The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 22

because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of pa.s.sion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the pa.s.sage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The [email protected], on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent Self.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the pa.s.sage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.

6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).

To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circ.u.mstance that the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained in the pa.s.sage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the pa.s.sage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.'--The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the pa.s.sage met with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge;' and in the pa.s.sage (I, 2, 18), 'The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter pa.s.sage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.

Here the [email protected] advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pa.s.sage, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the pa.s.sage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter pa.s.sage raise a distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects.--If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to a.s.sume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we a.s.sume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.

To this we make the following reply.--We by no means a.s.sume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which const.i.tutes the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad--which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na/k/iketas--carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the pa.s.sage (I, 1, 20), 'There is that doubt--; this is the third of my boons.'--If we therefore supposed that the pa.s.sage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby a.s.sume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad.--But--the [email protected] will perhaps interpose--it must needs be admitted that the pa.s.sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.

For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot const.i.tute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an ent.i.ty raised above all definite attributes, &c.

Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.--All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scriptural pa.s.sages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the pa.s.sage, 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'--which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is, moreover, another pa.s.sage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.'

This pa.s.sage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet.--There is another pa.s.sage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different ent.i.ties, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.'--The following circ.u.mstance, too, is worthy of consideration.

When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as G.o.d, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.

Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circ.u.mstance of that soul not being subject to sa/m/sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly a.n.a.logous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the pa.s.sage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered as furnis.h.i.+ng an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.--The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sa/m/sara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.--For these reasons the Sutra is right in a.s.suming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who a.s.sume that the pradhana const.i.tutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.

7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.

While the [email protected] employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the first-born ent.i.ty, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such pa.s.sages as the following, 'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve.

Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhana.--The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that aja means the pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved.

For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one aja[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three const.i.tuent elements of the pradhana. Pa.s.sion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e.

influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three const.i.tuent elements, i.e. the pradhana, is denoted by the attributes of its parts, and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called aja, i.e.

unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word aja the settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.--That pradhana produces many creatures partic.i.p.ating in its three const.i.tuent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pa.s.s through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.--On the ground of this pa.s.sage, as interpreted above, the followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis.

To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the [email protected] doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms aja, &c.

can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special a.s.sertion that the [email protected] doctrine only is meant. The case is a.n.a.logous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the term aja, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary pa.s.sage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the aja of the /S/veta/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term aja); for some read so in their text.

By the term aja we have to understand the causal matter of the four cla.s.ses of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word 'but' (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the a.s.sertion.--This aja is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three gu/n/as in the [email protected] sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one /s/akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, a.s.signs to them red colour, and so on.

'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water, and earth--we recognise in the /S/veta/s/vatara pa.s.sage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both pa.s.sages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the [email protected] gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That pa.s.sages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful pa.s.sages, is a generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the /S/veta/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the pa.s.sage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to G.o.d himself, hidden in its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary pa.s.sages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya;' 'who being one only rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be a.s.serted that the mantra treating of the aja refers to some independent causal matter called pradhana. We rather a.s.sert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other pa.s.sages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we a.s.sume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured aja? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus aja (i.e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that the word aja cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'--To this question the next Sutra replies.

10. And on account of the statement of the a.s.sumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in aja denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

The word aja neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather expresses an a.s.sumption, i.e. it intimates the a.s.sumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philosophical schools. For the purport of the pa.s.sage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural pa.s.sages such as, 'He is the one G.o.d hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'

(in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.

V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary to reason in the circ.u.mstance of the term aja being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

11. (The a.s.sertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).

The attempt to base the [email protected] doctrine on the mantra speaking of the aja having failed, the [email protected] again comes forward and points to another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya system counts. Cp. [email protected] Karika, 3: 'The fundamental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural pa.s.sage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the [email protected]/ri/ti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

To this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base the a.s.sertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on account of the diversity of the [email protected] categories.' The [email protected] categories have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for such combination.--Here the [email protected] will perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its const.i.tuent parts; just as the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only that there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the second 'five' const.i.tutes a compound with the word 'people,' the Brahma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the same conclusion we are led by another pa.s.sage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6, 2, 2, pa/nk/ana/m/ tva pa/nk/ajananam, &c.) where the two terms const.i.tute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word thus being a compound there is neither a repet.i.tion of the word 'five,'

involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another word.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound 'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/nk/a pa/nk/apulya/h/) conveys the idea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an a.n.a.logous one, we reply. The word 'pa/nk/apuli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating that there are five such bundles. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/, on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against which a.s.sumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the [email protected] is further not possible 'on account of the excess.' For on the [email protected] interpretation there would be an excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circ.u.mstance of the ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the [email protected] which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on their interpretation of the pa.s.sage, would here be mentioned once as const.i.tuting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five categories, the [email protected] would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circ.u.mstance of a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the a.s.sumption that what is meant are the twenty-five [email protected] categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the pa.s.sage.

How, then, the [email protected] will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five five-people?'--On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pa/n/ini II, 1, 50, according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain cla.s.ses of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such cla.s.ses are there? and to this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are certain cla.s.ses of beings called five-people, and these cla.s.ses are five. a.n.a.logously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/s.h.i.+s, where again the compound denotes a cla.s.s of beings merely, not their number.--Who then are those five-people?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

12. (The pa/nk/ajana/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary pa.s.sage.

The mantra in which the pa/nk/ajana/h/ are mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.--But how, the [email protected] asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on?--How, we ask in return, can it be applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word 'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary pa.s.sage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the pra/n/as in the pa.s.sage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch.

Up. III, 13, 6); and another pa.s.sage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning[238].--But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning?--That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice with the udbhid; he cuts the yupa; he makes the vedi.' a.n.a.logously we conclude that the term pa/nk/ajana/h/, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary pa.s.sage.--Some commentators explain the word pa/nk/ajana/h/ to mean the G.o.ds, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant.

Again, some scriptural pa.s.sage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the pa.s.sage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the pa.s.sage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the , declares that on the ground of the complementary pa.s.sage breath, &c. have to be understood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Ka/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka/n/vas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

The Ka/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, 'Him the G.o.ds wors.h.i.+p as the light of lights.'--If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other ent.i.ties enabling them to interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Ka/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is a.n.a.logous to that of the Sho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different pa.s.sages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-pa.s.sages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one pa.s.sage) as described (in other pa.s.sages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.--But now a new objection presents itself.

It is not possible--our opponent says--to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another. All the Vedanta-pa.s.sages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait. ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all.

Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).--As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter[240], the Vedanta-pa.s.sages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply.--Although the Vedanta-pa.s.sages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the creator is described in any one Vedanta-pa.s.sage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-pa.s.sages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence.

Further, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again--in the pa.s.sage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-different from the created effects. And--in the pa.s.sage, 'He created all this whatever there is'--it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above pa.s.sages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other pa.s.sages also, so, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire'

(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. ar. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedanta-pa.s.sages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony throughout.--On the other hand, there are found conflicting statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e.

Brahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree--for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization;--and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting pa.s.sages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way; nor have we the right to a.s.sume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the pa.s.sages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of pa.s.sages treating of Brahman. That all the pa.s.sages setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. a.n.a.logously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever' (Gau/d/ap. Ka. III, 15).--On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him pa.s.ses over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the a.s.sertion that pa.s.sages such as 'Non-being this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.

15. On account of the connexion (with pa.s.sages treating of Brahman, the pa.s.sages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The pa.s.sage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c.--If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the pa.s.sage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the pa.s.sage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); for that pa.s.sage also is connected with another pa.s.sage which runs, 'It became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former pa.s.sage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the pa.s.sage, 'Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine referred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The pa.s.sage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is.--The following pa.s.sage again, 'Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means a.s.sert that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we conclude from the circ.u.mstance of its being connected with another pa.s.sage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent p.r.o.noun 'he'

refer (in the pa.s.sage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also.--We, moreover, must a.s.sume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulers.h.i.+p of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make a.s.sumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural pa.s.sage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms'

(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself'

(vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. a.n.a.logously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).--Or else we may look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or somebody else').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the world.

In the Kaus.h.i.+taki-brahma/n/a, in the dialogue of Balaki and Ajata/s/atru, we read, 'O Balaki, he who is the maker of those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19).

The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word 'pra/n/a' in a complementary pa.s.sage ('Then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone'), and that word is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place, pra/n/a is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki; for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of pra/n/a we know from another scriptural pa.s.sage, viz. 'Who is that one G.o.d (in whom all the other G.o.ds are contained)? Pra/n/a and he is Brahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).--Or else, the purvapaks.h.i.+n continues, the pa.s.sage under discussion represents the individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The complementary pa.s.sage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual soul. For Ajata/s/atru, in order to instruct Balaki about the 'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Balaki, by the circ.u.mstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the pra/n/a and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by pus.h.i.+ng him with his stick, and so makes Balaki comprehend that the being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from the pra/n/a. A subsequent pa.s.sage also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau.

Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/n/a, it may itself be called pra/n/a.--We thus conclude that the pa.s.sage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks whatever.

To this we make the following reply.--The Lord only can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part of the section. Balaki begins his colloquy with Ajata/s/atru with the offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which partic.i.p.ate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end becomes silent. Ajata/s/atru then sets aside Balaki's doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman--with the words, 'Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.--and proposes the maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now that maker also were merely a soul partic.i.p.ating in the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant.--None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely independent.--Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work'

denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separately--in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'--and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict that a.s.sumption. Nor, again, can the term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there remains no other alternative than to take the p.r.o.noun 'this' (in 'He of whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the same world--as that which is made--by the term 'work.'--We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of discussion; we are rather ent.i.tled to conclude from the circ.u.mstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which const.i.tute a part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the pa.s.sage in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea of limited makers.h.i.+p; so that the whole pa.s.sage has to be interpreted as follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the world, or rather--to do away with this limitation--he of whom this entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that those persons whom Balaki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman.

The pa.s.sage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way of speaking a.n.a.logous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brahma/n/as[242].' And that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedanta-texts.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that has already been explained.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary pa.s.sage, either the one or the other must be meant in the pa.s.sage under discussion, and not the highest Lord.--We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the purvapaks.h.i.+n there would result a threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as well as the concluding clauses, that the pa.s.sage under discussion refers to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been already proved; that the concluding pa.s.sage also refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'--But if this is so, the sense of the pa.s.sage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of the pa.s.sage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present Sutra?--No, we reply; the sense of our pa.s.sage is not yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with the present pa.s.sage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.--The word pra/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the pa.s.sage, 'The mind settles down on pra/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).--The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.