Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him Part 29

It has often been said by certain gentlemen who were a.s.sociated with President Wilson on the other side that he was unyielding and dogmatic, that he insisted upon playing a "lone hand," that he was secretive and exclusive, and that he ignored the members of the Peace Commission and the experts who accompanied him to the Conference.

Contrary to this criticism, after an uninterrupted, continuous, and most intimate a.s.sociation with him for eleven years, an a.s.sociation which brought me into close contact with him in the most delicate crises through which his administration and the nation pa.s.sed, a time which threw upon the Chief Executive of the nation a task unparalleled in the history of the world, I wish to say that there is no franker or more open-minded man, nor one less dogmatic in his opinion than Woodrow Wilson. In him the desire for information and guidance is a pa.s.sion. Indeed, the only thing he resents is a lack of frankness upon the part of his friends, and no man is more ready courageously to act and to hold to his opinions after he has obtained the necessary information upon, which he bases his position. It is his innate modesty and a certain kind of shyness that people mistake for coldness and aloofness. He is not a good fellow in the ordinary sense of that term. His friends.h.i.+p does not wear the cheap or tawdry trappings of the politician, but there is about it a depth of genuineness and sincerity, that while it does not overwhelm you, it wins you and holds you. But the permanent consideration upon which this friends.h.i.+p is based is sincerity and frankness.

No man ever worked under greater handicaps than did Woodrow Wilson at Paris. Repudiated by his own people in the Congressional elections; hara.s.sed on every side and at every turn by his political enemies, he still pursued the even tenor of his way and accomplished what he had in mind, against the greatest odds.

In the murky atmosphere of the Peace Conference, where every att.i.tude of the President was grossly exaggerated, in order that his prestige might be lessened, it was not possible to judge him fairly, but it is now possible in a calmer day to review the situation from afar through the eyes of those who were actual partic.i.p.ants with him in the great a.s.sembly, onlookers, as it were, who saw every move and witnessed every play of the Peace Conference from the side lines, and who have not allowed petty motives to warp their judgments.

This testimony, which forms part of "What Really Happened in Paris,"

edited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, comes from gentlemen who were his friends and co-labourers and who daily conferred with him upon the momentous questions that came up for consideration at the Peace Conference.

Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, a member of the great banking house of J. P. Morgan & Company, one of the representatives of the United States Treasury with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, gives the lie to the unfair criticisms uttered about the President, to the effect that he was exclusive, secretive, and refused to confer with those a.s.sociated with him. Mr. Lamont in speaking of the President's att.i.tude throughout the Peace Conference said:

I am going to take this opportunity to say a word, in general, as to President Wilson's att.i.tude at the Peace Conference. He is accused of having been unwilling to consult his colleagues. I never saw a man more ready and anxious to consult than he. He has been accused of having been desirous to gain credit for himself and ignore others. I never saw a man more considerate of those of his co-adjutors who were working immediately with him, nor a man more ready to give them credit with the other chiefs of state. Again and again would he say to Mr.

Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau: "My expert here, Mr. So-and-So, tells me such-and-such, and I believe he is right. You will have to argue with him if you want me to change my opinion." President Wilson undoubtedly had his disabilities. Perhaps, in a trade, some of the other chiefs of state could have "out-jockeyed" him; but it seldom reached such a situation, because President Wilson, by his manifest sincerity and open candour, always saying precisely what he thought, would early disarm his opponents in argument. President Wilson did not have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of the work himself, studying until late at night papers and doc.u.ments that he should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was, by all odds, the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to delegate more of his work was not due to any inherent distrust he had of men--and certainly not any desire to "run the whole show" himself-- but simply to his lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on a large scale. In execution, we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; and inability, mind you, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any one of us volunteered or insisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted. Throughout the Peace Conference, Mr.

Wilson never played politics. I never witnessed an occasion when I saw him act from unworthy conception or motive. His ideals were of the highest, and he clung to them tenaciously and courageously. Many of the so-called "Liberals" in England have a.s.sailed Mr. Wilson bitterly because, as they declare, he yielded too much to their own Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and to Mr. Clemenceau. But could he have failed to defer to them on questions in which no vital principle was involved? I well remember his declaration on the question, whether the Allies should refuse, for a period of five years during the time of France's recuperations to promise Germany reciprocal tariff provisions. What Mr. Wilson said to Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau was this: "Gentlemen, my experts and I both regard the principle involved as an unwise one. We believe it will come back to plague you. But when I see how France has suffered, how she has been devastated, her industries destroyed--who am I to refuse to a.s.sent to this provision, designed, wisely or unwisely, to a.s.sist in lifting France again to her feet."

The question has often been asked, whether the President freely consulted his experts on the other side, or ignored them. The experience of the gentlemen who conferred with him is the best refutation of this insinuation against the President. Charles Homer Haskins, Chief of the Division of Western Europe, a member of the American Peace Conference, answers this question in these words:

The President was anxious to have the exact facts before him in every situation. Doubtless, there were a number of occasions when he could not consult with experts at a particular moment, but, in general, the President sought such advice, although he naturally had to use his own judgment whether that advice was to be adopted in any particular case.

Answering this same question, Mr. Douglas Wilson Johnson, Chief of the Division of Boundary Geography, and a member of the Peace Commission, says:

Whenever we, in our capacity as specialists, thought we had found something that the President ought to know about, and believed we could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could ask for a personal conference with him. He was, of course, a very busy man because, unlike the experts who usually had only one problem to consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial problems but in addition with all the problems bearing on the League of Nations, the economic problems, and many other aspects of the peace. Despite this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked for personal conferences with the President on this and certain other problems, he never failed to respond immediately with an appointment. He had a private wire and on occasion he would call us at the Crillon to make appointments on his own initiative or to secure papers, maps, or other doc.u.ments that he needed in his studies. I will not forget that in one instance he called me on the telephone late at night in my bedroom, asking for some papers which I had promised to supply him, and which had not reached him with sufficient promptness. You can judge from this that he kept closely in touch with the problems he was called upon to consider.

Another question that has been asked is: Did the President have an intimate knowledge of the complicated questions that came before him like the Adriatic problem, for instance? That criticism was answered by Mr.

Douglas Wilson Johnson in these words:

In answer to that question I will say that the President kept in constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic problem, not only through the memoranda furnished by the experts but in other ways. I can a.s.sure you that there was sent to him a voluminous quant.i.ty of material, and I want to say that when we had personal discussions with him upon the question it immediately became apparent that he had studied these memoranda most carefully. _It is only fair to say that of the details and intricacies of this most difficult problem the President possessed a most astonis.h.i.+ng command._

It has also been said that the President in his att.i.tude toward Germany was ruthless, and yet we have the testimony of Mr. Isaiah Bowman, Chief Territorial Adviser of the Peace Commission who, in answer to the direct question: "Was there not a time when it looked as if the Peace Conference might break up because of the extreme policy of one of the Allies?" said: "Yes, there were a number of occasions when the Peace Conference might have broken up. Almost anything might have happened with so many nations represented, so many personalities and so many experts--perhaps half a thousand in all! Owing to the fact that President Wilson has been charged on the one hand with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the other hand that he had always been soft with the Germans, particularly with Bulgaria, let us see just how soft he was! On a certain day three of us were asked to call at the President's house, and on the following morning at eleven o'clock we arrived. President Wilson welcomed us in a very cordial manner. I cannot understand how people get the idea that he is cold. He does not make a fuss over you, but when you leave you feel that you have met a very courteous gentleman. You have the feeling that he is frank and altogether sincere. He remarked: 'Gentlemen, I am in trouble and I have sent for you to help me out. The matter is this: the French want the whole left bank of the Rhine. I told M. Clemenceau that I could not consent to such a solution of the problem. He became very much excited and then demanded owners.h.i.+p of the Saar Basin. I told him I could not agree to that either because it would mean giving 300,000 Germans to France.'

Whereupon President Wilson further said: 'I do not know whether I shall see M. Clemenceau again. I do not know whether he will return to the meeting this afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the Peace Conference will continue. M. Clemenceau called me a pro-German and abruptly left the room. I want you to a.s.sist me in working out a solution true to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to France, and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a reasonable solution. I want to be fair to M. Clemenceau and to France, but I cannot consent to the outright transfer to France of 300,000 Germans.' A solution was finally found--the one that stands in the Treaty to-day."

Among the unfair things said about the President during the last campaign and uttered by a senator of the United States, was that the President promised Premier Bratiano of Rumania to send United States troops to protect the new frontiers. Mr. Charles Seymour, a member of the American Peace Commission, answers this charge in the following way:

The evidence against it is overwhelming. The stenographic notes taken during the session indicate that nothing said by President Wilson could be construed into a promise to send United States troops abroad to protect frontiers. The allegation is based upon the report of the interpreter, Mantoux, and a book by a journalist, Dr. E. W. Dillon, called "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference," M. Mantoux, though a brilliant and cultivated interpreter, whose work enormously facilitated the progress of the Conference, did not take stenographic notes and his interpretations sometimes failed to give the exact meaning of the original. Doctor Dillon's evidence is subject to suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip, and replete with errors of fact. The stenographic report, on the other hand, is worthy of trust. I have heard the President on more than one occasion explain to M. Clemenceau and Lloyd George _that if troops were necessary to protect any troubled area, they must not look to the United States for a.s.sistance, for public opinion in this country would not permit the use of American forces_.

Even Mr. Lansing himself in his book testified to the open-mindedness and candour of the President in these words:

It had always been my practice as Secretary of State to speak to him with candour and to disagree with him whenever I thought he was reaching a wrong decision in regard to any matter pertaining to foreign affairs. There was a general belief that Mr. Wilson was not open-minded and that he was quick to resent any opposition however well founded. I had not found him so during the years we had been a.s.sociated. Except in a few instances he listened with consideration to arguments and apparently endeavoured to value them correctly.

No men ever winced less under the criticism or bitter ridicule of his enemies than did Woodrow Wilson. Whether the criticism was directed at him or at some member of his Cabinet, or, mayhap, at a subordinate like myself, for some act, statement, or even an indiscretion, he bore up under the criticism like a true sportsman. I remember how manfully he met the storm of criticism that was poured upon him after the issuance of the famous Garfield Fuel Order. He courageously took the responsibility for the issuance of the order and stood by Doctor Garfield to the last.

It will be recalled what a tremendous impression and reaction the Garfield order caused when it was published throughout the country. Many about the President were greatly worried and afraid of the disastrous effect of it upon the country. Cabinet officers rushed in upon him and endeavoured to persuade him to recall it and even to repudiate Garfield for having issued the order without consulting the Cabinet, but their remonstrances fell unheeded upon the President's ears. I remember at the time that I wrote the President regarding the matter and called his attention to what appeared to me to be the calamitous results of the issuance of the Fuel Order.

My letter to the President is as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE, WAs.h.i.+NGTON

17 January, 1918.

DEAR GOVERNOR:

At twelve o'clock last night, Mr. Lincoln of the New York World called me out of bed by telephone to notify me that the Fuel Administration had issued a drastic order shutting down the factories of the country for five days, etc.

I do not know about the details of the order. I a.s.sume of course that it was necessary because of the tremendous shortage throughout the country. But what I am afraid of is that my own readiness to accept this a.s.sumption may not be shared by people outside. In other words, has the groundwork been laid for this radical step? Do the people know how much coal we have on hand and what the real shortage is? Have they not been led to believe that our chief ill was transportation and that by subjecting themselves to hards.h.i.+ps by cutting down trains, etc., enough cars have been provided to carry coal?

In other words, I am afraid the country will want to be shown that the step just taken was absolutely necessary and if this cannot be proved, I greatly fear the consequences upon the morale of the people. I am so afraid that it will weaken their confidence in any action the Government may take hereafter which depends for its execution on the voluntary cooperation of the people. Again, it seems to me unjust that all industries are put on the same footing. It is a difficult thing I know to distinguish between the essential and non-essential industries, but I am sure the country will understand if such a distinction is made of, for instance, inst.i.tutions that make pianos and talking machines and candy and articles that are not immediately necessary for our life, were cut down altogether and things necessary to our sustenance kept.

Sincerely yours, TUMULTY

THE PRESIDENT

[Ill.u.s.tration: An inside view of a well-remembered national crisis.

[Transcriber's note: contains a reproduction of the above-quoted letter.]]

The President's reply, written on his own typewriter, is as follows:

DEAR TUMULTY:

Of course, this is a tremendous matter and has given me the deepest concern, but I really think this direct road is the road out of difficulties which never would have been entirely remedied if we had not taken some such action. We must just bow our heads and let the storm beat.

WOODROW WILSON.

Even to Mr. James M. Beck, a prominent Republican lawyer and one of his bitterest opponents and critics, he showed a tolerance and magnanimity that were worthy of the man himself. It appears that Mr. Beck was invited to confer at the White House on a matter having to do with the war, and the question was presented to the President by Mr. Creel as to whether the President considered Mr. Beck _persona non grata_. The President at once sent me the following note:

DEAR TUMULTY:

Mr. James M. Beck expressed some hesitation about coming with the committee which Creel has organized and which is coming to see me on Monday afternoon, because he was not sufficiently _persona grata_ at the White House. I think his criticism and his whole att.i.tude before we went into the war were abominable and inexcusable, but I "ain't harbouring no ill will" just now and I hope that you will have the intimation conveyed to him through Mr. Creel or otherwise that he will be welcomed.

WOODROW WILSON.

While the President was busily engaged in France in laying the foundation stones of peace, his partisan enemies were busily engaged in destroying the things he held so dear, and had industriously circulated the story that the mission to France was a mere political one, that the purpose back of it was personal exploitation, or an attempt on the part of the President to thrust himself into the councils of the Democratic party as an active and aggressive candidate for a third term. The President's att.i.tude in this matter, his fear that talk of this kind would embarra.s.s the League of Nations, is disclosed by the following correspondence:

Received at the White House, June 2, 1919.

Paris.

TUMULTY, White House, Was.h.i.+ngton.

Have just read the editorial in the Springfield _Republican_, discussing "_Wilson the Third Term and the Treaty_," and would very much value your opinion with regard to the situation as it a.n.a.lyzes it. Please talk with Gla.s.s, Secretary Baker, Secretary Wilson, and c.u.mmings and let me know what your opinion is and what theirs is. _We must let nothing stand in the way of the Treaty and the adoption of the League._ I will, of course, form no resolution until I reach home but wish to think the matter out in plenty of time.

WOODROW WILSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, WAs.h.i.+NGTON

2 June, 1919.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, Paris.