A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume V Part 6

Having appointed Juan Fernandez to the command of the s.h.i.+ps, he took charge of the vacant government of Lima, where he made every possible preparation for carrying on the war, collecting arms ammunition and all other necessaries.

Some time after the departure of Juan d'Acosta from Lima for Cuzco by the mountain road, as already mentioned, at the head of three hundred men well armed and equipped, he got notice that Gonzalo Pizarro had abandoned that city; on which he sent Fra Pedro, a monk of the order of Mercy, to Gonzalo, to demand instructions for his ulterior proceedings.

Pizarro sent back the monk with directions for Acosta to join him at a certain place. On his return to Acosta, accompanied by a person named Gonzalo Muquos, after delivering his dispatches, Friar Pedro gave him an account of all that had happened in the army of Gonzalo, and in particular of the great number of men that had deserted from him; which Acosta had not before learnt, though several of his soldiers had received the intelligence by letters brought to them by the Indians who frequented the camp, but which they dared not to communicate to each other. On the present occasion, the messengers from Gonzalo recommended to Acosta to keep this matter as secret as possible till such time as he should join Gonzalo. Acosta therefore, gave out that he had received favourable intelligence from the monk, and that Gonzalo had been successful on several occasions, being daily joined by many additional soldiers; and, as he had found it convenient and necessary to send off many confidential persons in various directions, these persons pretended to have deserted from Gonzalo by way of stratagem, on purpose, to gain possession of the s.h.i.+ps commanded by Aldana. All this however was insufficient to disguise the truth from many of the followers of Aldana, particularly Paez de Sotomayor, his major-general, and Martin d'Olmos one of his captains; who, coming to a knowledge of the real state of affairs, entered into a resolution of putting D'Acosta to death. They formed this resolution unknown to each other, as no one at this time dared to avow his sentiments to any other person, for fear of being put to death; yet, from certain indications, they began to suspect each other of entertaining similar sentiments, and at length opened themselves reciprocally, and communicated their purposes to several soldiers in whom they confided. Just when they were about to have put their enterprize into execution, Sotomayor got notice that D'Acosta was holding a secret conference in his tent with two of his captains, and that he had doubled his ordinary guard. From these circ.u.mstances, Sotomayor concluded that their conspiracy, having been revealed to several persons, had been betrayed to Acosta. He took therefore prompt measures to inform all his confederates, and both he and they took horse without delay, and left the camp in sight of all the army, to the number of thirty-five in all; among whom, besides Sotomayor and D'Olmos, the princ.i.p.al persons were Martin d'Alarzon who carried the grand standard, Hernando de Alvarado, Alfonzo Regel, Antonio de Avila, Garcias Gutierrez d'Escovedo, and Martin Monje; who, with all who went off on this occasion, were men of consideration and of much experience in the affairs of Peru. These men took immediately the road for Guamanga, and used such expedition that, though Acosta sent off sixty mounted musqueteers to pursue them, they made their escape in safety.

Acosta caused immediate investigations to be made in regard to such as had partic.i.p.ated in this plot, and ordered several persons to be hanged who were proved to have known its circ.u.mstances: some others in the same predicament he detained prisoners, and dissembled with the rest who had been implicated, pretending not to know that they had partic.i.p.ated in the conspiracy: Yet, during his march towards Cuzco, he put to death several of those of whom he was suspicious, and others who endeavoured to desert. On his arrival at Cuzco, he displaced all the magistrates who had been appointed by Centeno, nominating others in their stead in whom he thought he could confide, and appointed Juan Velasquez de Tapia to take the chief direction of affairs in that city and province; and having regulated every thing to his mind, he resumed his march for Arequipa to join Gonzalo, according to his directions. In this latter part of his march, about thirty of his men deserted from him, by two or three at a time, all of whom went directly to Lima where they joined Lorenzo de Aldana. Besides these, when Acosta had got about ten leagues beyond Cuzco, Martin de Almandras abandoned him with twenty of the best soldiers of his small army, and returned to Cuzco, where he found a sufficient number of the inhabitants disposed to join him in returning to their duty, and in concurrence with whom he deposed the magistracy appointed by Acosta, one of whom he sent away prisoner to Lima, and established a new set in the name of his majesty. Finding that the number of his followers diminished from day to day, Acosta accelerated his march as much as possible, both for his own security and to serve the insurgent cause in which he was engaged. Out of three hundred well armed and excellently equipped men, with whom he had set out from Lima, only one hundred remained with him on his arrival at Arequipa. He found Gonzalo Pizarro at that place, with only about three hundred and fifty men, who a very short while before had a fine army of fifteen hundred, besides all those who were dispersed in different parts of Peru under various captains, all of whom were then under his orders. Gonzalo was now exceedingly irresolute as to his future proceedings; being too weak to wait the attack of the royalists, who continually augmented in their numbers, and yet deeming it dishonourable to fly or to endeavour to conceal himself.

In the mean time Centeno remained in the Collao, waiting an answer from Captain Mendoza to the message he had sent by Gonzalo de Zarate as formerly mentioned. While there he received dispatches from the president, which were forwarded by Aldana, and accounts of the events which had occurred at Lima, particularly the flight of Gonzalo Pizarro to Arequipa, and the junction of Acosta with the insurgents at that place. On receiving this intelligence he sent a new message to Mendoza by means of Luis Garcias, giving him an account of all these events, and particularly informing him of the orders and instructions given to the president, the general amnesty, the revocation of the obnoxious regulations, and the determination of his majesty that Gonzalo Pizarro was not to continue in the government of Peru. He apprized him likewise, that most of the gentlemen and persons of consideration, who had hitherto followed Gonzalo, had now abandoned him on account of his tyrannical conduct, in murdering and plundering all the princ.i.p.al colonists, and more especially because of his rebellion against the sovereign, and refusal to submit to his royal orders, and to the authority of him who had been appointed to regulate the affairs of the kingdom. Wherefore, although all that had been done hitherto might in some measure be excused, he urged Mendoza to consider that in continuing to obey Gonzalo he could no longer avoid the reproach of acting as a rebel against the king. It was now necessary and proper therefore, to forget all individual interests or past disputes, and to devote himself entirely to his majesty, to whom he was enabled by his present situation to render important service.

Alfonzo de Mendoza was already well disposed to act the part of a loyal subject in the present situation of affairs, yet uncertain how best to conduct himself for that purpose; but by this message from Centeno, he was completely determined as to the regulation of his conduct on the present emergency, and immediately declared for his majesty. By agreement between him and Centeno, each was to retain the chief command of the troops now under their orders, and Mendoza departed from La Plata with his men to join Centeno in the Collao. The union of these leaders and their troops occasioned great joy to all their followers, now exceeding a thousand men; and they resolved to march immediately against Gonzalo, taking up a position at a certain pa.s.s to prevent him from escaping, and were likewise induced to remain at that place for the convenience of procuring provisions.

At this time the whole extent of Peru from Quito to Lima had declared for his majesty. Juan d'Olmos, who commanded under Gonzalo at Puerto Viejo, on observing the vessels under Aldana pa.s.sing the port of Manta in that province, had sent an express to Gonzalo giving his opinion that these vessels seemed hostile, as they had not called at the port for refreshments. He at the same time sent some Indians on board, in their ordinary rafts or flat boats, to inquire the purpose of their voyage; by means of which Indians Aldana transmitted letters to D'Olmos, urging him to quit the insurgent party, with copies of all the papers connected with the mission of the president. After perusing these papers, D'Olmos transmitted them to Gomez Estacio who was lieutenant-governor of the province for Gonzalo at St Jago de Guyaquil, usually called Culata. On learning that his majesty did not approve of continuing Gonzalo in the government, and had sent out Gasca as president, Gomez wrote back to D'Olmos, that when the president arrived in the country he should know better how to act, and might probably join him; but in the present situation of affairs, he thought it best for both to remain quiet. Juan d'Olmos went immediately to visit Gomez, accompanied by seven or eight friends, under pretence of communing with him on the state of affairs; but, taking his opportunity, one day when Gomez was off his guard, he stabbed him with his poniard, and immediately got the people to declare for his majesty, after which he did the same at his own government of Puerto Viejo.

When Pedro de Puelles, the governor of Quito, became acquainted with these proceedings of D'Olmos, and that the fleet and army at Panama had declared for the president, he became exceedingly anxious as to the measures proper for him to pursue. At this time D'Olmos sent Diego de Urbina to Quito to endeavour to prevail on Puelles to declare for the royal party. Puelles declared he was ready to receive and obey the person sent out by the king, when once he was satisfied that his majesty had no intention of continuing Gonzalo in the government, but would make no alteration in the mean time; and with this indecisive answer Urbina returned to D'Olmos. A few days afterwards, Rodrigo de Salazar, in whom Puelles reposed entire confidence, entered into a conspiracy with several soldiers at Quito, a.s.sa.s.sinated Puelles, and declared for his majesty. After this exploit, Salazar set out from Quito for Tumbez with three hundred men, with the intention of joining the president. By these several events, and others which have been formerly related, almost the whole of Peru had already returned to obedience before the arrival of the president in the kingdom.

While these favourable events were going on in Peru, the president embarked at Panama with about five hundred men, and arrived safely at the port of Tumbez; one of his s.h.i.+ps, commanded by Don Pedro de Cabrera, being under the necessity of stopping at Buenaventura, whence Cabrera and his men marched by land to Tumbez. On his arrival in Peru, the president received letters from all parts of the kingdom, by which the writers offered him their services and a.s.sistance, besides communicating their sentiments on the situation of the colony, and giving their advice how best to proceed in reducing it to order; to all of which letters he replied with great condescension. So many flocked to his standard from all quarters, that he considered himself sufficiently strong to overcome all resistance from the remnant of the insurgents, without drawing any reinforcements from the other Spanish colonies in America; on which account he sent off messengers to New Spain, Guatimala, Nicaragua, and St Domingo, informing the governors of these colonies of the favourable turn of affairs in Peru, and that he should now have no occasion for the reinforcements which he had formerly thought necessary. Soon after his arrival, he gave orders to his lieutenant-general, Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa, to march with the troops to form a junction with the royalists in Caxamarca. In the mean time Polo de Menzes remained in charge of the fleet, with which he advanced along the coast to the southwards, while the president, with a sufficient escort, went by the road of the plain to Truxillo, at which place he received intelligence from all parts of the country, stating that every thing went on well.

The president had resolved that he would not go to Lima till he had completed the purposes of his mission, by the final conquest of Gonzalo and his adherents, and the restoration of peace and order in the kingdom of Peru; on which account he transmitted orders to all quarters, that all who had declared for his majesty should meet him in the valley of Jauja, which he considered to be a convenient situation in which to a.s.semble the whole loyal force of the kingdom, as in that place abundance of provisions could easily be procured. For this purpose, he sent orders to Lorenzo de Aldana, then at Lima, to march with all his force for Jauja; and joining the army under Hinojosa, now exceeding a thousand men, he marched for Jauja, all the army expressing the utmost satisfaction at the prospect of being freed from the tyranny of Gonzalo.

Many of the princ.i.p.al persons who had joined with Gonzalo at the beginning of the troubles, were now exceedingly offended and displeased by the cruel murders of so many of their friends and neighbours; above five hundred men having been put to death, many of whom were persons of consideration and importance; insomuch that those who still remained along with him were continually in fear of their lives.

On his arrival at Arequipa, Gonzalo found that city entirely deserted, as most of the inhabitants had gone to join Diego Centeno after that officer got possession of Cuzco. Hearing that Centeno was in the Collao, near the lake of t.i.ticaca, where after his junction with Mendoza, he had an army of near a thousand men, composed of the troops of Cuzco Las Charcas and Arequipa, and with which they occupied all the pa.s.ses towards the interior, Gonzalo believed it almost impossible to attack these officers with any probability of success. He waited therefore at Arequipa about three weeks, expecting the junction of D'Acosta, who at length arrived, but with very diminished numbers, as already related, many having abandoned him, and having put many of his followers to death on suspicion that they intended to desert. After the junction of D'Acosta, Gonzalo found himself at the head of five hundred men. He now wrote to Centeno, giving a recital of all the events which had occurred during the troubles, and dwelt particularly on the favour he had always shewn him, and particularly instanced the pardon he had granted him when Gaspard Rodriguez and Philip Guttierrez were executed, though equally guilty with them, and although all his officers had urged him to put Centeno to death. In addition, Gonzalo made high offers to Centeno, promising to accede to every demand he might choose to make, if he would now join him. He sent this letter to Centeno by a person named Francisco Vaso, who immediately offered his services to Centeno, to whom he intimated that Diego Alvarez his standard-bearer was in correspondence with Gonzalo. Centeno was already informed of this circ.u.mstance by Alvarez himself, who a.s.sured him he had entered into this correspondence for a quite different purpose than that of betraying him or the royal cause.

Centeno thought proper to send a civil answer to Gonzalo, giving him many thanks for his offers, and freely acknowledging the favour he had formerly experienced. That as a mark of his grat.i.tude, therefore, he now earnestly entreated him to reflect seriously on the present situation of affairs, to consider the gracious clemency of the king, who had granted a free pardon to him and all those who had taken any part in the past troubles. He a.s.sured Gonzalo, if he would abandon the insurrection, now evidently hopeless, and submit to the royal orders, that he would use his utmost endeavours to procure him an honourable and advantageous situation, and at the same time endeavoured to convince him that he would run no risk either in his person or property by following the present advice. On his return to Gonzalo with this letter, Vaso was met by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, who made minute inquiry respecting every thing he had seen and learnt, and gave him strict injunctions not to let it be known to the followers of Gonzalo that the force of Centeno exceeded seven hundred men. On being informed that Centeno refused to join him, Gonzalo disdained to read his letter, and ordered it immediately to be burnt in presence of several of his officers.

Immediately after this, Gonzalo determined to march into the province of Las Charcas, and accordingly took the direct road towards the pa.s.s occupied by Centeno and Mendoza. In this march the van-guard was commanded by the lieutenant-general, who took and hanged more than twenty persons whom he fell in with during the march. Among these was a priest named Pantaleon, who carried some letters for Centeno, and whom Carvajal ordered to be hung up, with his breviary and ink-horn suspended from his neck. Continuing this march, the scouts of the two armies fell in with each other on Thursday the 19th of October 1547. Gonzalo immediately sent one of his chaplains with a message to Centeno, demanding leave to continue his march through the pa.s.s, without being obliged to give battle[32]. The chaplain was conducted by the bishop of Cuzco, who happened to be in the army of Centeno, to his tent; and Centeno gave strict charges to his troops to be on their guard and always in good order to receive the enemy in case of an attack. For above a month Centeno had been afflicted by an obstinate fever, for which he had been six times blooded without any relief, and was not expected to recover; so that he was quite incapable of acting on the present emergency, being confined constantly to bed.

[Footnote 32: No consequences seem to have followed from this demand, which does not appear to have been acceded or even listened to.--E.]

The illness of Centeno was known in the army of Gonzalo, and that his tent was pitched at some distance from the rest, to avoid the noise and bustle of the camp. Founding on this intelligence, Juan d'Acosta was detached with twenty picked men, with orders to approach silently in the night to the camp of the royalists, and to endeavour to carry off Centeno. Acosta accordingly drew near with so much caution that he surprised the centinels that were on guard over Centeno, and had very near reached his tent when the alarm was given by some negro servants.

Being thus discovered, Acosta ordered his men to fire off their musquets, and immediately retreated back to the camp of Gonzalo without losing a man. In the confusion occasioned by this exploit, great numbers of the royalists hastened towards the tent occupied by Centeno; but on this occasion several of the soldiers belonging to Valdivia threw away their arms and fled. Next morning the scouts of both armies approached each other, followed by the respective armies, which at length came in sight. The army of Centeno consisted of about a thousand men, two hundred of whom were cavalry, an hundred and fifty armed with musquets, and all the rest with pikes. Of this army, Luis de Ribera was major-general, Pedro de Rios, Jerom Villegas, and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry, and Diego Alvarez carried the grand-standard. The captains of infantry were Juan de Vargas, Francisco Retamoso, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Lopez de Zuniga; Luis Garcias being sergeant-major, or adjutant-general[33]. The army of Gonzalo consisted only of five hundred men, of which three hundred were musqueteers, and eighty cavalry, the remainder being armed with pikes. Of this army Carvajal was lieutenant-general; the licentiate Cepeda and Juan Velez de Guevara were captains of horse; and Juan d'Acosta, Ferdinand Bachicao, and Juan de la Torre captains of foot.

[Footnote 33: It is not easy to understand how Mendoza, who had joined Centeno some time before, happens to be omitted in this enumeration--E.]

Both armies being drawn up in good order, the insurgents advanced, to the sound of trumpets and other musical instruments, till within six hundred paces of the enemy, when Carvajal ordered them to halt. The royalists continued to advance till within a hundred paces less, and then halted likewise. At this time, forty musqueteers were detached from the army of Gonzalo, with orders to begin the engagement; and two other parties of musqueteers, of forty men each, were posted on the wings, Pizarro taking his station between his cavalry and infantry. Thirty musqueteers were likewise advanced from the army of Centeno, to skirmish with those of the insurgents. As Carvajal observed that the royalists waited the attack in good order, he ordered his troops to advance a few steps very slowly, in hopes of inducing the enemy to make some movement or evolution which might occasion confusion in their ranks. This had the desired, effect, as the royalists, believing that their enemies, though interior in number, wished to have the honour of making the attack, they began immediately to advance, and the insurgents by order of Carvajal stood firm to receive them. When tolerably near, Carvajal gave orders for a small number of his troops to fire their musquets, on which the royalists made a general discharge, and marched forwards at a quick step with levelled pikes, during which the royalist musqueteers made a second discharge without occasioning any loss to the enemy, as they were still three hundred paces distant. Carvajal made his men reserve their fire till the enemy was within about an hundred paces; when, with a few pieces of artillery, and the whole of his musqueteers, he threw in so destructive a volley that above an hundred and fifty of the royalists were slain, among whom were two of their captains. By this terrible slaughter, the whole infantry of the royalist army was thrown into disorder, entirely defeated, and took to flight, in spite of every effort of Captain Retimoso to rally them, who lay wounded in the field.

Notwithstanding the defeat of the infantry, the royalist cavalry made a brave charge against the insurgents, of whom they killed and wounded a considerable number. On this occasion Gonzalo had his horse killed and was thrown to the ground, yet escaped unhurt. Pedro de Rios and Pedro de Ulloa, captains of cavalry belonging to Centeno, wheeled with their squadrons round the wing of the insurgent infantry, intending to charge their flank; but were opposed by the detachments of musqueteers which were posted on the wings, on which occasion De Rios and several others were slain. Being thus repulsed, and seeing their own infantry entirely defeated, the cavalry took likewise to flight and dispersed, every one endeavouring to save himself as he best could.

Gonzalo Pizarro, having thus gained an easy victory, marched on with his army in good order to the camp of Centeno, putting every person to death that came in the way. A considerable number of the dispersed royalists happened to seek safety in pa.s.sing by the camp of Pizarro, which they found entirely deserted, insomuch that they were able to make use of the horses and mules belonging to the insurgent infantry to facilitate their flight, and even made a considerable booty in gold and silver. While the royalist cavalry were engaged vigorously with the insurgents, Bachicao, one of Gonzalos captains, believing that the royalists would be victorious, went over to them. After the victory was decided in favour of Gonzalo, Bachicao, imagining that his conduct had not been observed, and would remain unknown, or that he would be able to justify himself under some colourable pretence, returned to his post. But as his defection was known to Carvajal, he caused him to be instantly hung up, adding insulting raillery to his cruelty, calling him his dear comrade and using many other bantering expressions.

During this unfortunate battle, Centeno was so ill that he was carried on a kind of litter by six Indians, almost in a state of insensibility; yet, by the care and attention of some of his friends, he was saved after the defeat of his army. In this b.l.o.o.d.y engagement, which was fought near a place called Guarina, above three hundred and fifty men were slain on the side of the royalists, besides thirty more who were put to death in the pursuit by the insurgent cavalry. Among these were, the major-general Luis de Ribera, the captains Retamoso, Diego Lopez de Zuniga, Negral, Pantoia, and Diego Alvarez, with Friar Gonzalo of the order of Mercy, and several other persons of condition. The insurgents lost about an hundred men. After the battle, Carvajal pursued the fugitives at the head of the insurgent cavalry for several days, on the road towards Cuzco. He was very anxious to take the bishop of Cuzco, against whom he was much incensed for having joined Centeno and being present in the battle. The bishop however made his escape; but Carvajal gratified his revenge on several royalists whom he got up with, all of whom he hung up without mercy, among whom were a brother of the bishop and a Dominican friar. After the return of Carvajal from the pursuit, Gonzalo made a distribution of lands and Indians among his troops, engaging to put them into possession at a convenient opportunity. He likewise took great care of his wounded men, and caused the slain to be buried. He then sent Bovadilla with a detachment to the city of La Plata and the mines, to collect all the gold and silver that could be procured, and dispatched Diego de Carvajal, usually called the _Beau_, on a similar mission to Arequipa. Juan de la Torre was sent to take possession of Cuzco, where he put to death Vasquez de Tapia and the licentiate Martel.

After this favourable turn of affairs, Pizarro issued a proclamation by which all the soldiers who had served under Centeno were commanded to join his standard, under pain of death; granting an amnesty for all that pa.s.sed, with the exception only of those princ.i.p.al leaders who had particularly exerted themselves for the royal cause. He then sent Pedro de Bustincia with a detachment, to oblige the curacas of Andaguaylas and the neighbouring districts to furnish provisions for his army. A few days afterwards Gonzalo repaired to Cuzco with about four hundred men, and used every effort to put himself into a situation for opposing the president; being so elated by the victory he had gained at Guarina over such superior numbers, that he and his followers believed themselves almost invincible.

While these things were going on in the south of Peru, the president marched by the mountain road for the valley of Jauja, accompanied by the troops which he had brought from the Tierra Firma, and those of the captains Diego de Mora, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Porcel, and the others that had a.s.sembled in Caxamarca. He sent orders likewise to Salazar, who now commanded at Quito, to join him with all his men; and ordered Lorenzo de Aldana to join him from Lima with all the soldiers from the fleet and those he had drawn together after the flight of Gonzalo to Arequipa. The president arrived first of all at Jauja with an escort of an hundred men, where he immediately took the proper measures for collecting arms and military stores, and provisions. On the same day he was joined by the licentiate Carvajal and Gabriel de Royas; and soon afterwards Ferdinand Mexia de Guzman, and Juan Alphonzo Palamino arrived with their companies. Lorenzo de Aldana remained at Lima with his own company, it being of great importance to keep possession of that city and its post. In a short time the president had collected an army of above fifteen hundred men in Jauja, and employed all the forges and artists he could procure to fabricate new musquets, to put all the old ones into good repair, and to provide abundance of pikes and all other arms, both offensive and defensive. In these preparations he not only exerted the utmost diligence, but shewed a great deal of intelligence and knowledge, far beyond what could tare been expected from a person who had hitherto been entirely occupied in civil and religious pursuits.

He carefully visited his camps, and inspected the workmen who were employed by his orders, taking at the same time every possible care of such of his soldiers as were sick, exerting himself to the utmost in every thing relative to the good of the service, beyond what could have been expected from any single person, by which means he acquired the entire confidence and affection of all who were under his command. His army had always been in hope that their services would not be required, and even at one time believed that the president would not have had occasion to a.s.semble an army, as they thought that Centeno was strong enough to have conquered Gonzalo.

Immediately on receiving intelligence of the victory which Gonzalo had gained at Guarina, the president sent the captains Lope Martin and Mercadillo, with a detachment of fifty men, to occupy the pa.s.ses of Guamanga, about thirty leagues from Jauja on the way to Cuzco, to learn the motions of the enemy, and to collect all who might have been able to escape from Cuzco. While at Guamanga, Lope Martin got notice that Pedro de Bustincia was in the district of Andahuaylas collecting provisions for the army of Gonzalo, as formerly mentioned. Accompanied by fifteen mounted musqueteers, Martin went into that district, where he unexpectedly attacked Bustincia during the night, and made him and all his people prisoners. After hanging some of these men, he returned to Guamanga, bringing all the curacas of the neighbourhood along with him, by whose means intelligence was conveyed to all parts of the country, giving notice of the arrival of the president in the valley of Jauja, and the great preparations he was making in that place.

From Jauja the president sent his lieutenant-general, Alfonzo de Alvarado, to bring up from Lima all the soldiers that could be spared from that place, together with some pieces of artillery from the s.h.i.+ps, and clothes and money for the supply of such of the soldiers as were in want; all of which services were performed by Alvarado in a short time.

The president now mustered his army, of which Pedro Alfonzo de Hinojosa was lieutenant-general, and the licenciate Bendicto de Carvajal carried the royal standard, Don Pedro de Cabrera, Gomez de Alvarado, Juan de Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Francisco Hernandez, Rodrigo de Salazar, and Alfonzo de Mendoza were captains of cavalry; Don Balthazar de Castillo, Pablo de Menezes, Hernando Mexia de Guzman, Juan Alfonzo Palomino, Gomez de Solis, Francisco Mosquera, Don Ferdinand de Cardinas, the adelantado Andagoya, Francisco d'Olmos, Gomez d'Arias, and three other captains, Porcel, Pardaval, and Serna, commanded the infantry. Gabriel de Royas was appointed to command the artillery. Besides the military officers already mentioned, the president was attended by the archbishop of Lima, the bishops of Cuzco and Quito, the provincials of the Dominicans and of the order of Mercy, and by several other ecclesiastics, both priests and friars. On a general muster and review of the army, it was found to consist of seven hundred musqueteers, five hundred pikemen, and four hundred cavalry. Afterwards, on arriving at Xaquixaguana on the march towards Cuzco, it was augmented to nineteen hundred men, by the junction of several other detachments, forming the largest and best appointed array hitherto seen in Peru.

The president, having completed his preparations, began his march from Jauja in good order on the 19th of December 1547, taking the route of Cuzco, and especially desirous of crossing the river Abancay[34] in some safe place. In this part of his march he was joined by Pedro de Valdivia, the governor of Chili. Valdivia had come by sea to Lima, on purpose to raise men, and to procure various stores of which he was in want, with clothing and ammunition, on purpose to enable him to proceed in the conquest of Chili. On his arrival at Lima, and learning the situation of affairs in Peru, he determined upon joining the president.

His arrival was considered as an indication of good fortune; for, although the president had already in his army many officers of merit and capacity, and of eminent rank and fortune, there was not any one in Peru who possessed so much experience in the manner of conducting warlike operations in that country as Valdivia, on which account he was considered as a fit person to be opposed to the experience and stratagems of Carvajal, who was much dreaded by every one in the presidents army, more especially since the late defeat of Centeno, which was entirely attributed to the talents of Carvajal. About the same time Centeno joined the president with more than thirty horse, who had accompanied him ever since the defeat of Guarina. Continuing his march amid considerable difficulties, owing to the scarcity of provisions, the president at length reached the province of Andahuaylas, where he judged it proper to remain during the winter, on account of the violent rains which fell night and day almost without ceasing, by which the tents were all rotted. The maize which they procured as food for the troops was all wet and spoiled, by which a considerable number of the soldiers were afflicted with dysentery, of which some died, notwithstanding the care taken of the sick by Francisco de la Rocha, a Trinitarian monk, who acted as physician to the army. Although there were above four hundred sick at one time, so great was the care bestowed, that they were as well attended and as plentifully supplied with medicines as if in a populous city, insomuch that they almost all recovered.

[Footnote 34: Rather the Pachacamac, near which the town or city of Abancay is situated, and where probably the president proposed to pa.s.s that river.--E.]

The arrival of Valdivia and Centeno diffused much joy through the army, which was expressed in frequent feasts and entertainments, with concerts of music, running at the ring, and similar amus.e.m.e.nts. During the continuance of the army in winter quarters at Andahuaylas, the general Hinojosa with Alfonzo de Alvarado and Valdivia applied themselves indefatigably to have every thing in the best possible order for taking the field. On the commencement of spring, and when the rains began sensibly to diminish, the army broke up from Andahuaylas and marched to the bridge of Abancay, about twenty leagues from Cuzco, where it halted until bridges were constructed across the Apurimac at the distance of twelve leagues from Cuzco[35], as the enemy had broken down all the bridges over that river, and it was necessary either to construct new ones, or to make a circuit of more than seventy leagues to get to Cuzco.

On purpose to distract the enemy, the president caused materials for the construction of bridges to be carried to three different points on the Apurimac; one on the great road of the Incas[36], a second in the valley of Cotabamba, about twelve leagues farther up the river, and a third still farther up the Apurimac, at a village belonging to Don Pedro de Puertocarrero, where that officer was posted with a hundred men to guard the pa.s.sage. For the construction of these bridges cables and ropes were prepared, after the manner of the native Peruvians as formerly described in our general account of the country; and beams and pillars were got ready on which to fix the cables when the army should be collected at the intended place of pa.s.sing the river. Had Gonzalo been able to ascertain the place at which it was intended to pa.s.s, he had a.s.suredly opposed the royalists, and would at least have made it exceedingly difficult for them to construct a bridge; but as he could not ascertain the actual point fixed on, he did not consider it safe to divide his force so as to oppose the royalists at the three points of demonstration, and satisfied himself therefore by posting spies at the different places, to bring him immediate notice of the place where the royalists might begin their operations, that he might know where to march to oppose them. But the secret was confined to the knowledge of the president, and the members of his council of war.

[Footnote 35: Abancay on the Pachacamac is not above 14 Spanish leagues from Cuzco in a straight line. The other bridges mentioned in the text must have been thrown over the Apurimac Proper, somewhere near the town or village of Limatambo.--E.]

[Footnote 36: This was probably by Limatambo, as on the great road the Incas had palaces for lodging in with their attendants, called _tambos_.--E.]

When all the materials were in readiness, the army began its march for Cotabamba, at which place it was determined to pa.s.s the river. In this march the army had to encounter very considerable difficulties in pa.s.sing through mountains covered with snow. Several of the captains were of opinion that this was an improper route, and proposed another place almost fifty[37], leagues higher up; but Lope Martin, who guarded the pa.s.s of Cotabamba, always insisted that the securest pa.s.sage was to be had at that place. In consequence of this difference of opinion, the president sent Valdivia and three other captains to examine the different places; and on their report that Cotabamba was attended by the least difficulty and danger, that place was fixed upon. When Lope Martin got information that the army approached to Cotabamba, he set to work with the Spaniards and Indians of his detachment, to extend and tighten the cables and ropes across the river, of which the main support of the bridge was to be composed. Three of the cables were already fixed, when the spies employed by Gonzalo came to the place, and cut two of them without resistance. On this intelligence being communicated to the army, it gave much concern to the president and his officers, lest Gonzalo might bring up his forces to dispute the pa.s.sage before the army could be able to get over. The president, therefore, accompanied by his princ.i.p.al officers, Hinojosa Alvarado and Valdivia, hastened to the scite of the bridge, where he immediately gave orders for some companies of infantry to pa.s.s the river on Peruvian flat boats or rafts, which was deemed a very hazardous enterprize, both on account of the rapidity of the current, and because it was believed the enemy might be in some force on the other side. Among the first who got over was Hondegardo with a few soldiers, after whom several other captains of infantry got across with their men, so that before night above four hundred men were got over, some of whom swam over their horses along with the flat boats, holding them by the bridles, and having their musquets and other arms tied to the saddles. Yet so rapid was the current, that above sixty horses were lost on this occasion, either drowned or dashed against the rocks.

[Footnote 37: This may probably be an error of the press in the original for _fifteen_ leagues. Fifty leagues even from Abancay would have carried the army almost to Arequipa, to turn the head of the Apurimac, and among the highest mountains of Peru.--E.]

On receiving notice from his spies that a part of the royalists had got across the river, Gonzalo sent off Juan d'Acosta with two hundred mounted musqueteers, with orders to give no quarter to any of those who had pa.s.sed the river, excepting such as had newly come from Spain. On the approach of Acosta, as the royalists then on that side of the river were not numerous, they mounted a considerable number of Indians and negroes on the horses which had been got over, arming them with lances, and by that means presented the appearance of a formidable squadron drawn up on a height, the few Spanish troops who were on that side of the river being placed in the front rank; insomuch that, when Acosta went to reconnoitre, they appeared so numerous that he did not venture to attack; and returned for a reinforcement. In the mean time, the bridge being got ready with the utmost possible diligence, most of the royalists pa.s.sed the river, every one expressing the utmost astonishment at the negligence of Gonzalo in not being at hand to dispute the pa.s.sage, as a hundred men at each of the three places where preparations had been made for pa.s.sing, might have rendered the attempt exceedingly hazardous.

Next day, when all the army with its stores and followers had pa.s.sed the river, Don Juan de Sandoval was sent out upon discovery, who reported on his return that he had advanced three leagues into the country without seeing any thing of the insurgents. Hinojosa and Valdivia were then ordered to advance with several companies of infantry to occupy the pa.s.ses in the neighbouring mountain, as Gonzalo might have given them much trouble if he had taken possession of these heights, which were above a league and a half in ascent; and this order was happily executed without meeting with any resistance. When Acosta retreated from the river, in consequence of believing himself too weak to attack those who had pa.s.sed, he sent to demand a reinforcement from Gonzalo of a hundred musqueteers, with the aid of whom he alleged he would be enabled to defeat the royalist party which had crossed. At this time one Juan Nunnez de Prado deserted from him to the president, and gave him notice of the succours which were expected by Acosta. Believing therefore that Gonzalo would advance with all his forces, the president took post on the ridge of the mountain with above nine hundred men, both cavalry and infantry, and remained under arms all night. Next morning, Acosta advanced with the reinforcement he had demanded, and the scouts of the president brought notice of his approach. On this intelligence, believing the whole army of the insurgents at hand, the president sent his major-general Alfonzo de Alvarado back to the river, to bring up the artillery and the rest of the army: And as the colours of Pizarro came in sight, before the return of Alvarado, the president drew up his nine hundred men in order of battle, giving all the necessary orders in case of being attacked. But in a short time, it was discovered that these precautions were unnecessary, as Acosta soon retreated with his three hundred men, on seeing the greatly superior force of the royalists.

The president remained two or three days in the position he had taken on the summit of the mountain, waiting for his artillery and the rest of his army. While at that place, Gonzalo sent him a message by a priest, demanding that he should dismiss his army, and refrain from making war against him till he should receive new orders from his majesty. On this occasion, the bishop of Cuzco, who was along with the president, ordered the priest into confinement. A little time before this, Gonzalo had dispatched another priest, to endeavour to gain over Hinojosa and Alvarado to his party, But that messenger, being resolved to desert the party of the insurgents, had taken measures in concert with his brother to go off in company with all their effects, in which they succeeded. At this time likewise the president wrote to Gonzalo, as he had repeatedly done during his march, earnestly entreating him to submit to the orders of his majesty, and sending him at the same time a copy of the amnesty.

The usual manner in which these dispatches was forwarded to Gonzalo, was by means of the scouts of the army, who had orders to give them to those belonging to Gonzalo when they chanced to meet.

When it was known at Cuzco that the president had crossed the river Apurimac with all his army, and had taken possession of the pa.s.s in the high mountain, Gonzalo Pizarro immediately marched out from that city with his army and encamped at Xaquixaguana, about five leagues from Cuzco, in a plain through which the road pa.s.sed by which the royalists would have to march on their way from the mountain towards Cuzco. His army at this time consisted of five hundred and fifty musqueteers, with six pieces of cannon, and three hundred and fifty cavalry and pikemen.

Gonzalo established his camp in a very strong position, as it was only accessible in front by means of a very narrow defile, one flank being secured by a river and mora.s.s, the other flank by the mountain, and the rear by precipitous rocks. During two or three days, that the two armies remained near each other before the battle, Gonzalo sometimes detached a hundred and sometimes two hundred men to skirmish with similar parties of the enemy. As the royalist army was now encamped only at a short distance from the insurgents, Gonzalo was afraid his troops might lose courage by noticing the vast superiority of the enemy in number, and that many of his men might abandon him; for which reason he always drew up his men under cover of a rising ground near his camp, pretending that he did so to induce the president to attack him in his present advantageous post, confiding in his numbers and believing the insurgents much fewer than they really were.

After the president had pa.s.sed the mountains and pitched his camp on the descent towards the plain, within view of the insurgents, Gonzalo drew up his army in order of battle, and caused some discharges to be made from his cannon and musquetry. On that day there arose so thick a mist, that the scouts and spies of the two armies often came against each other unexpectedly. Seeing that the insurgents were disposed to await his attack, or even to give battle, the president was inclined to defer bringing matters to that extremity for some time, in the hope that a considerable number of the enemy might come over to him if they could find an opportunity. Yet, as the season was exceedingly cold, even accompanied with strong frost, and as wood could not be procured for making fires, and provisions were scarce, it was impossible to remain long in a state of inaction. The army of Gonzalo was not subject to any of these inconveniencies, having plenty of provisions brought regularly from Cuzco, and being encamped in a comfortable and temperate situation in comparison with the position of the president, whose camp was on the slope of the mountain, while that of the insurgents was in the plain or valley below. Such is the difference in the temperature of Peru at very inconsiderable distances, that on the mountains a severe cold is experienced, accompanied by frost and snow, while only at eight or ten miles distance in the valley the inhabitants are obliged to use precautions to relieve them from excessive heat.

Gonzalo and his lieutenant-general, Carvajal, had formed an arrangement for a night attack upon the president, intending to have a.s.sailed his camp in three points at the same time; but they were induced to abandon this project, in consequence of the desertion of one of their soldiers named Nava, who communicated their intentions to the president. By this person and some others who had joined him from the army of Gonzalo, the president was advised to delay coming to battle as long as possible; as they were certain that many of the followers of Gonzalo would take the first favourable opportunity of returning to their duty, more especially those soldiers who had served under Centeno, and who had been constrained after his defeat to enter into the ranks of the insurgents to save their lives. In expectation of the proposed attack, the president kept his army the whole of that night under arms, by which they suffered, much distress from the extreme coldness of the weather on the mountain, so that many of the soldiers were hardly able to keep hold of their arms, and waited impatiently for day. At daylight, a party of musqueteers belonging to Gonzalo was observed in march to gain possession of a height in the neighbourhood of the royal camp. Mexia and Palomino were immediately detached, with three hundred musqueteers, to dislodge them, and Valdivia and Alvarado advanced in the same direction, so that the enemy were soon forced to retire. During this skirmish, the president marched down from the mountain with the main body of his army, in the direction of Cuzco, under cover of the hill on which the skirmish had taken place; and, to distract the attention of the enemy, a small detachment of cavalry and infantry was ordered to advance in view of the insurgent camp from that hill. On the arrival of Valdivia and Alvarado at the top of the hill, observing that it was possible to cannonade the camp of the enemy from that place, they sent orders to Gabriel de Royas to bring up the artillery. On this occasion, De Royas promised a reward of five hundred crowns for each ball that should reach the enemy: In fact he paid that sum about a year afterwards to one of his gunners, who sent a ball through the tent of Gonzalo, which was exceedingly conspicuous, by which one of his pages was slain. In consequence of this incident, Gonzalo ordered all the tents to be struck, that they might not serve as marks for the cannoneers of the president. He likewise ordered his own artillery to commence firing, and drew up his army in order of battle, taking his own station at the head of his cavalry, which was commanded by the licentiate Cepeda and Juan d'Acosta. Carvajal was at the head of the infantry, having under him the captains Juan de la Torre, Diego Guillen, Juan Velasquez de Guevara, Francisco Maldonado, and Sebastian de Vergara. Pedro de Soria commanded his artillery. When the insurgent army was drawn up in order of battle, the numerous Indians that were attached to it quitted the camp, and posted themselves in view of both armies on the slope of a neighbouring hill.

While the artillery on both sides kept up a constant fire, the royalist army descended from the mountain without keeping any regular order, and in all possible haste, the cavalry all on foot leading their horses, both on account of the ruggedness of the ground and the better to avoid the cannonade from the enemy, as they had no shelter from the b.a.l.l.s.

Immediately on getting down to the plain, the troops were drawn up in order of battle; the infantry in two battalions in the centre, and the cavalry on the two wings. The cavalry of the left wing was commanded by the captains Juan Saavedra, Diego de Mora, Rodrigo Salazar, and Francisco Hernandez de Aldana. The royal standard was displayed by the licentiate Carvajal in the right wing, in which likewise were posted the captains Don Pedro de Cabrera, Alfonso Mercadillo, and Gomez de Alvarado. The infantry marched between the wings of horse, but a little farther in advance, under the captains Ramirez, De Castro, De Solis, Cardenas, Menezes, Mosquera, De la Cerna, Urbina, Aliaga, De Robles, De Arias, and De Olmos. A little in advance of the infantry, Alfonso de Mendoza marched with his troop of horse to commence the attack, accompanied by Centeno, who was determined to exert himself on this occasion in revenge for his defeat at Guarina. Pedro de Villavicentio acted as serjeant-major or adjutant-general of the army. The president, accompanied by the archbishop of Lima, was a little on one side, on the slope of the mountain, by which the major-general Alvarado and Valdivia brought down the artillery and the three hundred musqueteers commanded by Mexia and Palomino. On getting into the plain, this body of musqueteers divided in two, Mexia marching to the right along the river, and Palomino keeping to the left along the skirts of the mountain.

While the royalist artillery was coming down the mountain, the licentiate Cepeda, Garcila.s.so de la Vega, and Alfonso de Piedra, with several other persons of rank and some private soldiers, abandoned Gonzalo to surrender themselves to the president. They were closely pursued by Pedro Martin de Cicilia and some others of the insurgents, who wounded several of these deserters. The horse of Cepeda was killed under him by the thrust of a lance, and himself wounded, and he had a.s.suredly been either taken or killed unless promptly succoured by order of the president. In the mean time Gonzalo kept his troops in firm array, waiting for the enemy, and in expectation that they might attack him in confusion and be easily defeated, as had happened in the battle of Guarina. Hinojosa on his side, advanced with the royalists in the best order and at a slow pace, to within musquet-shot of the insurgents, where he halted in some low ground, in such a situation that his men were secure from the cannon-b.a.l.l.s of the enemy, which all flew over their heads, although the gunners used every effort to depress their guns so as to fire low. At this time the platoons of musquetry on the wings of both armies kept up a close fire, Alvarado and Valdivia using every effort to cause their men take good aim, while the president and archbishop encouraged their gunners to fire quickly and to purpose; making them often change the direction of their guns, as circ.u.mstances appeared to require.

Observing that several of the soldiers of Gonzalo were endeavouring to abandon him and were hotly pursued, Centeno and Mendoza advanced with the cavalry under their command, on purpose to protect all who wished to come over. All those who quitted the insurgents, urged the commanders of the royal army not to advance to the charge, as they were certain the far greater part of the army of Gonzalo would abandon him, so that he would be easily defeated without any danger to the royalists, and with little effusion of blood. At this time, a platoon of thirty musqueteers, finding themselves near the royal army, came over in a body and surrendered themselves. Gonzalo wished to have these men pursued and brought back; but the attempt threw his troops into confusion, and his whole army began instantly to break up, some fleeing towards Cuzco, while others went over to the president and surrendered themselves. Some of the insurgent officers were so confounded by this sudden and universal derout, that they neither had presence of mind to flee or to fight. On seeing this hopeless turn of his affairs, Gonzalo lost all courage, and exclaimed in despair, "Since all surrender to the king, so must I also." It is reported, that Juan d'Acosta endeavoured to encourage him, saying, "let us rush upon the thickest of the enemy, and die like Romans;" to which Gonzalo is reported to have answered, "It is better to die like Christians."

At this time, Gonzalo observing the serjeant-major of the royalists near him, surrendered to him, giving up a long small sword which he had used instead of a lance, as he had previously broken his lance upon some of his own men who were running away. He was immediately conducted to the president, to whom he used some very imprudent expressions, and by whom he was committed to the custody of Centeno. About the same time with Gonzalo, most of his officers were made prisoners. The lieutenant-general Carvajal endeavoured to save himself by flight, meaning to hide himself among some tall reeds in a marsh during the night; but his horse stuck fast in the mora.s.s, and he was brought prisoner to the president by some of his own men. In the pursuit, some of the insurgents were killed, but most of their officers were made prisoners.

After the entire derout of the enemy, the soldiers of the royal army pillaged the camp of the insurgents, where they made a prodigious plunder in gold, silver, horses, mules, and rich baggage, by which many of them acquired considerable riches, some individuals having acquired so much as five or six thousand ducats. One of the soldiers happened to fall in with a fine mule having a load on his back, which seemed to consist only of clothes, he therefore cut the cords and threw off the load, carrying off the mule alone; immediately after which three other soldiers, more experienced in such matters, opened up the pack, which they found to contain a considerable quant.i.ty of gold and silver wrapped up in Indian cloaks for better concealment, worth five or six thousand ducats.

As the army was much fatigued by the operations of that day; besides being under arms all night, the president allowed the men to rest one day, yet thought it necessary to dispatch the two Captains Mexia and De Robles with their companies to Cuzco, to prevent those soldiers who had pursued the fugitives towards that place from entering and plundering the city and killing a number of the inhabitants; more especially as many might now feel inclined to act from particular enmity towards such as had given them offence during the late troubles, under pretence of following up the victory. Those captains were likewise directed to secure such of the officers and soldiers of the defeated army as had fled in that direction. Next day, the president gave orders to the licentiate Cianca, one of the new oydors, and Alfonzo de Alvarado, his major-general, to bring the prisoners to trial. No other proof was requisite against Gonzalo Pizarro than his own acknowledgment and the notoriety of his having been in open rebellion against the sovereign. He was condemned to be beheaded, and that his head should be fixed in a niche or recess on the gibbet at Lima, secured by a trellis or net-work of iron through which it might be visible, with this inscription above.

"The head of Gonzalo Pizarro, a traitor and rebel, who revolted against the royal authority in Peru, and presumed to give battle to the army under the royal standard in the valley of Xaquixaguana." His whole estates and property of every kind were confiscated; and his house in Cuzco was ordered to be rased, and salt sown upon its scite, on which a pillar or monument was to be erected with a suitable inscription to perpetuate the remembrance of his crime and condign punishment. Gonzalo was executed on the day of his trial, dying like a good Christian.

While in prison and till his death, Centeno, to whose custody he had been committed, treated him with much civility, and would not allow any one to insult his fallen greatness. When about to be put to death, Gonzalo made a gift of the magnificent dress which he then wore to the executioner; but Centeno paid its full value to the executioner, that the body might not be stripped and exposed till carried away for interment; and next day he had it carried to Cuzco and respectfully buried. But the head, pursuant to the sentence, was carried to Lima.

On the same day in which Pizarro was beheaded, his lieutenant-general Carvajal was drawn and quartered, and eight or nine of the insurgent captains were hanged; and in the sequel several others of the princ.i.p.al persons concerned in the revolt were punished when taken[38]. On the day following the president went to Cuzco with all his army, whence he sent Alfonzo de Mendoza with a detachment into Las Charcas, to make prisoners of those who had been sent into that district by Gonzalo in quest of silver, and such as might have fled thither from the battle. On account of the rich mines in the province of Las Charcas, especially Potosi, it was supposed that many of the fugitives had taken refuge in that place, to which Hondegardo was sent as lieutenant-governor and captain-general, with orders to chastise all those of the inhabitants who had been guilty either of favouring Gonzalo, or of neglecting to repair to the royal standard on the summons of the president. Along with Hondegardo, Gabriel de Royas was sent as receiver of the royal fifth and other tributes belonging to the king, and of the fines which the governor might inflict on the disaffected and recusants. As De Royas soon died, Hondegardo had to discharge the united functions of governor and receiver of the province, and in a short s.p.a.ce of time he ama.s.sed treasure to the amount of 3,600,000 livres[39], which he transmitted to the president.

[Footnote 38: Yet the Historian of American, II. 392., says that "Gasca, happy in his bloodless victory, did not stain it with cruelty; Pizarro, Carvajal, and a small number of the most distinguished or notorious offenders being punished capitally." The executions seem however to have been sufficiently numerous, considering that the whole rebel army before the battle was only nine hundred strong, many of whom went over to the victor, and all the rest disbanded without fighting.--E.]