Washington and the American Republic Part 26

In a private letter to Was.h.i.+ngton, written on the same day that he signed the treaty, Mr. Jay said, "To do more was impossible. I ought not to conceal from you," he added, "that the confidence reposed in your personal character was visible and useful throughout the negotiation."

To the secretary of state he wrote:--

"The long-expected treaty accompanies this letter. The difficulties which r.e.t.a.r.ded its accomplishment frequently had the appearance of being insurmountable. They have at last yielded to modifications of the articles in which they existed, and to that mutual disposition to agreement which reconciled Lord Grenville and myself to an unusual degree of trouble and application. They who have levelled uneven ground know how little of the work afterward appears.

"Since the building is finished, it can not be very important to describe the scaffolding, nor to go into all the details which respected the business. My opinion of the treaty is apparent from my having signed it. I have no reason to believe or conjecture that one more favorable to us is attainable."

This treaty provided for the establishment of three boards of commissioners; one to determine the eastern boundary of the United States, by deciding which was the river St. Croix named in the treaty of peace in 1783; another to ascertain the amount of losses which British subjects had experienced in consequence of legal impediments to the recovery of debts due them by citizens of the United States, contracted before the Revolution--such amount, on their report being made, to be paid by the government of the United States; and a third to estimate the losses sustained by American citizens in consequence of irregular and illegal captures by British cruisers, for which the sufferers had no adequate remedy in suits of law--such losses to be paid by the British government.

It was provided that the western posts should be given up to the United States on the first of June, 1796, in consideration of the adjustment of the ante-revolutionary debts, the then residents in their respective neighborhoods having the option of remaining, or of becoming American citizens. The important Indian traffic in the interior was left open to both nations, by a mutual reciprocity of inland trade and free intercourse between the North American territories of the two nations, including the navigation of the Mississippi. The British were to be allowed to enter all American harbors, with the right to ascend all rivers to the highest port of entry. This reciprocity did not extend to the possessions of the Hudson's Bay company, nor to the admission of American vessels into the harbors of the British North American colonies, nor to the navigation of the rivers of those colonies below the highest port of entry.

It was stipulated that the subjects or citizens of one government, holding lands in the dominions of the other government, should continue to hold them without alienage; nor, in the event of war or other national differences, should there be any confiscation by either party of debts, or of public or private stocks, due to or held by the citizens or subjects of the other. In a word, there should be no disturbance of existing conditions of property; and merchants and traders on each side should enjoy the most complete protection and security for their property.

The foregoing is the material substance of the first ten articles of the treaty, which it was declared should be perpetual; the remaining eighteen, having reference chiefly to the regulation of commerce and navigation between the two countries, were limited in their operations to two years after the termination of the war in which Great Britain was then engaged.

The commercial portion of the treaty provided for the admission of American vessels into British ports in Europe and the East Indies, on terms of equality with British vessels. But partic.i.p.ation in the East Indian coasting trade, and the trade between European and British East Indian ports, was left to rest on the contingency of British permission.

The right was also reserved to the British to meet the existing discrimination in the American tonnage and import duties by countervailing measures. American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons burden, were to be allowed to trade to the British West Indies, but only on condition of a renunciation, during the continuance of the treaty, of the right to transport from America to Europe any of the princ.i.p.al colonial products. British vessels were to be admitted into American ports without any further addition to the existing discriminating duties, and on terms equal to the most favored nations.

It was also stipulated that privateers should give bonds, with security, to make equivalent rest.i.tution for any injury they might inflict upon neutrals, in the event of the condemnation of any prize. Other provisions, favorable to neutral property captured by privateers, were made; and it was determined that the list of contraband articles should include, besides ammunition and warlike implements, all articles serving directly for the equipment of vessels, except unwrought iron and fir-plank.

It was also provided that no vessel attempting to enter a blockaded port should be captured, unless previously notified of the blockade; that neither nation should allow enlistments within its territory by any third nation at war with the other; nor should the citizens or subjects of either be allowed to accept commissions from such third nation, or to enlist in its service--citizens or subjects acting contrary to this stipulation to be treated as pirates. Provision was also made for the exercise of hospitality and courtesy between s.h.i.+ps-of-war and privateers of the two countries; also for prohibiting the arming of privateers of any nation at war with either of the contracting parties, or fitting them out in the ports of the other; and for excluding the privateers of a third nation from the ports of the contracting parties, which had made prizes of vessels belonging to citizens or subjects of either country.

It was also agreed that neither nation should allow vessels or goods of the other to be captured in any of its bays or other waters, or within cannon-shot of its coast.

It was further stipulated, that in the event of war between the two nations, the citizens or subjects of each, residing within the limits of the other, should be allowed to continue peaceably in their respective employments, so long as they should behave themselves properly. It was also provided that fugitives from justice, charged with murder or forgery, should be mutually given up.

Such was the substance of the famous treaty, the ratification of which caused a tempest in the political atmosphere, whose fury shook the Union to its foundation, and proved to the utmost test the stability of the character and popularity of Was.h.i.+ngton.

Rumors of the conclusion of a treaty reached the Congress before its adjournment in March, 1795; but the treaty itself did not arrive until two days afterward. The president received it on the fifth of March, but its contents were kept a profound secret for several months. Was.h.i.+ngton studied it carefully, fully digested every article, and resolved to ratify it, should it be approved by the senate. Parts of it he approved, parts he disapproved; but he saw in it the basis for a satisfactory adjustment of the relations of the two governments, and a guaranty of peace.

The president issued a circular calling the senate together in June, for the purpose of considering the treaty. He resolved to keep its provisions a secret until that time, because there was a predisposition in the public mind to condemn it. Already, as we have seen, the appointment of a special envoy to negotiate with Great Britain had been denounced as a cowardly overture, and degrading to the United States; and it was declared that the mission of a special envoy, if one was to be sent, should be to make a formal and unequivocal demand of reparation for wrongs inflicted on our commerce, the payment of damages to owners of slaves carried away, and the immediate surrender of the western posts.

A large party in the United States had resolved that the treaty, whatever it might be, especially if it should remove all pretexts for a war with Great Britain, should be rejected; and, even before its arrival, preparations for opposition were made. In the course of a few days after Was.h.i.+ngton received it, and had submitted it, under the seal of strict privacy, to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, sufficient information concerning it leaked out to awaken public distrust, and yet not enough was known for the formation of any definite opinion concerning it. But instantly the opposition press commenced a crusade against it.

"Americans, awake!" cried a writer in one of these. "Remember what you suffered during a seven-years' war with the satellites of George the Third (and I hope the last). Recollect the services rendered by your allies, now contending for liberty. Blush to think that America should degrade herself so much as to enter into _any kind of treaty_ with a power, now tottering on the brink of ruin, whose principles are directly contrary to the spirit of republicanism.

"The United States are a republic. Is it advantageous to a republic to have a connection with a monarch? Treaties lead to war, and war is the bane of a republican government. If the influence of a treaty is added to the influence which Great Britain has already in our government, we shall be colonized anew.

"Commercial treaties are an artificial means to obtain a natural end--they are the swathing bands of commerce that impede the free operations of nature. Treaties are like partners.h.i.+ps; they establish intimacies which sometimes end in profligacy, and sometimes in ruin and bankruptcy, distrust, strife, and quarrel.

"_No treaty_ ought to have been made with Great Britain, for she is famed for perfidy and double dealing; her polar star is interest; artifice, with her, is a subst.i.tute for nature. To make a treaty with Great Britain is forming a connection with a monarch; and the introduction of the fas.h.i.+ons, forms, and precedents of monarchical governments has ever accelerated the destruction of republics.

"If foreign connections are to be formed, they ought to be made with nations whose influence would not poison the fountain of liberty, and circulate the deleterious streams to the destruction of the rich harvest of our Revolution. _France_ is our natural ally; she has a government congenial with our own. There can be no hazard of introducing from her, principles and practices repugnant to freedom. That gallant nation, whose proffers we have neglected, is the sheet-anchor that sustains our hopes; and should her glorious exertions be incompetent to the great object she has in view, we have little to flatter ourselves with from the faith, honor, or justice of Great Britain. The nation on whom _our political existence depends_, we have treated with indifference bordering on contempt. _Citizens_, your only security depends on _France_; and, by the conduct of your government, that security has become precarious.

"To enter into a treaty with Great Britain at the moment when we have evaded a treaty with France; to treat with an enemy against whom France feels an implacable hatred, an enemy who has neglected no means to desolate that country and crimson it with blood, is certainly insult.

Citizens of America, sovereigns of a free country, your hostility to the French republic has been spoken of in the National Convention, and a motion for an inquiry into it has been only suspended from prudential motives--the book of account may soon be opened against you. What then, alas, will be your prospects! To have your friends.h.i.+p questioned by that nation is indeed alarming!"

Such was the logic--or rather the mad, seditious cry of faction--employed to forestall public opinion, and defeat the n.o.ble and humane intentions of the government. The Democratic Societies, though infirm and tottering, joined in the clamor. One of these in Virginia exclaimed, "Shall we Americans, who have kindled the spark of liberty, stand aloof and see it extinguished when burning a bright flame in France, which hath caught it from us? If all tyrants unite against a free people, should not all free people unite against tyrants? Yes, let us unite with France, and stand or fall together."

The Ma.s.sachusetts Society, in an address to all sister societies of the Union, put forth similar sentiments, and declared that the political interests of the United States and France were "one and indivisible."

The Pennsylvania Society exhorted that of New York to be ready and oppose the treaty if its provisions should be found dishonorable to the country; and newspapers and pamphleteers joined in the general cry of factious opposition.

The senate, pursuant to proclamation, a.s.sembled at Philadelphia on the eighth of June. Some changes had taken place in the material of that body, favorable to the government. Mr. Jay's treaty, with accompanying doc.u.ments, was laid before it on the first day of the session. That gentleman had arrived from England a fortnight previously, and found himself elected governor of the state of New York by a large majority; and when he landed, he was greeted by thousands of his fellow-citizens, who gathered to welcome their new chief magistrate, and to testify their respect to the envoy who had so faithfully, as they believed, executed a mission of peace. A great crowd attended him to his dwelling, and the firing of cannon and ringing of bells attested the public joy. He immediately resigned his seat as chief justice of the United States, and three days after his arrival home he took the oath of office as governor of the state of New York.

The senate held secret sessions when considering the treaty, and for a fortnight it was discussed in that body with the greatest freedom and candor. Finally, on the twenty-fourth of June, the senate by a vote of twenty to ten--precisely a const.i.tutional majority--advised the ratification of the treaty, that article excepted which related to the West India trade.

"An insuperable objection," says Marshall, "existed to an article regulating the intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States of those articles which were the princ.i.p.al productions of the islands was to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quant.i.ty for domestic consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern states. The senate, being informed of this fact, advised and consented that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which related to the intercourse with the West Indies.

"Although, in the mind of the president, several objections to the treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and, before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise and consent to an article which had not been laid before them, and whether their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of their power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under the advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be introduced into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these doubts; at the expiration of which, intelligence was received from Europe which suspended the resolution which the president had formed.

"The English papers contained an account, which, though not official, was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the eighth of June, 1793, for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed.

In the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to favor the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband, might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had determined not to acquiesce, the president thought it wise to reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration there is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the ratification of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate, connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made, were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before him."[78]

The senate, on voting to recommend the ratification of the treaty, removed the seal of secrecy, but forbade any publication of the treaty itself. Regardless alike of the rules of the senate, and of official decorum, Senator Mason, of Virginia, sent to Bache, the editor of the _Aurora_ (the democratic newspaper) a full abstract of the treaty, which was published on the second of July. In this, Mason had only antic.i.p.ated Was.h.i.+ngton, who, to counteract statements concerning the contents of the treaty, and malignant comments which began to appear, had resolved to have the whole doc.u.ment published.

FOOTNOTES:

[75] Life of Was.h.i.+ngton, ii, 360.

[76] His son, William Jay.

[77] Life and Writings of John Jay, by his Son, William Jay, i, 323.

[78] Life of Was.h.i.+ngton, ii, 361.

CHAPTER XXIX.

TERMINATION OF JAY'S TREATY--WAs.h.i.+NGTON WITHHOLDS HIS SIGNATURE TO THE RATIFICATION--EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE HIM--VIOLENT PROCEEDINGS IN PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK--PROCEEDINGS OF THE SELECTMEN OF BOSTON--RIOTOUS PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK--HAMILTON AND OTHERS STONED--OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY--CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN FAVOR OF THE TREATY--MOVEMENTS IN PHILADELPHIA--DENUNCIATIONS OF JAY AND THE TREATY IN THE SOUTHERN STATES--DISUNION THREATENED--WAs.h.i.+NGTON'S LETTER TO THE SELECTMEN OF BOSTON--WAs.h.i.+NGTON AT MOUNT VERNON--HIS HASTY RETURN TO THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT--FAUCHET'S LETTER INTERCEPTED--CONFIDENCE WITHDRAWN FROM RANDOLPH--THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY SIGNED--RANDOLPH AND FAUCHET--RANDOLPH'S VINDICATION OF HIS CONDUCT--HIS REPENTANCE.

The publication of the contents of the treaty produced a blaze of excitement throughout the country. The author of the treaty, the senators who approved of its ratification, and the president, were all vehemently denounced. Great indignation had already been expressed because the entire negotiation had been involved in mysterious secrecy; because the doc.u.ment had not been immediately made public on its reception by the president; and because the senate deliberated upon it with closed doors. The partisans of France had used every effort, during the spring and summer, to excite the people against Great Britain; and it was evident, from the tone of opposition writers and declaimers, that no possible adjustment of difficulties with that country, which might promise a future friendly intercourse between the two nations, would be satisfactory.[79]

It was a.s.serted that any treaty of amity and commerce with Great Britain under the circ.u.mstances, whatever might be its principles, was a degrading insult to the American people, a pusillanimous surrender of their honor, and a covert injury to France. They affected to regard the compact as an alliance; an abandonment of an ancient ally of the United States, whose friends.h.i.+p had given them independence, and whose current victories, at that moment challenging the admiration of the world, still protected them, for an alliance with the natural enemy of that friend, and with an enemy of human liberty. They spoke of the court of Great Britain as the most faithless and corrupt in the world, and denounced the result of Jay's mission as a surrender of every just claim upon a rapacious enemy for rest.i.tution on account of great wrongs.

These denunciations had great immediate effect. All acknowledged that the treaty was not as favorable to the United States as the latter had a right to expect; and "public opinion did receive a considerable shock,"

says Marshall. Men unaffected by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its first appearance; therefore, when exposed to the public view, continues Marshall, "it found one party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other not ready in its defence. An appeal to the pa.s.sions, prejudices, and feelings of the nation might confidently be made by those whose only object was its condemnation; while reflection, information, and consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were not in its favor, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to those impressions."

As we have observed, Was.h.i.+ngton, for a specific purpose, withheld his signature in ratification of the treaty. The vote of the senate recommending its ratification, with the stipulation that one article should be added, suspending so much of another as seemed requisite, and requesting the president to open without delay further negotiation on that head, presented serious questions to his mind. He had no precedent for his guide. Could the senate be considered to have ratified the treaty before the insertion of the new article? Was the act complete and final, so as to make it unnecessary to refer it back to that body? Could the president affix his official seal to an act before it should be complete? These were important questions, and demanded serious reflection.

The opponents of the treaty, aware of the cause of the delay in its ratification, resolved to endeavor to intimidate the president and prevent his signing it. The most violent demonstrations, by word and deed, were made against it. On the fourth of July, a great mob a.s.sembled in Philadelphia, and paraded the streets with effigies of Jay and the ratifying senators. That of Jay bore a pair of scales: one was labelled "_American Liberty and Independence_;" and the other, which greatly preponderated, "_British Gold_." From the mouth of the figure proceeded the words, "_Come up to my price, and I will sell you my country_." The effigies were committed to the flames amid the most frightful yells and groans.

Public meetings were a.s.sembled all over the country to make formal protests against the treaty. They were called ostensibly to "deliberate upon it," but they were frequently tumultuous, and always declamatory. A large meeting was held in Boston on the tenth of July. The chief actors there denounced the treaty as not containing one single article honorable or beneficial to the United States. It was disapproved of by unanimous vote, and a committee of fifteen, appointed to state objections, in an address to the president, reported no less than twenty. They were adopted by the meeting without debate, and were sent to the president accompanied by a letter from the selectmen of Boston.

Only a few of the stable inhabitants of Boston appear to have been concerned in this matter, and the wealthy merchants and some other rich men who attended the meeting, and whose fears were excited by the leaders of the opposition, were made mere tools of on the occasion.

A meeting for a similar purpose was held in front of the city-hall, in Wall street, New York, on the eighteenth of July, pursuant to a call of an anonymous handbill. There the opposition gathered in great numbers, and there also was a large number of the friends of the treaty, who succeeded at first in electing a chairman. They were then about to adjourn to some more convenient place, when Brockholst Livingston, Mr.

Jay's brother-in-law, and a leader of the opposition, urged the meeting to proceed instantly, as the president might ratify the treaty at any moment. Indeed, the whole Livingston family, with the eminent chancellor at their head, were now in the ranks of the opposition, and exerted a powerful influence. "With more than thoughtless effrontery," says Doctor Francis, "they fanned the embers of discontent."