History of Woman Suffrage Volume II Part 81

As to the main question, the right of married women to make contracts not affecting their separate property, the position of those who a.s.sert such right is, that because the Legislature has expressly removed the common law disabilities of married women in regard to holding property not derived from their husbands, it has therefore, by necessary implication, also removed all their common law disabilities in regard to making contracts, and invited them to enter, equally with men, upon those fields of trade and speculation by which property is acquired through the agency of contracts.

The hiatus between the premise and the conclusion is too wide for us to bridge. It may be desirable that the Legislature should relieve married women from all their common law disabilities. But to say that it has done so in the Act of 1861, the language of which is carefully guarded, and which makes no allusion to contracts, and does not use that or any equivalent term, would be simple misinterpretation. It would be going as far beyond the meaning of that act as that act goes beyond the common law in changing the legal status of women. The act itself is wise and just, and therefore ent.i.tled to a liberal interpretation.

This we have endeavored to give it in the cases that have come before us, but we do not intend to decide that the Legislature has gone to a length in its measure of reform for which the language it has carefully used furnishes no warrant.

It is urged, however, that the law of the last session of the Legislature, which gives to married women the separate control of their earnings, must be construed as giving to them the right to contract in regard to their personal services. This act had no application to the case of Carpenter _vs._ Mitch.e.l.l, having been pa.s.sed after that suit was commenced, and we were unmindful of it when considering this application at the last term. Neither do we now propose to consider how far it extends the power of a married woman to contract, since, after further consultation in regard to this application, we find ourselves constrained to hold that the s.e.x of the applicant, independently of coverture; is, as our law now stands, a sufficient reason for not granting this license.

Although an attorney-at-law is an agent, as claimed by the applicant's argument, when he has been retained to act for another, yet he is also much more than an agent. He is an officer of the court, holding his commission in this State, from two of the members of this court, and subject to be disbarred by this court for what our statute calls "mal-conduct in his office." He is appointed to a.s.sist in the administration of justice, is required to take an oath of office, and is privileged from arrest while attending courts.

Our statute provides that no person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from two of the justices of the Supreme Court. By the second section of the act, it is provided that no person shall be ent.i.tled to receive a license until he shall have obtained a certificate, from the court of some county, of his good moral character, and this is the only express limitation upon the exercise of the power thus intrusted to this court. In all other respects it is left to our discretion to establish the rules by which admission to this office shall be determined. But this discretion is not an arbitrary one, and must be held subject to at least two limitations. One is, that the court should establish such terms of admission as will promote the proper administration of justice; the second, that it should not admit any persons or cla.s.s of persons who are not intended by the Legislature to be admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the statute.

The substance of the last limitation is simply that this important trust reposed in us should be exercised in conformity with the designs of the power creating it.

Whether, in the existing social relations between men and women, it would promote the proper administration of justice, and the general well-being of society, to permit women to engage in the trial of cases at the bar, is a question opening a wide field of discussion upon which it is not necessary for us to enter. It is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the other implied limitation upon our power, to which we have above referred, must operate to prevent our admitting women to the office of attorney-at-law. If we were to admit them, we should be exercising the authority conferred upon us in a manner which, we are fully satisfied, was never contemplated by the Legislature.

Upon this question it seems to us neither this applicant herself, nor any unprejudiced and intelligent person, can entertain the slightest doubt. It is to be remembered that at the time this statute was enacted we had, by express provision, adopted the common law of England; and, with three exceptions, the statutes of that country pa.s.sed prior to the fourth year of James the First, so far as they were applicable to our condition.

It is to be also remembered that female attorneys-at-law were unknown in England, and a proposition that a woman should enter the courts of Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a barrister, would have created hardly less astonishment than one that she should ascend the bench of Bishops, or be elected to a seat in the House of Commons. It is to be further remembered, that when our act was pa.s.sed, that school of reform which claims for women partic.i.p.ation in the making and administering of the laws had not then arisen, or, if here and there a writer had advanced such theories, they were regarded rather as abstract speculations than as an actual basis for action.

That G.o.d designed the s.e.xes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth. It may have been a radical error, and we are by no means certain it was not, but that this was the universal belief certainly admits of no denial. A direct partic.i.p.ation in the affairs of government, in even the most elementary form, namely, the right of suffrage, was not then claimed, and has not yet been conceded, unless recently in one of the newly-settled Territories of the West.

In view of these facts, we are certainly warranted in saying, that when the Legislature gave to this court the power of granting licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege would be extended equally to men and women.

Neither has there been any legislation since that period which would justify us in presuming a change in the legislative intent. Our laws to-day in regard to women, are substantially what they have always been, except in the change wrought by the acts of 1861 and 1869, giving to married women the right to control their own property and earnings.

Whatever, then, may be our individual opinions as to the admission of women to the bar, we do not deem ourselves at liberty to exercise our power in a mode never contemplated by the Legislature, and inconsistent with the usages of courts of the common law from the origin of the system to the present day.

But it is not merely an immense innovation in our own usages as a court that we are asked to make. This step, if taken by us, would mean that in the opinion of this tribunal, every civil office in this State may be filled by women--that it is in harmony with the spirit of our Const.i.tution and laws that women should be made governors, judges, and sheriffs. This we are not yet prepared to hold.

In our opinion, it is not the province of a court to attempt, by giving a new interpretation to an ancient statute, to introduce so important a change in the legal position of one-half the people. Courts of justice were not intended to be made the instruments of pus.h.i.+ng forward measures of popular reform. If it be desirable that those offices which we have borrowed from the English law, and which from their origin some centuries ago down to the present time, have been filled exclusively by men, should also be made accessible to women, then let the change be made, but let it be made by that department of the Government to whom the Const.i.tution has intrusted the power of changing the laws.

The great body of our law rests merely upon ancient usage. The right of a husband in this State to the personal property of his wife, before the act of 1861, rested simply upon such usage, yet who could have justified this court if, prior to the pa.s.sage of that act, it had solemnly decided that it was unreasonable that the property of the wife should vest in the husband, and this usage should no longer be recognized? Yet was it not as unreasonable that a woman by marriage should lose the t.i.tle of her personal property, as it is that she should not receive from us a license to practice law? The rule in both cases, until the law of 1861, rested upon the same common law usage and could have pleaded the same antiquity. In the one case it was never pretended that this court could properly overturn the rule, and we do not see how we could be justified should we disregard it in the other. The principle can not be too strictly and conscientiously observed, that each of the three departments of the Government should avoid encroachment upon the other, and that it does not belong to the judiciary to attempt to inaugurate great social or political reforms. The mere fact that women have never been licensed as attorneys-at-law is, in a tribunal where immemorial usage is as much respected as it is and ought to be in courts of justice, a sufficient reason for declining to exercise our discretion in their favor, until the propriety of their partic.i.p.ating in the offices of State and the administration of public affairs shall have been recognized by the law-making department of the Government--that department to which the initiative in great measures of reform properly belongs. For us to attempt, in a matter of this importance, to inaugurate a practice at variance with all the precedents of the law we are sworn to administer, would be an act of judicial usurpation deserving of the gravest censure. If we could disregard, in this matter, the authority of those unwritten usages which make the great body of our law, we might do so in any other, and the dearest rights of person and property would become a matter of mere judicial discretion.

But it is said the 28th section of chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of 1845 provides that, whenever any person is referred to in the statute by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as males shall be deemed to be included. But the 36th section of the same chapter provides that this rule of construction shall not apply where there is anything in the subject or context repugnant to such construction. That is the case in the present instance.

In the view we have taken of this question the argument drawn by the applicant from the Const.i.tution of the United States has no pertinency.

In conclusion we would add that, while we are constrained to refuse this application, we respect the motive which prompts it, and we entertain a profound sympathy with those efforts which are being so widely made to reasonably enlarge the field for the exercise of woman's industry and talent. While those theories which are popularly known as "woman's rights" can not be expected to meet with a very cordial acceptance among the members of a profession which, more than any other, inclines its followers, if not to stand immovable upon the ancient ways, at least to make no hot haste in measures of reform, still all right-minded men must gladly see new spheres of action opened to woman, and greater inducements offered her to seek the highest and widest culture.

There are some departments of the legal profession in which she can appropriately labor.

Whether, on the other hand, to engage in the hot strifes of the Bar, in the presence of the public, and with momentous verdicts the prizes of the struggle would not tend to destroy the deference and delicacy with which it is the pride of our ruder s.e.x to treat her, is a matter certainly worthy of her consideration. But the important question is, what effect the presence of women as barristers in our courts would have upon the administration of justice, and the question can be satisfactorily answered only in the light of experience.

If the Legislature shall choose to remove the existing barriers and authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and women, we shall cheerfully obey, trusting to the good sense and sound judgment of women themselves to seek those departments of the practice in which they can labor without reasonable objection.

Application denied.

The opinion will be best understood by reading our arguments first, and knowing all the points made before the court. We have not the s.p.a.ce to review the opinion in this issue, but shall do so at some future day, and will simply say now, that what the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case was to the rights of negroes as citizens of the United States, this decision is to the political rights of women in Illinois--annihilation.

CAN A WOMAN PRACTICE LAW OR HOLD ANY OFFICE IN ILLINOIS?

_Full Report of the Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Illinois and the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the application of Myra Bradwell to be admitted to the Bar._

On pp. 145, 146, and 147 of this volume, we gave the proceedings in full in the Supreme Court of this State upon our application to be admitted to practice law, including the opinion of Judge Lawrence, the present learned Chief-Justice of that tribunal, denying the application on the sole ground that a woman could not be admitted to the bar or hold any office in Illinois. As soon after this opinion was announced as we could obtain a certified copy of the record, we placed it in the hands of the Hon. Matt.

H. Carpenter, one of the ablest const.i.tutional lawyers in the nation, with a view of obtaining a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Carpenter prepared and presented our pet.i.tion for a writ of error, together with the record. The following is the indors.e.m.e.nt upon the record, allowing the writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States:

I allow a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the suit and judgment of which the foregoing record is a transcript.

SAM. F. MILLER, _a.s.so. Jus. Sup. Court U. S._

_August 16, 1870_.

CITATION TO THE STATE OF ILLINOIS TO APPEAR AT WAs.h.i.+NGTON.

_The United States of America to the State of Illinois_:--The State of Illinois is hereby cited and admonished to appear and be at the Supreme Court of the United States to be holden at Was.h.i.+ngton City in the District of Columbia, on the first Monday of December next, pursuant to a writ of error filed in the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, wherein Myra Bradwell is plaintiff in error, and the State of Illinois is defendant in error, to show cause, if any there be, why the judgment in the said writ of error mentioned should not be corrected, and speedy justice should not be done to the parties in that behalf.

Witness the Honorable Salmon P. Chase, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States this 16th day of August, A.D. 1870.

SAM. F. MILLER, _a.s.so. Jus. Sup. Court U. S._

WRIT OF ERROR.

_United States of America, ss.:_

[SEAL.] The President of the United States, To the Honorable the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois--Greeting:

Because, in the record and proceedings, as also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which is in the said Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, before you, or some of you, being the highest court of law or equity of the said State in which a decision could be had in the said suit in the matter of the application of Myra Bradwell, of Cook County, Illinois for a license to practice law in the courts of said State, wherein was drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision was against their validity; or wherein was drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, said State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Const.i.tution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision was in favor of such their validity; or wherein was drawn in question the construction of a clause of the Const.i.tution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under, the United States, and the decision was against the t.i.tle, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed under such clause of the said Const.i.tution, treaty, statute, or commission, a manifest error hath happened, to the great damage of the said Myra Bradwell, as by her complaint appears. We being willing that error, if any hath been, should be duly corrected, and full and speedy justice done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do command you, if judgment be therein given, that then under your seal, distinctly and openly, you send the record and proceedings aforesaid, with all things concerning the same, to the Supreme Court of the United States, together with this writ, so that you have the same at Was.h.i.+ngton on the first Monday of December next, in the said Supreme Court, to be then and there held, that the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the said Supreme Court may cause further to be done therein to correct that error what of right, and according to the laws and custom of the United States, should be done.

Witness the Honorable Salmon P. Chase, Chief-Justice of the said Supreme Court, the first Monday of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.

D. W. MIDDLETON, _Clerk of the Supreme Court of the U. S._

Issued 23d August, 1870. Allowed by me,

SAM. F. MILLER, _a.s.so. Jus. Sup. Court, U. S._

While these suits for the recognition of the political rights of women were pending, a contest of a different character took place in Illinois. Mrs. Myra Bradwell, editor of the Chicago _Legal News_, applied for admission to the bar of that State, and was refused. She made this denial of her civil rights a test case by bringing suit against the State of Illinois in the Supreme Court of the United States. The case was argued for the plaintiff in the December term, 1871, by the Hon. Matt. H. Carpenter, of Wisconsin, an eminent republican United States Senator. In addressing the Court Mr.

Carpenter said:

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, to review the proceedings of that court, denying the pet.i.tion of the plaintiff in error to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor of that court, which right was claimed by the plaintiff in error in that court under the XIV. Amendment of the Const.i.tution of the United States. The plaintiff in error is a married woman, of full age, a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois; was ascertained and certified to be duly qualified in respect of character and attainments, but was denied admission to the bar for the sole reason that she was a married woman. This is the error relied upon to reverse the proceedings below.

By the rules of this court no person can be admitted to practice at the bar without service for a fixed term in the highest court of the State in which such person resides. Consequently a denial of admission in the highest court of the State is an insurmountable obstacle to admission to the bar of this court.

This record, therefore, presents the broad question, whether a married woman, being a citizen of the United States and of a State, and possessing the necessary qualifications, is ent.i.tled by the Const.i.tution of the United States to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the courts of the State in which she resides. This is a question not of taste, propriety, or politeness, but of civil right. Before proceeding to discuss this question, it may be well to distinguish it from the question of the right of female citizens to partic.i.p.ate in the exercise of the elective franchise.

The great problem of female suffrage, the solution of which lies in our immediate future, naturally enough, from its transcendent importance, draws to itself, in prejudiced minds, every question relating to the civil rights of women; and it seems to be feared that doing justice to woman's rights in any particular would probably be followed by the establishment of the right of female suffrage, which, it is a.s.sumed, would overthrow Christianity, defeat the ends of modern civilization, and upturn the world.