Mr. Hastings has combined the principles of disobedience which he had used in all the cases. .h.i.therto stated. In his Minute of Consultation on this recall he refers to his former Minutes; and he adds, that he has "a recent motive in the necessity of removing any circ.u.mstance which may contribute to lessen his _influence_ in the effect of any negotiations in which he may be engaged in the prosecution of his intended visit to Lucknow." He here reverts to his old plea of preserving his influence; not content with this, as in the case of Mahomed Reza Khan he had called in the aid of the Nabob of Bengal, he here calls in the aid of the Nabob of Oude, who, on reasons exactly tallying with those given by Mr. Hastings, desires that Mr. Bristow may be removed. The true weight of these requisitions will appear, if not sufficiently apparent from the known situation of the parties, by the following extract of a letter from this Nabob of Oude to his agent at Calcutta, desiring him to acquaint Mr. Hastings, that, "if it is proper, I will write to the king [of Great Britain], and the vizier [one of his Majesty's ministers], and the chief of the Company, _in such a manner as he shall direct, and in the words that he shall order_, that Mr. Bristow's views may be thwarted there." There is no doubt of the entire cooperation of the Nabob Asoph ul Dowlah in all the designs of Mr. Hastings, and in thwarting the views of any persons who place their reliance on the authority of this kingdom.

As usual, the Court of Directors appear in their proper order in the procession. After this third act of disobedience with regard to the same person and the same office, and after calling the proceedings unwarrantable, "_in order to vindicate and uphold their own authority, and thinking it a duty inc.u.mbent on them to maintain the authority of the Court of Directors_," they again order Mr. Bristow to be reinstated, and Mr. Middleton to be recalled: in this circle the whole moves with great regularity.

The extraordinary operations of Mr. Hastings, that soon after followed in every department which was the subject of all these acts of disobedience, have made them appear in a light peculiarly unpropitious to his cause. It is but too probable, from his own accounts, that he meditated some strong measure, both at Benares and at Oude, at the very time of the removal of those officers. He declares he knew that his conduct in those places was such as to lie very open to malicious representations; he must have been sensible that he was open to such representations from the beginning; he was therefore impelled by every motive which ought to influence a man of sense by no means to disturb the order which he had last established.

Of this, however, he took no care; but he was not so inattentive to the satisfaction of the sufferers, either in point of honor or of interest.

This was most strongly marked in the case of Mr. Fowke. His reparation to that gentleman, in point of honor, is as full as possible. Mr.

Hastings "declared, that he approved his character and his conduct in office, and believed that he might _depend_ upon _his exact and literal obedience and fidelity_ in the execution of the functions annexed to it." Such is the character of the man whom Mr. Hastings a second time removed from the office to which he told the Court of Directors, in his letter of the 3rd of March, 1780, he had appointed him in conformity to their orders. On the 14th of January, 1781, he again finds it an indispensable obligation in him to exercise powers "_inherent_ in the const.i.tution of his government." On this principle he claimed "the right of nominating the agent of his own choice to the Residence of Benares; that it is a representative situation: that, speaking for myself _alone_, it may be _sufficient_ to say, that Mr. Francis Fowke is not _my_ agent; _that I cannot give him my confidence_; that, while he continues at Benares, he stands as a screen between the Rajah and this government, instead of an instrument of control; that the Rajah himself, and every chief in Hindostan, will regard it as the pledge and foundation of his independence." Here Mr. Hastings has got back to his old principles, where he takes post as on strong ground. This he declares "to be his objection to Mr. Fowke, and that it is insuperable."

The very line before this paragraph he writes of this person, to whom he _could_ not give his _confidence_, that "he believed he might _depend_ upon _his fidelity_, and his exact and literal obedience." Mr. Scott, who is authorized to defend Mr. Hastings, supported the same principles before your Committee by a comparison that avowedly reduces the Court of Directors to the state of a party against their servants. He declared, that, in his opinion, "it would be just as _absurd_ to _deprive him_ of the power of nominating his amba.s.sador at Benares as it would be to force on _the ministry_ of this country an amba.s.sador from _the opposition_." Such is the opinion entertained in Bengal, and that but too effectually realized, of the relation between the princ.i.p.al servants of the Company and the Court of Directors.

So far the reparation, in point of honor, to Mr. Fowke was complete. The reparation in point of interest your Committee do not find to have been equally satisfactory; but they do find it to be of the most extraordinary nature, and of the most mischievous example. Mr. Fowke had been deprived of a place of rank and honor,--the place of a public _Vackeel_, or representative. The recompense provided for him is a succession to a contract. Mr. Hastings moved, that, on the expiration of Colonel Morgan's contract, he should be appointed agent to all the boats employed for the military service of that establishment, with a commission of _fifteen per cent on all disburs.e.m.e.nts in that office_,--permitting Mr. Fowke, at the same time, to draw his allowance of an hundred pounds a month, as Resident, until the expiration of the contract, and for three months after.

Mr. Hastings is himself struck, as every one must be, with so extraordinary a proceeding, the principle of which, he observes, "is liable to _one_ material objection." That one is material indeed; for, no limit being laid down for the expense in which the percentage is to arise, it is the direct interest of the person employed to make his department as expensive as possible. To this Mr. Hastings answers, that "he is convinced by experience it will be better performed"; and yet he immediately after subjoins, "This _defect_ can _only_ be corrected by the probity of the person intrusted with so important a charge; and I am willing to have it understood, as a proof of _the confidence I repose in Mr. Fowke_, that I have proposed his appointment, in opposition _to a general principle_, to a trust so const.i.tuted."

In the beginning of this very Minute of Consultation, Mr. Hastings removes Mr. Fowke from the Residency of Benares because "he cannot give him his confidence"; and yet, before the pen is out of his hand, he violates one of the soundest general principles in the whole system of dealing, in order to give a proof of the confidence he reposes in that gentleman. This apparent gross contradiction is to be reconciled but by one way,--which is, that confidence with Mr. Hastings comes and goes with his opposition to legal authority. Where that authority recommends any person, his confidence in him vanishes; but to show that it is the authority, and not the person, he opposes, when that is out of sight, there is no rule so sacred which is not to be violated to manifest his real esteem and perfect trust in the person whom he has rejected.

However, by overturning general principles to compliment Mr. Fowke's integrity, he does all in his power to corrupt it; at the same time he establishes an example that must either subject all future dealings to the same pernicious clause, or which, being omitted, must become a strong implied charge on the integrity of those who shall hereafter be excluded from a trust so const.i.tuted.

It is not foreign to the object of your Committee, in this part of their observations, which relates to the obedience to orders, to remark upon the manner in which the orders of the Court of Directors with regard to this kind of dealing in contracts are observed. These orders relate to contracts; and they contain two standing regulations.

1st, That all contracts shall be publicly advertised, and that the most reasonable proposals shall be accepted.

2ndly, That two contracts, those of provisions and for carriage bullocks, shall be only annual.

These orders are undoubtedly some correctives to the abuses which may arise in this very critical article of public dealing. But the House will remark, that, if the business usually carried on by contracts can be converted at pleasure into agencies, like that of Mr. Fowke, all these regulations perish of course, and there is no direction whatsoever for restraining the most prodigal and corrupt bargains for the public.

Your Committee have inquired into the observance of these necessary regulations, and they find that they have, like the rest, been entirely contemned, and contemned with entire impunity. After the period of Colonel Monson's death, and Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell obtaining the lead in the Council, the contracts were disposed of without at all advertising for proposals. Those in 1777 were given for three years; and the gentlemen in question growing by habit and encouragement into more boldness, in 1779 the contracts were disposed of for five years: and this they did at the eve of the expiration of their own appointment to the government. This increase in the length of the contracts, though contrary to orders, might have admitted some excuse, if it had been made, even in appearance, the means of lessening the expense. But the advantages allowed to the contractors, instead of being diminished, were enlarged, and in a manner far beyond the proportion of the enlargement of terms. Of this abuse and contempt of orders a judgment may be formed by the single contract for supplying the army with draught and carriage bullocks. As it stood at the expiration of the contract in 1779, the expense of that service was about one thousand three hundred pounds a month. By the new contract, given away in September of that year, the service was raised to the enormous sum of near six thousand pounds a month. The monthly increase, therefore, being four thousand seven hundred pounds, it const.i.tutes a total increase of charges for the Company, in the five years of the contract, of no less a sum than two hundred and thirty-five thousand pounds. Now, as the former contract was, without doubt, sufficiently advantageous, a judgment may be formed of the extravagance of the present. The terms, indeed, pa.s.s the bounds of all allowance for negligence and ignorance of office.

The case of Mr. Belli's contract for supplying provisions to the Fort is of the same description; and what exceedingly increases the suspicion against this profusion, in contracts made in direct violation of orders, is, that they are always found to be given in favor of persons closely connected with Mr. Hastings in his family, or even in his actual service.

The principles upon which Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell justify this disobedience, if admitted, reduce the Company's government, so far as it regards the Supreme Council, to a mere patronage,--to a mere power of nominating persons to or removing them from an authority which, is not only despotic with regard to those who are subordinate to it, but in all its acts entirely independent of the legal power which is nominally superior. These are principles directly leading to the destruction of the Company's government. A correspondent practice being established, (as in this case of contracts, as well as others, it has been,) the means are furnished of effectuating this purpose: for the common superior, the Company, having no power to regulate or to support their own appointments, nor to remove those whom they wish to remove, nor to prevent the contracts from being made use of against their interest, all the English in Bengal must naturally look to the next in authority; they must depend upon, follow, and attach themselves to him solely; and thus a party may be formed of the whole system of civil and military servants for the support of the subordinate, and defiance of the supreme power.

Your Committee being led to attend to the abuse of contracts, which are given upon principles fatal to the subordination of the service, and in defiance of orders, revert to the disobedience of orders in the case of Mahomed Reza Khan.