History of the Russian Revolution Vol 1 Part 4

On the 25th, the strike spread wider. According to the government's .gures, 240,000 workers partic.i.p.ated that day. The most backward layers are following up the vanguard. Already a good number of small establishments are on strike. The streetcars are at a stand. Business concerns are closed. In the course of the day students of the higher schools join the strike. By noon tens of thousands of people pour to the Kazan cathedral and the surrounding streets. Attempts are made to organise street meetings; a series of armed encounters with the police occurs. Orators address the crowds around the Alexander III monument. The mounted police open .re. A speaker falls wounded. Shots from the crowd kill a police inspector, wound the chief of police and several other policemen. Bottles, petards and hand grenades are thrown at the gendarmes. The war has taught this art. The soldiers show indifference, at times hostility, to the police. It spreads excitedly through the crowd that when the police opened .re by the Alexander 111 monument, the Cossacks let go a volley at the horse "Pharaohs" (such was the nickname of the police) and the latter had to gallop off. This apparently was not a legend circulated for self-encouragement, since the incident, although in different versions, is con.rmed from several sources.

A worker-Bolshevik, Kayurov, one of the authentic leaders in those days, relates how at one place, within sight of a detachment of Cossacks, the demonstrators scattered under the whips of the mounted police, and how he, Kayurov, and several workers with him, instead of following the fugitives, took off their caps and approached the Cossacks with the words: "Brothers-Cossacks, help the workers in a struggle for their peaceable demands; you see how the Pharaohs treat us, hungry workers. Help us! "This consciously humble manner, those caps in their hands-what an accurate psychological calculation! Inimitable gesture! The whole history of street .ghts and revolutionary victories swarms with such improvisations. But they are drowned without a trace in the abyss of great events-the sh.e.l.l remains to the historian, the generalisation. "The Cossacks glanced at each other in some special way, "Kayurov later, near the station gate, the crowd were tossing in their arms a Cossack continues, "and we were hardly out of the way before they rushed into the .ght." And a few minutes who before their eyes had slaughtered a police inspector with his sabre.

Soon the police disappear altogether-that is, begin to act secretly. Then the soldiers appear-bayonets lowered. Anxiously the workers ask them: "Comrades, you haven't come to help the police' A rude "Move along' for answer. Another attempt ends the same way. The soldiers are sullen. A worm is gnawing them, and they cannot stand it when a question hits the very centre of the pain.

Meanwhile disarmament of the Pharaohs becomes a universal slogan. The police are .erce, implacable, hated and hating foes. To win them over is out of the question. Beat them up and kill them. It is different with the soldiers: the crowd makes every effort to avoid hostile encounters with them; on the contrary, seeks ways to dispose them in its favour, convince, attract, fraternise, merge them in itself. In spite of the auspicious rumours about the Cossacks, perhaps slightly exaggerated, the crowd's att.i.tude toward the mounted men remains cautious. A horseman sits high above the crowd; his soul is separated from the soul of the demonstrator by the four legs of his beast. A .gure at which one must gaze from below always seems more signi.cant, more threatening. The infantry are beside one on the pavement-closer, more accessible. The ma.s.ses try to get near them, look into their eyes, surround them with their hot breath. A great ro1e is played by women workers in relations.h.i.+p between workers and soldiers. They go up to the cordons more boldly than men, take hold of the ri.es, beseech, almost command: "Put down your bayonets-join us." The soldiers are excited, ashamed, exchange anxious glances, waver; someone makes up his mind .rst, and the bayonets rise guiltily above the shoulders of the advancing crowd. The barrier is opened, a joyous and grateful "Hurrah' shakes the air. The soldiers are surrounded. Everywhere arguments, reproaches, appeals the revolution makes another forward step.

Nicholas from headquarters sent Khabalov a telegraphic command to put an end to the disorders "tomorrow." The czar's will fell in with the next step in Khabalov's "plan," and the telegram served merely as an extra stimulus. To-morrow the troops will say their say. Isn't it too late? You can't tell yet. The question is posed, but far from answered. The indulgence of the Cossacks, the wavering of certain infantry lines-these are but much-promising episodes repeated by the thousand voiced echo of the sensitive street. Enough to inspire the revolutionary crowd, but too little for victory. Especially since there are episodes of an opposite kind. In the afternoon a detachment of dragoons, supposedly in response to revolver shots from the crowd, .rst opened .re on the demonstrators near Gostinny Dvor. According to Khabalov's report to headquarters three were killed and ten wounded. A serious warning! At the same time Khabalov issued a threat that all workers registered in the draft would be sent to the front if they did not go to work before the 28th. The general issued a three-day ultimatum-that is, he gave the revolution more time than it needed to overthrow Khabalov and the monarchy into the bargain. But that will become known only after the victory. On the evening of the 25th n.o.body guessed what the next day had in its womb.

Let us try to get a clearer idea of the inner logic of the movement. On February 23, under the .ag of "Woman's Day," began the long-ripe and long-withheld uprising of the Petrograd working ma.s.ses. The .rst step of the insurrection was the strike. In the course of three days it broadened and became practically general. This alone gave a.s.surance to the ma.s.ses and carried them forward. Becoming more and more aggressive, the strike merged with the demonstrations, which were bringing the revolutionary ma.s.s face to face with the troops. This raised the problem as a whole to the higher level where things are solved by force of arms. The .rst days brought a number of individual successes, but these were more symptomatic than substantial.

A revolutionary uprising that spreads over a number of days can develop victoriously only in case it ascends step by step, and scores one success after another. A pause in its growth is dangerous; a prolonged marking of time, fatal. But even successes by themselves are not enough; the ma.s.ses must know about them in time, and have time to understand their value. It is possible to let slip a victory at the very moment when it is within arm's reach. This has happened in history.

The .rst three days were days of uninterrupted increase in the extent and acuteness of the strife. But for this very reason the movement had arrived at a level where mere symptomatic successes were not enough. The entire active ma.s.s of the people had come out on the streets. It was settling accounts with the police successfully and easily. In the last two days the troops had been drawn into the events-on the second day, cavalry, on the third, the infantry too. They barred the way, pushed and crowded back the ma.s.ses, sometimes connived with them, but almost never resorted to .rearms. Those in command were slow to change their plan, partly because they under-estimated what was happening-the faulty vision of the reaction supplemented that of the leaders of the revolution-partly because they lacked con.dence in the troops. But exactly on the third day, the force of the developing struggle, as well as the czar's command, made it necessary for the government to send the troops into action in dead earnest. The workers understood this, especially their advance ranks; the dragoons had already done some shooting the day before. Both sides now faced the issue unequivocally.

On the night of the 26th about a hundred people were arrested in different parts of the city-people belonging to various revolutionary organisations, and among them .ve mem-bers of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks. This also meant that the government were taking the offensive. What will happen today? In what mood will the workers wake up after yesterday's shooting? And most important: what will the troops say? The sun of February 26 came up in a fog of uncertainty and acute anxiety.

In view of the arrest of the Petrograd Committee, the guidance of the entire work in the city fell into the hands of the Vyborg rayon. Maybe this was just as well. The upper leaders.h.i.+p in the party was hopelessly slow. Only on the morning of the 25th, the, Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee a last decided to issue a hand bill calling for an all-Russian General strike. At the moment of issue, if indeed it ever did issue, the general strike in Petrograd was facing an armed uprising. The leaders were watching the movement from above; they hesitated, they lagged-in other words, they did not lead. They dragged after the movement.

The nearer one comes to the factories, the greater the decisiveness. Today however, the 26th, there is anxiety even in the rayons. Hungry, tired, chilled, with a mighty historic responsibility upon their shoulders, the Vyborg leaders gather outside the city limits, amid vegetable gardens, to exchange impressions of the day and plan the course . . . of what? Of a new demonstration? But where will an unarmed demonstration lead, now the government has decided to go the limit? This question bores into their minds. "One thing seems evident: the insurrection is dissolving." Here we recognise the voice of Kayurov, already familiar to us, and at .rst it seems hardly his voice. The barometer falls so low before the storm.

In the hours when hesitation seized even those revolutionises closest to the ma.s.s, the movement itself had gone much farther than its partic.i.p.ants realised. Even the day before, towards evening of the 25th, the Vyborg side was wholly in the hands of the insurrection. The police stations were wrecked, individual of.cers had been killed, and the majority had .ed. The city headquarters had completely lost contact with the greater part of the capital. On the morning of the 26th it became evident that not only the Vyborg side, but also Peski almost up to Liteiny Prospect, was in control of the insurrection. At least so the police reports de.ned the situation. And it was true in a sense, although the revolutionists could hardly realise it: the police in so many cases abandoned their lairs before there was any threat from the workers. But even aside from that, ridding the factory districts of the police could not have decisive signi.cance in the eyes of the workers: the troops had not yet said their .nal word. The uprising is "dissolving," thought the boldest of the bold. Meanwhile it was only beginning to develop.

The 26th of February fell on a Sunday; the factories were closed, and this prevented measuring the strength of the ma.s.s pressure in terms of the extent of the strike. Moreover the workers could not a.s.semble in the factories, as they had done on the preceding days, and that hindered the demonstrations. In the morning the Nevsky was quiet. In those hours the czarina telegraphed the czar: "The city is calm."

But this calmness does not last long. The workers gradually concentrate, and move from all suburbs to the centre. They are stopped at the bridges. They .ock across the ice: it is only February and the Neva is one solid bridge of ice. The .ring at their crowds on the ice is not enough to stop them. They .nd the city transformed. Posses, cordons, horse-patrols everywhere. The approaches to the Nevsky are especially well guarded. Every now and then shots ring out from ambush. The number of killed and wounded grows. Ambulances dart here and there. You cannot always tell who is shooting and where the shots come from. One thing is certain: after their cruel lesson, the police have decided not to expose themselves again. They shoot from windows, through balcony doors, from behind columns, from attics. Hypotheses are formed, which easily become legends. They say that in order to intimidate the demonstrators, many soldiers are disguised in police uniforms. They say that Protopopov has placed numerous machine-gun nests in the garrets of houses. A commission created after the revolution did not discover such nests, but this does not mean that there were none. However, the police on this day occupy a subordinate place. The troops come decisively into action. They are given strict orders to shoot, and the soldiers, mostly training squads-that is, non-commissioned of.cers' regimental schools-do shoot. According to the of.cial .gures, on this day about forty are killed and as many wounded, not counting those led or carried away by the crowd. The struggle arrives at a decisive stage. Will the ma.s.s ebb before the lead and .ow back to its suburbs? No, it does not ebb. It is bound to have its own.

Bureaucratic, bourgeois, liberal Petersburg was in a fright. On that day Rodzianko, the President of the State Duma, demanded that reliable troops be sent from the front; later he "reconsidered " and recommended to the War Minister Belyaev that the crowds be dispersed, not with lead, but with cold water out of a .re-hose. Belyaev, having consulted General Khabalov, answered that a dowse of water would produce precisely the opposite effect "because it excites." Thus in the liberal and bureaucratic upper circles they discussed the relative advantages of hot and cold douches for the people in revolt. Police reports for that day testify that the .re-hose was inadequate: " In the course of the disorders it was observed as a general phenomenon, that the rioting mobs showed extreme de.ance towards the military patrols, at whom, when asked to disperse, they threw stones and lumps of ice dug up from the street. When preliminary shots were .red into the air, the crowd not only did not disperse but answered these volleys with laughter. Only when loaded cartridges were .red into the very midst of the crowd, was it found possible to disperse the mob, the partic.i.p.ants, in which, however, would most of them hide in the yards of nearby houses, and as soon as, the shooting stopped come out again into the street." This police report shows that the temperature of the ma.s.ses had risen very high. To be sure, it is hardly probable that the crowd would have begun of itself to bombard the troops-even the training squads-with stones and ice: that would too much contradict the psychology of the insurrectionary ma.s.ses, and the wise strategy they had shown with regard to the army. For the sake of supplementary justi.cation for ma.s.s murders, the colours in the report are not exactly what they were, and are not laid on the way they were, in actual fact. But the essentials are reported truly and with remarkable vividness: the ma.s.ses will no longer retreat, they resist with optimistic brilliance, they stay on the street even after murderous volleys, they cling, not to their lives, but to the pavement, to stones, to pieces of ice. The crowd is not only bitter, but audacious. This is because, in spite of the shooting, it keeps its faith in the army. It counts on victory and intends to have it at any cost.

The pressure of the workers upon the army is increasing countering the pressure from the side of the authorities. The Petrograd garrison comes into the focus of events. The expectant period, which has lasted almost three days, during which it was possible for the main ma.s.s of the garrison to keep up friendly neutrality toward the insurrection, has come to an end. "Shoot the enemy' the monarchy commands. "Don't shoot your brothers and sisters' cry the workers. And not only that: "Come with us' Thus in the streets and squares, by the bridges, at the barrack-gates, is waged a ceaseless struggle now dramatic, now unnoticeable-but always a desperate struggle, for the heart of the soldier. In this strug-gle, in these sharp contacts between working men and women and the soldiers, under the steady crackling of ri.es and machine-guns, the fate of the government, of the war, of the country, is being decided.

The shooting of demonstrators increased the uncertainty among the leaders. The very scale of the movement began to seem dangerous. Even at the meeting of the Vyborg com-mittee the evening of the 26th-that is, twelve hours before the victory-arose discussions as to whether it was not time to end the strike. This may seem astonis.h.i.+ng. But remember, it is far easier to recognise victory the day after, than the day before. Besides, moods change frequently under the impact of events and the news of them. Discouragement quickly gives way to a .ow of enthusiasm. Kayurovs and Chugurins have plenty of personal courage, but at moments a feeling of responsibility for the ma.s.ses clutches them. Among the rank-and-.le workers there were fewer oscillations. Reports about their moods were made to the authorities by a well informed agent in the Bolshevik organisation, Shurkanov. "Since the army units have not opposed the crowd, wrote this provocateur," and in individual cases have even taken measures paralysing the initiative of the police of.cers, the ma.s.ses have got a sense of impunity, and now, after two days of un.o.bstructed walking the streets, when the revolutionary circles have advanced the slogans "Down with war" and "Down with the autocracy' the people have become convinced that the revolution has begun, that success is with the ma.s.ses, that the authorities are powerless to suppress the movement because the troops are with it, that a decisive victory is near, since the troops will soon openly join the side of the revolutionary forces, that the movement begun will not subside, but will cease-lessly grow to a complete victory and a state revolution." A characterisation remarkable for compactness and clarity! The report is a most valuable historic doc.u.ment. This did not, of course, prevent the victorious workers from executing its author.

These provocateurs, whose number was enormous, especially in Petrograd, feared, more than anyone else did, the victory of the revolution. They followed a policy of their own: in the Bolshevik conferences Shurkanov defended the most extreme actions; in his reports to the secret police he suggested the necessity of a decisive resort to .rearms. It is possible that with this aim, Shurkanov tried even to exaggerate the aggressive con.dence of the workers. But in the main he was right events would soon con.rm his judgement.

The leaders in both camps guessed and vacillated, for not one of them could estimate a priori the relation of forces. External indications ceased absolutely to serve as a measure. Indeed one of the chief features of a revolutionary crisis consists in this sharp contradiction between the present consciousness and the old forms of social relations.h.i.+p. A new relation of forces was mysteriously implanting itself in the consciousness of the workers and sol-diers. It was precisely the government's offensive, called forth by the previous offensive of the revolutionary ma.s.ses, which transformed the new relation of forces from a potential to an active state. The worker looked thirstily and commandingly into the eyes of the soldier, and the soldier anxiously and dif.dently looked away. This meant that, in a way, the sol-dier could no longer answer for himself. The worker approached the soldier more boldly. The soldier sullenly, but without hostility-guiltily rather-refused to answer. Or sometimes now more and more often-he answered with pretended severity in order to conceal how anxiously his heart was beating in his breast. Thus the change was accomplished. The sol-dier was, clearly shaking off his soldiery. In doing so he could not immediately recognise himself. The authorities said that the revolution intoxicated the soldier. To the soldier it seemed, on the contrary, that he was sobering up from the opium of the barracks. Thus the decisive day was prepared-the 27th of February.

However, on the eve of that day an incident occurred which in spite of its episodic nature paints with a new colour all the events of the 26th. Towards evening the fourth company of the Pavlovsky regiment of the Imperial Guard mutinied. In the written report of a police inspector the cause of the mutiny is categorically stated: "Indignation against the training squad of the same regiment which, while on duty in the Nevsky, .red on the crowd." Who informed the fourth company of this? A record has been accidentally preserved. About two o'clock in the afternoon, a handful of workers ran up to the barracks of the Pavlovsky regiment. Interrupting each other, they told about a shooting on the Nevsky. "Tell your comrades that the Pavlovtsi, too, are shooting at us-we saw soldiers in your uniform on the Nevsky." That was a burning reproach, a .aming appeal. "All looked distressed and pale."

The seed fell not upon the rock. By six o'clock the fourth company had left the barracks without permission under the command of a non-commissioned of.cer-Who was he? His name is drowned forever among hundreds and thousands of equally heroic names-and marched to the Nevsky to recall its training squad. This was not a mere soldiers' mutiny over wormy meat; it was an act of high revolutionary initiative. On their way down, the company had an encounter with a detachment of mounted police. The soldiers opened .re. One policeman and one horse were killed; another policeman and another horse were wounded. The further path of the mutineers in the hurricane of the streets is unknown. The company returned to the barracks and aroused the entire regiment. But their arms had been hidden. According to some sources, they nevertheless got hold of thirty ri.es. They were soon surrounded by the Preobrazhentsi. Nineteen Pavlovtsi were arrested and imprisoned in the fortress; the rest surrendered. According to other information, the of.cers on that evening found twenty-one soldiers with ri.es missing. A dangerous leak! These twenty-one soldiers would be seeking allies and defenders all night long. Only the victory of the revolution could save them. The workers would surely learn from them what had happened. This was not a bad omen for to-morrow's battles.

Nabokov, one of the most prominent liberal leaders, whose truthful memoirs seem at times to be the very diary of his party and of his cla.s.s, was returning home from a visit at one o'clock in the morning along the dark and watchful streets. He was "perturbed and .lled with dark forebodings." It is possible that at one of the crossings he met a fugitive Pavlovetz. Both hurried past: they had nothing to say to each other. In the workers' quarters and the barracks some kept watch or conferred, others slept the half-sleep of the bivouac, or dreamed feverishly about to-morrow. Here the fugitive Pavlovetz found shelter.

How scant are the records of the ma.s.s .ghting in the February days-scant even in com-parison with the slim records of the October .ghts. In October the party directed the in-surrection from day to day; in its articles, proclamations, and reports, at least the external continuity of the struggle is recorded. Not so in February. The ma.s.ses had almost no lead-ers.h.i.+p from above. The newspapers were silenced by the strike. Without a look back, the ma.s.ses made their own history. To reconstruct a living picture of the things that happened in the streets, is almost unthinkable. It would be well if we could recreate at least the general continuity and inner order of events.

The government, which had not yet lost hold of the machinery of power, observed the events on the whole even less ably than the left parties, which, as we know, were far from brilliant in this direction. After the "successful" shootings of the 26th, the ministers took heart for an instant. At dawn of the 27th Protopopov rea.s.suringly reported that, according to information received, "part of the workers intend to return to work." But the work-ers' never thought of going back to the shops. Yesterday's shootings and failures had not discouraged the ma.s.ses. How explain this? Apparently the losses were out-balanced by certain gains. Pouring through the streets, colliding with the enemy, pulling at the arms of soldiers, crawling under horses' bellies, attacking, scattering, leaving their corpses on the crossings, grabbing a few .rearms, spreading the news, catching at rumours, the insur-rectionary ma.s.s becomes a collective ent.i.ty with numberless eyes, ears and antennae. At night, returning home from the arena of struggle to the workers' quarter, it goes over the impressions of the day, and sifting away what is petty and accidental, casts its own thought-ful balance. On the night of the 27th, this balance was practically identical with the report made to the authorities by the provocateur, Shurkanov.

In the morning the workers streamed again to the factories, and in open meetings re-solved to continue the struggle. Especially resolute, as always, were the Vyborgtsi. But in other districts too these morning meetings were enthusiastic. To continue the struggle! But what would that mean to day? The general strike had issued in revolutionary demonstra-tions by immense crowds, and the demonstrations had led to a collision with the troops. To continue the struggle to day would mean to summon an armed insurrection. But n.o.body had formulated this summons. It had grown irresistibly out of the events, but it was never placed on the order of the day by a revolutionary party.

The art of revolutionary leaders.h.i.+p in its most critical moments consists nine-tenths in knowing how to sense the mood of the ma.s.ses-just as Kayurov detected the movement of the Cossacks eyebrow, though on a larger scale. An unexcelled ability to detect the mood of the ma.s.ses was Lenin's great power. But Lenin was not in Petrograd. The legal and semi-legal "socialistic" staffs, Kerensky, Cheidze, Skobelev, and all those who circled around them, p.r.o.nounced warnings and opposed the movement. But even the central Bolshevik staff, composed of Shliapnikov, Zalutsky and Molotov was amazing in its helplessness and lack of initiative. In fact, the districts and barracks were left to themselves. The .rst proclamation to the army was released only on the 26th by one of the Social Democratic organisations close to the Bolsheviks. This proclamation, rather hesitant in character-not even containing an appeal to come over to the people-was distributed throughout all the city districts on the morning of the 27th. "However," testi.es Yurenev, the leader of this organisation, "the tempo of the revolutionary events was such that our slogans were already lagging behind it. By the time the lea.ets had penetrated into the thick of the troops, the latter had already come over." As the Bolshevik centre Shliapnikov, at the demand of Chugurin one of the best worker-leaders of the February days, .nally wrote an appeal to the soldiers on the morning of the 27th. Was it even published? At best it might have come in at the .nish. It could not possibly have in.uenced the events of February 27. We must lay it down as a general rule for those days that the higher the leaders, the further they lagged behind.

But the insurrection, not yet so named by anyone, took its own place on the order of the day. All the thoughts of the workers were concentrated on the army. "Don't you think we can get them started?" To day haphazard agitation would no longer do. The Vyborg section staged a meeting near the bar racks of the Moscow regiment. The enterprise proved a failure. Is it dif.cult for some of.cer or sergeant major to work the handle of a machine gun? The workers were scattered by cruel .re. A similar attempt was made at the barracks of Reserve regiment. And there too: of.cers with machine gun interfered between the workers and soldiers. The leaders of the workers fumed, looked for .rearms, demanded them from the party. And the answer was: "The soldiers have the .rearms, go get them." That they knew themselves. But how to get them? Isn't everything going to collapse all at once to day? Thus came on the critical point of the struggle. Either the machine gun will wipe out the insurrection, or the insurrection will capture the machine gun.

In his recollections, Shliapnikov, the chief .gure in the Petrograd centre of the Bolshe-viks, tells how he refused the demands of the workers for .rearms or even revolvers sending them to the barracks to get them. He wished in this way to avoid b.l.o.o.d.y clashes between workers and soldiers, staking everything on agitation-that is, on the conquest of the soldiers by work and example. We know of no other testimony which con.rms or refutes this statement of a prominent leader of those days-a statement which testi.es to side-stepping rather than foresight. It would be simpler to confess that the leaders had no .rearms.

There is no doubt that the fate of every revolution at a certain point is decided by a break in the disposition of the disposition of the army. Against a numerous, disciplined, well-armed and ably led military force, unarmed or almost unarmed ma.s.ses of the people cannot possibly gain a victory. But no deep national crisis can fail to affect the army to some extent. Thus along with the conditions of a truly popular revolution there develops a possibility-not, of course, a guarantee-of its victory. However, the going over of the army to the insurrection does not happen of itself, nor as a result of mere agitation. The army is heterogeneous, and its antagonistic elements are held together by the terror of discipline. On the very eve of the decisive hour, the revolutionary soldiers do not know how much power they have, or what in.uence they can exert. The working ma.s.ses, of course, are also heterogeneous. But they have immeasurably more opportunity for testing their ranks in the process of preparation for the decisive encounter. Strikes, meetings, demonstrations, are not only acts in the struggle, but also measures of its force. The whole ma.s.s does not partic.i.p.ate in the strike. Not all the strikers are ready to .ght. In the sharpest moments the most daring appear in the streets. The hesitant, the tired, the conservative, sit at home. Here a revolutionary selection takes place of itself; people are sifted through the sieve of events. It is otherwise with the army. The revolutionary soldiers-sympathetic, wavering or antagonistic-are all tied together by a compulsory discipline whose threads are held, up to the last moment, in the of.cer's .st. The soldiers are told off daily into .rst and second .les, but how are they to be divided into rebellious and obedient?

The psychological moment when the soldiers go over to the revolution is prepared by a long molecular process, which, like other processes of nature, has its point of climax. But how determine this point? A military unit may be wholly prepared to join the people, but may not receive the needed stimulus. The revolutionary leaders.h.i.+p does not yet believe in the possibility of having the army on its side, and lets slip the victory. After this ripened but unrealised mutiny, a reaction may seize the army. The soldiers lose the hope which .ared in their b.r.e.a.s.t.s; they bend their necks again to the yoke of discipline, and in a new encounter with the workers, especially at a distance, will stand opposed to the insurrection. In this process there are many elements imponderable or dif.cult to weigh, many crosscurrents, collective suggestions and autosuggestions. But out of this complicated web of material and psychic forces one conclusion emerges with irrefutable clarity: the more the soldiers in their ma.s.s are convinced that the rebels are really rebelling-that this is not a demonstration after which they will have to go back to the barracks and report, that this is a struggle to the death, that the people may win if they join them, and that this winning will not only guarantee impunity, but alleviate the lot of all-the more they realise this, the more willing they are to turn aside their bayonets, or go over with them to the people. In other words, the revolutionises can create a break in the soldiers' mood only if they themselves are actually ready to seize the victory at any price whatever, even the price of blood. And the highest determination never can, or will, remain unarmed.

The critical hour of contact between the pus.h.i.+ng crowd and the soldiers who bar their way has its critical minute. That is when the grey barrier has not yet given way, still holds together shoulder to shoulder, but already wavers, and the of.cer, gathering his last strength of will, gives the command: "Fire!" The cry of the crowd, the yell of terror and threat, drowns the command, but not wholly. The ri.es waver. The crowd pushes. Then the of.cer points the barrel of his revolver at the most suspicious soldier. From the decisive minute now stands out the decisive second. The death of the boldest soldier, to whom the others have involuntarily looked for guidance, a shot into the crowd by a corporal from the dead man's ri.e, and the barrier closes, the guns go off of themselves, scattering the crowd into the alleys and backyards. But how many times since 1905 it has happened otherwise! At the critical moment, when the of.cer is ready to pull the trigger, a shot from the crowd-which has its Kayurovs and Chugurins-forestalls him. This decides not only the fate of the street skirmish, but perhaps the whole day, or the whole insurrection.

The task which Shliapnikov set himself of protecting the workers from hostile clashes with the troops by not giving .rearms to the insurrectionists, could not in any case be car-ried out. Before it came to these clashes with the troops, innumerable clashes had occurred with the police. The street .ghting began with the disarming of the hated Pharaohs, their revolvers pa.s.sing into the hands of the rebels. The revolver by itself is a weak, almost toy-like weapon against the muskets, ri.es, machine guns and cannon of the enemy. But are these weapons genuinely in the hands of the enemy? To settle this question the work-ers demanded arms. It was a psychological question. But even in an insurrection psychic processes are inseparable from material ones. The way to the soldier's ri.e leads through the revolver taken from the Pharaoh.

The feelings of the soldiers in those hours were less active than those of the workers, but not less deep. Let us recall again that the garrison consisted mainly of reserve battalions many thousands strong, destined to .ll up the ranks of those at the front. These men, most of them fathers of families, had the prospect of going to the trenches when the war was lost and the country ruined. They did not want war, they wanted to go home to their farms. They knew well enough what was going on at court, and had not the slightest feeling of attachment to the monarchy. They did not want to .ght with the Germans, and still less with the Petrograd workers. They hated the ruling cla.s.s of the capital, who had been having a good time during the war. Among them were workers with a revolutionary past, who knew how to give a generalised expression to all these moods.

To bring the soldiers from a deep but as yet hidden revolutionary discontent to overt mutinous action-or, at least, .rst to a mutinous refusal to act-that was the task. On the third day of the struggle the soldiers totally ceased to be able to maintain a benevolent neutrality toward the insurrection. Only accidental fragments of what happened in those hours along the line of contact between workers and soldiers have come down to us. We heard how yesterday the workers complained pa.s.sionately to the Pavlovsky regiment about the behaviour of its training squad. Such scenes, conversations, reproaches, appeals, were occurring in every corner of the city. The soldiers had no more time for hesitation. They were compelled to shoot yesterday, and they would be again to day. The workers will not surrender or retreat; under .re they are still holding their own. And with them their women-wives, mothers, sisters, sweethearts. Yes, and this is the very hour they had so often whispered about: "If only we could all get together ..." And the moment of supreme agony, in the unbearable fear of the coming day, the choking hatred of those who are imposing upon them the executioner's rle, there ring out in the barrack room the .rst voices of open indignation, and in those voices-to be for ever nameless-the whole army with relief and rapture recognises itself. Thus dawned upon the earth the day of destruction of the Romanov monarchy.

At a morning conference in the home of the indefatigable Kayurov, where over forty shop and factory representatives had a.s.sembled, a majority spoke for continuing the move-ment. A majority, but not all. Too bad we cannot establish what majority, but in those hours there was no time for records. Anyway, the decision was belated. The meeting was inter-rupted by the intoxicating news of the soldiers' insurrection and the opening of the gaols. Shurkanov kissed all those present. A kiss of Judas, but not, fortunately, to be followed by a cruci.xion.

One after another, from early morning, the Reserve Guard battalions mutinied before they were led out of the barracks, continuing what the 4th Company of the Pavlovsky regiment had begun the day before. In the doc.u.ments, records, memoirs, this grandiose event of human history has left but a pale, dim imprint. The oppressed ma.s.ses, even when they rise to the very heights of creative action, tell little of themselves and write less. And the overpowering rapture of the victory later erases memory's work. Let us take up what records there are.

The soldiers of the Volynsky regiment were the .rst to revolt. As early as seven o'clock in the morning a battalion commander disturbed Khabalov with a telephone call and this threatening news: the training squad-that is, the unit especially relied on to put down the insurrection-had refused to march out, its commander was killed, or had shot himself in front of the troops. The latter version, by the way, was soon rejected. Having burned their bridges behind them, the Volintzi hastened to broaden the base of the insurrection. In that lay their only salvation. They rushed into the neighbouring barracks of the Litovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments "calling out" the soldiers, as strikers go from factory to factory calling out the workers. Some time after, Khabalov received a report that the Volynsky regiment had not only refused to surrender their ri.es when ordered by the general, but together with the Litovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments-and what is even more alarming, "having joined the workers"-had wrecked the barracks of the political police. This meant that yesterday's experiment of the Pavlovtsi had not been in vain: the insurrection had found leaders, and at the same time a plan of action.

In the early hours of the 27th, the workers thought the solution of the problem of the insurrection in.nitely more distant than it really was. It would be truer to say that they saw the problem as almost entirely ahead of them, when it was really, nine-tenths behind. The revolutionary pressure of the workers on the barracks fell in with the existing revolutionary movement of the soldiers to the streets. During the day these two mighty currents united to wash out clean and carry away the walls, the roof, and later the whole groundwork of the old structure.

Chugurin was among the .rst to appear at the Bolshevik headquarters, a ri.e in his hands, a cartridge belt over his shoulder," all spattered up, but beaming and triumphant." Why shouldn't he beam? Soldiers with ri.es in their hands are coming over to us! In some places the workers had succeeded in uniting with the soldiers, penetrating the barracks and receiving ri.es and cartridges. The Vyborgtsi together with the most daring of the soldiers, outlined a plan of action: seize the police stations where the armed police have entrenched themselves; disarm all policemen; free the workers held in the police stations, and the political prisoners in the gaols; rout the government troops in the city proper; unite with the still inactive troops and with the workers of other districts.

The Moscow regiment joined the uprising not without inner struggle. Amazing that there was so little struggle among the regiments. The monarchist command impotently fell away from the soldier ma.s.s, and either hid in the cracks or hastened to change its colours. "At two o'clock," remembers Korolev, a worker from the "a.r.s.enal" factory, "when the Moscow regiment marched out, we armed ourselves.... We took a revolver and ri.e apiece, picked out a group of soldiers who came up some of them asked us to take command and tell them what to do, and set out for Tikhvinskaia street to shoot up the police station." The workers, it seems, did not have a moment's trouble telling the soldiers "what to do."

One after another came the joyful reports of victories. Our own armoured cars have appeared! With red .ags .ying, they are spreading terror through the districts to all who have not yet submitted. Now it will no longer be necessary to crawl under the belly of a Cossack's horse. The revolution is standing up to its full height.

Toward noon Petrograd again became the .eld of military action; ri.es and machine guns rang out everywhere. It was not easy to tell who was shooting or where. One thing was clear: the past and the future were exchanging shots. There was much casual .ring; young boys were shooting off revolvers unexpectedly acquired. The a.r.s.enal was wrecked.

"They say that several tens of thousands of Brownings alone were carried off" From the burning buildings of the District Court and the police stations pillars of smoke rolled to the sky. At some points clashes and skirmishes thickened into real battles. On Sampsonievsky boulevard the workers came up to a barrack occupied by the bicycle men, some of whom crowded into the gate." Why don't you get on the move, comrades?" The soldiers smiled "not a good smile," one of the partic.i.p.ants testi.es and remained silent, while the of.cers rudely commanded the workers to move on. The bicyclists, along with the cavalry, proved to be the most conservative part of, the army in the February, as in the October revolution. A crowd of workers and revolutionary soldiers soon gathered round the fence. "We must pull out the suspicious battalion!" Someone reported that the armoured cars had been sent for; perhaps there was no other way of getting these bicyclists, who had set up the machine guns. But it is hard for a crowd to wait; it is anxiously impatient, and quite right in its impatience. Shots rang out from both sides. But the board fence stood in the way, dividing the soldiers from the revolution. The attackers decided to break down the fence. They broke down part of it and set .re to the rest. About twenty barracks came into view. The bicyclists were concentrated in two or three of them. The empty barracks were set .re to at once. Six years later Kayurov would recall: "The .aming barracks and the wreckage of the fence around them, the .re of machine guns and ri.es, the excited faces of the besiegers, a truck load of armed revolutionises das.h.i.+ng up, and .nally an armoured car arriving with its gleaming gun mouths, made a memorable and magni.cent picture." This was the old czarist, feudal, priestly, police Russia burning down, barracks and fences and all, expiring in .re and smoke, spewing out its soul with the cough of machine-gun shots. No wonder Kayurov, and tens, hundreds, thousands of Kayurovs, rejoiced! The arriving armoured car .red several sh.e.l.ls at the barracks where the bicyclists and of.cers were barricaded. The commander was killed. The of.cers, tearing off their epaulets and other insignia, .ed through the vegetable gardens adjoining the barracks; the rest gave them selves up. This was probably the biggest encounter of the day.

The military revolt had meanwhile become epidemic. Only those did not mutiny that day who did not get around to it. Toward evening the s.e.m.e.novsky regiment joined in, a regiment notorious for its brutal putting down of the Moscow uprising of 1905. Eleven years had not pa.s.sed in vain. Together with the cha.s.seurs, the s.e.m.e.novtsi late at night "called out" the lzmailovtsi, whom the command were holding locked up in their barracks. This regiment, which on December 3, 1905 had surrounded and arrested the .rst Petrograd soviet, was even now considered one of the most backward.

The czarist garrison of the capital, numbering 150,000 soldiers, was dwindling, melting, disappearing. By night it no longer existed.

After the morning's news of the revolt of the regiments, Khabalov still tried to offer resistance, sending against the revolution a composite regiment of about a thousand men with the most drastic orders. But the fate of that regiment has become quite a mystery. "Something impossible begins to happen on that day," the incomparable Khabalov relates after the revolution, " . . . the regiment starts, starts under a brave, a resolute of.cer (mean-ing Colonel Kutyepov), but ... there are no results." Companies sent after that regiment also vanished, leaving no trace. The general began to draw up reserves on Palace Square, "but there were no cartridges and nowhere to get them." This is taken from Khabalov's au-thentic testimony before the Commission of Inquiry of the Provisional Government. What became of the punitive regiments? It is not hard to guess that as soon as they marched out they were drowned in the insurrection. Workers, women, youths, rebel soldiers, swarmed around Khabalov's troops on all sides, either considering the regiment their own or striving to make it so, and did not let them move any way but with the mult.i.tude. To .ght with this thick swarming, inexhaustible, all-penetrating ma.s.s, which now feared nothing, was as easy as to fence in dough.

Together with reports of more and more military revolts, came demands for reliable troops to put down the rebels, to defend the telephone building, the Litovsky Castle, the Mariinsky Palace, and other even more sacred places. Khabalov demanded by telephone that loyal troops be sent from Kronstadt, but the commandant replied that he himself feared for the fortress. Khabalov did not yet know that the insurrection had spread to the neigh-bouring Garrisons. The general attempted, or pretended to attempt, to convert the Winter Palace into a redoubt, but the plan was immediately abandoned as unrealisable, and the last handful of "loyal" troops was transferred to the Admiralty. Here at last the dictator occupied himself with a most important and urgent business he printed for publication the last two governmental decrees on the retirement of Protopopov "owing to illness," and on the state of siege in Petrograd. With the latter he really had to hurry, for several hours later Khabalov's army lifted the "siege" and departed from the Admiralty for their homes. It was due only to ignorance that the revolution had not already on the evening of the 27th arrested this formidably empowered but not at all formidable general. This was done without any complications the next day.

Can it be that that was the whole resistance put up by the redoubtable Russian Empire in the face of mortal danger? Yet that was about all-in spite of its great experience in crus.h.i.+ng the people and its meticulously elaborated plans. When the came to themselves later, the monarchists explained the case of the February victory of the people by the peculiar char-acter of the Petrograd garrison. But the whole further course of the revolution refutes this explanation. True, at the beginning of the fatal year, the camarilla had already suggested to the czar the advisability of renovating the garrison. The czar had easily allowed himself to be persuaded that the cavalry of the Guard, considered especially loyal, "had been under .re long enough" and had earned a rest in its Petrograd barracks. However, after respectful representations from the front, the czar agreed that four regiments of the cavalry Guard should be replaced by three crews of the naval Guard. According to Protopopov's version, this replacement was made by the command without the czar's consent, and with treach-erous design: " . . . The sailors are recruited from among the workers and const.i.tute the most revolutionary element of' the forces." But this is sheer nonsense. The highest of.cers of the Guard, and particularly the cavalry, were simply cutting out too good a career for themselves at the front to want to come back. Besides that, they must have thought with some dread of the punitive functions to be allotted to them. In these they would be at the head of troops totally different after their experience at the front from what they used to be on the parade grounds of the capital. As events at the front soon proved, the horse Guard at this time no longer differed from the rest of the cavalry, and the naval Guard, which was transferred to the capital, did not play an active part in the February revolution. The whole truth is that the fabric of the rgime had completely decayed; there was not a live thread left.

During the 27th of February the crowd liberated without bloodshed from the many gaols of the capital, all political prisoners-among them the patriotic group of the Military and Industrial Committee, which had been arrested on the 26th of January, and the members of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolsheviks, seized by Khabalov forty hours earlier. A political division occurred immediately outside the prison gates. The Menshevik-patriots set out for the Duma, where functions and places were to be a.s.signed; the Bolsheviks marched to the districts, to the workers and soldiers, to .nish with them the conquest of the capital. The enemy must have no time to breathe. A revolution, more than any other enterprise, has to be carried through to the end.

It is impossible to say who thought of leading the mutinous troops to the Tauride Palace. This political line of march was dictated by the whole situation. Naturally all the elements of radicalism not bound up with the ma.s.ses gravitated toward the Tauride Palace as the cen-tre of oppositional information. Quite probably these elements, having experienced on the 27th a sudden injection of vital force, became the guides of the mutinous soldiers. This was an honourable ro1e and now hardly a dangerous one. In view of its location, Potemkin's palace was well .tted to be the centre of the revolution. The Tauride' is separated by just one street from the whole military community, containing the barracks of the Guard and a series of military inst.i.tutions. It is true that for many years this part of the city was considered both by the government and the revolutionises to be the military stronghold of the monarchy. And so it was. But now everything had changed. The soldiers' rebellion had begun in the Guard sector. The mutinous troops had only to cross the street in order to reach the park of the Tauride Palace, which in turn was only one block from the Neva River. And beyond the Neva lies the Vyborg district, the very cauldron of the revolution. The workers need only cross Alexander's Bridge, or if that is up, walk over the ice of the river, to reach the Guards' barracks or the Tauride Palace. Thus the heterogeneous, and in its origins contradictory, north east triangle of Petrograd-the Guards, Potemkin's palace, and the giant factories-closely interlocked-became the .eld of action of the revolution.

In the Tauride Palace various centres are already created, or at least sketched out-among them the .eld staff of the insurrection. It has no very serious character. The revolutionary of.cers-that is, those of.cers who had somehow or other, even though by mistake, got con-nected with the revolution in the past, but who have safely slept through the insurrection-hasten after the victory to call attention to themselves, or upon summons from others arrive "to serve the revolution." They survey the situation with profound thought and pessimisti-cally shake their heads. These tumultuous crowds of soldiers, often unarmed, are totally un.t for battle. No artillery, no machine guns, no communications, no commanders. One strong regiment is all the enemy needs! To be sure, just now the revolutionary crowds pre-vent any planned manoeuvres in the streets. But the workers will go home for the night, the residents will quiet down, the town will be emptied. If Khabalov were to strike with a strong regiment at the barracks, he might become master of the situation. This idea, by the way, will meet us in different versions throughout all the stages of the revolution. "Give me a strong regiment," gallant colonels will more than once exclaim to their friends, "and in two seconds I will clean up all this mess!" And some of them, as we shall see, will make the attempt. But they will all have to repeat Khabalov's words: "The regiment starts, starts' under a brave of.cer, but ... there are no results."

Yes, and how could there be results? The most reliable of all possible forces had been the police and the gendarmes, and the training squads of certain regiments. But these proved as pitiful before the a.s.sault of the real ma.s.ses as the Battalion of St. George and the of.cers' training schools were to prove eight months later in October. Where could the monarchy get that salvation regiment, ready and able to enter a prolonged and desperate duel with a city of two million? The revolution seems defenceless to these verbally so en-terprising colonels, because it is still terri.cally chaotic. Everywhere aimless movements, con.icting currents, whirlpools of people, individuals astounded as though suddenly gone deaf, unfastened trench coats, gesticulating students, soldiers without ri.es, ri.es without soldiers, boys .ring into the air, a thousand-voiced tumult, hurricanes of wild rumour, false alarms, false rejoicing. Enough, you would think, to lift a sword over all that chaos, and it would scatter apart and leave never a trace. But that is a crude error of vision. It is only seeming chaos. Beneath it is proceeding an irresistible crystallisation of the ma.s.ses around new axes. These innumerable crowds have not yet clearly de.ned what they want, but they are saturated with an acid hatred of what they do not want. Behind them is an irreparable historic avalanche. There is no way back. Even if there were someone to scatter them, they would be gathering again in an hour, and the second .ood would be more furious and bloodier than the .rst. After the February days the atmosphere of Petrograd becomes so red hot that every hostile military detachment arriving in that mighty forge, or even coming near to it, scorched by its breath, is transformed, loses con.dence, becomes paralysed, and throws itself upon the mercy of the victor without a struggle. To-morrow General Ivanov, sent from the front by the czar with a battalion of the. Knights of St. George, will .nd this out. In .ve months the same fate will befall General Kornilov, and in eight months it will happen to Kerensky.

On the streets in the preceding days the Cossacks had seemed the most open to persua-sion; it was because they were the most abused. But when it came to the actual insurrection, the cavalry once more justi.ed its conservative reputation and lagged behind the infantry. On the 27th, it was still preserving the appearance of watchful neutrality. Though Khabalov no longer relied upon it, the revolution still feared it.

The fortress of Peter and Paul, which stands on an island in the Neva opposite the Winter Palace and the palaces of the grand dukes, remained a puzzle. Behind its walls the garrison of the fortress was, or seemed to be, a little world completely s.h.i.+elded from outside in.uences. The fortress had no permanent artillery except for that antiquated cannon which daily announced the noon, hour to Petrograd. But to day .eld guns are set up on the walls and aimed at the bridge. What are they getting ready for? The Tauride staff has worried all night what to do about the fortress, and in the fortress they were worrying what will the revolution do with us? By morning the puzzle is solved: "On condition that of.cers remain inviolable," the fortress will surrender to the Tauride Palace. Having a.n.a.lysed the situation-not so dif.cult a thing to do-the of.cers of the fort hastened to forestall the inevitable march of events.

Towards evening of the 27th, a stream of soldiers, workers, students and miscellaneous people .ows toward the Tauride, Palace. Here they hope to .nd those who know every-thing to get information and instructions. From all sides ammunition is being carried by armfuls into the palace, and deposited in a room that has been converted into an a.r.s.enal. At nightfall, the revolutionary staff settles down to work. It sends out detachments to guard the railway stations, and despatches reconnoitring squads wherever danger lurks. The soldiers carry out eagerly and without a murmur, although very unsystematically, the orders of the new authorities. But they always demand a written order. The initiative in this probably came from the fragments of the military staff which had remained with the troops, or from the military clerks. But they were right; it is necessary to bring order immediately into the chaos. The staff, as well as the new born Soviet, had as yet no seals. The revolution has still to .t itself out with the implements of bureaucratic management. In time this will be done-alas, too well.

The revolution begins a search for enemies. Arrests are made all over the city-"arbitrarily," as the liberals will say reproachfully later. But the whole revolution is arbitrary. Streams of people are brought into the Tauride under arrest such people as the Chairman of the State Council, ministers, policemen, secret service men, the "pro-German" countess, whole broods of gendarme of.cers. Several statesmen, such as Protopopov, will come of their own volition to be arrested: it is safer so. "The walls of the chamber which had resounded to hymns in praise of absolutism, now heard but sobbing and sighs," the countess will sub-sequently relate. "An arrested general sank down exhausted on a near-by chair. Several members of the Duma kindly offered me a cup of tea. Shaken to the depths of his soul, the general was saying excitedly: Countess, we are witnessing the death of a great country."

Meanwhile, the great country, which had no intention of dying, marched by these people of the past, stamping its boots, clanging the b.u.t.ts of its ri.es, rending the air with its shouts, and stepping all over their feet. A revolution is always distinguished by impoliteness, probably because the ruling cla.s.ses did not take the trouble in good season to teach the people .ne manners.

The Tauride became the temporary .eld headquarters, governmental centre, a.r.s.enal, and prison-fortress of the revolution, which had not yet wiped the blood and sweat from its face. Into this whirlpool some enterprising enemies also made their way. A disguised captain of gendarmes was accidentally discovered taking down notes in a corner-not for history, but for the court-martials. The soldiers and workers wanted to end him right there. But people from the "staff" interfered, and easily led the gendarme out of the crowd. The revolution was then still good-natured, trustful and kind-hearted. It will become ruthless only after a long series of treasons, deceits and b.l.o.o.d.y trials.

The .rst night of the triumphant revolution was full of alarms. The improvised com-missars of the railway terminals and other points, most of them chosen haphazard from the intelligentsia through personal connection, upstarts and chance acquaintances of the revolution-non-commissioned of.cers, especially of worker origin, would have been more useful-got nervous, saw danger on all sides, nagged the soldiers and ceaselessly telephoned to the Tauride asking for reinforcements. But in the Tauride too they were nervous. They were telephoning. They were sending out reinforcements which for the most part did not arrive. "Those who receive orders," said a member of the Tauride night staff, "do not execute them; those who act, act without orders."

The workers' districts act without orders. The Revolutionary chiefs who have led out their factories, seized the police stations, "called out" the soldiers and wrecked the strongholds of the counter-revolution, do not hurry to the Tauride Palace, to the staffs, to the administrative centres. On the contrary, they jerk their heads in that direction with irony and distrust: "Those brave boys are getting in early to divide the game they didn't kill-before it's even killed." Worker-Bolsheviks, as well as the best workers of the other Left parties, spend their days on the streets, their nights in the district headquarters, keeping in touch with the barracks and preparing to-morrow's work. On the .rst night of victory they continue, and they enlarge, the same work they have been at for the whole .ve days and nights. They are the young bones of the revolution, still soft, as all revolutions are in the .rst days.

On the 27th, Nabokov, already known to us as a member of the Kadet centre, and at that time working-a legalised deserter-at General Headquarters, went to his of.ce as usual and stayed until three o'clock, knowing nothing of the events. Toward evening shots were heard on the Morskaia. Nabokov listened to them from his apartment. Armoured cars dashed along, individual soldiers and sailors ran past, sidling along the wall. The respected liberal observed them from the side windows of his vestibule. "The telephone continued to function, and my friends, I remember, kept me in touch with what was going on during the day. At the usual time we went to bed." This man will soon become one of the inspi-rators of the revolutionary (!) Provisional Government, occupying the position of General Administrator. To-morrow an unknown old man will approach him on the street-a book-keeper, perhaps, or a teacher-bow low and remove his hat, and say to him: "Thank you for all that you have done for the people." Nabokov, with modest pride, will relate the incident himself.

Nevsky Prospect, the main avenue of the city. [Trans.]

Vyborgtsi means the men of the Vyborg district the workers just as Pavlovtsi means men of the Pavlovsky regiment. In the singular, Pavlovets. [Trans.]

CHAPTER 8.

WHO LED THE FEBRUARY.

INSURRECTION?.

Lawyers and journalists belonging to the cla.s.ses damaged by the revolution wasted a good deal of ink subsequently trying to prove that what happened in February was essentially a petticoat rebellion, backed up afterwards by a soldiers' mutiny and given out for a revolu-tion. Louis XVI in his day also tried to think that the capture of the Bastille was a rebellion, but they respectfully explained to him that it was a revolution. Those who lose by a rev-olution are rarely inclined to call it by its real name. For that name, in spite of the efforts of spiteful reactionaries, is surrounded in the historic memory of mankind with a halo of liberation from all shackles and all prejudices. The privileged cla.s.ses of every age, as also their lackeys, have always tried to declare the revolution which overthrew them, in contrast to past revolutions, a mutiny, a riot, a revolt of the rabble. Cla.s.ses which have outlived themselves are not distinguished by originality.

Soon after the 27th of February attempts were also made to liken the revolution to the military coup d'etat of the Young Turks, of which, as we know, they had been dream-ing not a little in the upper circles of the Russian bourgeoisie. This comparison was so hopeless, however, that it was seriously opposed even in one of the bourgeois papers. Tugan-Baranovsky, an economist who had studied Marx in his youth, a Russian variety of Sombart, wrote on March 10 in the Birzhevoe Vedomosti: "The Turkish revolution con-sisted in a victorious uprising of the army, prepared and carried out by the leaders of the army; the soldiers were merely obedient executives of the plans of their of.cers. But the regiments of the Guard which on February 27 overthrew the Russian throne, came without their of.cers. Not the army but the workers began the insurrection; not the generals but the soldiers came to the State Duma. The soldiers supported the workers not because they were obediently ful.lling the commands of their of.cers, but because . . . they felt themselves blood brothers of the workers as a cla.s.s compos