The Franco-German War of 1870-71 Part 3

His Ist Corps, therefore, marched southwards on Neufchateau, whence Chalons could be reached by railway. The Vth Corps was being s.h.i.+fted to and fro by contradictory orders from the Emperor's head-quarters. First it was to proceed to Nancy, then to take an opposite direction towards Langres. On arriving at Charmes it was ordered to Toul, but from Chaumont it was finally directed to proceed to Chalons. General Trochu had there located the newly-formed XIIth Corps, and behind this gathering point the VIIth Corps also managed to get away from Alsace and reach Rheims by rail by way of Bar sur Aube and Paris.

Thus by August 22nd a Reserve Army was formed, consisting of four Corps and two Cavalry Divisions, under the command of Marshal MacMahon, who, however, at a distance, as he was, of about 120 miles, was unable to render timely a.s.sistance to Marshal Bazaine, who stood directly in the line of the advancing enemy.

When the news of the double disaster of August 6th reached the Imperial Head-quarter, the first impression there was that it would be necessary to retreat immediately on Chalons with Bazaine's army; and the VIth Corps, a portion of which was already being transported thence to Metz, was ordered to retrace its steps. But this resolution was presently retracted. The Emperor had not merely to consider the foreign enemy, but public opinion within his own realm. The sacrifice of entire provinces at the very beginning of a war which had been undertaken with such high antic.i.p.ations, would have provoked the unbounded indignation of the French people. There were still 200,000 men who could be brought together in front of the Moselle, supported by a large fortress, and though the enemy would still have the superiority in numbers, his army was holding a line nearly sixty miles long. It had yet to cross the Moselle, and this would necessitate a dislocation which might create a weakness at the critical moment.

In the IIIrd German Army the disorderly condition of the defeated enemy was not known, nor even the direction of his retreat. It was expected that MacMahon's Army would be found rallied on the farther side of the Vosges for renewed resistance; and as it was impossible to cross the mountains except in detached columns, the German advance was very cautious, and by short marches only. Though the distance between Reichshofen and the Saar is not more than about twenty-eight miles in a straight line, that river was only reached in five days. Nothing was seen of the enemy, except in the fortified places, small indeed, but too strong to be taken by storm, which command the highways in the mountains. Bitsch had to be avoided by a fatiguing circuit, Lichtenberg was captured by surprise, Lutzelstein had been abandoned by its garrison, the investment of Pfalzburg was handed over to the approaching VIth Corps, and Marsal capitulated after a short resistance.

The German left wing had no enemy before it, and could be brought into closer connection with the centre. To bring the three armies abreast of each other a wheel to the right was requisite. The advance of the Ist and IInd Armies had, however, to be delayed, as the IIIrd did not reach the Saar until August 12th. The whole movement was so arranged that the IIIrd Army was to use the roads by Saarunion and Dieuze, and to southward; the IInd those by St. Avold and Nomeny and to southward; the Ist those by Saarlouis and Les Etangs, the last also taking the direction of Metz.

The cavalry Divisions which were reconnoitring far to the front, reported the enemy as retreating all along the line. They ranged close up to Metz, and across the Moselle both above and below the place, forcing the detachments of Canrobert's Corps, which had again been ordered up from Chalons, to return thither. All their information indicated that very large ma.s.ses were encamped in front of Metz. From this it might equally be inferred that the enemy intended to retreat further, or, with his whole force concentrated, to strike hard at the right wing of the German Army, at the moment when the impending crossing of the Moselle should make its severance from the left wing unavoidable.

The chief Head-quarter restricted itself in ordinary course to issuing general directions, the execution of which was left in detail to the army commanders; but in this instance it was deemed necessary in the momentary circ.u.mstances to regulate the movements of each separate corps by specific orders. On August 11th the Head-quarter of his Majesty was therefore transferred to St. Avold, in the front line, and midway between the Ist and IInd Armies, so as, by being in the immediate vicinity, to be able to exercise timely authority to either hand. The three Corps of the Ist Army advanced towards the German Nied on August 12th, only to find that the French had evacuated that position. Three Corps of the IInd Army on the left of the Ist also moved forward in prolongation of the same front by Faulquemont and Morhange, while two others followed.

On the next day the IInd Army reached the Seille, without encountering the enemy, and occupied Pont a Mousson with infantry.

The strangely inactive att.i.tude of the French made it seem quite probable that they might not make any stand in front of Metz, a probability strengthened by the reports of the German cavalry, which was scouting as far as Toul and on to the Verdun road. But there always loomed the possibility that the enemy would throw himself with 200 battalions on the Ist Army, now in his immediate front. The two Corps forming the right wing of the IInd Army were therefore ordered to halt for the present, a little to the south of Metz, ready to deliver a shattering blow on the flank of any such attack. If the enemy preferred to a.s.sail these Corps, then would devolve on the Ist Army on its part the prompt a.s.sumption of the offensive.

Meanwhile the other Corps of the IInd Army were pursuing the march towards the Moselle farther to the southward; if the enemy should attack them with superior forces after they had crossed the river, it would be possible for them, in case of need, to fall back on the IIIrd Army.

So much caution was not universally deemed essential; it was argued that the French seemed already committed to full retreat, they ought not to be allowed to get away without punishment, and it followed that the German Army should strike without delay. The French had, indeed, already committed themselves to a further retreat; but when in the afternoon (of the 14th) the VIIth Corps discerned their retrograde movement, a fight began on the hither side of the Moselle, which, by the voluntary intervention of the nearest bodies of troops, developed into a battle in the course of the evening.

BATTLE OF COLOMBEY--NOUILLY.

(August 14th.)

The Commandant of Metz had declared his inability to hold that place for a fortnight, if left to his own resources; but the chosen and intrenched position on the Nied, taken up to cover the fortress, had been found locally defective, and the French Head-quarter hoped to find a more favourable defensive position in the vicinity of Verdun.

Military necessity outweighed even a politic regard for public opinion, and the Emperor, although he had transferred the command-in-chief to Marshal Bazaine, still remained with the army, for it would have been impossible for him to return to Paris in existing circ.u.mstances.

Very early in the morning of the 14th August the mult.i.tudinous trains were being withdrawn through the city, and towards noon the IInd, IVth, and VIth Corps got in motion, while the IIIrd Corps remained in position behind the deep valley of the Colombey brook, to cover the retirement.

When, at four in the afternoon, the break-up of the enemy was perceived, General von der Goltz (commanding 26th Infantry Brigade) with the advanced guard of the VIIth Corps struck him in the act, and wrenched from him Colombey and the Chateau d'Aubigny on his right flank. But, at the first cannon sound, the French columns immediately turned about, fully equipped for fighting, and eager, after their many previous disasters, to break the spell by a desperate effort. Castagny's Division threw itself in greatly superior force upon the weak German detachment in the isolated position of Colombey, which held its own only by the utmost exertion.

Already the advanced guard of the Ist Army Corps was approaching by both the high-roads from Saarbrucken and Saarlouis; and its batteries having pushed on ahead, at once took part in the engagement. Pa.s.sing through Lauvallier, the infantry followed close, climbed the eastern slope of the plateau of Bellecroix, and farther to the right drove the enemy out of the wood east of Mey. But the presence at this point of the main body of the French IIIrd Corps gave pause to the German offensive for the time.

The 13th, 1st, and 2nd Divisions had meanwhile followed their respective advanced guards, the two latter having been held in full readiness by General von Manteuffel ever since his outposts had reported that the enemy was moving. General von Zastrow, too, arrived on the field, and took over the command of the left wing. Soon sixty field-pieces were in action against the enemy. General von Osten-Sacken hurried forward the 25th Brigade through the hollow of Coincy, and climbed on to the edge of the upland. The clump of fir-trees on the road to Bellecroix was taken by storm, was surrounded on three sides, was lost again in a b.l.o.o.d.y conflict, and was once more recaptured. Soon afterwards two batteries succeeded in establis.h.i.+ng themselves above Planchette, whose fire drove the French back as far as Borny; yet still the conflict raged on both sides with the utmost fury.

But now there threatened the German right the danger of being out-flanked. General Ladmirault, on learning that Grenier's Division had been driven out of Mey, immediately set out to its support with his other two Divisions, retook the village, and pressed farther forward by the Bouzonville road. General von Manteuffel had meanwhile given the necessary orders for holding, at all hazards, the deep-cut trough of the Vallieres brook which covered the flank. The 1st Brigade was posted behind Noisseville as general reserve, the 4th, and part of the artillery of the Ist Corps, marched by the Bouzonville road to confront General Ladmirault near Poix, while the remaining batteries from the southern slopes to the eastward of Nouilly enfiladed his advance. On the left, Glumer's Division (13th) had all this time been holding its ground at Colombey, and now, at seven o'clock in the evening, Woyna's Brigade came to its a.s.sistance, and took possession of the copses westward of Colombey. A very welcome reinforcement now arrived from the IInd Army remaining halted on the Seille.

The 18th Infantry Division, after a heavy march, had bivouacked near Buchy in the afternoon, but when General von Wrangel (its commander) was informed that fighting was audible from the locality of the Ist Army, he promptly set his Division in motion in that direction. He drove the enemy out of Peltre, and then in conjunction with Woyna's Brigade occupied Grigy, somewhat in rear of the French position in front of Borny.

On the right wing of the fighting line, the 2nd Division had also pushed on towards Mey, by way of Nouilly and through the adjacent vineyards; and, as darkness was setting in, that village and the adjoining woods were wrenched from the enemy. The French had not advanced beyond Villers L'Orme, and they now withdrew all along their line from that village to Grigy. The Prussians, as they followed up after dark, were molested only by the fire of the heavy guns of the forts, more especially Fort St.

Julien.

The engagement of August 14th cost them the heavy loss of 5000 men, inclusive of 200 officers; while the French lost only 3600 men, their IIIrd Corps being the heaviest sufferer. The vicinity of a great fortress of course prevented the reaping of the fruits of victory by an immediate pursuit. It was for the same reason that a battle on the part of the Ist Army on that day had not been included in the concerted plan of action, though the possibility of such an occurrence had been foreseen. Although it was true that but one Division of the IInd Army (the 18th) had been able to hasten to the aid of the Ist, and that after the late opening of the fight, its a.s.sault on the left[7] flank of the enemy had not failed of its effect.

The manner in which the battle originated rendered unity of direction impossible.

It was but the advanced-guards of four Divisions which were the troops princ.i.p.ally engaged; and the daring attacks made on greatly superior hostile forces by small bodies unfollowed by immediate supports occasioned many critical moments, which might have been dangerous if the enemy had pushed forward more energetically in closely concentrated strength. But while, for instance, his IIIrd Corps received no support from the Imperial Guard standing close behind it, the contrast presented itself that on the Prussian side, in this as in the previous battles, there shone forth, along with their ready acceptance of personal responsibility, the eager mutual helpfulness of all the commanders within reach of the battle-field.

An essential share of the success of the day must be attributed to the artillery. Hurrying along in front, leaving the responsibility of covering it to the advanced guards which reached forward before the main bodies of the Divisions had time to come up, it drove the French completely out of their positions before Metz, and back under the guns of the defences of the place.

The protection so afforded to the enemy rendered it impossible that the victory of Colombey-Nouilly should yield any trophies, but the supreme Command was quite content with the results obtained. The retreat of the enemy had been arrested, and a day had been gained for the crossing of the Moselle by the IInd and IIIrd Armies.

_August 15th._--In the early morning of the 15th the cavalry had ridden forward to the outworks of Metz, but found none of the enemy on this side of the fortress. A few sh.e.l.ls scared away the Imperial Head-quarter from Longeville on the further side of the Moselle.

As King William was riding over to visit the Ist Army, immense clouds of dust were observed rising on the further side of the fortress; and it was no longer doubtful that the French had begun their retreat, and that the IInd Army was henceforth free to follow across the Moselle with all its Corps.

The Ist Corps of the Ist Army was necessarily left at Courcelles, south of Metz, to protect the railway, the other two were brought up leftward towards the Seille; and they were also by-and-by to cross the Moselle higher up, so as to avoid interference from the fortress.

The French had started again on the retreat interrupted on the previous day, but proceeded little more than four miles[8] beyond Metz on August 15th. Their cavalry only went somewhat farther ahead, by both the roads to Verdun.

The IIIrd Corps of the German IInd Army crossed the Moselle at Noveant, by the bridge which was found intact, and by a flying pontoon bridge; its artillery, however, was forced to make a detour by Pont a Mousson.

It was not until late at night that the troops were all across and in bivouac close to the left bank. One Division of the Xth Corps remained at Pont a Mousson and the other advanced to Thiaucourt. The cavalry scouted farther forward towards the Metz-Verdun road, and struck in on the French cavalry near Mars la Tour. Several small engagements took place, but when early in the afternoon twenty-four Prussian squadrons had a.s.sembled, the French retired on Vionville. The Guard Corps and the IVth Corps crossed at Dieulouard and Marbache, higher up the river.

The IIIrd Army advanced to the line Nancy-Bayon. On this day an attempt to seize the fortress of Thionville by surprise proved a failure.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Clearly should be "right."

[8] On the night of 15th, four of Bazaine's five Corps (less one Division) bivouacked at distances of from eight to ten miles westward of Metz; viz., from beyond Rezonville rearward to Gravelotte.

BATTLE OF VIONVILLE--MARS LA TOUR.

(August 16th.)

In the Head-quarter of the IInd Army there was the belief that serious fighting with the French was no more to be antic.i.p.ated on the Moselle, and therefore two Corps, the IIIrd and the Xth, were ordered to march on August 16th, northwards toward the road to Verdun by way of Gorze and Thiaucourt, while the other Corps were directed to advance by forced marches westwards towards the Meuse.

The French retreat from Metz was, however, not completely effected on this day. The trains blocked every road, and in the forenoon three Divisions still remained behind in the Moselle valley. The Emperor, however, escorted by two brigades of cavalry, had departed at an early hour by the road through Etain, which was still comparatively safe. As the right wing of the army could not yet follow, the prosecution of the retreat was postponed until the afternoon, and the left wing, which had already begun the march, was sent back again into its bivouacs. But so early as nine o'clock Prussian sh.e.l.ls startled the troops from their rest.

Major Korber had advanced with four batteries close up to Vionville under cover of the cavalry, and the French troopers, surprised by their fire, fled in utter confusion through the camp of the infantry. The latter, however, briskly got under arms in good order, and the artillery opened a heavy fire. Dest.i.tute at first of infantry supports, the Prussian guns were withdrawn. Matters soon became serious.

General von Alvensleben, fearing lest he should fail to overtake the enemy, had started again with the IIIrd Corps after a short night's rest. The 6th Division marched on the left, by Onville; the 5th, on the right, followed the long forest valley on the way to Gorze. This valley so capable of defence was found unoccupied by the enemy, who indeed had taken very few precautions. The advanced-guard presently encountered Berges' French Division on the open plateau south of Flavigny, and General von Stulpnagel (commanding 5th Infantry Division) soon discovered that he had before him an enemy whom it would take all his strength to beat. At ten o'clock he began operations by sending forward the 10th Brigade (commanded by General von Schwerin); and opened fire with twenty-four guns.

Both sides now a.s.sumed the offensive. The Prussians, on the right, fought their way with varying fortunes through the wood, often in hand-to-hand encounter, and, towards eleven o'clock, succeeded in reaching the spur of the wood of St. Arnould projecting in the direction of Flavigny. Their left wing, on the contrary, was repulsed; even the artillery was in danger; but the 52nd Regiment hurried forward and re-established the fight at the cost of b.l.o.o.d.y sacrifices. Its 1st Battalion lost every one of its officers, the colours pa.s.sed from hand to hand as its bearers were successively shot down, and the commander of the 9th Brigade, General von Doring, fell mortally wounded. General von Stulpnagel rode up into the foremost line of fire, inspiriting the men with brave words, while General von Schwerin collected the remnants of troops bereft of their leaders, and, reinforced by a detachment of the Xth Corps from Noveant, carried the height in front of Flavigny, whence the French presently retired.

On the a.s.sumption that the French were already prosecuting the retreat, the 6th Division had been ordered forward towards Etain by way of Mars la Tour, to bar the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun. When it reached the height of Tronville, whence could be seen how things really stood, the brigades wheeled to the right in the direction of Vionville and Flavigny. The artillery going on in advance, formed a formidable line of batteries, the fire of which prepared the way for a farther advance, and by half-past eleven the 11th Brigade had taken possession of Vionville in spite of heavy losses. From thence, and from the south, in conjunction with the 10th Brigade, an attack was then directed on Flavigny, which had been set on fire by sh.e.l.l-fire. The different detachments were hereabouts very much mixed, but by skilfully taking advantage of every fold of the ground, the individual regimental officers succeeded in getting their men steadily forward, in spite of the heavy fire of the hostile infantry and artillery. Flavigny was taken by a.s.sault, and one cannon and a number of prisoners fell into the hands of the brave Brandenburgers.

Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the forest of St. Arnould const.i.tuted the points of support of the Prussian front now facing to the east; but this front was more than four miles long, and the whole infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt all in one line. The second line consisted only of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and half of the 37th Brigade near Tronville.