The Freedom of Science Part 11

Hence if the critic of the Bible presupposes miracles and prophecies to be impossible, inferring therefrom that many narratives in Holy Writ cannot be authentic, but must be legends of a later period, he is making arbitrary presuppositions, he is not an unprepossessed scientist. Likewise, if an historian presupposing G.o.d's supernatural providence over the world to be impossible, and, in building upon this basis, comes to the conclusion that the Christian religion grew from purely natural factors, from Oriental notions and myths, from Greek philosophy and Roman forms of government, he again makes unproved suppositions. If the natural philosopher a.s.sumes that there cannot be a personal Creator, and infers from it that the world is of itself and eternal, he has forfeited the claim of being an unprepossessed scientist, and by making in any way his own pet ideas the basis of his research he is violating the demands of unprepossession; the results he arrives at are not scientific results, but the speculations of an amateur.

Unprepossession and Religious Conviction.

Is it possible for the Christian scientist who adheres to his faith, to be unprepossessed, as demanded by science? According to all that has been said hitherto about the relation of science to faith, the answer can be only in the affirmative. The believing Christian and Catholic looks upon the doctrines of faith taught him by revelation and the Church as an _established truth_. What to me is true and certain I can take for the true and certain basis and standard of my thought. This is demanded by unprepossession-nothing more.

Considering the immense extent of the sciences, the profane sciences will but seldom, and in but few matters, have occasion to presuppose truths of faith in the above-mentioned way; and only in a negative form at that. We have previously shown that the profane sciences must never take truths of faith for a positive basis to build upon; they must regard the doctrines of revelation only in so far as it is not allowed to teach anything in contradiction to them. And with this demand they will meet in rare instances only, because, if not overstepping their province, they will very seldom come in touch with faith (cf. pp. 88-96). When _Kepler_ was studying his planetary orbits, and _Newton_ discovered the law of gravitation, both worked independent of the Christian view of the world which they both professed; it was in no way a necessary presupposition to their research. When _Scheiner_ discovered the sun-spots, and _Secchi_ cla.s.sified the spectra of the stars, they were not doing so as Jesuits nor as Catholics; as Mohammedans or atheists they might have made the same discoveries. Steam engines and railways, _Volta's_ electricity, cathode-rays and X-rays, all discoveries that the nineteenth century can boast of, do not depend directly on any special view of the world.

And if the believing scientist does take his faith for a guide in some matters, when in all his researches in the history of the Christian religion and the Church he presupposes that G.o.d's miraculous interference is not impossible, because the contrary would offend not only against his faith, but also against his common sense; when in pondering the ultimate reasons of all things he allows himself to be influenced by the idea that atheism is false, or at least not proved-for that there is a G.o.d both his faith and his reason tell him-then these presumptions are by no means inadmissible. The naturalist, too, presupposing certain results of science to be true, takes care not to get into conflict with them, and he will soon correct himself should he arrive at different results. If a mathematician should arrive at results conflicting with other proved results, he would infer therefrom that his calculation was faulty; why, then, cannot the Christian now and then be led by the truths of his faith, of which he is certain, without by doing so offending against the spirit of scientific truthfulness?

Or may he not do so just because they are _religious_ truths, vouched for by a supernatural authority? As a fact many of them are established also by the testimony of reason. This is shown by the examples just mentioned.

However, the question is not how a truth is vouched for, but whether it be a truth or not. If the scientist is a.s.sured that something is unquestionably true, then he owes it to the spirit of truthfulness to accept it. In doing so he will in no way be unfaithful to his scientific method; the truths of faith are to him not a source of proofs for the results of his profane science, but only hints, calling his attention to the fact that certain propositions are not proved, that they are even false.

Much less is in historical questions the Catholic obliged to defend or praise everything of advantage to his Church, whether true or not. Hence _Mommsen_ is grossly mistaken when he states in his letter of protest mentioned above: "The appointment of a historian or philosopher, who must be a Catholic or a Protestant and who must serve his confession, evidently means nothing else but to prohibit the Protestant historian from presenting the powerful mental structure of the papacy in its full light, and the Catholic historian from appreciating the profound thought and the tremendous importance of heresy and Protestantism." The Catholic is only bound to the truth.

Or are the Christian truths of faith perhaps regrettable errors, hence presumptions that should not be made? If so, demonstrate it. Hitherto such demonstration has not succeeded. So long as the creed of the believing Christian cannot be refuted convincingly, he has the right to cling to it in the name of truth.

Or can we not have reasonable certainty at all in religious matters? Are they the undemonstrable things of an uncontrollable sentiment? To be sure, this is a.s.serted often enough, explicitly or by insinuation. If this were true, then of course duty of faith and true unprepossession could not go together; one would be regarding as the truth things of which one cannot be convinced. But this is also an unproved a.s.sumption: it is the duality of subjectivism and agnosticism, the fundamental presumption of liberal freedom of science, which we have already sufficiently exposed.

However, let us a.s.sume again the position of those who do not feel themselves personally convinced of the truth of the Christian dogmatic faith, or of the Catholic Church. But the Catholic is _firmly convinced_ thereof and, if need be, will make sacrifices for this conviction, as millions have done. Hence, can any one forbid him to think and judge according to his conviction? Would they who differ from his opinion for this very reason force him to think against his own conviction? Would not that indeed be "seduction to sin against the Holy Ghost"? If the jurist or historian has formed the conviction that _Mommsen_ is on historical questions concerning Roman law an authority, who may be followed without scruple, and he does so without re-examining the particular points, will this be looked upon as an offence against unprepossession? If, then, the Catholic is certain that he may safely trust to revelation and the Church-and there is no authority on earth of more venerable standing, even if viewed from a purely natural point-will he alone be accused of mental blindness and lack of freedom?

Or may the scientist have _no view of the world_ at all, because he might be influenced thereby in certain directions? The champions of this demand will surely not admit that they have not a definite view of the world. By no means! We know very well that just those who are most vehement in urging unprepossessed science have a very p.r.o.nounced notion of the world, we know also that they are resolutely propagating that notion. Yet nothing is said against a scientist who is a monist, or who starts from agnosticism. It seems they intend to exclude one view only, the positive religious view. Yet not even this one wholly. No one finds the Jew who adheres to his religion unfit for scientific research. Of course not.

Protestants, too, find favour: according to the statutes of some German universities Protestants only may be professors there. Neither _Mommsen_ nor any other herald of unprepossession deems it necessary to defend science against these inst.i.tutions and usages. It is plain what is meant by the popular cry for science unprepossessed: The man of science may be anything, sceptic or atheist, pagan or Hottentot, only he must not be a faithful Catholic. Is this fair? Is this the spirit of truth and justice with which they claim to be filled?

What has just been said about the Catholic being excluded, could easily be exemplified by a lengthy list of facts. But we shall pa.s.s them over. We shall note one utterance only, from the pen of a non-Catholic writer. The renowned pedagogue, _Fr. W. Foerster_, says in the preface to the second edition of his book on "s.e.xual Ethics and s.e.xual Pedagogy": "Special exception has been taken to the catholicizing tendency of my book, and not infrequently the author has without further ado been made out an orthodox Catholic.

For many years past I have been in a position to gain interesting information concerning the incredible bias of many champions of unprepossessed research. To them it is an a-priori dogma that everything represented by the Catholic Church is nonsense, superst.i.tion, bigotry. They are past comprehending how an unprejudiced man, simply by concrete experience, unprepossessed research and serious pondering in the field of pedagogy, could be brought to affirm that certain notions of the Roman Catholic Church are the unavoidable consequence of a penetrating knowledge of soul and life. This cannot be admitted by the non-Catholic: for him the truth must cease where the Catholic faith begins; he dares not a.s.sent to anything, else he will no longer be taken for a reputable scientific man."

The bl.u.s.ter about unprepossession proceeds from _shallowness and dishonesty_. The most varied presumptions, that have nothing to do with science and the pursuit of the truth, may pa.s.s without notice; only when Christian and Catholic religious convictions, resting upon divine authority, are encountered, then tolerance gives way to excitement, a hue and cry is raised, the gate is shut, and entrance to the scientific world denied.

Philosophers arise, and each philosophizes according to his manner. _Fichte_ says: "What philosophy to choose depends on the kind of a man one is." The historian enters. It is reported that _Treitschke_ said: "If I cannot write history from my own view-point, with my own judgment, then I had rather be a soapmaker." According to trustworthy testimony, the well-known Protestant historian, _Giesebrecht_, used to preface his lectures in Munich with the words: "I am a Prussian and a Protestant: I shall lecture accordingly" (Hochschulnachrichten, 1901, 2, p. 30).

Even here there are no objections in the name of Unprepossession.

"Science," says _Harnack_, "will tear off the mask of the hypocrite or plagiarist and throw him out of the temple, but the queerest suppositions it must let pa.s.s if they go by the name of convictions, and if those who harbour them are trying to demonstrate them by scientific means."

Therefore the convictions, or, to speak with _Harnack_, the "prejudices," of the Catholic "certainly deserve as much consideration and patience as the velleities, idiosyncrasies, and blind dogmas which we have to meet and refute in the struggle between intellects" (Internationale Wochenschrift, 1908, 259 _seq._). "Science has been restricted," the same authority also admits, "at all times; our progeny will find even modern science in many ways not ruled by pure reason only" (Dogmengesch. III, 3d ed., 1907, 326).

And what is to be said of those more serious suppositions, unproved and unprovable, which guide modern science wherever it meets philosophical-religious questions? That truly dogmatic rejection of everything supernatural and transcendental, that obstinate ignoration of a personal G.o.d, the rejection of any creative act, of any miracle, of any revelation,-a presupposition directly raised to a scientific principle: the principle of causality. Later on we shall make an excursion into various fields of science, and we shall show clearly how this presumption is stamped upon entire branches of science. Those solemn a.s.surances of persevering unselfishness in desiring nothing but the truth; the confidence with which they claim a monopoly of the instinct for the truth, all this will appear in quite a strange light, the twilight of dishonesty, when we examine the doc.u.ments and records of liberal science itself. We shall see sufficiently how truthful the self-confession of a modern champion of liberal science really is: "The recently coined expression, 'science unprepossessed,' I do not like, because it is a product of that shortcoming which has already done so much damage to free thought in its struggle with the powers of the past-because that word is not entirely honest.

None of us sits down to his work unprepossessed" (_F. Jodl_, Neue Freie Presse, November 26, 1907). Here we shall touch upon only one more question.

The Duty to Believe and Scientific Demonstration.

But cannot the believing Christian submit to scientific investigation the doctrine of faith itself, which he must without doubt hold to be true?

This must surely be allowed if he is to convince himself scientifically of the truth of it. Indeed, this is allowed. He may critically examine everything to the very bottom, even the existence of G.o.d, the rationality of his own mind. But how can he, if no doubt is permissible? To examine means to search doubtingly; it means to call the matter in question-this, too, is right. It is, on the one hand, a doctrine of the Catholic Church that they who have received faith through the ministry of the Church, that is, they that have been made familiar with the essential subjects of the faith and the motives of their credibility by proper religious instruction, must not doubt their faith. They have no reasonable excuse for doubting because they are a.s.sured of the truth of the faith. We have discussed this point before.(4)

As a matter of course only voluntary doubts are excluded, doubts by which one a.s.sents deliberately and wilfully to the judgment that perhaps not all may be true that is proposed for our belief.

Involuntary doubts are neither excluded nor sinful. These are apparent counter-arguments, objections, difficulties against the faith, which occur to the mind without getting its conscious approval. They are not unlikely, because the cognition of the credibility of Christian truths, while it is certain, is yet lacking in that obvious clearness which would render obscurity and counter-argument impossible; the a.s.sent to faith is free. Doubts of this kind are apt to molest the mind and buzz round it like bothersome insects, but they are not sinful because they do not set aside the a.s.sent to faith any more than the cloud that intervenes between us and the sun can extinguish its light. The a.s.sent to faith is withdrawn only when the will with clear consideration approves of the judgment that the doubt may be right.

But what about doubts which one cannot solve? Would we not owe it to truth and probity to withhold a.s.sent to faith for a while?

The answer lies in the distinction of a twofold solution of difficulties. It is by no means necessary, nor even possible, to solve directly all objections; it suffices to solve them indirectly, that is, by recognizing them as void; since faith is certain, whatever is contrary to it must be false. If one is convinced by clear proofs of the innocence of a defendant he will not be swayed in his a.s.surance, no matter how much circ.u.mstantial evidence be offered against the defendant. He may not be able to account directly for one or the other remarkable coincidence of circ.u.mstances, but all the arguments of the other side are to him refuted, because to him the defendant's innocence is a certainty.

Thus the faithful Christian may hear it solemnly proclaimed as a scientifically established fact that miracles are impossible, because they would be tantamount to G.o.d making correction on His own work, because they would imply a self-contradiction, or they would be against the law of preservation of energy; he hears of atrocities in the history of the Church, of the Inquisition, of the Church being an enemy of civilization-he knows not what to say: but one thing he knows, that there must be an answer, because he knows, enlightened by faith, that his belief cannot be false.

Nowhere is it demanded that all objections be directly answered, in order that the conviction be true. If I, with the whole world, am convinced that I am able to recognize the truth, must I therefore carefully disentangle all the cobwebs ever spun about the truth by brooding philosophical brains? If I am in the house, safe from the rain, must I, in order to keep dry, go out and catch every drop of rain that is falling? Such doubts may indeed hara.s.s the untrained mind, may even confuse it. This is the juncture where grace comes in, the pledge of which has been received at baptism, bringing enlightenment, peace, a.s.surance; then we learn from others and from ourselves that faith is also a grace.

Nevertheless a scientific examination of the foundations and truths of faith is allowed and wholesome. Nearly all the theological works written by Catholics since the days of _Justin_ and _Augustine_ are nothing but examinations of this kind. At every examination one proceeds with doubt and question. This is admitted; but this doubt must be merely a methodical one, not a serious one, nor need it be serious. These two kinds of doubt must be clearly distinguished. In case of a serious doubt I look upon the matter as really dubious, and withhold my a.s.sent. I am not yet convinced of its truth. This kind of a doubt is not allowed in matters of faith and it is the only one that is forbidden. In case of a methodical doubt I proceed as convinced of a truth, but I do not yet see the reasons plainly, and would like to be fully conscious of them. Evidently there is no need of casting aside the convictions I have hitherto held, and of beginning to think that the matter is by no means positively established.

For instance, I am convinced that a complicated order must be the work of intellect; however, I would like to find the proof of it. Hence I proceed as if the truth were yet to be found. But it would evidently be absurd to think in the meantime that such admirable order could be the result of blind accident. Or, I am convinced that there must be a source for every event: I desire to find the demonstration of it. In the meantime shall I think it possible for another Nova Persei to be produced in the sky without any cause? Or, investigating to see whether I am capable of recognizing the truth, shall I seriously become a sceptic till I am convinced that I ought not to be such? As soon as I really doubt that I can recognize anything at all as true, obviously I cannot proceed any further. _Kant_ begins his "Critique of Pure Reason" with this doubt, and many imitate him, but only by evident inconsistency are they able to continue their researches by means of reason. Scientific examination does not consist in repudiating a certainty held hitherto, in order to arrive at it anew; it consists in bringing to one's clear consciousness the reasons for that certainty, and in trying to formulate those reasons precisely. To investigate the light it is evidently not necessary first to extinguish it.

Thus the believing Christian may most certainly probe into his religious conviction without interfering with his adherence, and by doing so proceed unprepossessed in the fullest sense, for unprepossession does not mean the rooting up of all certainty. At the threshold of wisdom does not sit Scepticism.

What Unprepossession is Not.

But the deeper, modern meaning of unprepossession is precisely the right to doubt seriously everything, especially the truths of the Christian faith; this is the freedom demanded. Scepticism, the stamp of our time.

Many a misconception may have contributed to the definition of this unprepossession. For instance, overlooking the important difference between methodical doubt and serious doubt.

Then there is the erroneous opinion that we should and could proceed everywhere in the same way as in the natural sciences. Almost parallel with the progress in the natural sciences grew the doubt of the correctness of the ancient physical and astronomical notion of the world; piece after piece crumbled away under the hand of research; new truths were discovered. In just admiration of these results it was concluded that all provinces of human cognition should be "researched" in the same way, not excepting religion and theories of the world; here, too, science should cast a radical doubt upon everything and discover truth-as if here we had to deal with matters similar to astronomy and physics, in the state they were centuries ago; as if all mankind was still ignorant of the truth and science had to discover it.

This right to doubt is claimed especially in the higher questions of religion. Certain cognition by reason is, after all, impossible here, such is the presumption, and therefore, first of all, it is the right and duty of man, as soon as he has attained his intellectual maturity, to shape by doubt his views of the world to the satisfaction of his mind and heart, to win them by a struggle; nor is this true only in the case of the single individual, but also of entire generations. To see problems everywhere, not to have any convictions, this is taken to be true unprepossession.

"Man must learn," so we are told, "that there is no absolute miracle, not even in the domain of the religious life, which supernaturally offers truth at a point or by an inst.i.tution, but that every man and every era as witnessed by the authority of history must conquer truth by themselves for their own sake and at their own risk" (_E. Troeltsch_, Internationale Wochensch. 1908, 26). Thus the mind of man cannot slake its thirst for positive truth at the divine fountain of revelation, but only by search and research. Such is the cheerful message of this science. "Amid grave crises," we are told again, "a new concept of science has forced its way to the front since the beginning of the eighteenth century and conquered the universities." "Science is not a finished system, but a research to be forever under examination"

(_A. Harnack_, Die Aufgabe der theol. Facultaeten, 1901, 17).

Research without ever arriving at the sure possession of the truth, this is now the meaning of science, especially of philosophy. Hence there cannot be a philosophy conclusive and immutable, and any point which seems established may at any time be revised according to new perceptions.

"There is no question that may not be asked; none which in the abstract could not just as well be denied as affirmed. In this sense philosophy is unprepossessed" (_Paulsen_, Die deutschen Universitaeten, 1902, 304 _seq._). The highest achievement it declares itself capable of, is not to point out the truth to its disciples, for it does not know the truth itself, but only this: "We expect, or at least we should expect, that during the years of study the mind give itself earnestly to philosophy, and strive for a firm grasp of ideas. The great pathfinders in world thought, _Plato_, _Aristotle_, _Spinoza_, _Kant_, and whoever may be ranked with them, remain the living teachers of philosophy." Thus we hold those great intellectual achievements, _Plato's_ doctrine and ideas, _Spinoza's_ atheistic pantheism, _Aristotle's_ objectivism and _Kant's_ subjectivism, with other views of the world of most variegated patterns, all contradicting and excluding one another, all dubious, none sure. What would be said of an astronomy that could do nothing better than fix the telescope on the different stars and then tell its disciples: Now look for what you please, ideas of _Ptolemy_ or _Copernicus_; _Aristotle's_ theory of the spheres or _Newton's_ theory of gravity; each has its points, but of none can it be said it is certain! Such an astronomy would probably be left to its deserved fate.

In the most important points of religion mankind has ever, even in pagan times, recognized the truth, albeit imperfectly. This is evinced by the conviction that there exists a personal G.o.d and a hereafter; convictions which can be proved historically. G.o.d's revelation has provided those who desire to believe with a fuller knowledge of the truth: heaven and earth will pa.s.s away, but these words will not pa.s.s away. But what is already in our safe possession cannot be once more discovered by research. What has already been found is no longer an object of research. Mankind's lot would be a sad one indeed were this unprepossessed science in the right; if in the most important questions of life it were condemned forever to tantalizing doubt. G.o.d's providence has ordained matters more kindly for humanity.

On the other hand, it is a poor science that has nothing to offer but an eternal query for the truth. A poor science, that with self-consciousness promises enlightenment and what not, but finally can give nothing but ceaseless doubt instead of truth, tormenting darkness instead of cheerful light. Why, then, research where nothing can be found? Why raise searching eyes to the sky when the stars do not show themselves? What kind of progress is this when science does nothing further than dig forever at the foundation? The great _St. Augustine_ has long also pa.s.sed judgment on this kind of science: "Such doubting is abhorred by the City of G.o.d as false wisdom, because among the things which we grasp with our intellect and reason there is a knowledge, limited, it is true, because the soul is weighed down by a perishable body, as the Apostle says: _ex parte scimus_-but which has full certainty" (De Civitate Dei, XIX, 18).