World's Best Histories Part 21

"Your conscience is a fool!" said Napoleon to De Broglie, Bishop of Ghent, whom he had made a chevalier of the legion of honor, when the latter protested against a clause in the oath. He had said as much to other prelates whom he had just convoked to the Council. It is a serious case for absolute power when it enters into a struggle with the most n.o.ble sentiments of human nature. The Emperor Napoleon had come to that point when he regarded as his enemies freedom of thought and freedom of conscience amongst his subjects still suspected of independence, _litterateurs_ or bishops.

Ninety-five prelates a.s.sembled, on the 17th of June, in the morning, in the church of Notre Dame. They were joined by nine bishops appointed by Napoleon, although they had not yet received canonical inst.i.tution. At the second seance, when the affairs of the Council began to be seriously considered, the Ministers of Religion of France and Italy took their places in the a.s.sembly. In opening, on the 16th, the session of the Corps Legislatif, the emperor had haughtily proclaimed his supremacy. "The affairs of religion," he said, "have been too often mixed up with, and sacrificed to, the interests of a state of the third order. I have put an end to this scandal forever. I have united Rome to the Empire. I have accorded palaces to the popes at Rome and in Paris. If they have at heart the interests of religion, they will often desire to sojourn at the centre of the affairs of Christendom. It was thus that St. Peter preferred Rome to a sojourn in the Holy Land."

On taking his seat at the Council, Bigot de Preameneu, then Minister of Religion, p.r.o.nounced in his turn a discourse which history ought to a.s.sign to its true origin. The emperor enumerated, by the mouth of his minister, his numerous grievances with regard to the court of Rome, dioceses without bishops, the prelates deprived of canonical inst.i.tution. "By this means the Pope has tried to create troubles in the Church and in the state. The sinister projects of the Pope have been rendered null by the firmness of the chapters in maintaining their rights, and by the good feeling of the people, accustomed to respect only the legitimate authorities. His Majesty declares that he will never suffer in France as in Germany, that the court of Rome should exercise on vacancies in the sees any influence by vicars apostolic, because the Christian religion being necessary to the faithful, and to the state, its existence would be compromised in countries where vicars, whom the government might not recognize should be charged with the direction of the faithful. His Majesty wishes to protect the religion of his fathers; he wishes to preserve it; and yet it would be no longer the same religion if it ceased to have bishops, and if one claimed to concentrate in himself the power of all. His Majesty expects, as emperor and king, as protector of the Church, as the father of his people, that the bishops should be inst.i.tuted according to the forms anterior to the Concordat, and without a see ever remaining vacant over three months, a time more than sufficient for its being filled up."

The declaration fell like a thunderbolt in the midst of the Council. With the exception of a very small number of prelates acquainted with the negotiations of Savona, or in the confidence of the emperor, the ma.s.s of the bishops, come from a distance, ignorant or deceived, thought to find peace accomplished, or on the way of being accomplished, in the Church between the civil power and the holy see. On the previous evening all had applauded the words of Boulogne, Bishop of Troyes, then the most celebrated amongst the religious orators, when he cried, "Whatever vicissitudes the see of Peter may experience, whatever may be the state and condition of his august successor, we shall always be linked to him by the bonds of respect and filial reverence. This see may be removed, it can never be destroyed. They may deprive it of its splendor, they can never deprive it of its force. Wheresoever the see may be, there all others will meet. Wheresoever this see may be transported, all Catholics will follow it, because wheresoever it may be settled there will be the stem of the succession, the centre of government, and the sacred depository of the apostolic traditions." When the prelates were successively called upon to give their consent to the opening of the Council, Mgr. d'Aviau, Archbishop of Bordeaux, replied, "Yes, I wish it; excepting, nevertheless, the obedience due to the sovereign pontiff, an obedience to which I pledge myself on oath." All the members of the Council, its president, Cardinal Fesch, at the head of it, took the oath of allegiance to the Catholic Church, apostolic and Roman, and at the same time a "faithful obedience to the Roman pontiff, successor of St. Peter, the prince of the apostles, and successor of Jesus Christ."

Such was not the end which the emperor had proposed to himself in convoking the Council, and his wrath towards Cardinal Fesch was violent, as well as towards Boulogne. "I have ever in my heart the oath taken to the Pope, which seemed to me very ill-timed," wrote he to Bigot de Preameneu; "make researches to discover what is meant by this oath, and how the parliaments regarded it. Let the sittings of the Council be secret, and let it not have, either in session or in committee, any motion of order. The report that you make to the Council ought not to be printed." The commissions were to be appointed by ballot; the first elected was charged with drawing up the address to the emperor. The task was confided to the Bishop of Nantes, Mgr. Duvoisin, clever and wise, well advanced in the good graces of Napoleon, and who had been one of the delegates to Savona. To the first objections that his colleagues presented to him, the prelate responded that his draft of the address had received the approval of the emperor.

It was much to presume on the docility of an a.s.sembly, incomplete in truth, for a very small part of the Italian and German bishops had been convoked, independent, however, by character and station. Whilst Mgr.

Duvoisin submitted his draft with regret to a revision which allowed nothing to remain of the complaisance but lately evinced for the imperial policy, an obscure prelate demanded that the entire Council should entreat from the emperor the liberty of the Pope. "It is our right; it is also our duty," cried Dessolles, Bishop of Chambery; "we owe it not only to ourselves, but we owe it also to the faithful of our dioceses--what do I say, to ail the Catholics of Europe, and of the whole world? Let us not hesitate; let us go, we must, let us go to throw ourselves in a body at the feet of the emperor, in order to obtain this indispensable deliverance." And as timid objections began to manifest themselves in the a.s.sembly, "What, messieurs?" resumed the bishop, "the Chapter of Paris has been able to ask for mercy to M. d'Astros, one of its members, and we will not have the courage to ask for the freedom of the Pope. And why should the emperor be provoked at it? Messeigneurs, the Divinity himself consents to be solicited, persecuted, importuned with our prayers; sovereigns are the image of G.o.d upon earth; by what right ought they to complain if we act towards them as towards the Master of Heaven?"

Emotion overcame all the members of the Council; the moderates and the waverers were drawn along by the ardor of the prelates personally attached to the Pope, or n.o.bly resolved upon sustaining their convictions even to the end. The old Archbishop of Bordeaux, the Bishops of Ghent and of Troyes, claimed at once the liberty of the pontiff, and his canonical right to use the ecclesiastical thunderbolts. "Judge the Pope, if you dare, and condemn the Church if you can," cried Mgr. d'Aviau. The prelates pledged to the imperial power wished to adjourn the discussion; when they came to the vote on the draft of the address, now without color or life, Cardinal Maury proposed that it should only be signed by the president and the secretaries. This overture suited all the timid characters; the address was voted by sitting and standing. The emperor did not show himself satisfied. "The bishops are much, mistaken if they think to have the last word with me," said he. The Bishop of Chambery alone found favor in his eyes. "One is never to be blamed for asking for the freedom of his chief," said Napoleon. He had an order sent to the Council to answer his message on the subject of canonical inst.i.tution within eight days, without losing time in useless discussions. A few of the more moderate bishops happened to be going out of the Tuileries from the imperial ma.s.s; the emperor approached them. "I have desired to act by you as princes of the Church," said he; "It is for you to say if you will henceforth be only beadles, The Pope refuses to execute the Concordat; ah, well! I no longer wish for the Concordat." "Sire," said Osmond, "your Majesty will not tear with your own hands the finest page in your history." "The bishops have acted like cowards!" cried Napoleon, with violence. "No, sire," again replied the prelate, who had so lately accepted the Archbishopric of Florence without waiting for canonical inst.i.tution, "they are not cowards, for they have taken the side of the most feeble." The emperor turned his back on him.

"The only and exclusive object of the council of 1811," the Abbe de Pradt has said in his "Histoire des quatre Concordats," "was to regulate the order of Canonical Inst.i.tution, and to provide that it should not henceforth be hindered by any other cause than the objections urged against the appointments by the Pope. In this lay the whole dispute between the holy see and the princes. It was not only his own affairs that Napoleon was attending to in this settlement, it was also those of other sovereigns, whom he spared by his example the embarra.s.sments which awaited them." The Council felt the extreme importance of the question. After a lively discussion, and in spite of the persistency of the prelates favorable to the court, the commission appointed for this purpose would not p.r.o.nounce upon the message of his Majesty before sending a deputation to the holy Father, who might set forth to him the deplorable state of the churches in the empire of France and in the kingdom of Italy, and who might confer with him on the means of remedying these evils. "The emperor requires a decree of the Council before consenting to the sending of the deputation," repeated Cardinal Fesch and his friends. "That would be a sure method to make everything fail," cried the Bishop of Tournay, "for it would be exactly like saying to the Pope: Your purse or your life; give us the bulls and we shall be satisfied with you." Cardinal Fesch was constrained to carry to Napoleon the vote of the commission.

The emperor did not think highly either of the skill or the character of his uncle, and was not particular how he treated him. "He will not reject you," said the cardinal to a lady with a pet.i.tion, "I have been turned out of doors, yes I, twice in a single day." He essayed vainly to explain to Napoleon the canonical reasons which had determined the commission.

"Still more theology," replied the emperor; "hold your tongue; you are an ignoramus. In six months I should get to know more than you. Ah! the commission votes thus! I shall not get the worst of it. I shall dissolve the Council and all will be finished. It is of small consequence what the Council wishes or doesn't wish, I shall declare myself competent, following the advice of the philosophers and lawyers. The prefects will appoint the cures, the chapters, and the bishops. If the metropolitan does not choose to inst.i.tute them, I will shut up the seminaries, and religion will have no more ministers." The violence of the insult and the grandeur of the situation elevated the soul of Cardinal Fesch. "If you wish to make martyrs, commence in your own family, sire," said he. "I am ready to give my life to seal my faith. Be perfectly a.s.sured that unless the Pope shall have approved this measure, I, the metropolitan, will never inst.i.tute any of my suffragans. I go even further: if one of them should bethink himself, in my default, of inst.i.tuting a bishop in my province, I would excommunicate him immediately."

It was then that Napoleon recognized the advantages of the abortive attempt at Savona. "You are all noodles," said he to his ecclesiastical counsellors, "you do not understand your position. It will then be for me to extricate you from the affair; I am about to arrange everything." He dictated upon the spot the draft of a decree based upon the concessions at first accepted by the Pope. "The deputation of bishops to the holy Father has removed all difficulties," said he; "the Pope has condescended to enter into the difficulties of the Church; the sole difference is to be found in the length of the delay; the emperor wished for three months, the Pope asked for six. This difference not being of a nature to break up the arrangement already concluded, it became henceforth the duty of the Council to enact it. The deputation to the holy Father should convey to him the thanks of the prelates and the faithful."

At first the commission of the Council almost entirely fell into the trap.

Could it be doubted that the authorization given by the Pope appeared to cut the question whilst reserving the rights of the holy see. The Archbishop of Bordeaux alone protested in the first place; he soon rallied to his side Broglie, Boulogne, and the Bishop of Tournay. In spite of the most ardent efforts of the bishops favorable to the court the majority of the commission ended by rejecting the decree. "You will answer for all the future evils of the Church," said the Archbishop of Tours to the Bishop of Ghent, "and I cite you before the tribunal of G.o.d." "I await you there yourself," replied Broglie.

The emperor appeared to acquiesce without anger in the decision of the commission. "What is it in the decree that most displeases the bishops?"

he asked of Cardinal Fesch. "It is the demand for it to be converted into a law of the state," replied the Archbishop of Lyons. "If that hinders them, they have only to take it out," replied Napoleon; "I can just as well make it a law of the state when I please." Cardinal Fesch gave a report of his mission; he promptly broke up the sitting (July 10th). On the following morning the Council was dissolved. In the night the bishop of Ghent, Troyes, and Tournay were arrested in their beds, taken to Vincennes, and kept in secrecy. The Duc de Rovigo was opposed to the arrest of the Archbishop of Bordeaux. "We must not touch M. d'Aviau," said he; "he is a saint, and we shall have everybody against us."

The Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr had but recently given a peremptory reason against select companies. "There are not many brave men in the world,"

said he; "when you collect them all in the same corps, there is not enough leaven elsewhere to make the dough rise." Deprived of the most resolute of its members, the Council found itself in the hands of Napoleon like dough, soft and unresisting. The grand reasons, the elevated and powerful arguments which the captive prelates had made so important, lost all influence over the ma.s.s of their colleagues. "One is afraid of Vincennes and one has no desire to loose one's revenues," replied Cardinal Fesch to the entreaties of the persons who solicited the fathers of the Council to use their efforts in favor of the prisoners. By fear or persuasion the bishops, when personally urged and worked upon, bent one after another under the imperial will. The news from Savona were that the Pope's health was improved and that he was inclined to go back to the original concessions. The Council, dissolved on the 11th of July, quietly a.s.sembled again on the 5th August. The signature of about eighty bishops was considered certain. The public discussion was not renewed; the Archbishop of Bordeaux alone protested against sanctioning all the imperial claims by a decree, thirteen or fourteen prelates joining their mute protest to Aviau's declaration; and the votes were decided by sitting and rising.

Subject to a power which they durst not discuss, the Fathers of the Council disliked to proclaim openly their personal subservience. The decree drawn up by the Emperor Napoleon came back to his hands confirmed by the approbation of the Council "Our wine was not considered good in the wood," said Cardinal Maury cynically, "you will find it better in bottles." A deputation of bishops set out for Savona.

A few months afterwards, under the pressure of the same arbitrary and sovereign will, Pius VII., now alone at Fontainebleau as he had been in his prison at Savona, had in his turn to yield in a certain measure to Napoleon's demands. As it had recently been at Savona, he was destined to see his concessions deformed and exaggerated in order to serve as a basis for a convention which he never ratified. On the day after the Council he showed no displeasure to the bishops who had come as delegates, but promised the invest.i.ture of the twenty-seven prelates who were nominated, and even gave to the deliberations of the Council a sort of sanction in a brief which he reserved to himself the right of drawing up. The form of it did not please the emperor, who sent it back to the Council of State for examination. The bishops who still remained in Paris waiting for the decisions of the holy Father were sent to their dioceses. "I don't wish to have a meeting of saints always here," said the emperor to Rovigo. In summoning the Council he had made the blunder of reckoning upon the easy docility of an a.s.sembly. "To ask men questions is to acknowledge their right to be deceived," said the Parisians on the day after the refractory bishops were arrested; "why does he summon a Council to imprison afterwards those who are not of his opinion?" The triumph obtained by Napoleon over the terrified prelates did not add to his glory, though it a.s.sisted in lessening for the moment his ecclesiastical difficulties. All the dioceses were now provided with bishops, and order was restored to the chapters. That was all the emperor then wished, his outrages upon the independence of consciences and on personal liberty weighing nothing in his balance. He was accustomed to set little value on rights which prevented the accomplishment of his designs. He had brought the bishops to submission, imposed upon the captive Pope a partial acceptance of his will, loftily vindicated the heritage of Charlemagne, and proclaimed his moral and religious supremacy: and now, leaving Pius VII. still at Savona and the refractory prelates at Vincennes, there was nothing more to keep him in Paris. The Russian campaign was already preparing.

CHAPTER XIII.

GLORY AND MADNESS--THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1811-1812).

It is painful to love one's country and see it advancing to defeat; it is sad to see a great mind, whose good sense recently equalled his power, dragged to ruin by his own faults and dragging after him a wearied nation.

In 1812, France began to judge the Emperor Napoleon: and long previously Europe had denounced him as an insatiable conqueror who laid her waste incessantly. She was about to learn once more that neither distance, nor the rigors of climate, nor threatening armies, afforded sufficient protection against the emperor's schemes. Whilst his armies were struggling hard in Spain and Portugal against the insurgent population a.s.sisted by England, and whilst still holding in Germany the pledges of his conquests, Napoleon made preparations to attack the Emperor Alexander, who was still officially honored with the name of "ally," and to whom he thus wrote on the 6th April, 1811, when his armaments were already everywhere being prepared: "Has your Majesty ever had reason to repent of the confidence which you have shown me?"

Several reasons urged Napoleon to begin hostilities against the Emperor Alexander--reasons which, though bad and insufficient, weighed in his eyes, and, under the influence of his personal pa.s.sions, with a decisive weight in the balance. He wished to pursue, everywhere and by every means, his struggle against England and her influence in Europe. Alexander had refused to increase the rigors of the continental blockade. To this infraction of the spirit of the treaties uniting the emperors, Alexander had added, during the Austrian war, an att.i.tude of indifference and reserve which inspired confidence in the Emperor Francis and his advisers.

He had shown no eagerness for the family alliance which Napoleon twice offered, while, at the same time, the latter was not deceived as to the annoyance caused at St. Petersburg by the negotiations for the hand of the grand-d.u.c.h.ess being suddenly broken off. In short, Napoleon was convinced that the Emperor Alexander was preparing for war, eager to recover his liberty, and be freed from the conditions of the treaty of Tilsit. He, at the same time, believed that the renewal of hostilities would be signalized by important advantages for whichever of the two belligerents could first enter on the campaign. His main efforts, therefore, in 1811, were to hasten his warlike preparations, while using diplomatic artifices to make his adversary sleep, and, at the same time, proving to Europe that the rupture of the treaties was on the part of Alexander, and that the Russians were the first to arm. On sending him Count Lauriston, who was appointed to replace Caulaincourt, Napoleon wrote the Czar: "The man I send you has no consummate skill in business, but he is true and upright, as are the sentiments I bear towards you. Nevertheless I daily receive from Russia news which are not pacific. Yesterday I learned from Stockholm that the Russian divisions in Finland had left to go towards the frontiers of the Grand Duchy. A few days ago I had instructions from Bucharest that five divisions had left the Moldavian and Wallachian provinces for Poland, and that only four divisions of your Majesty's troops remain on the Danube. What is now taking place is a new proof that repet.i.tion is a powerful figure of rhetoric. Your Majesty has so often been told that I have a grudge against you, that your confidence has been shaken. The Russians quit a frontier where they are necessary, to go to a point where your Majesty has only friends. Nevertheless I had to think also of my affairs, and consider my own position. The recoil of my preparations will lead your Majesty to increase yours; and what you do, re-echoing here, will make me raise new levies, and all that for mere phantoms! It is a repet.i.tion of what I did in 1807 in Prussia, and in 1809 in Austria. As for me, I shall remain your Majesty's friend even when that fatality which rules Europe will one day compel our two nations to take sword in hand. I shall regulate my conduct by your Majesty's; I shall never make the attack: my troops will advance only when your Majesty has torn up the treaty of Tilsit. I shall be the first to disarm, and restore everything to the condition in which things were a year ago, if your Majesty will go back to the same confidence."

The emperor spoke the truth, and his treatment of Russia was nothing new.

It had long been a clumsy artifice of his insatiable greed for war and conquest to charge his enemies with taking the sword in hand on account of their fears or expectations, the fear and expectations being usually caused by his att.i.tude and the projects with which he was credited.

Military reasons a.s.sisted at this time in encouraging him to dissimulate and talk of peace. He had conceived the idea of occupying successively the vast territories by which he was separated from Russia, and gaining first the Oder and then the Vistula before the Russians were in motion to cross the Niemen. The first links of this combination were already begun to be forged; crowds of runaway conscripts were everywhere being dragged from the woods and rocks where they hid themselves; and, by sending columns of militia to scour the provinces, garrison the villages, and freely pillage the houses of the young deserters, there were 50,000 or 60,000 men thus compelled to give themselves up, whose hiding-places had not been discovered. The emperor sent them in troops to the islands of Elba, Corsica, Re, Belle-Isle, and Walcheren, appointing the sea to keep his deserters. Scarcely had they acquired the most rudimentary notions of military discipline, when they were despatched in a body to Marshal Davout, who was still stationed on the Elbe, with instructions to drill and form them. They often arrived still clad in their peasant's dress, their bodies ill, and their minds revolting against the existence thus forced upon them far from their home and country. About one sixth of these wretches escaped during the march, braving all the dangers and suffering of flight across an unknown country rather than be soldiers. Recruits from all the conquered nations filled up the gaps in the regiments of the ever- increasing army. War supplies as well as soldiers were also constantly acc.u.mulating in Germany. Napoleon resolved to collect at Dantzig the resources necessary to support an army of 400,000 men for a year. The marvellous fertility of his mind was entirely occupied in facilitating and rendering certain the movements of that enormous ma.s.s of men and horses during a long campaign and across vast s.p.a.ces. The transport arrangements were in charge of skilled lieutenants, who had been with him in all his battles; and General Eble was at the head of the engineer division for bridge-construction. "With the means at our disposal, we shall eat up all obstacles," said Napoleon, confidently.

Alliances would have been difficult and few in Napoleon's case, if he had insisted on having genuine sympathy and hearty a.s.sistance; but he did not ask so much from Prussia, nor even from the Emperor Francis, whose daughter he had just married. Fear was enough for the accomplishment of his wishes, and in that he reckoned rightly. King Frederick William asked for Napoleon's alliance, because he dreaded seeing himself suddenly hemmed in by the attack against Russia. After leaving him for a long time unanswered, and at last bringing his preparations as far forward as he had beforehand determined, the emperor accepted the offers of the King of Prussia and his minister Hardenberg. In their anxiety to close the bargain, the Prussian diplomatist had gone so far as to say that their sovereign could place 100,000 men at the service of France. By skilful system of rotation in their military service, the King of Prussia had been able to exercise all his subjects who were of age to bear arms without appearing to exceed the narrow limits allowed to his army by Napoleon.

Thus, under the weight of unjust restriction, were sown the seeds of that military organization which afterwards proved several times so fatal to us. In 1812, Napoleon let the King of Prussia know that he had observed the state of his military resources. By the treaty of alliance, concluded in February, 1812, the Prussian contingent in the war then preparing amounted only to 20,000 soldiers. Large supplies of provisions were to be received in part payment of the war contributions which Prussia still owed France; and on this condition the emperor guaranteed the security of the territory of his new ally--recently his mangled victim. Some hopes were also allowed him of several ulterior advantages; but Napoleon refused to restore Glogau, in spite of the entreaties of King Frederick William.

Austria would have wished to avoid the necessity of joining in the war and allying herself to Napoleon; but the situation of the daughter of the Emperor Francis upon the throne of France, and the eagerness which the Austrian court had shown for the union, prevented any refusal. In his negotiations Metternich insisted that the treaty should be kept secret: "There are only two of us in Austria who wish for a French alliance," said he; "the emperor is the first, and I am the second; but Russia must not know of our feeling towards you." Some regiments were being secretly prepared in Galicia.

In a famous conversation which Napoleon had, on 15th August, 1811, with Prince Kourakin, the Russian amba.s.sador at Paris, he said, "Is it on Austria that you reckon? You made war upon her in 1809, and deprived her of a province during peace. Is it Sweden, from whom you took Finland? Is it Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at Tilsit after being her ally?" The same reproaches could with more justice have been applied to France--or rather, to her ruler. He was soon to understand that truth, and weigh the value of the alliances which he had imposed. On the eve of the Russian campaign he was, and seemed, more formidable than the Czar; and fear made the weak cling to his side, while they still concealed their secret hatred and long-cherished rancor.

Russia, nevertheless, was also negotiating, relying upon her rival's natural and declared enemies. The treaties were not new when they were published, on the 20th July, 1812, between the Czar and the Spanish insurgents, the 1st August with England, and on the 5th April with Sweden.

The powers hostile to France were astonished to hear of the advances made by the new Prince Royal of Sweden. From recollection of the republican enthusiasm of his youth, as well as personal antipathy, Bernadotte had never liked General Bonaparte when they were comrades and rivals for military fame. The fortune of Napoleon had dug a gulf between them. Raised to the throne by a curious freak of destiny, Bernadotte had brought to his new country no attachment for Napoleon, nor the enthusiastic recollections of France with which he was generally credited. He had asked the emperor to grant him Norway; but Napoleon did not wish to rob Denmark, and a contemptuous silence was the reply to the court of Sweden. Bernadotte pursued in another direction the same views of ambition and aggrandizement; and in allying himself to Russia he asked for Norway, urging the importance of the personal and national a.s.sistance which he could contribute to the coalition. England was not a stranger to this arrangement. Two months afterwards, disregarding his engagements with Russia, and alarmed at the huge display of Napoleon's power, the Prince Royal of Sweden proceeded to make fresh overtures to France. Norway was to remain as the price of his alliance, together with a subsidy of 20,000,000. Napoleon was extremely angry. Bernadotte had never possessed his good graces; and he, not unnaturally, felt indignant at the manoeuvres of a Frenchman who had so soon forgot his country. "The wretch!" exclaimed he; "he is true neither to his reputation, to Sweden, or his native land, but is preparing bitter remorse for himself. When Russia wants the Sound, her soldiers have only to cross the ice from Aland to Stockholm. The present opportunity of humbling Russia is unique, and he will never have such another. Never again will a man like me be seen marching against the North with 600,000 men! He is not worth thinking about; let n.o.body mention him again to me; I forbid sending any communication to him, formal or informal." Thus repulsed, Bernadotte remained faithful to his engagements with Russia, and was soon after to make others, which were still more disastrous to his native country.

Soon after the official publication of the treaty uniting Sweden to the enemies of France, the Emperor Alexander concluded a war which had long occupied the greater part of his forces. The hostilities so long waged between Russia and Turkey had not contributed to the glory of Alexander's generals. "Your soldiers are very brave," said Napoleon once to the Czar's amba.s.sador, "but your generals are not worthy of them. It is impossible not to see that they have managed their movements very badly, and acted against all the rules." The fear inspired by the Emperor Napoleon had been of still greater use to the Turks than the bad generals.h.i.+p of the Russians, Alexander being eager to conclude the peace, in order to concentrate his forces against an enemy more formidable than the Sultan.

Admiral Tchitchakoff, at the head of the army of the Danube, was empowered to finish the war or negotiate peace. The Czar renounced part of his former claims, contenting himself with Bessarabia, and proposing the Pruth as the boundary for both empires, on condition that Turkey became an active ally. The influence of the English diplomatists turned the balance, and Mahmoud, yielding to the desire for peace, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the 28th May, 1812.

Napoleon was afraid of this peace, and had tried to prevent it.

Perpetually trying to gain time, he succeeded in throwing off the scent Nesselrode, who had been sent with instructions to put the question of peace or war simply. Lauriston was directed to dwell constantly upon the emperor's friendly feeling towards the Czar. Napoleon was at the trouble of conversing for a long time with a Russian of position who was visiting Paris. Czernicheff was sent to gather information as to the importance of our armament, and had learned much, when the emperor sent for him to come to the Elysee, to unfold his intentions with regard to Poland. He had formerly said to Prince Kourakin, "I shall give you nothing in Poland-- nothing! nothing!" Now he declared his resolution never to restore to Poland its national independence. "I had no wish to engage in the convention which was proposed to me," said he, "because that engagement was not compatible with my dignity; but I am well resolved on that point.

I have no other reason for arming except the notoriously unkind disposition of the Russian court towards me. She is deceived as to my intentions; she serves England, whose commerce extends to all parts of her territory. I only ask her to come closer; by ourselves we two shall crush all our enemies." Napoleon gave Czernicheff a letter for the Emperor Alexander, which made him a sort of accredited agent at the Russian court.

"My brother, after the arrival of the courier sent by Count Lauriston on the 6th instant, I laid down my views of the troublesome events of the last fifteen months in a conversation with Colonel Czernicheff. It only depends on your Majesty to finish it all."

At the same time a despatch of the Duke of Ba.s.sano (Maret), who had succeeded the Duke of Cadore (Champagny) as minister of foreign affairs, informed Lauriston of the importance of the mission. "The emperor is anxious," said he, "that the troops should gradually advance upon the Vistula, rest there, settle there, strengthen their position, fortify their bridges; in short, make use of every advantage, and be certain of taking the initiative in military movements. The emperor has shown great kindness to Colonel Czernicheff, but I must tell you that officer has used his time in Paris intriguing and disseminating corruption. The emperor knew it without interfering. The preparations of his Majesty are really enormous, and the more they are known it will only be the better for him.

The Emperor Alexander will, no doubt, show you the letter sent him by his Majesty; it is very simple.... The emperor has no wish for an interview, or even a negotiation which should take place out of Paris. He has no confidence in a negotiation of any sort, unless the 450,000 men whom his Majesty has put in movement, and their enormous ma.s.s of war apparatus, should have caused the cabinet of St. Petersburg to reflect seriously, and, by loyally restoring the system established at Tilsit, place Russia again in the state of inferiority in which she then was. Your single aim must be to gain time. The head of the army of Italy is already at Munich, and the general movement is being everywhere declared. Maintain on all occasions that, should war take place, it is Russia who wished for it."

It was no longer from Paris that the emperor dictated his diplomatic orders and directed the movements of his armies. Since March he had lived at St. Cloud, to avoid an opposition Which vexed him to the bottom of his heart, and which he had in vain attempted to disarm. The Parisians, long enthusiastic in favor of his glory, were showing discontent, aversion, and complaint. After the long drought of the summer of 1811, bread was dear; and the financial measures which had been tried to reduce the prices in the capital were extremely onerous for the Treasury without acting successfully upon trade. Corn was scarce, and the threat of an arbitrary tariff kept back the supply of provisions. The strain upon all the commercial relations caused by the continental blockade reacted unfavorably on the necessary resources during a dearth. The Food Council appointed by the emperor tried in vain to supply by artificial means the beneficent action of commercial freedom and confidence.

Other causes contributed to the agitation and ill-temper of the Parisians; and the discontent, as well as the suffering caused by the dearness of corn, was not confined to the capital. Too clear-sighted, in spite of the mad impulses of his ambition, not to feel what risks he was running, and making France run, Napoleon wished to provide some protection. Though long inexhaustible in men and devotion, the country was becoming tired, and about to be deprived of its means of defence at the very moment when a new European conflagration was bursting forth. The emperor had therefore ordered the formation of a certain number of cohorts of the national guard, under the name of "First Ban" (Body of Defence). Thus 120,000 men, borrowed from the "sedentary contingents" of 1809 to 1812, had been formed into regiments, on the a.s.surance that they should not have to leave their departments. Their families, however, were deprived of them, and the present hards.h.i.+ps combining with their fear of the future, there was great dissatisfaction in the country. The number of deserters having increased, the columns of militia recommenced their hateful work: and in the conquered countries, Holland and the territory of the Hanse towns, the conscription was violently resisted. Insurrections took place, followed by executions. Several of the regiments raised in the ancient free towns had mutinied, and kept themselves for several days in the isle of Heligoland.

These troops were incorporated with Marshal Davout's army, and put under the most rigid guard. In Italy itself, and even in the army of Prince Eugene, the discontent and fatigue were unmistakable. The hard service of Napoleon had become a slavery. His severity towards the Pope also a.s.sisted in alienating the Italians, and throughout the Roman States he was hated by the population.

His pacific protestations, however, deceived n.o.body. The Czar had no wish for war; he dreaded it, and his people had also long dreaded it; but now he felt it to be inevitable, and the patriotic pa.s.sion of defending their soil took possession of the Russian nation. Lauriston was besieged with attentions, but he lived alone, having no intercourse with the Russian upper cla.s.ses, who were now urging the emperor forward. "Everything will be against us in this war," said Napoleon boldly to some of those about him who knew Russia well, especially Caulaincourt and Segur. "On their side, love of country and independence; all private and public interests, even to the secret wishes of our allies! On our side, against so many obstacles, glory alone, even without the hope of plunder, since the frightful poverty of those regions renders it impossible."

The events proved, in a startling manner, the justice of what the military diplomatists antic.i.p.ated. From the history of the secret negotiations we learn that advices and promises were largely bestowed by Austria and Prussia upon the Emperor Alexander. The leaders of our armies, which had for several months occupied Germany and Poland, could not pretend not to see the increasing hatred which was silently brooding under the disguises of popular submission and princely attentions. General Rapp, who commanded at Dantzig, felt it his duty to inform Marshal Davout of the precarious state in which our rule in Europe then stood. "If the French army has a single check," wrote the general, "there will quickly be from the Rhine to the Niemen only one single insurrection." Davout, in transmitting this information to Napoleon, made only one remark: "I recollect, sire, true enough, that in 1809, without the miracles wrought by you at Ratisbon our situation in Germany would have been very difficult."

It was upon those miracles of his genius, and upon a destiny which he justly considered superhuman, that the Emperor Napoleon always reckoned.

The information brought vexed him without persuading him, and made him somewhat distrust those who ventured to give it him. The brilliant renown of Marshal Davout, the justice and consistency of his administration in Poland, and the admirable order which reigned in his army, had made Napoleon somewhat displeased and gloomy. The rivals and enemies of Davout skilfully utilized the occasion. "One would think that the Prince of Eckmuhl commanded the army," they said constantly in the emperor's presence. Some even accused him of aiming at the throne of Poland.

Napoleon had dispensed with Ma.s.sena's services; and now he showed a coolness towards Davout, as if he were jealous of his glory and power, and at the moment of engaging in the supreme struggle wished to be surrounded with servants only!

Marshal Davout, nevertheless, went on his way, executing the emperor's instructions with consummate skill and prudence. There were now 450,000 men marching against Russia; an army of reserve of 150,000 men was about to be formed in Germany from the recruits sent from all parts of France; 120,000 men of the national guard were to protect the French soil, in combination with 150,000 soldiers, sick or new, who were still in the military depots. According to the "cadres," which were often deceptive, there were 300,000 men engaged in Spain. On leaving Italy to march to Germany, Prince Eugene had left about 50,000 soldiers in the strongholds.

Thus for one man's quarrel, and in his name, there were under arms more than 1,200,000 soldiers. The Russian army did not exceed 300,000 men: on their side they had the weather, extent of country, and climate. "Don't come into collision with the Emperor Napoleon," said Knesebek, the Prussian envoy to the Czar; "draw the French into the interior of Russia.

Let fatigue and hunger do the rest." The Emperor Alexander had just learnt that Davout had appeared at Elbing: having crossed the Vistula, he was on his way to the Niemen. The feeling of the people as well as the ardor of the court called the Czar to head-quarters, but he still hesitated, having a repugnance to give the sign of general conflagration; and at last, on the 21st, set out for Wilna after telling Lauriston that there was still time for negotiations. The population of St. Petersburg were all present at his departure, earnest and full of interest, and the churches were crowded with people praying at the altars. "I go with you. G.o.d will be against the aggressor." Such was the Czar's proclamation on reaching his head-quarters.

Europe was no more deceived than Russia and France herself; in spite of Napoleon's precautions, n.o.body was ignorant as to the real aggressor. The emperor remained at St. Cloud till 9th May, 1812, waiting till an act of the Czar's should give him the liberty of his movements. Before leaving France, and as a last indication of his pacific intentions, he despatched Narbonne to Wilna, with instructions to propose to the Czar an interview and armed negotiation, on the Niemen. "My aide-de-camp, Count Narbonne, who is the bearer of this letter to your Majesty, has at the same time important communications for Count Romanzoff," wrote Napoleon on the 25th April; "they will prove to your Majesty my desire to avoid war, and my constancy to the sentiments of Tilsit and Erfurt. In any case your Majesty will allow me to a.s.sure you, that if fate renders this war inevitable between us, it will make no change in the sentiments with which your Majesty has inspired me, and which are safe from all vicissitude or alteration."

It was at Dresden, whither he had gone on leaving France, that Napoleon received the refusal to negotiate, brought by Narbonne from the Czar.

England had replied by a similar refusal to the pacific manifesto which the emperor, as usual, had addressed to her before recommencing new hostilities in Europe. The orders for the positions of the troops were already given. Davout was to concentrate between Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Elbing; the Prussians had been appointed to the advance-guard, and still remained on their right, advancing to the banks of the Niemen.

Marshal Oudinot occupied the suburbs of Dantzig, forming Davout's right; while Ney's body, at Thorn, supported his left. Prince Eugene, with the Bavarians, advanced to Plock, on the Vistula; the Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians were united at Warsaw, under the orders of King Jerome; and the guard, who held Posen, were commanded by Mortier and Lefebvre. General St. Cyr was appointed to lead the Bavarians in the field, and General Regnier was responsible for the Saxons. The Austrians were to invade Volhynia. Already wherever the troops pa.s.sed there was raised a chorus of complaints from the pillaged and ill-treated populations, and from the King of Prussia, who had seen Spandau and Pillau occupied by the French troops, on pretext of depositing the war-material there. King Frederick William had set out for Dresden, to present his claims personally to the conqueror.

In the sight of the crowned crowd which at Dresden thronged around Napoleon, there was something at once brilliant and sad. Amongst the sovereigns who claimed the honor of presenting their homages, there were very few who did not cherish against him some secret grievance or bitter rancor. All dreaded some new misfortunes, and were endeavoring to charm them away by servile flatteries. The Empress Marie Louise accompanied her husband, showing her delight and want of tact in displaying her splendor so near her native country, before the eyes of her father and mother-in- law, who had just met her in Dresden. All purely military display had been forbidden at the magnificent court around Napoleon. Murat and King Jerome themselves had been ordered to their head-quarters, yet the couriers followed each other night and day, frequently disturbing the brilliant _fetes_ by the fear of the first cannon-shot ready to go off. At Paris, Prince Kourakin, discontented and uneasy, had asked for his pa.s.sports, thus antic.i.p.ating the official rupture. At St. Petersburg, Lauriston received the order to join the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, and again lay before him the proposals of peace. It was necessary to let the gra.s.s grow --to let the sun dry the roads--to give Napoleon's emissaries the opportunity of acting on the minds of the Poles, and stirring up amongst them a national movement in favor of France, a mission to which Abbe Pradt, afterwards Bishop of Malines, had been appointed. Talleyrand, of whom the emperor at first thought, did not then enjoy his good graces.

"Set out, my lord," said Napoleon to the bishop, "set out at once; spare no expense; rouse their enthusiasm; set Poland a-going without embroiling me with Austria, and you will have well understood and fulfilled your mission." The prelate's vanity was fired, surrounded as he was by the apparatus of his new grandeur. He set out to stir up Poland in the name of France!