Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers Part 8

It is, however, essential that touch with the enemy {139} should be maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when hostile troops are within striking distance. In the American Civil War, by losing touch with the Northern Army, the Southern Army permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled.

During the Third Battle of Ypres (July 31-November 6, 1917) the Allies renewed the attack on a six-mile front from Zonnebeke to Langemarck (the junction of the Franco-British Armies in Flanders). This action, known as the _Battle of Broenbeck_, or _Brombeek_ (October 9, 1917), was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the 1st Battalion Royal Newfoundland Regiment through the correct employment of Battle Outposts. Germans ma.s.sing for the counter-attack in Taube Farm were pinned by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another attacking force was destroyed by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it was launched. A defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. The casualties of the Newfoundlanders throughout this battle were 50 killed, 14 missing, and 132 wounded out of a total strength of 500 all ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded 800.

After the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) the Army of the Potomac under Gen. Burnside eluded the vigilance of Gen. R. E. Lee, who had defeated it on December 13, 1862. Burnside withdrew (December 15, 1862) across the Potomac to Stafford Heights with the whole of his army, under cover of a heavy storm. If special orders had been given by the Outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if scouts had been instructed to penetrate the Federal lines from time to time at all risks, Burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage while on the move and should have been driven into the Potomac. {140} During the battle itself a Confederate Brigade was surprised in its own front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with which touch was not maintained. At all times of action with enemy forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close observation, or surprise may lead to disaster.

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TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under "Influences on the Battle" and in other lectures, and owing to the close connection between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance in general have been noted in dealing with Protection. It has also been seen that observation by Aircraft, Patrols, and Sentries is essential to Protection both in Position Warfare and the War of Manoeuvre, and that Reconnaissance is the essence of Protection. There remain, however, two forms of Reconnaissance that have not yet been considered, namely: the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to attacking it, and the Reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a view to occupying it for defence.

RECONNAISSANCE FOR ATTACK.--The first of these is the constant duty of all commanders in the line during Position Warfare, and it is carried out by Patrols and Raiding Parties, who provide information which supplements the photographs and reports of the Air Service, and enables a commander to arrive at a decision. In a War of Manoeuvre reconnaissance by the Air Service is equally important, and it is supplemented by the work of the Patrols of the Advanced Guard, but princ.i.p.ally by that of specially selected Intelligence Officers, working in conjunction with, or independent of, the Vanguard. Such officers would be in possession of information which it might not be possible to reveal to the commander of the Patrols of the Vanguard, and their special training would give an added value to their report. The chief {142} points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position are:--

I. The extent of the position occupied.

II. Weak points of the position.

III. Points, the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or reverse fire, and would thus render the rest of the position untenable.

IV. Best line of attack.

V. Supporting positions, for covering, converging, enfilade, and traversing fire.

It should be possible to gather this information without alarming the enemy, or giving notice of impending attack.

Information on further points can be gained by fighting, and _Reconnaissance by Raids_ is a common feature of Position Warfare. By such means additional information can be gained, as to:--

VI. Names of regiments holding the position, judged from ident.i.ty discs, badges, b.u.t.tons, etc.

VII. Whether preparations are being made for an attack (discoverable by ear as well as eye), or bombardment, etc.

(from examination of sh.e.l.l dumps, etc.).

VIII. Position of machine guns (Pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc.

IX. Condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements.

X. Effects of recent bombardments.

XI. Moral of the enemy.

RECONNAISSANCE FOR OCCUPATION.--In the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the points to be noted are:--

I. The best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry.

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II. The best means of protecting the flanks.

III. The best position for the artillery and machine guns.

IV. The tactical key to the position.

V. The line from which attack may be expected.

VI. The best line for the counter-attack.

VII. The positions for the supports and reserves.

and, additionally, in the case of a War of Manoeuvre:--

VIII. The best position for the cavalry.

IX. Alternative positions in rear from which, after reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best line of withdrawal to them.

Additional information would be required in Position Warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position, and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.).

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NIGHT OPERATIONS

There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement, and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the position of a.s.sembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn it!"

NIGHT MARCHES.--Night Marches are the movement of columns in march formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day; but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit, deceive, and surprise the enemy--the princ.i.p.al aim of the strategist--by outflanking his position, by antic.i.p.ating him in the occupation of a locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. {145} Forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. Long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view, the "March" may be said to terminate when the Position of a.s.sembly is reached, and from that point to become an "Advance" or an "a.s.sault." There are certain essentials to success:--

I. _Direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. The route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the Advanced Guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should be secured. Across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compa.s.s. (See Chapter VIII., "Manual of Map Reading.")

II. _Protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by Advanced, Flank, and Rear Guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service.

The Advanced Guard will be small, and will usually consist of Patrols within 100 yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the rest of the Advanced Guard in collective formation. The Rear Guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. Flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted by the Advanced Guard, and withdrawn by the Rear Guard.

III. _Secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. The march {146} itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind. Care must be taken to prevent or m.u.f.fle sounds, and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train. In the case of a march to elude the enemy, Outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning.

IV. _Connection_.--Every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times. Units must be closed up, and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions. The pace should be uniform, but not more than 2 miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including halts. The time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting, and units must regain any distance lost before halting. After crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters. In addition to these general principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb"

with all concerned:--

An officer must march in rear of each unit.

All ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack.

Fire will not be opened without orders.

Magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber.

There must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights.