Ismailia Part 20

They met the natives; and Monsoor and Achmet Bash Choush had a narrow escape from lances. The Baris lost three killed and two prisoners.

On that day the river rose four feet six, which was the highest flood during the wet season.

On 10th July, at mid-day, several hundred Baris, having cautiously approached the grazing cattle un.o.bserved, made a sudden rush from the bushes upon the guards, killing one soldier and wounding another. The soldiers belonged to the line, and must have behaved badly, as the musket and cartouche-box and belt were stolen and carried off from the dead man. The shots from the guard immediately alarmed the camp. The horses were saddled, and, attended by Lieutenant Baker, I rode hard in pursuit. The natives had gained the forest and had scattered, but we rode a red-painted savage to bay, who fought to the last, shooting two arrows at me, which I avoided by dropping quickly on my horse's neck, and a third arrow stuck deeply in Mr. Baker's saddle as he escaped the well-aimed shot by spurring his horse across the line of sight. These arrows were shot at a distance of a very few yards. The native was killed.

On 12th July the Baris attempted to surprise both my station and the camp at head-quarters.

On the 13th the natives repeated the attempt; but one was shot dead by the sentry at Gondokoro; also another met the same fate at my station.

Nearly every night we were subject to attempts at surprise. This was excellent practice for the troops, as it taught them the, necessity of keeping a good look-out; at the same time it was very wearying, as the men had to work hard all day, and they were kept awake at night.

The Baris were irrepressible vermin that gave us no rest. My men were all occupied in building the station, therefore it was impossible for me to take a flying column and give the Baris a severe lesson; but I made up my mind that when the work should be finished, I would take the fight out of them most thoroughly. They now considered us fair game, that they might insult as they thought proper; and I heard from our two faithful allies, Sherroom and Morgian, that they imagined we should become afraid of them, and then return to Khartoum.

They teased us at night like rats, but they lost many men. I rather admired them for their persistence, as the scouts must have been adventurous fellows. Whenever these people were taken prisoners, they confessed that they were the spies of the main body that was concealed at some distance in the rear. The favourite method of a Bari attack is during the night, when the darkness reduces the danger of fire-arms. On such occasions they generally halt either in forest or high gra.s.s, according to circ.u.mstances, about half a mile from the camp they propose to attack. Scouts are sent forward to ascertain the position and vigilance of sentries before the advance of the main body. The scouts, being quite naked, crawl upon their hands and knees until the darkness permits them to approach within a few yards of the sentries. They then lie flat upon their bellies un.o.bserved until they can retreat to the expectant body in their rear.

The attacking force now advances in perfect silence, and approaching upon hands and knees in the same manner as the scouts, they suddenly spring upon the sentries, and with wild yells make a general rush upon the camp. This sudden attack would be extremely dangerous unless provided against; and in this manner large parties of the slave-hunters have been completely destroyed.

Our pa.s.sive resistance to the numerous native attempts at surprise had been misconstrued by the Baris into timidity. The news had spread throughout the country that we should not venture far inland: thus a grand alliance had been made among the tribes. The Baris desired to make friends with their powerful enemy, the Loquia: they accordingly invited this tribe to form an alliance and to join in a combined attack upon Gondokoro, by which means they hoped to overpower and destroy our force, and to become possessed of many thousand cattle which were now at head-quarters.

The Loquia consented; thus we were exposed to a grand coalition. In the mean time Abou Saood and his people, in their camp on the west side of the river, continued to be most friendly with the enemies of the government, and supplied the Belinian natives with ammunition.

At 1.30. a.m., on July 21, I was awakened by the sound of firing at head-quarters.

I was dressed and armed in a few minutes. The bugle sounded the alarm, and "The Forty" fell into position.

I heard the bugles at head-quarters, together with a confused din of native drums, horns, and yells. The first shots had appeared to proceed from the sentries, but these were shortly succeeded by heavy file-firing from the whole force at the camp. An attack had evidently been made, and a regular fight was going on: it was therefore to be expected that my small force would soon have to act on the defensive. Spare ammunition was quickly in readiness, and we were well prepared.

In the mean time, a general action was growing hotter every moment; the yells of the natives and the din of their horns became louder. I was momentarily expecting to hear the sound of cannon, and I was speculating upon the effect that the fire of ten guns loaded with case shot would have among such a crowd of enemies; but to my astonishment not a gun was fired. Simply the roll of musketry continued.

In about half an hour the native yells grew fainter, the noise of their horns and drums was reduced, and the heavy firing dwindled to dropping shots. I heard the bugles sound "cease firing." I then heard "the advance." Again firing commenced, this time in volleys; then I heard once more "cease firing," and then "the retreat:" the attack was repulsed.

I could not understand why my little station had not been attacked; but I subsequently heard that the natives were more afraid of the "Forty Thieves" than of the entire force. Added to this was the powerful reason that I had only a few cows for milk, while the attraction of many thousand head of cattle induced an attack on the camp at Gondokoro.

On the following morning before sunrise I rode up to camp to hear the news. It appeared that the natives had actually surprised the sentries.

We had lost a corporal, killed; and a lieutenant and one soldier were wounded by arrows.

The Baris and the Loquia had attacked in large force with the intention of burning the station, as many were provided with flaming firebrands, with which they had advanced bravely to the edge of the thorn fence. Had the station not been protected by this defence it is probable that the enemy might have succeeded in firing the houses.

As usual, the troops had fired badly. Such a fusilade as I had heard should have covered the plain with dead. The officers and men declared that great numbers of the enemy were killed, but their comrades had carried off the bodies. This was true to a certain extent, as I saw blood in many directions, and we found one Loquia lying dead with two bullet wounds, through the head and thigh.

There can be no doubt that the camp was surprised through the neglect of the patrol and the sleepiness of sentries, and it was only saved by the thorn fence and the fire of so large a force as 1,100 men. The colonel in command of the troops, Raouf Bey, could give no satisfactory explanation for the silence of the artillery, but he subsequently told me they HAD FORGOTTEN ITS EXISTENCE in the excitement of the moment.

Another officer told me they had brought up one gun, but could not find the key of the ammunition. I remembered what David said in his haste, and I came to the conclusion that they had been disgracefully surprised.

I determined to lose no time in protecting the station by a ditch and earthwork, so that I could leave a garrison without risk, and I would then attack the country in every direction.

The iron magazines were completed, and all goods and supplies were stored. The camp was so far finished that the men were housed. I therefore drew a plan for the fort, which I intrusted to the care of Mr.

Higginbotham, the chief engineer, for execution. I gave orders that all hands, including the sailors, should immediately be employed to dig the fosse. The expedition was well supplied with tools, and the work was commenced with vigour, as the officers and men did not object to have a deep ditch between them and the enemy.

I also planned a triangular fort as a protection to my small herd of about a hundred milch cows at my own station. The "Forty Thieves" did not require a fort, but the cattle might be carried off by a sudden rush that would induce a stampede unless they were well secured.

"The Forty" set to work, a.s.sisted daily by thirty men from head-quarters, and we soon had a strong fort, with ditch and rampart, that defied attack.

A short time after the grand surprise of the camp at head-quarters, the last attempt was made upon my little station, which ended as usual in my men being well on the alert, and in the death of one of the scouts, shot by the outlying guard through the thigh. Before he died, he confessed that the Belinian and the Loquia, together with the Baris of Gondokoro, had united in the general attack on the camp on the 21st; but that they had lost many men, who, being badly wounded, had died on the road during the retreat.

My little station from this date went out of fas.h.i.+on, and the Baris declined to attack, as they subsequently declared that my sentries were never asleep like those at head-quarters.

"The Forty" had earned a reputation that increased their self-respect.

Not only were they nearly sure to kill the wily scouts, but patrols at night searched out the natives, and generally came upon them with fatal effect.

CHAPTER X

DESTRUCTION OF THE s.h.i.+R DETACHMENT.

On July 30, 1871, I was astonished by the arrival of the tall sheik, Niambore, with whom I had left an officer and six men in the s.h.i.+r tribe, to superintend the cultivation of corn. This fine-looking fellow was introduced, accompanied by five of his princ.i.p.al advisers. He shortly told me his story. He had been four nights on the road, as he had not dared to travel by day, fearing the Baris: thus, in the dark, he had frequently wandered from the track. In the daytime he had slept in the concealment of forests.

He had run this risk in order to be the first to give me the bad news, lest I should suspect him of foul play. All my soldiers were killed, except the major, Achmet Rafik, and a corporal!

When Abou Saood had pa.s.sed his country some weeks since, his people had attacked a neighbouring sheik, and had carried off a large number of cattle, although he was aware of the presence of a government officer with a very small detachment. Abou Saood had sent three of the captured cows as a present to the officer in command, Achmet Rafik, who, instead of protesting against the razzia, had, Turk-like, actually accepted the present, and thus had fallen into the snare.

The natives, smarting under the unprovoked attack, visited Niambore, and desired him to send my men out of the country, as they were evidently leagued with those of Abou Saood. The sheik Niambore refused, and declared that he should protect them until he received further orders from me. This implicated Niambore, and the neighbours then insisted upon the sacrifice of Achmet Rafik and his few soldiers in revenge for their lost cattle. Niambore, with a chivalry that is rare among negroes, declared his determination of sheltering my people until he should communicate with me. He was attacked at night by the neighbouring sheiks; and my soldiers a.s.sisted him in the defence. The attack was repulsed, and he determined to return the compliment on the following day, with the a.s.sistance of the soldiers. After a long march across many deep channels, the battle went against him, and in a precipitate retreat, the soldiers could not swim the deep channels like Niambore's people; they were accordingly overtaken and killed, with the loss of their arms and accoutrements, now in possession of the natives.

Major Achmet Rafik and a corporal were safe, as they were both ill, and had therefore not accompanied the five soldiers in the attack. Niambore had faithfully exposed himself to great danger in order to secure their protection, and they were now in his keeping, concealed in a forest about a day's march from the village which had been their station.

On the following day I sent the steamer off at 9 p.m. with Niambore and twenty men, the moon being full. The river had risen about four feet six inches, therefore there was no fear of her touching a sand-bank. At the same time I wrote to Abou Saood, giving him notice of his responsibility for the loss of the government troops, caused by his unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression. (From that time, I of course gave up all ideas of returning the cattle that had been captured by Abou Saood, as I had originally intended. Such an act, after the destruction of my men, would have been received by the s.h.i.+r as a proof of fear.)

All my antic.i.p.ations of successful cultivation had been fruitless. The drought of this year had caused a general scarcity. The months of July and August should have the heaviest rainfall; July had just expired with a rainfall of only 1.13 inch. The mean temperature had been 71 degrees F at 6 a.m.; at noon, 84 degrees F.

I was very anxious about our supply of dhurra, which would not last much longer. On 1st August I ordered the troops to receive fifteen days'

rations of rice, so as to save the small stock of dhurra until the crops should be ripe upon the island. These were guarded by a company of troops. I extract the following entry from my journal:-

"August 2, 1871. --The Soudani soldiers are discontented with their rations of dhurra; and to-day I was addressed by an unreasonable mob, demanding an increase of corn which does not exist. These people never think of to-morrow, and during the long voyage from Tewfikeeyah they have been stealing the corn, and drinking merissa heedless of the future.

"The black colonel, Tayib Agha, is much to blame for the discontent, as he has, upon several occasions, in THE PRESENCE OF THE TROOPS, told Mr.

Higginbotham and myself that 'the men could not work well because they were hungry.' This foolish remark, made before the soldiers by their own lieutenant-colonel, is certain to create bad feeling.

"I went across to the island to examine the corn: the greater portion of the crop will be ready in about eight days, but the Baris, in spite of the guards, are stealing large quant.i.ties during the night.

"The terrible difficulty in this country is the want of corn; and now that all direct communication with Khartoum is cut off by the obstructions in the Nile, the affair is most serious. The natives are all hostile, thus a powerful force is absolutely necessary, but the difficulty is to feed this force.

"I wrote an official letter to Raouf Bey to caution Lieutenant-Colonel Tayib Agha against making remarks in the presence of his troops."

On August 3 the steamer returned, bringing Achmet Rafik and the sole surviving soldier from the s.h.i.+r. This officer declared his men to have been insubordinate, and that they joined the natives against his orders to make an attack upon their enemies in return for attacks on their part.

Two witnesses, the surviving soldier and the wife of one that was killed, declared that Achmet Rafik himself gave the men orders to fight the tribe, in company with the people of Niambore; but fearing responsibility for the result, he now laid the onus of failure upon the insubordination of the men. (The fact remained that in consequence of the razzia made by Abou Saood's orders the natives attacked Niambore and my people. In self-defence, Niambore and my few men returned the attack, and my soldiers were killed. The s.h.i.+r were thus rendered hostile with the exception of Niambore.)

My people were so obtuse that they could not understand the true position of affairs. The harvest was commencing. I had jealously guarded the corn upon the island, which should have produced at least 500 urdeps; but the officers and men did not wish to see the granaries filled, as that fact would destroy the excuse for a return to Khartoum; thus, instead of labouring with heart and soul to gather the harvest, they worked so lazily, that in nine days they only reaped 237 urdeps, or not one half that was actually upon the fields. They permitted the natives to steal by night, and the swarms of small birds destroyed an incredible quant.i.ty by day. These innumerable and ruinous pests do not consume the entire grain, but they nibble the soft sweet portion from the joint of each seed, neatly picking out the heart; thus the ground beneath is strewed with their remnants of destruction.

I had not visited Belinian since their unprovoked attack, for two reasons. First, we were engaged in fortifying the station; and, secondly, I did not wish to raise the suspicion among the Baris that I might come down suddenly upon their crops. Up to the present time we had acted mainly on the defensive, and the natives had no fear for their harvest. I knew that about 2,000 acres of dhurra would be at our service by a sudden attack on Belinian, if the troops would work earnestly to secure it. At the same time I was afraid to mention the subject, lest some intrigue might destroy the possibility of success.