British Airships, Past, Present, and Future Part 12

At 5.57 a.m. (British summer time) R 34 set out on her return voyage, steering for New York, to fly over the city before heading out into the Atlantic. She was picked up by the searchlights and was distinctly visible to an enormous concourse of spectators. During the early part of the flight a strong following wind was of great a.s.sistance, and for a short period an air speed of 83 miles per hour was attained. On the morning of July 11th the foremost of the two engines in the after car broke down and was found to be beyond repair. The remainder of the voyage was accomplished without further incident. On July 12th at noon, a signal was sent telling R 34 to proceed to the airs.h.i.+p station at Pulham in Norfolk as the weather was unfavourable for landing in Scotland. On the same day at 8.25 p.m., land was first sighted and the coast line was crossed near Clifden, county Galway, at 9 p.m. On the following morning, July 13th, at 7.57 a.m. (British summer time), the long voyage was completed and R 34 was safely housed in the shed, having been in the air 75 hours 3 minutes.

Thus a most remarkable undertaking was brought to a successful conclusion. The weather experienced was by no means abnormally good.

This was not an opportunity waited for for weeks and then hurriedly s.n.a.t.c.hed, but on the preordained date the flight was commenced. The airs.h.i.+p enthusiast had always declared that the crossing of the Atlantic presented no insuperable difficulty, and when the moment arrived the sceptics found that he was correct. We may therefore a.s.sume that this flight is a very important landmark in the history of aerial transport, and has demonstrated that the airs.h.i.+p is to be the medium for long-distance travel. We may rest a.s.sured that such flights, although creating universal wonder to-day, will of a surety be accepted as everyday occurrences before the world is many years older.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WORK OF THE AIRs.h.i.+P IN THE WORLD WAR

The outbreak of war found us, as we have seen, practically without airs.h.i.+ps of any military value. For this unfortunate circ.u.mstance there were many contributory causes. The development of aeronautics generally in this country was behind that of the Continent, and the airs.h.i.+p had suffered to a greater extent than either the seaplane or the aeroplane. Our att.i.tude in fact towards the air had not altered so very greatly from that of the man who remarked, on reading in his paper that some pioneer of aviation had met with destruction, "If we had been meant to fly, G.o.d would have given us wings." Absurd as this sounds nowadays, it was the opinion of most people in this country, with the exception of a few enthusiasts, until only a few years before we were plunged into war.

The year 1909 saw the vindication of the enthusiasts, for in this summer Bleriot crossed the Channel in an aeroplane, and the first pa.s.senger-carrying Zeppelin airs.h.i.+p was completed. Those who had previously scoffed came to the conclusion that flying was not only possible but an accomplished fact, and the next two years with their great aerial cross-country circuits revealed the vast potentialities of aircraft in a.s.sisting in military operations. We, therefore, began to study aeronautics as the science of the future, and aircraft as an adjunct to the sea and land forces of the empire.

The airs.h.i.+p, unfortunately, suffered for many reasons from the lack of encouragement afforded generally to the development of aeronautics.

The airs.h.i.+p undoubtedly is expensive, and one airs.h.i.+p of size costs more to build than many aeroplanes. In addition, everything connected with the airs.h.i.+p is a source of considerable outlay. The shed to house an airs.h.i.+p is a most costly undertaking, and takes time and an expenditure of material to erect, and bears no comparison with the cheap hangar which can be run up in a moment to accommodate the aeroplane. The gas to lift the airs.h.i.+p is by no means a cheap commodity. If it is to be made on the station where the airs.h.i.+p is based, it necessitates the provision of an expensive and elaborate plant. If, on the other hand, it is to be manufactured at a factory, the question of transport comes in, which is a further source of expense with costly hydrogen tubes for its conveyance.

Another drawback is the large tract of ground required for an aerodrome, and the big airs.h.i.+p needs a large number of highly-trained personnel to handle it.

A further point always, raised when the policy of developing the airs.h.i.+p was mooted is its vulnerability. It cannot be denied that it presents a large target to artillery or to the aeroplane attacking it, and owing to the highly inflammable nature of hydrogen when mixed with air there can be no escape if the gas containers are pierced by incendiary bullets or sh.e.l.ls.

Another contributing factor to the slow development of the airs.h.i.+p was the lack of private enterprise. Rivalry existed between private firms for aeroplane contracts which consequently produced improvements in design; airs.h.i.+ps could not be produced in this way owing to the high initial cost, and if the resulting s.h.i.+ps ended in failure, as many were bound to do, there would be no return for a large outlay of capital.

The only way by which private firms could be encouraged to embark on airs.h.i.+p building was by subsidies from the Government, and at this time the prevalent idea of the doubtful value of the airs.h.i.+p was too strong for money to be voted for this purpose.

To strengthen this argument no demand had either been made from those in command of the Fleet or from commanders of our Armies for airs.h.i.+ps to act as auxiliaries to our forces.

The disasters experienced by all early airs.h.i.+ps and most particularly by the Zeppelins were always seized upon by those who desired to convince the country what unstable craft they were, and however safe in the air they might be were always liable to be wrecked when landing in anything but fine weather. Those who might have sunk their money in airs.h.i.+p building thereupon patted themselves upon the back and rejoiced that they had been so far-seeing as to avoid being engaged upon such a profitless industry.

Finally, all in authority were agreed to adopt the policy of letting other countries buy their experience and to profit from it at a later date. Had the war been postponed for another twenty years all might have been well, and we should have reaped the benefit, but most calamitously for ourselves it arrived when we were utterly unprepared, and having, as we repeat, only three airs.h.i.+ps of any military value.

With these three s.h.i.+ps, Astra-Torres (No. 3), Pa.r.s.eval (No. 4) and Beta, the Navy did all that was possible. At the very outbreak of war scouting trips were made out into the North Sea beyond the mouth of the Thames by the Astra and Pa.r.s.eval, and both these s.h.i.+ps patrolled the Channel during the pa.s.sage of the Expeditionary Force.

The Astra was also employed off the Belgian coast to a.s.sist the naval landing party at Ostend, and together with the Pa.r.s.eval a.s.sisted in patrolling the Channel during the first winter of the war.

The Beta was also sent over to Dunkirk to a.s.sist in spotting for artillery fire and locating German batteries on the Belgian coast. Our airs.h.i.+ps were also employed for aerial inspection of London and other large towns by night to examine the effects of lighting restrictions and obtain information for our anti-aircraft batteries.

With the single exception of the S.S. s.h.i.+p, which carried out certain manoeuvres in France in the summer of 1916, our airs.h.i.+ps were confined to operations over the sea; but if we had possessed s.h.i.+ps of greater reliability in the early days of the war, it is conceivable that they would have been of value for certain purposes to the Army. The Germans employed their Zeppelins at the bombardment of Antwerp, Warsaw, Nancy and Libau, and their raids on England are too well remembered to need description. The French also used airs.h.i.+ps for the observation of troops mobilizing and for the destruction of railway depots. The Italians relied entirely at the beginning of the war on airs.h.i.+ps, constructed to fly at great heights, for the bombing of Austrian troops and territory, and met with a considerable measure of success.

When it was decided, early in 1915, to develop the airs.h.i.+p for anti-submarine work difficulties which appeared almost insuperable were encountered at first. To begin with, there were practically no firms in the country capable of airs.h.i.+p production. The construction of envelopes was a great problem; as rubber-proofed fabric had been found by experiment to yield the best results for the holding of gas, various waterproofing firms were invited to make envelopes, and by whole-hearted efforts and untiring industry they at last provided very excellent samples. Fins, rudder planes, and cars were also entrusted to firms which had had no previous experience of this cla.s.s of work, and it is rather curious to reflect that envelopes were produced by the makers of mackintoshes and that cars and planes were constructed by a shop-window furnisher. This was a sure sign that all cla.s.ses of the community were pulling together for the good of the common cause.

Among other difficulties was the shortage of hydrogen tubes, plants, and the silicol for making gas.

Sufficient sheds and aerodromes were also lacking, and the airs.h.i.+ps themselves were completed more quickly than the sheds which were to house them.

The lack of airs.h.i.+p personnel to meet the expansion of the service presented a further obstacle. To overcome this the system of direct entry into the R.N.A.S. was inst.i.tuted, which enabled pilots to be enrolled from civil life in addition to the mids.h.i.+pmen who were drafted from the Fleet. The majority of the ratings were recruited from civil life and given instruction in rigging and aero-engines as quickly as possible, while technical officers were nearly all civilians and granted commissions in the R.N.V.R.

A tremendous drawback was the absence of rigid airs.h.i.+ps and the lack of duralumin with which to construct them.

Few men were also experienced in airs.h.i.+p work at this time, and there was no central airs.h.i.+p training establishment as was afterwards inst.i.tuted. Pilots were instructed as occasion permitted at the various patrol stations, having pa.s.sed a balloon course and undergone a rudimentary training at various places.

To conclude, the greatest of all difficulties was the shortage of money voted for airs.h.i.+p development, and this was a disadvantage under which airs.h.i.+ps laboured even until the conclusion of hostilities.

We have seen previously how the other difficulties were surmounted and how our airs.h.i.+ps were evolved, type by type, and the measure of success which attended them. It is interesting to recall that five years ago we only possessed three s.h.i.+ps capable of flying, and that during the war we built upwards of two hundred, of which no fewer than 103 were actually in commission on the date of the signing of the Armistice.

The work carried out by our airs.h.i.+ps during the war falls under three main headings:

1. Operations with the fleet or with various units.

2. Anti-submarine patrol and searching for mines.

3. Escort of s.h.i.+pping and examination duties.

With regard to the first heading it is only permissible at present to say very little; certain manoeuvres were carried out in connection with the fleet, but the slow development of our rigid airs.h.i.+ps prohibited anything on a large scale being attempted. The Germans, on the other hand, made the fullest use of their Zeppelins for scouting purposes with the high seas fleet. Responsible people were guilty of a grave mistake when speaking in public in denouncing the Zeppelin as a useless monster every time one was destroyed in a raid on this country. The main function of the Zeppelin airs.h.i.+p was to act as an aerial scout, and it carried out these duties with the utmost efficiency during the war. It is acknowledged that the German fleet owed its escape after the Battle of Jutland to the information received from their airs.h.i.+ps, while again the Zeppelin was instrumental in effecting the escape of the flotilla which bombarded Scarborough in 1916.

Very probably, also, the large airs.h.i.+p was responsible for the success which attended the U boats during their attack on the cruisers Nottingham and Falmouth, and also at the Hogue disaster.

Various experiments were carried out in towing airs.h.i.+ps by cruisers, in refuelling while in tow and changing crews, all of which would have borne good fruit had the war lasted longer.

An exceedingly interesting experiment was carried out during the closing stages of the war by an airs.h.i.+p of the S.S. Zero type. At this period the German submarines were gradually extending their operations at a greater distance from our coasts, and the authorities became concerned at the prospect that the small type of airs.h.i.+p would not possess sufficient endurance to carry out patrol over these increased distances. The possibility was considered of carrying a small airs.h.i.+p on board a s.h.i.+p which should carry out patrol and return to the s.h.i.+p for refuelling purposes, to replenish gas, and change her crew. To test the feasibility of this idea S.S. Z 57 carried out landing experiments on the deck of H.M.S. Furious, which had been adapted as an aeroplane carrier. S.S. Z 57 came over the deck and dropped her trail rope, which was pa.s.sed through a block secured to the deck, and was hauled down without difficulty. These experiments were continued while the s.h.i.+p was under weigh and were highly successful. No great difficulty was encountered in making fast the trail rope, and the airs.h.i.+p proved quite easy to handle. The car was also lowered into the hangar below the upper deck, the envelope only remaining on the upper level, and everything worked smoothly. If the war had continued there is no doubt that some attempt would have been made to test the practical efficiency of the problem.

Anti-submarine patrol was the chief work of the airs.h.i.+p during the war, and, like everything else, underwent most striking changes. Submarine hunting probably had more clever brains concentrated upon it than anything else in the war, and the part allotted to the airs.h.i.+p in conjunction with the hunting flotillas of surface craft was carefully thought out.

In the case of a suspected submarine in a certain spot, all surface and air craft were concentrated by means of wireless signals at the appointed rendezvous. It is in operations of this kind that the airs.h.i.+p is so superior to the seaplane or aeroplane, as she can hover over a fixed point for an indefinite period with engines shut off. If the submarine was located from the air, signals were given and depth charges dropped in the position pointed out. Incidents of this kind were of frequent occurrence, and in them the value of the airs.h.i.+p was fully recognized.

The most monotonous and arduous of the airs.h.i.+p's duties was the routine patrol. The s.h.i.+p would leave her shed before dawn and be at the appointed place many miles away from land. She then would carry out patrol, closely scanning the sea all round, and investigating any suspicious object. For hours this might last with nothing seen, and then in the gathering darkness the s.h.i.+p would make her way home often against a rising wind, and in the winter through hail and snow. Bombs were always carried, and on many occasions direct hits were observed on enemy submarines. A sharp look-out was always kept for mines, and many were destroyed, either by gunfire from the airs.h.i.+p herself or through the agency of patrol boats in the vicinity. This was the chief work of the S.S. s.h.i.+ps, and was brought to a high pitch of perfection by the S.S. Zero. These s.h.i.+ps proved so handy that they could circle round an object without ever losing sight of it, and yet could be taken in and out of sheds in weather too bad to handle bigger s.h.i.+ps.

The hunting of the submarine has been likened to big-game hunting, and certainly no one ever set out to destroy a bigger quarry. It needs the same amount of patience and the same vigilance. Days may pa.s.s without the opportunity, and that will only be a fleeting one: the psychological moment must be seized and it will not brook a moment's delay. The eye must be trained to pick up the minutest detail, and must be capable of doing this for hour after hour. For those on submarine patrol in a small s.h.i.+p there is not one second's rest. As is well known, the submarine campaign reached its climax in April, 1917.

In that month British and Allied s.h.i.+pping sustained its greatest losses. The value of the airs.h.i.+p in combating this menace was now fully recognized, and with the big building programme of Zero airs.h.i.+ps approved, the housing accommodation again reached an acute stage.

Shortage of steel and timber for shed building, and the lack of labour to erect these materials had they been available, rendered other methods necessary. It was resolved to try the experiment of mooring airs.h.i.+ps in clearings cut into belts of trees or small woods.

A suitable site was selected and the trees were felled by service labour. The s.h.i.+ps were then taken into the gaps thus formed and were moored by steel wires to the adjacent trees. Screens of brushwood were then built up between the trees, and the whole scheme proved so successful that even in winter, when the trees were stripped of their foliage, airs.h.i.+ps rode out gales of over 60 miles per hour. The personnel were housed either in tents or billeted in cottages or houses in the neighbourhood, and gas was supplied in tubes as in the earlier days of the stations before the gas plants had been erected.

This method having succeeded beyond the most sanguine expectations, every station had one or more of these sub-stations based on it, the airs.h.i.+ps allocated to them making a periodical visit to the parent station for overhaul as required. Engineering repairs were effected by workshop lorries, provided that extensive work was not required.

In this way a large fleet of small airs.h.i.+ps was maintained around our coasts, leaving the bigger types of s.h.i.+ps on the parent stations, and the operations were enabled to be considerably extended. Of course, certain s.h.i.+ps were wrecked when gales of unprecedented violence sprung up; but the output of envelopes, planes and cars was by this time so good that a s.h.i.+p could be replaced at a few hours' notice, and the cost compared with building of additional sheds was so small as to be negligible.

From the month of April, 1917, the convoy system was introduced, by which all s.h.i.+ps on entering the danger zones were collected at an appointed rendezvous and escorted by destroyers and patrolboats. The airs.h.i.+p was singularly suitable to a.s.sist in these duties. Owing to her power of reducing her speed to whatever was required, she could keep her station ahead or abeam of the convoy as was necessary, and from her alt.i.tude was able to exercise an outlook for a far greater distance than was possible from the bridge of a destroyer. She could also sweep the surface ahead of the approaching convoy, and warn it by wireless or by flash-lamp of the presence of submarines or mines. By these timely warnings many vessels were saved. Owing to the position of the stations it was possible for a convoy to be met by airs.h.i.+ps west of the Scilly Isles and escorted by the airs.h.i.+ps of the succeeding stations right up the Channel. In a similar manner, the main s.h.i.+pping routes on the east coast and also in the Irish Sea were under constant observation. The mail steamers between England and Ireland and transports between England and France were always escorted whenever flying conditions were possible. For escort duties involving long hours of flying, the Coastal and C Star types were peculiarly suitable, and at a later date the North Sea, which could accompany a convoy for the length of Scotland. Airs.h.i.+ps have often proved of value in summoning help to torpedoed vessels, and on occasions survivors in open boats have been rescued through the agency of patrolling airs.h.i.+ps.

Examination duties are reckoned among the many obligations of the airs.h.i.+p. Suspicious-looking vessels were always carefully scrutinized, and if unable to give a satisfactory answer to signals made, were reported to vessels of the auxiliary patrol for closer examination.

Isolated fis.h.i.+ng vessels always were kept under close observation, for one of the many ruses of the submarine was to adopt the disguise of a harmless fis.h.i.+ng boat with masts and sails.

The large transports, conveying American troops who pa.s.sed through England on their way to France, were always provided with escorting airs.h.i.+ps whenever possible, and their officers have extolled their merits in most laudatory terms.

Our rigid airs.h.i.+ps also contributed their share in convoy work, although their appearance as active units was delayed owing to slowness in construction.

A disturbing feature to the advocate of the large airs.h.i.+p, has been the destruction of raiding Zeppelins by heavier-than-air machines, and the Jeremiahs have not lost this opportunity of declaring that for war purposes the huge rigid is now useless and will always be at the complete mercy of the fast scouting aeroplane. There is never any obstacle in this world that cannot be surmounted by some means or other. On the one hand there is helium, a non-inflammable gas which would render airs.h.i.+ps almost immune to such attacks. On the other hand, one opinion of thought is that the rigid airs.h.i.+p in the future will proceed to sea escorted by a squadron of scouting aeroplanes for its defence, in the same way that the capital s.h.i.+p is escorted at sea by destroyers and torpedo boats. This latter idea has been even further developed by those who look into the future, and have conceived the possibility of a gigantic airs.h.i.+p carrying its own aeroplanes for its protection.

To test the possibility of this innovation, a small aeroplane was attached to one of our rigid airs.h.i.+ps beneath the keel. Attachments were made to the top of the wings and were carried to the main framework of the hull. The release gear was tested on the ground to preclude the possibility of any accident, and on the day appointed the airs.h.i.+p was got ready for flight. While the airs.h.i.+p was flying, the pilot of the aeroplane was in his position with his engine just ticking over. The bows of the airs.h.i.+p were then inclined upwards and the release gear was put into operation. The pilot afterwards said that he had no notion that anything had been done until he noticed that the airs.h.i.+p was some considerable height above him. The machine made a circuit of the aerodrome and landed in perfect safety, while no trouble was experienced in any way in the airs.h.i.+p. Whether this satisfactory experiment will have any practical outcome the future alone can say, but this achievement would have been considered, beyond all the possibilities of attainment only a few years ago.