A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume Xi Part 14

Over and above their complements of sailors and marines, these s.h.i.+ps had on board an old Spanish regiment of foot, intended to reinforce the garrisons on the coast of the South-Sea. Having cruised some days to leeward of Madeira, as formerly mentioned, they left that station in the beginning of November, and steered for the Rio de la Plata, where they arrived on the 5th of January O.S. and coming to anchor in the bay of Maldonado, at the mouth of that river, their admiral sent immediately to Buenos Ayres for a supply of provisions, having left Spain with only four months provisions on board. While waiting this supply, they received intelligence, by the treachery of the Portuguese governor of St Catharines, of Mr Anson having arrived at that island on the 21st December preceding, and that he was preparing to put to sea again with the utmost expedition. Notwithstanding his superior force, Pizarro had his reasons, and some say his orders, for avoiding our squadron any where short of the South-Sea. He was, besides, extremely desirous of getting round Cape Horn before us, imagining that alone would effectually baffle all our designs; wherefore, hearing that we were in his neighbourhood, and that we should be soon ready to proceed for Cape Horn, he weighed anchor with his five large s.h.i.+ps, the Patache being disabled and condemned, and the men taken out of her; and, after a stay of seventeen days only, got under sail without his provisions, which arrived at Maldonado within a day or two after his departure. Notwithstanding this precipitation, we put to sea from St Catharines four days before he did from Maldonado; and at one part of our pa.s.sage to Cape Horn the two squadrons were so near, that the Pearl, one of our s.h.i.+ps, being separated from the rest, fell in with the Spanish fleet, and, mistaking the Asia for the Centurion, got within gun-shot of the Asia before the mistake was discovered, and narrowly escaped being taken.

As it was the 22d January when the Spaniards weighed from Maldonado, they could not expect to get into the lat.i.tude of Cape Horn before the equinox; and, as they had reason to apprehend very tempestuous weather in doubling it at that season, while the Spanish sailors, for the most part accustomed to a fair-weather country, might be supposed averse from so dangerous and fatiguing a navigation, the better to encourage them, some part of their pay was advanced to them in European goods, which they were to have leave to dispose of in the South-Seas, that so the hopes of the great profits they were to make of their ventures, might animate them in their duty, and render them less disposed to repine at the labours, hards.h.i.+ps, and perils they might in all probability meet with, before their arrival on the coast of Peru.

Towards the latter end of February, Pizarro and his squadron got into the lat.i.tude of Cape Horn, and then stood to the westwards in order to double that southern promontory. But, in the night of the last of February O.S. while turning to windward with this view, the Guipuscoa, Hermiona, and Espranza were separated from the admiral. On the 6th March following, the Guipuscoa was separated from the other two; and next day, being that after we pa.s.sed the Straits of Le Maire, there came on a most furious storm at N.W. which, in spite of all their efforts, drove the whole squadron to the eastward, and, after several fruitless attempts, obliged them to bear away for the river of Plate.

Pizarro arrived there in the Asia about the middle of May, and was followed a few days after by the Esperanza and Estevan. The Hermiona was supposed to have foundered, as she was never more heard of; and the Guipuscoa was run on sh.o.r.e and destroyed on the coast of Brazil.

The calamities of all kinds which this squadron underwent in their unsuccessful attempt to double Cape Horn, can only be paralleled by what we ourselves experienced in the same climate, when buffeted by the same storms. There was indeed some diversity in our distresses, rendering it difficult to decide whose situation was most worthy of commiseration; for, to all the miseries and misfortunes we experienced in common, as shattered rigging, leaky s.h.i.+ps, and the fatigues and despondency necessarily attendant on these disasters, there was superadded on board our squadron the ravages of a most destructive and incurable disease; and in the Spanish squadron the devastation of famine.

It has been already observed, that this squadron left Spain with only four months provisions on board, and even that, it is said, at short allowance, either owing to the hurry of their outfit, or presuming upon a supply at Buenos Ayres; so that, when their continuance at sea was prolonged, by the storms they met with off Cape Horn, a month or more beyond their expectation, they were reduced to such infinite distress, that rats, when they could be caught, sold for four dollars a-piece; and a sailor who died in one of the s.h.i.+ps, had his death concealed by his brother for some days, who lay all that time in the hammock with the corpse, that he might receive the dead man's allowance of provisions. In this dreadful situation, if their horrors were capable of augmentation, they were alarmed by discovering a conspiracy among the marines on board the Asia, who proposed ma.s.sacring the officers and whole crew, their sole motive for this b.l.o.o.d.y resolution appearing to be the desire of relieving their hunger, by appropriating the whole provisions in the s.h.i.+p to themselves. This design was prevented, when just on the point of execution, by means of one of their confessors, and three of the ringleaders were immediately put to death. By the complicated distresses of fatigue, sickness, and famine, the three s.h.i.+ps that escaped lost the greatest part of their men. The admiral's s.h.i.+p, the Asia, arrived at Monte Video in the Rio Plata with only half her crew.

The Estevan, when she anch.o.r.ed in the bay of Barragan had also lost half her men. The Esperanza was still more unfortunate, for of 450 hands she brought with her from Spain, only 58 remained alive. The whole regiment of foot perished except sixty men. To give a more distinct idea of what they underwent upon this occasion, I shall present a short account of the fate of the Guipuscoa, extracted from a letter written by Don Joseph Mindinuetta, her captain, to a person of distinction at Lima, a copy of which fell into our hands when in the South-Sea.

Having separated on the 6th March in a fog from the Hermiona and Esperanza, being then, as I suppose, to the S.E. of States Land, and plying to the westward, it blew a furious storm at N.W. the succeeding night, which, at half past ten, split his main-sail, and obliged him to bear away with his foresail. The s.h.i.+p now went ten knots an hour with a prodigious sea, and often ran her gangway under water. He likewise sprung his main-mast, and the s.h.i.+p made so much water that she could not be freed by four pumps a.s.sisted by bailing. On the 9th the wind became calm, but the sea continued so high that the s.h.i.+p, in rolling, opened all her upper works and seams, and started the b.u.t.t ends of her planks, and the greatest part of her top-timbers, the bolts being drawn by the violence of the roll. In this condition, with additional disasters to the hull and rigging, they continued beating westward to the 12th, when they were in lat. 60 S. and in great want of provisions, numbers peris.h.i.+ng daily by the fatigue of pumping, and the survivors quite dispirited by labour, hunger, and the severity of the weather, their decks being covered with snow above a foot in depth. Finding the wind fixed in the west and blowing strong, and their pa.s.sage that way impossible, they resolved to bear away for the Rio Plata. On the 22d they had to throw overboard all their upper-deck guns and an anchor, and were obliged to take six turns of the cable round the s.h.i.+p to prevent her from opening and falling to pieces. On the 4th of April, in calm weather, but with a very heavy sea, the s.h.i.+p rolled so much that her main-mast came by the board, and was soon after followed by the fore and mizen masts, after which they had to cut away the boltsprit, to diminish, if possible, the leakage forwards. By this time two hundred and fifty of the men had perished by hunger and fatigue. Those who were capable of working at the pumps, at which every officer took his turn without exception, were only allowed an ounce and a half of biscuit daily; while those who were weak and sickly, so that they could not a.s.sist in this necessary labour, had no more than one ounce of wheat. It was common for the men to fall down dead at the pumps, and all they could muster for duty, including the officers, was from eighty to an hundred men.

The S.W. wind blew so fresh for some days after they lost their masts, that they could not set up jury-masts; so that they were obliged to drive like a wreck, between the lat.i.tude of 32 and 38 S. till the 24th of April, when they made the coast of Brazil at Rio de Patas, ten leagues to the southward of the island of St Catharines. They came here to an anchor, the captain being very desirous of proceeding to St Catharines, in order to save the hull of the s.h.i.+p, with her guns and stores: But the crew instantly left off pumping, and all in one voice cried out, _On sh.o.r.e! on sh.o.r.e!_ enraged at the hards.h.i.+ps they had suffered and the numbers they had lost, there being at this time thirty dead bodies lying on the deck. Thus the captain was obliged to run the s.h.i.+p directly to the land, where she parted and sunk five days after, with all her stores and furniture; but the remainder of the crew, whom hunger and fatigue had spared, to the number of four hundred, got safe on sh.o.r.e.

From this account of the adventures and catastrophe of the Guiapuscoa, we may form some conjecture of the manner in which the Hermiona was lost, and of the distresses endured by the three remaining s.h.i.+ps of the squadron which got into the Rio Plata. These last being in great want of masts, yards, rigging, and all kinds of naval stores, and having no supply at Buenos Ayres or any of the neighbouring settlements, Pizarro dispatched an advice-boat with a letter of credit to Rio de Janeiro, to purchase what was wanting from the Portuguese.

He sent at the same time an express across the continent to St Jago de Chili, to be thence forwarded to the viceroy of Peru, informing him of the disasters that had befallen his squadron, and desiring a remittance of two hundred thousand dollars from the royal chest at Lima, to enable him to refit and victual his remaining s.h.i.+ps, that he might be again in condition to attempt the pa.s.sage to the South-Sea as soon as the season of the year should be more favourable. It is mentioned by the Spaniards, as a most extraordinary circ.u.mstance, that, though then the depth of winter, when the Cordilleras are esteemed impa.s.sable on account of the snow, the Indian who was charged with this express was only thirteen days on his journey from Buenos Ayres to St Jago in Chili, though the distance is three hundred Spanish leagues, near forty of which are among the snows and precipices of the Cordilleras.

The return to this dispatch of Pizarro from the viceroy was by no means favourable. Instead of two hundred thousand dollars, the sum demanded, the viceroy remitted him only one hundred thousand, telling him that it was with great difficulty he was able to procure even that sum. But the inhabitants of Lima, who considered the presence of Pizarro as absolutely necessary to their security, were much discontented at this procedure, and did not scruple to a.s.sert, that it was not the want of money, but the interested views of some of the viceroy's confidants, that prevented Pizarro from getting the whole sum.

The advice-boat sent to Rio Janeiro also executed her commission but imperfectly; for, though she brought back a considerable quant.i.ty of pitch, tar, and cordage, she could not procure either masts or yards; and, as an additional misfortune, Pizarro was disappointed of some masts he expected from Paraguay, as a carpenter whom he entrusted with a large sum of money, and sent there to cut masts, instead of prosecuting the business he was sent upon, married in the country, and refused to return. However, by removing the masts of the Esperanza into the Asia, and using what spare masts and yards they had on board, they made a s.h.i.+ft to refit the Asia and Estevan: And, in the October following, Pizarro was prepared to put to sea with these two s.h.i.+ps, in order to attempt the pa.s.sage round Cape Horn a second time; but, in coming down the Rio Plata, the Estevan ran upon a shoal and beat off her rudder, and Pizarro proceeded to sea in the Asia without her.

Having now the antarctic summer before him, and the winds favourable, no doubt was made of his having a fortunate and speedy pa.s.sage: But, when off Cape Horn and going right before the wind, it being moderate weather, though in a swelling sea, the s.h.i.+p rolled away her masts, by some misconduct of the officer having the watch, and was a second time obliged to put back in great distress to the Rio Plata.

As the Asia had suffered considerably in this second unfortunate expedition, the Esperanza was now ordered to be refitted, the command of her being given to Mindinuetta, who was formerly captain of the Guipuscoa. In November 1742, he sailed from the Rio Plata for the south, and arrived safe on the coast of Chili, where he was met by his commodore, Pizarro, who pa.s.sed over-land from Buenos Ayres. Great animosities and contests took place between these two officers, owing to the claim of Pizarro to command the Esperanza, which Mindinuetta had brought round, and now refused to resign; insisting, as he had come round the South Sea alone and under no superior, it was not now in the power of Pizarro to resume the authority he had once parted with. But, after a long and obstinate struggle, as the president of Chili interposed and declared for Pizarro, Mindinuetta was obliged to submit.

Pizarro had not yet completed the series of his misfortunes. When he and Mindinuetta returned over-land, in 1745, from Chili to Buenos Ayres, they found the Asia still at Monte Video, and resolved, if possible, to carry her to Europe. With this view they refitted her in the best manner they could, but had great difficulty in procuring a sufficient number of hands to navigate her, as all the remaining sailors of the squadron, then to be met with in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres, did not amount to an hundred men. They endeavoured to supply this defect, by pressing many of the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, and putting on board all the English prisoners then in their custody, together with a number of Portuguese smugglers they had taken at different times, and some of the Indians of the country. Among these last there was a chief and ten of his followers, who had been surprised by a party of Spanish soldiers about three months before.

The name of this chief was Orellana, and he belonged to a very powerful tribe, which had committed great ravages in the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres. With this motley crew, all of them except the European sailors averse from the voyage, Pizarro set sail from Monte Video about the beginning of November 1745: and the native Spaniards, being no strangers to the dissatisfaction of their forced men, treated them, the English prisoners and the Indians, with great insolence and barbarity, particularly the Indians; for it was common in the meanest officers in the s.h.i.+p to beat them cruelly on the slightest pretence, and often merely to shew their superiority.

Orellana and his followers, though in appearance sufficiently patient and submissive, meditated a severe revenge for all these inhumanities.

As these Indians have great intercourse with Buenos Ayres in time of peace, Orellana understood Spanish, and affected to converse with such of the English prisoners as could speak that language, seeming very desirous of being informed how many Englishmen there were on board, and of having them pointed out to him. As he knew the English were as much enemies to the Spaniards as he was, he had doubtless an intention of disclosing his purposes to them, and making them partners in the scheme he had projected for revenging his wrongs and recovering his liberty; but, having sounded them at a distance, and not finding them so precipitate and vindictive as he expected, he proceeded no farther with them, but resolved to trust alone to the resolution of his ten faithful followers, who readily engaged to observe his directions and to execute his commands. Having agreed on the measures to be pursued, they contrived to provide themselves with Dutch knives, sharp at the point, which, being the common knives used in the s.h.i.+p, they procured without difficulty. They also employed their leisure in secretly cutting thongs from raw hides, of which there were great numbers on board, and in fixing to each end of these thongs the double-headed shot of the small quarter-deck guns; by which they formed most mischievous weapons, in the use of which, by swinging round the head, the Indians about Buenos Ayres are extremely expert, being trained to it from their infancy. When these things were in good forwardness, the execution of their scheme was perhaps precipitated by a particular outrage committed upon Orellana, who was ordered aloft by one of the officers, and being incapable of doing so, the officer, who was a brutal fellow, beat him with such violence, under pretence of disobedience, that he left him bleeding on the deck, and quite stupified with wounds and bruises. This certainly increased his thirst of revenge, so that within a day or two he and his followers began to execute their desperate resolves in the following manner.

About nine in the evening, when many of the princ.i.p.al officers were on the quarter-deck indulging in the freshness of the night air, the forecastle being manned with its customary watch, Orellana and his companions, having prepared their weapons, and thrown off their trowsers and other c.u.mbrous parts of their dress, came all together on the quarter-deck, and drew towards the door of the great cabin. The boatswain reprimanded them for their presumption, and ordered them to be gone; on which Orellana spoke to his followers in their native language, when four of them drew off, two towards each gangway, and the chief and six remaining Indians seemed to be slowly quitting the quarter-deck. When the detached Indians had taken possession of the gangways, Orellana placed his hands hollow to his mouth, and bellowed out the war-cry of the savages, said to be the harshest and most terrifying of sounds. This hideous yell was the signal for beginning the ma.s.sacre; upon which all the Indians drew their knives and brandished their prepared double-headed shot. The chief, and the six who remained with him on the quarter-deck, fell immediately on the Spaniards with whom they were intermingled, and in a very short s.p.a.ce laid forty of them at their feet, above twenty of whom were killed on the spot, and the rest disabled.

In the beginning of the tumult, many of the officers rushed into the great cabin, where they put out the lights and barricadoed the door; while of the others, who had escaped the first fury of the Indians, some endeavoured to escape along the gangways to the forecastle, where the Indians, placed there on purpose, stabbed the greater part of them as they attempted to pa.s.s, or forced them off the gangways into the waste of the s.h.i.+p, which was filled with live cattle. Some threw themselves voluntarily over the barricades into the waste, and thought themselves fortunate to lie concealed among the cattle; but the greatest part escaped up the main-shrouds, and took shelter in the tops and rigging of the s.h.i.+p. Although the Indians only attacked the quarter-deck, yet the watch in the forecastle, finding their communication cut off, and terrified by a few of the wounded who had been able to force their pa.s.sage, and not knowing either who were their enemies, or what were their numbers, they also gave all over for lost, and in great confusion ran up into the rigging of the foremast and boltsprit.

Thus these eleven Indians, with a resolution perhaps without example, possessed themselves almost in an instant of the quarter-deck of a s.h.i.+p mounting sixty-six guns, and manned by near five hundred hands, and even continued in peaceable possession of this part for some time.

During a considerable s.p.a.ce, the officers in the great cabin, among whom were Pizarro and Mindinuetta, the crew between decks, and those who had escaped into the tops and rigging, were merely anxious for their own safety, and were incapable of forming any project for suppressing the insurrection and recovering the possession of the s.h.i.+p. The yells of the Indians, the groans of the wounded, and the confused clamours of the crew, all heightened by the darkness of the night, had at first greatly magnified the danger, and filled them with imaginary terrors. The Spaniards were sensible of the dissatisfaction of their impressed hands, and were conscious of their barbarity to their prisoners, wherefore they concluded that the conspiracy was general, and considered their own destruction as infallible; insomuch, that some are said to have designed to leap into the sea, but were prevented by their companions.

When the Indians had entirely cleared the quarter-deck, the tumult in a great measure subsided; for those who had escaped were kept silent by their fears, and the Indians were incapable of pursuing them.

Orellana, when master of the quarter-deck, broke open the arm-chest, which had been ordered there a few days before, on a slight suspicion of mutiny. He there expected to find cutla.s.ses wherewith to arm himself and his followers, who were all well skilled in the use of that weapon, and with these it is imagined they proposed to have forced the great cabin: But on opening the chest, there appeared nothing but fire-arms, which to them were of no use. There were indeed abundance of cutla.s.ses in the chest, but they were hidden by the fire-arms being laid uppermost. This was a sensible disappointment to Orellana and his Indians. By this time Pizarro and his companions in the great cabin had been able to communicate with those below in the gun-room and between decks, by conversing aloud through the cabin windows; by which means they learnt that the English prisoners, whom they chiefly suspected, were all safe below, and had not partic.i.p.ated in the mutiny; and by other circ.u.mstances they were at last made sensible that Orellana and his people only were concerned in it. Upon this information, Pizarro and the officers resolved to attack them on the quarter-deck, before any of the discontented on board had so far recovered from their surprise as to reflect on the facility of seizing the s.h.i.+p by joining with the Indians. With this view, Pizarro collected what arms were in the cabin and distributed them to those who were with him. There were no fire-arms except pistols, and for these they had neither powder nor ball; but having now a correspondence with the gun-room, they lowered a bucket from the cabin window, into which the gunner put a quant.i.ty of pistol cartridges out of one of the gun-room ports. Having thus procured ammunition, and loaded their pistols, they partly opened the cabin door, and fired several shots among the Indians on the quarter-deck, though at first without effect. At last Mindinuetta had the good fortune to shoot Orellana dead; on which his faithful companions, abandoning all thoughts of farther resistance, instantly leaped into the sea, where they all perished. Thus was this insurrection quelled, and possession of the quarter-deck regained, after it had been fully two hours in the power of this great and daring chief, and his small band of gallant unhappy countrymen.

Having thus escaped from imminent peril, Pizarro continued his voyage for Europe, and arrived safely on the coast of Gallicia in the beginning of the year 1746, after an absence of between four and five years, and having, by attendance on our expedition, diminished the royal power of Spain by above three thousand of their prime sailors, and by four considerable s.h.i.+ps of war and a patache. For we have seen that the Hermione foundered at sea, the Guipuscoa was stranded and destroyed on the coast of Brazil, the St Estevan was condemned and broken up in the Rio Plata, and the Esperanza, being left in the South Sea, is doubtless by this time incapable of returning to Spain: So that the Asia alone, with less than an hundred hands, may be considered as all that remains of the squadron with which Pizarro put forth to sea; and whoever considers the very large proportion which this squadron bore to the whole navy of Spain, will no doubt confess that, even if our undertaking had been attended with no other advantages, than that of ruining so great a part of the naval force of so dangerous an enemy, this alone would be a sufficient equivalent for our equipment, and an incontestable proof of the service which the nation has thence received. Having thus given a summary of Pizarro's adventures, I return to the narrative of our own transactions.

SECTION IV.

_Pa.s.sage from Madeira to St Catharines._

I have already mentioned that we weighed from Madeira on the 3d November, after orders being given to rendezvous at St Jago, one of the Cape Verd islands, in case of a separation. But next day, when we were got to sea, the commodore, considering that the season was far advanced, and that touching at St Jago would create additional delay, thought proper for this reason to alter the rendezvous, and appointed the island of St Catharines, on the coast of Brazil, to be the first place to which the s.h.i.+ps of the squadron were to repair, in case of separation.

In our pa.s.sage to the island of St Catharines, we found the direction of the trade winds to differ considerably from what we had reason to expect, both from the general histories given of these winds, and the experience of former navigators. For the learned Dr Halley, in his account of the trade-winds which prevail in the Ethiopic and Atlantic Oceans, tells us that, from the lat. of 28 N. to 10 N. there is generally a fresh gale of N.E. wind, which, towards the African coasts, rarely comes to the eastward of E.N.E. or pa.s.ses to the northward of N.N.E. but on the American side the wind is somewhat more easterly; though even there it is commonly a point or two to the northward of east; that from 10 N. to 4 N. the calms and tornadoes take place; and from 4 N. to 30 S. the winds are generally and perpetually between the south and east. We expected to find this account of the matter confirmed by our experience; but we found considerable variations from it, both in regard to the steadiness of the winds, and the quarters from whence they blew. For though we met with a N.E. wind about lat. 28 N. yet, from lat. 25 N. to 18 N the wind was never once to the northward of E. but almost constantly to the southward of it. From thence, however, to 6 20' N. we had it usually to the northward of E. though not always, as it changed for a short time to E.S.E. From 6 20' N. to about 4 46' N. the weather was very unsettled, the wind being sometimes N.E. then changing to S.E.

and sometimes we had a dead calm, with small rain and lightning. After this, to the lat. of 7 30' S. the wind continued almost invariably between S. and E. and then again as invariably between N. and E. till we came to 15 30' S. then E. and S.E. to 21 37' S. After this, even to 27 44' S. the wind was never once between S. and E. though we had it in all the other quarters of the compa.s.s; though this last circ.u.mstance may be in some measure accounted for from our approach to the coast of Brazil.

I do not mention these particulars with a view of cavilling at the received accounts of these trade-winds, which, I doubt not, are sufficiently accurate; but I thought it worthy of public notice, that such deviations from the established rules do sometimes take place.

This observation may not only be of service to navigators, by putting them on their guard against these hitherto unexplained and unnoticed irregularities, but it is also a circ.u.mstance that requires to be attended to in the solution of the great question about the causes of trade-winds and monsoons; a question which, in my opinion, has not been hitherto discussed with that clearness and accuracy which its importance demands, whether it be considered in a naval or a philosophical point of view.

On the 16th November, one of our victuallers made a signal to speak with the commodore, and we shortened sail for her to come up with us.

The master came on board, and represented to Mr Anson, that, having complied with the terms of his charter-party, he now desired to be unloaded and discharged. On consulting the captain of the squadron, it was found all the s.h.i.+ps had still such quant.i.ties of provisions between their decks, and were also so deep, that they could only take in their proportions of brandy from the Industry pink, one of the victuallers; and consequently the commodore had to continue the other, the Ann pink, in the service of attending the squadron. Accordingly, a signal was made next day for the s.h.i.+ps to bring to, and the long-boats were employed that and the three following days, till the 19th in the evening, to take their proportions of the brandy in the Industry to the several s.h.i.+ps of the squadron. Being then unloaded, she parted company, intending for Barbadoes; and there to take in a freight for England. Most of the officers in the squadron took the opportunity of this s.h.i.+p, to write to their friends at home; but I have been informed she was taken by the Spaniards.

On the 20th November, the captains of the squadron represented to the commodore, that their s.h.i.+ps companies were very sickly; and that, both in their own opinions and of their surgeons, it would tend to the health of the men to let in more air between decks; but that the s.h.i.+ps were so deep in the water, that the lower-deck ports could not possibly be opened. On this representation, the commodore ordered six air-scuttles to be cut in each s.h.i.+p, in such places as had least tendency to weaken them. On this occasion, I cannot but observe how much it is the duty of all who have any influence in the direction of our naval affairs, to attend to the preservation of the lives and health of our seamen. If it could be supposed that motives of humanity were insufficient for this purpose, yet policy, a regard to the success of our arms, and the honour and interest of each individual commander, all should lead to a careful and impartial examination of every probable method proposed for preserving the health and vigour of seamen. But hath this been always done? Have the late invented, plain, and obvious methods for keeping our s.h.i.+ps sweet and clean, by a constant supply of fresh air, been considered with that candour and temper which the great benefits they promise to produce ought naturally to have inspired? On the contrary, have not these salutary schemes been often treated with neglect and contempt? And have not some, who have been entrusted with experimenting their effects, been guilty of the most indefensible partiality in the accounts they have given of these trials? It must, however, be confessed, that many distinguished persons, both in the direction and command of our fleets, have exerted themselves on these occasions with a judicious and dispa.s.sionate examination, becoming the interesting nature of the enquiry: But the wonder is, that any one should have been found so irrational as to act a contrary part, in despite of the strongest dictates of prudence and humanity. I cannot, however, believe this conduct to have arisen from such savage motives as the first reflection seems naturally to suggest; but am apt rather to impute it to an obstinate, and, as it were, superst.i.tious attachment to long-established practices, and to a settled contempt and hatred to all innovations, especially such as are projected by landsmen, or persons residing on sh.o.r.e.

We crossed the equinoctial, with a fine fresh gale at N.E. on Friday, the 28th November, at four in the morning, being thus, by estimation, in long. 27 59' W. from London. In the morning of the 2d December, we saw a sail in the N.W. and made the Gloucester's and Tryal's signals to chase; and half an hour after, let out our reefs, and chased with the rest of the squadron. About noon a signal was made for the Wager to take our remaining victualler, the Ann pink, in tow; but, at seven in the evening, finding we did not near the chase, and that the Wager was very far astern, we shortened sail, and recalled the chasing s.h.i.+ps. Next day but one we again discovered a sail, which, on a nearer approach, we judged to be the same vessel. We chased her the whole day, and though we rather gained upon her, night came on before we could overtake her, which obliged us to give over the chase, to collect the scattered squadron. We were much chagrined at the escape of this vessel, supposing her to have been an advice-boat from Old Spain to Buenos Ayres, sent to give notice of our expedition: But we have since learnt that it was our East-India Company's packet, bound to St Helena.

On the 10th December, being by our reckoning in lat. 20 S. and long.

36 30' W. from London, the Tryal fired a gun to denote soundings. We immediately tried, and found sixty fathoms, the bottom coa.r.s.e ground with broken sh.e.l.ls. The Tryal, which was a-head of us, had at one time thirty-seven fathoms, which afterwards increased to ninety, after which she had no bottom; which happened to us also at our second trial, though we sounded with a line of 150 fathoms. This is the shoal laid down in most charts by the name of the _Abrollos_,[1] and it appeared we were upon its verge; perhaps farther in it may be extremely dangerous. We were then, by our different accounts, from sixty to ninety leagues east of the coast of Brazil. Next day but one we spoke a Portuguese brigantine from Rio Janeiro bound to _Bahia de todos los Santos_, by which we learnt that we were thirty-four leagues from Cape St Thomas, and forty from Cape Frio; which latter bore from us W.S.W. By our own accounts we were nearly eight leagues from Cape Frio; and though, on the information of this brig, we altered our course, standing more southerly, yet, by our coming in with the land afterwards, we were fully convinced that our own reckoning was more correct than that of the Portuguese. After pa.s.sing lat. 16 S. we found a considerable current setting to the southward. The same took place all along the coast of Brazil, and even to the southward of the Rio Plata, amounting sometimes to thirty miles in twenty-four hours, and once to above forty miles. If, as is most probable, this current be occasioned by the running off of the water which is acc.u.mulated on the coast of Brazil by the constant sweeping of the eastern trade-wind over the Ethiopic Ocean, it were then most natural to suppose that its general course must be determined by the bearings of the adjacent sh.o.r.es. Perhaps in every instance of currents the same may hold true, as I believe there are no examples of any considerable currents at any great distance from land. If this could be ascertained as a general principle, it might be easy by their a.s.sistance and the observed lat.i.tude, to correct the reckoning. But it were much to be wished, for the general interests of navigation, that the actual settings of the different currents in various parts of the world were examined more frequently and more accurately than appears to have been done hitherto.

[Footnote 1: In the map of the world by Arrowsmith, the Abrolhos are made a cl.u.s.ter of islands off the coast of Brazil, in lat. 18 10' S.

long. 39 W. from Greenwich.--E.]

We began now to grow impatient for a sight of land, both for the recovery of our sick, and for the refreshment and security of those who still continued in health. When we left. St Helens, we were in so good a condition that we only lost two men in the Centurion in our long run to Madeira. But in this run, from Madeira to St Catharines, we were remarkably sickly, so that many died, and great numbers were confined to their hammocks, both in our s.h.i.+p and the others, and several of these past all hopes of recovery. The disorders they in general laboured under were those common to hot climates, and which most s.h.i.+ps bound to the south experience in a greater or less degree.

These were the fevers usually called _calentures_, a disease not only terrible in its first instance, but of which the remains often proved fatal to those who considered themselves as recovered; for it always left them in a very weak and helpless condition, and usually afflicted with fluxes or tenesmus. By our continuance at sea all these complaints were every day increasing; so that it was with great joy we discovered the coast of Brazil on the 18th December, at seven in the morning.

The coast of Brazil appeared high and mountainous, extending from W.

to W.S.W. and when we first saw it, the distance was about seventeen leagues. At noon we could perceive a low double land, bearing W.S.W.

about ten leagues distant, which we took to be the island of St Catharines. That afternoon and the next morning, the wind being N.N.W.

we gained very little to windward, and were apprehensive of being driven to leeward of the island: But next day, a little before noon, the wind came about to the southward, and enabled us to steer in between the N. point of St Catharines and the neighbouring island of Alvoredo. As we stood in for the land we had regular soundings, gradually decreasing from thirty-six to twelve fathoms, all muddy ground. In this last depth of water we let go our anchor at five in the evening of the 18th,[2] the N.W. part of St Catharines bearing S.S.W. three miles off; and the island of Alvoredo N.N.E. distant two leagues. Here we found the tide to set S.S.E. and N.N.W. at the rate of two knots, the tide of flood coming from the southward.

[Footnote 2: There is an error in date here, as it has been already said they first got sight of the coast of Brazil on the 18th, obviously two days before. Hence, if the former date be right, this ought to be the 20th.--E.]

We could perceive from our s.h.i.+ps two fortifications at a considerable distance from us, which seemed intended to prevent the pa.s.sage of an enemy between the island of St Catharines and the main. We could also soon see that our squadron had alarmed the coast, as the two forts hoisted their colours and fired several guns, signals, as we supposed, for a.s.sembling the inhabitants. To prevent any confusion, the commodore immediately sent an officer to compliment the governor, and to request a pilot to conduct our s.h.i.+ps into the road. The governor returned a very civil answer, and ordered us a pilot. On the morning of the 20th we weighed and stood in, and the pilot came aboard of us about noon, and the same afternoon brought us to anchor in five and a half fathoms, in a commodious bay on the continent, called by the French Bon-port. From our last anchorage to this, we found every where an oozy bottom, the water first regularly decreasing to five fathoms, and then increasing to seven, after which we had five and six fathoms alternately. The squadron weighed again next morning, in order to run above the two fortifications formerly mentioned, which are called the castles of Santa Cruiz and St Joam. Our soundings between the island and the main were four, five, and six fathoms, with muddy ground. We saluted the castle of Santa Cruiz in pa.s.sing with eleven guns, and were answered with an equal number. At one in the afternoon of the 21st December, the squadron came to anchor in five fathoms and a half, Governor's Isle bearing N.N.W. St Joam's castle N.E. 1/2 E. and the island of St Antonio S. At this time the squadron was sickly, and in great want of refreshments, both of which we hoped to have speedily remedied at this settlement, celebrated by former navigators for its healthiness and abundance of provisions, and for the freedom, indulgence, and friendly a.s.sistance given here to all the s.h.i.+ps of nations in amity with the crown of Portugal.

SECTION V.

_Proceedings at St Catharines, and a Description of that Place, with a short Account of Brazil._

Our first care after mooring the s.h.i.+ps was to get our sick men on sh.o.r.e; preparatory for which each s.h.i.+p was ordered by the commodore to erect two tents, one for the reception of the sick, and the other for the surgeon and his a.s.sistants. We sent eighty sick on sh.o.r.e from the Centurion, and I believe the other s.h.i.+ps sent as many in proportion to the number of their hands. As soon as this necessary duty was performed, we sc.r.a.ped our decks, and gave our s.h.i.+p a thorough cleansing, then smoaked it between decks, and lastly washed every part with vinegar. These operations were extremely necessary for correcting the noisome stench on board, and destroying the vermin; for, from the number of our men and the heat of the climate, both these nuisances had increased upon us to a very loathsome degree, and, besides being most intolerably offensive, were doubtless in some sort productive of the sickness we had laboured under for a considerable time before our arrival at this island.[3]

[Footnote 3: This matter is now infinitely better regulated in the British navy, and with most admirable and infinitely important advantages. By the most minute, sedulous, and perpetual attention to cleanliness, all noisome stench and all vermin are prevented, by which doubtless diseases are in a great measure lessened.--E.]

Our next employment was wooding and watering the squadron, caulking the sides and decks of the s.h.i.+ps, overhawling the rigging, and securing our masts against the tempestuous weather we were, in all probability, to meet with in going round Cape Horn at so advanced and inconvenient a season. Before proceeding in the narrative of our voyage, it may be proper to give some account of the present state of the island of St Catharines and the neighbouring country; both because the circ.u.mstances of the place have materially changed from what they were in the time of former writers, and as these changes laid us under many more difficulties and perplexities than we had reason to expect, or than other British s.h.i.+ps, bound hereafter to the South Sea, may perhaps think it prudent to struggle with.

This island is nine leagues from N. to S. and two from E. to W. It extends from lat. 27 35' to 28 both S. and is in long. 49 45'

W. from London.[4] Although of considerable height, it is scarcely discernible at the distance of ten leagues, being obscured under the continent of Brazil, the mountains of which are exceedingly high; but on a nearer approach is easily distinguished, and may be readily known by having a number of small islands at each end.[5] Frezier has given a draught of the island of St Catharines and the neighbouring coast, with the smaller adjacent isles; but has, by mistake, called the island of Alvoredo St Gal; whereas the true island of St Gal is seven or eight miles northward of Alvoredo, and much smaller. He has also called an island to the southward of St Catharines Alvoredo, and has omitted the island of Masaquara. In other respects his plan is sufficiently exact. The best entrance to the harbour is between the N.E. point of the island of St Catharines and the island of Alvoredo, where s.h.i.+ps may pa.s.s under the guidance of the lead, without the least apprehensions of danger. The north entrance is about five miles broad, the distance from thence to the island of St Antonio is eight miles, and the coa.r.s.e to that island is S.S.W. 1/2 W. About the middle of the island the harbour is contracted to a narrow channel by two points of land, not more than a quarter of a mile separate, and at this time a battery was erecting on the point on the island side to defend this pa.s.sage. This seemed, however, a very useless work, as this channel had only two fathoms water, and is consequently only navigable for barks and boats, wherefore an enemy could have no inducement to attempt this pa.s.sage, more especially as the northern one is so broad and safe that no squadron can be prevented from coming in by any fortifications whatever, when the sea-breeze makes. The brigadier Don Jose Sylva de Paz, who is governor of this settlement, has a different opinion; for, besides the above-mentioned battery, there were three other forts carrying on for the defence of the harbour, none of which were completed when we were there. The first of these, called St Joam, was building on a point of the island of St Catharines, near Parrot Island. The second, in form of a half-moon, was on the island of St Antonio; and the third, which seemed the chief, and had some appearance of a regular fortification, is on an island near the continent, where the governor resides. Don Jose Sylva de Paz was esteemed an expert engineer; and he doubtless understood one branch of his business very well, which is the advantages which new works bring to those who have charge of their erection.

[Footnote 4: This account of the matter is very erroneous. The lat.i.tudes are between 28 5' and 28 30' both S. and the longitude is 49 10' W. from Greenwich.--E.]

[Footnote 5: The more elaborate nautical description of this island is necessarily omitted, as referring to two extensive views, without which the description would be unintelligible.--E.]