The Life of Napoleon I Part 77

Castlereagh, vol. ix., p. 336, calls it "my treaty," and adds that England was practically supplying 300,000 men to the Coalition. One secret article invited Spain and Sweden to accede to the treaty; another stated that Germany was to consist of a federation of sovereign princes, that Holland must receive a "suitable" military frontier, and that Italy, Spain, and Switzerland must be independent, that is, of France; a third bound the allies to keep their armies on a war footing for a suitable time after the peace.]

[Footnote 422: See his instructions of March 2nd to Caulaincourt: "Nothing will bring France to do anything that degrades her national character and deposes her from the rank she has held in the world for centuries." But it was precisely that rank which the allies were resolved to a.s.sign to her, neither more nor less. The joint allied note of February 29th to the negotiators at Chatillon bade them "announce to the French negotiator that you are ready to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, every modification that he might be authorized to propose"; but that any essential departure from the terms already proposed by them must lead to a rupture of the negotiations.]

[Footnote 423: Letters of March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, to Clarke.]

[Footnote 424: Houssaye, p. 156, note. So too m.u.f.fling, "Aus meinem Leben," shows that Blucher could have crossed the Aisne there or at Pontavaire or Berry-au-Bac.]

[Footnote 425: See Napoleon's letters to Clarke of March 4th-6th.]

[Footnote 426: Houssaye, pp. 176-188.]

[Footnote 427: m.u.f.fling says that Blucher and Gneisenau feared an attack by _Bernadotte_ on their rear. Napoleon on February 25th advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some very suspicious relations with the French General Maison in Belgium.

Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political reasons.]

[Footnote 428: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., p. 697. Lord Burghersh wrote from Troyes (March 12th): "I am convinced this army will not be risked in a general action.... S. would almost wish to be back upon the Rhine." So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from Pougy: "I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain the causes of our apathy--the facts are too evident to be disputed. We have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, two at Arcis, and are now at this place. We go tomorrow to Brienne" ("Unpublished Mems.

of Sir H. Lowe"). Stewart wittily said that Napoleon came to Arcis to feel Schwarzenberg's pulse.]

[Footnote 428: Letters of March 20th to Clarke.]

[Footnote 430: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.]

[Footnote 431: These letters were written in pairs--the one being official, the other confidential. Caulaincourt's replies show that he appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).]

[Footnote 432: From Caulaincourt's letter of March 3rd to Napoleon; Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 379.]

[Footnote 433: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 555.]

[Footnote 434: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 335, 559.

Caulaincourt's project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by Napoleon three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the Adige, the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugene, and the duchy of Warsaw to the King of Saxony, etc. The allies rejected it (Fain, p. 388).]

[Footnote 435: Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully, Houssaye's objections (p. 287) to its genuineness. Besides, the letter is on the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects. No forger could have known of those instructions. At Elba, Napoleon admitted that he was wrong in not making peace at this time. "_Mais je me croyais a.s.sez fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis trompe_" (Lord Holland's "Foreign Rem.," p. 319). The same writer states (p. 296) that he saw the official correspondence about Chatillon: it gave him the highest opinion of Caulaincourt, but N.'s conduct was "full of subterfuge and artifice."]

[Footnote 436: Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.]

[Footnote 437: Napier, bk. xxiv., ch. iii. Wellington seems to have thought that the allies would probably make peace with Napoleon.]

[Footnote 438: Broglie, "Mems.," bk. iii., ch. i.]

[Footnote 439: Letter of February 25th to Joseph. Thiebault gives us an odd story that Bernadotte sent an agent, Rainville, to persuade Davoust to join him in attacking the rear of the allies; but that Rainville's nerve so forsook him in Davoust's presence that he turned and bolted for his life!]

[Footnote 440: Caulaincourt to Metternich on March 25th: "Arrived only this [last] night near the Emperor, His Majesty has ... given me all the powers necessary to sign peace with the Ministers of the allied Courts" (Fain, p. 345; Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 634).

Thiers does not mention these overtures of Napoleon, which are surely most characteristic. His whole eastward move was motived by them.

Efforts have been made (_e.g._, by M. de Bacourt in Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. 4) to prove that on the 25th Napoleon was ready to agree to all the allied terms, and thus concede more than was done by Louis XVIII. But there is no proof that he meant to do anything of the sort. The terms of Caulaincourt's note were perfectly vague. Moreover, even on the 28th, when Napoleon was getting alarmed, he had an interview with a captured Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg, whom he set free in order that he might confer with the Emperor Francis. He told the envoy that France would yet give him support: he wanted the natural frontiers, but would probably make peace on less favourable terms, as he wished to end the war: "I am ready to renounce all the French colonies if I can thereby keep the mouth of the Scheldt for France. England will not insist on my sacrificing Antwerp if Austria does not support her" (Arneth's "Wessenberg," vol. i., p.

188). This extract shows no great desire to meet the allied terms, but rather to separate Austria from her allies. According to Lady Burghersh ("Journals," p. 216), Napoleon admitted to Wessenberg that his position was desperate. I think this was a pleasing fiction of that envoy. There is no proof that Napoleon was wholly cast down till the 29th, when he heard of La Fere Champenoise (Macdonald's "Souvenirs").]

[Footnote 441: Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 436, 437.]

[Footnote 442: On hearing of their withdrawal Stein was radiant with joy: "Now, he said, the Czar will go on to Paris, and all will soon be at an end" (Tourgueneff quoted by Hausser, vol. iv., p. 553).]

[Footnote 443: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., pp. 737 _et seq._; Houssaye, pp. 354-362; also Nesselrode's communication published in Talleyrand's "Mems." Thielen and Radetzky have claimed that the initiative in this matter was Schwarzenberg's; and Lord Burghersh, in his despatch of March 25th ("Austria," No. 110), agrees with them.

Stein supports Toll's claim. I cannot agree with Houssaye (p. 407) that "Napoleon had resigned himself to the sacrifice of Paris." His intercepted letter, and also the official letters, Nos. 21508, 21513, 21516, 21526, 21538, show that he believed the allies would retreat and that his communications with Paris would be safe.]

[Footnote 444: I take this account largely from Sir Hudson Lowe's unpublished memoirs. Napoleon blamed Marmont for not marching to Rheims as he was ordered to do. At Elba, Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that Marmont's disobedience spoilt the eastern movement, and ruined the campaign. But had Marmont and Mortier joined Napoleon at Vitry, Paris would have been absolutely open to the allies.]

[Footnote 445: Houssaye, pp. 485 _et seq._; Napoleon's letters of February 8th and March 16th; Mollien, vol. iv., p. 128. In Napoleon's letter of April 2nd to Joseph ("New Letters") there is not a word of reproach to Joseph for leaving Paris.]

[Footnote 446: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 420; Pasquier, vol.

iii., ch. xiii.]

[Footnote 447: We do not know definitely why Alexander dropped Bernadotte so suddenly. On March 17th he had a.s.sured the royalist agent, Baron de Vitrolles, that he would not hear of the Bourbons, and that he had first thought of establis.h.i.+ng Bernadotte in France, and then Eugene. We do know, however, that Bernadotte had made suspicious overtures to the French General Maison in Belgium ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 383, 445, 512).]

[Footnote 448: De Pradt, "Restauration de la Royaute, le 31 Mars, 1814"; Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xiii. Vitrolles ("Mems.," vol. i., pp.

95-101) says that Metternich a.s.sured him on March 15th that Austria would not insist on the Regency of Marie Louise, but would listen to the wishes of France.]

[Footnote 449: For the first draft of this Declaration, see "Corresp.," No. 21555 (note).]

[Footnote 450: Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xv.; Macdonald, "Souvenirs."]

[Footnote 451: Houssaye, pp. 593-623; Marmont, vol. vi., pp. 254-272; Macdonald, chs. xxvii.-xxviii. At Elba, Napoleon told Lord Ebrington that Marmont's troops were among the best, and his treachery ruined everything ("Macmillan's Mag.," Dec, 1894).]

[Footnote 452: Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xvi.; "Castlereagh Papers,"

vol. ix., p. 442. Alison wrongly says that _Napoleon_ chose Elba.]

[Footnote 453: Martens, vol. ix., p. 696.]

[Footnote 454: Thiers and Constant a.s.sign this event to the night of 11th-12th. I follow Fain and Macdonald in referring it to the next night.]

[Footnote 455: Bausset, "Cour de Napoleon."]

[Footnote 456: Sir Neil Campbell's "Journal," p. 192.]

[Footnote 457: Ussher, "Napoleon's Last Voyages," p. 29.]

[Footnote 458: A quondam Jacobin, Pons (de l'Herault), Commissioner of Mines at Elba, has left "Souvenirs de l'Ile d'Elbe," which are of colossal credulity. In chap. xi. he gives tales of plots to murder Napoleon--some of them very silly. In part ii., chap, i., he styles him "essentiellement religieux," and a most tender-hearted man, who was compelled by prudence to hide his sensibility! Yet Campbell's official reports show that Pons, _at that time_, was far from admiring Napoleon.]

[Footnote 459: "F.O.," Austria, No. 117. Talleyrand, in his letters to Louis XVIII., claims to have broken up the compact of the Powers. But it is clear that fear of Russia was more potent than Talleyrand's _finesse_. Before the Congress began Castlereagh and Wellington advised friends.h.i.+p with France so as to check "undue pretensions"

elsewhere.]

[Footnote 460: Stanhope's "Conversations," p. 26. In our archives ("Russia," No. 95) is a suspicious letter of Pozzo di Borgo, dated Paris, July 10/22, 1814, to Castlereagh (it is not in his Letters) containing this sentence: "_L'existence de Napoleon_, comme il etait aise a prevoir, est un inconvenient qui se rencontre partout." For Fouche's letter to Napoleon, begging him voluntarily to retire to the New World, see Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. iv. Lafayette ("Mems.," vol. v., p. 345) a.s.serts that French royalists were plotting his a.s.sa.s.sination. Brulart, Governor of Corsica, was suspected by Napoleon, but, it seems, wrongly (Houssaye's "1815," p. 172).]

[Footnote 461: Pallain, "Correspondance de Louis XVIII avec Talleyrand," pp. 307, 316.]

[Footnote 462: "Recollections," p. 16; "F.O.," France, No. 114. The facts given above seem to me to refute the statements often made that the allies violated the Elba arrangement and so justified his escape.

The facts prove that the allies sought to compel Louis XVIII. to pay Napoleon the stipulated sum, and that the Emperor welcomed the non-payment. His words to Lord Ebrington on December 6th breathe the conviction that France would soon rise.]

[Footnote 463: Fleury de Chaboulon's "Mems.," vol. i., pp. 105-140; Lafayette, vol. v., p. 355.]

[Footnote 464: Campbell's "Journal"; Peyrusse, "Memorial," p. 275.]