England's Case Against Home Rule Part 4

sisters; we may not during this generation get the blessing of a good criminal code, if Mr. Parnell and his followers sit in Parliament prepared to practice all the arts of obstruction. The Irish members, in the second place, perturb and falsify the whole system of party government. The majority of Great Britain wish to be ruled say by Lord Salisbury; the Parnellites do not care whether Lord Salisbury or Mr.

Gladstone is Premier, but they do care for making the English executive feeble, and ridiculous. They can, therefore, by the practice of a very little art, seize some opportunity of putting Lord Salisbury in a minority, and turning him out of office. Mr. Gladstone comes back into what is ironically called power. The same game begins again. The Parnellites coalesce with the Tories, we have a change of Cabinet, and possibly a dissolution. Nor are changes of Ministry the whole of the evil. The high tone of party politics is degraded. English or Scottish members of Parliament are but men; they are liable to be tempted; the Parnellites have the means of offering temptation; and temptation, members of Parliament intimate to us, will in the long run be too great for their virtue. The presence, in short, at Westminster of eighty-six gentlemen who do not respect the dignity or care for the efficiency of Parliament is absolutely fatal to the success of Parliamentary government, and to the character of Parliamentary statesmans.h.i.+p. We must, it is inferred, let the Parnellites have a Parliament of their own in Ireland, or else we shall soon cease to have any Parliament worth keeping in England.

[Sidenote: Criticism.]

The force of this line of argument, as far as it goes, cannot be denied.

The presence in the House of Commons of politicians disloyal to Parliament causes immense inconvenience; but to anyone not a member of the House of Commons, it appears singular that men of sense should think the inconveniences of obstruction a sufficient ground for breaking up the Const.i.tution. The whole thing is a question of proportion. The nation suffers a good deal from obstruction, but the suffering is not of a kind to justify revolution. A toothache is a bad thing, but a severe toothache hardly suggests suicide; and though life might not be worth having, if toothache were to last for years, the thoughts of putting an end to one's existence are removed by the knowledge that an aching tooth can be drawn by a dentist. Now the more obvious evils of obstruction can clearly be removed by changes of procedure. Members of Parliament appear to think that to alter the rules of the House of Commons; to curtail and limit the power of debate; to confer, if necessary, upon the Speaker, or upon the bare majority of members present, authority to bring every debate summarily to a close, is something like overthrowing the monarchy, a thing not to be dreamt of by the wildest of innovators.

Plain men outside the walls of Parliament can a.s.sure our representatives, that the world would bear with infinite calmness the imposition of stringent restrictions on the overflow of Parliamentary eloquence. If even the great debate on Home Rule had been finished say in a week, the outer world would have been well pleased; and measures such as the Government of Ireland Bill happily do not come before Parliament every year. The more subtle evils arising in part at least from the presence of the Irish members must be met by more searching remedies. Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused the weakness of government by Parliament. The experience, not of England only, but of other countries, shows the great difficulty of working our present party system of government in a representative a.s.sembly which is divided into more than two parties. The essential difficulty lies in the immediate dependence of a modern ministry for its existence on every vote of the House of Commons. If you see the difficulty, you can also see various means by which it may be removed. In more than one country, and notably in the United States and in Switzerland--states, be it remarked, in which popular government flourishes--the executive, though in the long run amenable to the voice of the people, and though in Switzerland actually appointed by the legislature, is not like an English Cabinet dependent on the fluctuating will of a legislative a.s.sembly. If it were necessary to choose between modifications in the relation of the executive to Parliament, and the repeal of the Act of Union, most Englishmen would think that to increase the independence of the executive--a change probably desirable in itself--was a less evil than a disruption of the United Kingdom, which not only is in itself a gigantic evil, but may well lead to others. A modification, however, in the practice would, for the moment at least, save the real principles of Parliamentary government. Were it once understood that a Ministry would not retire from office except in consequence of a direct vote of want of confidence in the House of Commons, the political power of the Parnellite, or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished.

Meanwhile, members of Parliament may be reminded that it is on them that the duty lies of removing the obstacles which from time to time impede the working of Parliamentary machinery, and that the existence of temptation to political turpitude is not an admitted excuse for yielding to it. In one way or another a majority of 584 members must, if they choose, be able to make head against the minority of 86. Their failure already excites astonishment; the time is coming when it will excite contempt. The English people, moreover, have the remedy in their own hands. By giving to either of the great parties an absolute majority they can terminate all the inconveniences threatened by Parnellite obstruction. The remedy is in their hands, and recent experience suggests that they will not be slow to use it.

A survey of the arguments in favour of Home Rule suggests the following reflections:

The arguments, taken as a whole, do undoubtedly show that the present state of things is accompanied by considerable evils or inconveniences.

They show what no one who has given a thought to the matter ever doubted, that the relation between England and Ireland is unsatisfactory. They are, as far as they go, objections to the maintenance of the Union, but neither the feelings which favour Home Rule, nor the reasons by which they are supported, tell in reality in favour of Home Rule policy. They scarcely tend to show that Home Rule would cure the evils complained of; they certainly do not show, they only a.s.sume, that Home Rule in Ireland would not be injurious to England. They are, in short, arguments in favour of Irish independence; every one of them would be seen in its true character if the Irish demand should take the form of a claim that Ireland should become an independent nation. Meanwhile, even on the Home Rule view, the case stands thus: the present condition of things excites Irish discontent, and involves great evils. We have before us but three courses:--Maintenance of the Union; the concession of Irish independence; the concession of Home Rule to Ireland. The Home Ruler urges that the last is the best course left open to us. To decide whether this be so or not requires a fair examination of the possibilities which each course presents to England.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] For the const.i.tution of Austria-Hungary see Ulbrich's _Oesterreich-Ungarn_ in Marquardsen's _Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts_; Francis Deak, with preface by M.E. Grant Duff; Home Rule in Austria-Hungary, by David King, in the _Nineteenth Century_, January 1886, p. 35.

[5] Ulbrich, pp. 15, 76, 77.

[6] See Marquardsen, 28-30.

[7] This is, in my judgment, true even of such federations as the United States or the Swiss confederacy.

[8] Froude's 'English in Ireland,' vol. 3, pp. 581, 582.

[9] See especially on this subject 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande,' Partie Historique, pp. 15-207.

[10] "On ne saurait considerer attentivement l'Irlande, etudier son histoire et ses revolutions, observer ses moeurs et a.n.a.lyser ses lois, sans reconnaitre que ses malheurs, auxquels ont concouru tant d'accidents funestes, ont eu et ont encore de nos jours, pour cause princ.i.p.ale, une cause _premiere_, radicale, permanente; et qui domine toutes les autres; cette cause, c'est une mauvaise _aristocratie_." 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande,' deuxieme partie, p. 228. The only objection which may be fairly taken to De Beaumont's language, though not to his essential meaning, is, that the words he uses occasionally suggest the idea that he attributes some special vice of nature, so to speak, to the landed cla.s.ses in Ireland, whilst there is, of course, no reason to suppose that the original Norman invaders of Ireland were a whit worse than the Normans they left behind them in England, or that the Cromwellian settlers did not possess the virtues which distinguished Puritan soldiers. What De Beaumont really means is that the aristocracy, or landed gentry, have been from first to last placed in a false position, which has led to their exhibiting the vices, with few of the virtues, of aristocratic government.

[11] Compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., pp. 253-256.

[12] See Dicey, 'Law of the Const.i.tution' (Second Edition), pp. 181-210; and compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., pp. 253-299.

[13] Cromwell's reputation as a statesman suffers even more than that of most great men from the indiscriminating eulogy of admirers. The merit of his Irish policy was not his severity to Catholics, but his equity to Protestants. If he did not acknowledge the equality of man, he at any rate acknowledged what English statesmans.h.i.+p before and after his time refused to admit--the equality of Englishmen, at least when Protestants.

His policy handed down to us a legacy of justifiable hatred on the part of Irish Catholics. But it is the fault not of the Protector, but of his successors, that his policy did not ensure to England the loyalty of every Protestant in Ireland.

[14] The penal laws against the Catholics in England were as severe as those in Ireland. Their practical effect and working was however very different in the two countries. See 1 Lecky,'History of England,' pp.

268-310.

[15] See Walpole, 'Short History of the Kingdom of Ireland,' p. 176.

[16] See a speech of Lord Clare made in defence of the Bill for Establis.h.i.+ng the Union with England, and republished by the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union.

[17] 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' p. 251. It is of primary consequence that Englishmen should realise the undoubted fact, that agrarian conspiracies and agrarian outrages, such as those which baffle the English Government in Ireland, are known to foreign countries. For centuries the question of tenant-right, in a form very like that in which it arises in Ireland, has been known in the parts of France near Saint-Quentin under the name of the _droit de marche_. In France, as in Ireland, tenants have claimed a right unknown to the law, and have enforced the right by outrage, by boycotting, by murder. The _Depointeur_ is the land grabber, and is treated by French peasants precisely as the Irish land grabber is treated by Irish peasants. See Calonne, 'La Vie Agricole, sous l'Ancien Regime,' pp. 66-69. Precisely the same phenomena have appeared in parts of Belgium, where for centuries there has been, in respect of land, the conflict to which we are accustomed in Ireland, between the law of the Courts and the law of the people. "From the commencement of the year 1836 to the end of 1842 there had been" [in consequence of this conflict] "forty-three acts of incendiarism, eleven a.s.sa.s.sinations, and seven agrarian outrages entailing capital punishment," all within a limited part of Belgium. See Parliamentary Reports on Tenure of Land in Countries of Europe, 1869, p.

118-123. In Belgium decisive measures of punishment at last put an end to agrarian outrages. What should be specially noted is that in France and Belgium crimes in character exactly resembling the agrarian outrages which take place in Ireland had, it is admitted, no connection whatever with national, or even it would seem with general political feeling.

[18] See 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale,' &c., p. 251.

[19] 2 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, Politique et Religeuse.'

Septieme edition, pp. 135 and 137.

[20] A Home Ruler may in this matter take up one position which is consistent. He may say that England can allow to be carried out through the agency of an Irish Parliament a policy which no English Parliament could itself adopt. To put the matter plainly, an English Parliament which cannot for very shame rob Irish landlords of their property may, it is suggested, create an Irish Parliament with authority to rob them.

This position is consistent, but it is disgraceful. To ascribe it to a fair opponent would be gross controversial unfairness.

[21] A reader who wishes to see the American view put in its best and strongest form should read Mr. E.L. G.o.dkin's article on "American Home Rule," _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 793. I entirely disagree with the general conclusion to which the article is intended to lead, but I am anxious to acknowledge the importance of the information and the arguments which it contains.

[22] See pp. 87-89, _ante._

[23] See 'American Home Rule,' _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, pp.

793, 803, 804.

[24] _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 801.

[25] Contrast the Coercion Acts of 1881 and 1882 respectively. For list of Coercion Acts see "Federal Union with Ireland," by R.B. O'Brian, _Nineteenth Century_, No. 107, p. 35.

[26] In England the Courts can change the venue for the trial of a criminal. In Scotland the Lord Advocate can always (I am told) bring any case he chooses to trial before the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh, and the same thing could be done by the Court on the application of the prisoner. In Scotland, again, any Sheriff or Chief Magistrate of a Burgh could prohibit a meeting, however lawful, which he thought likely to endanger the peace. The provisions of the last Irish Coercion Act, Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c.

25, s. 16, giving power to a magistrate where an offence had been committed to summon and examine witnesses, even though no person is charged with the offence, formed, I believe, part of the draft criminal code for England.

[27] See for an admirable statement of this argument, "Alternative Policies in Ireland," in the _Nineteenth Century_ for February, 1886.

CHAPTER V.

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION.

[Sidenote: The failure of the Union; its nature.]

Eighty-six years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Union between England and Ireland. The two countries do not yet form an united nation. The Irish people are, if not more wretched (for the whole European world has made progress, and Ireland with it), yet more conscious of wretchedness; and Irish disaffection to England is, if not deeper, more wide-spread than in 1800. An Act meant by its authors to be the source of the prosperity and concord which, though slowly, followed upon the union with Scotland, has not made Ireland rich, has not put an end to Irish lawlessness, has not terminated the feud between Protestants and Catholics, has not raised the position of Irish tenants, has not taken away the causes of Irish discontent, and has therefore not removed Irish disloyalty. This is the indictment which can fairly be brought against the Act of Union. It is, however, of importance to notice that the main charges to which the Act of Union is liable are negative. It has not removed (its foes, say that it has not mitigated) great evils; but the ma.s.s of ills for which the Union is constantly made chargeable were in existence before the days of Pitt or Cornwallis.

Dest.i.tution, sectarian animosities, harsh evictions, met by savage outrages, the terror of secret societies, the stern enforcement of law which to the people represented anything but justice, are phenomena of Irish society, which, as they existed before the Volunteers established the Parliamentary independence of the country, and continued to exist when Ireland was subject to no laws but those pa.s.sed by an Irish Parliament, cannot be attributed to the Act of Union. That enactment introduced a purely political change. It could not, except very indirectly, either increase or remove evils which it did not affect to touch. To two charges its authors are indeed, with more or less of justice, liable; they committed the intellectual error of supposing that a change or improvement in the form of the Const.i.tution would remove evils due to social and economical causes; they committed the moral error of thinking that a beneficial enactment might allowably be pa.s.sed by means which outraged all the best moral feeling of Ireland. Their mistakes are worth notice. England is again told that a Const.i.tutional change is the remedy for Irish misery. Ethical considerations (in this case the moral rights of a loyal minority and the legal rights of Irish landlords) are, it is again intimated, to be held of slight account compared with the benefit to Ireland and to England which is to be expected from an experiment in Const.i.tution-making. To impartial observers it may appear that the proposed policy of 1886 threatens to reproduce in its essence the errors and the vices of the policy of 1800.

Be this as it may, the reflection that the ill results of the Act of Union are mainly negative suggests the conclusion that the good results (if any) of its repeal would probably be negative also, and clears the way for the question with which we are immediately concerned, namely, What are the actual and undoubted evils to England of maintaining a legislative union with Ireland?

[Sidenote: The evils of maintaining the Union]

The nature and extent of these evils has been considered in criticising the arguments in favour of Home Rule. A bare enumeration of them therefore may here suffice.

[Sidenote: 1. Complication of English policy.]

_First._--The Union hampers and complicates English policy, and this even independently of the existing agitation for Home Rule. The tenacity of England during the war with America, her triumphant energy during the revolutionary struggle, were due to a unity of feeling on the part, at any rate, of her governing cla.s.ses, which even under the most favourable circ.u.mstances can hardly exist in a Parliament containing, as the Parliament of the United Kingdom always must contain, a large body of Irish Roman Catholics. If it be urged that the presence of Roman Catholics is due to the Catholic Emanc.i.p.ation Act, and not to the Act of Union, the remark is true but irrelevant. No maintainer or a.s.sailant of the Union is insane enough to propose the repeal of the Emanc.i.p.ation Act.

[Sidenote: 2. Obstruction]

_Secondly_.--The refusal of Home Rule involves a long, tedious, and demoralising contest with opponents will use, and from their own point of view have a right to use, all the arts of obstruction and of Parliamentary intrigue. The battle of the Const.i.tution must be fought out in Parliament, and if it is to be won, Englishmen may be compelled to forego for a time much useful legislation, to modify the rules of party government, and, it is possible, even the forms of the Const.i.tution.