Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third Volume II Part 26

I do not know from whence the papers have got the idea of Lord Camelford's return. He is not come, nor any officer or despatch, from Vancouver, but I understand the s.h.i.+p has been heard of in October last, all well. Many thanks for the offer of Paddington, which we may probably be glad to avail ourselves of.

Ever, my dear brother, Most affectionately yours, G.

We have nothing new from Lord Hood; and I am told that officers who know the coast do not speak favourably of the chance of doing anything against the French fleet in their present situation.

The failure of the Imperialists had thrown a serious damp on the spirits of the allies. It appears to have been thought the Austrians had not shown sufficient energy and determination; and it was resolved to send over Lord Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville to Vienna, in the hope of inducing them to make more vigorous exertions. A subsequent letter from Mr. Thomas Grenville to the Duke of Portland contains an admirable report of the progress of the mission.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, July 19th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Tom has, I know, mentioned to you the Commission which he has undertaken--jointly with Lord Spencer--to endeavour to encourage our Austrian allies to a little more exertion and energy, which, after all the late events, I continue persuaded is _the only_ thing wanting to ensure success, instead of such a series of retreats as the last month has shown. G.o.d knows whether they will succeed; but it is an infinite satisfaction to me to see his talents employed in the public service, and to be corresponding with him on subjects of this nature. The rest of our public events are just such as you see them in the papers.

Lord Cornwallis is returned, speaking highly of the Duke of York, and far otherwise of the Austrian Generals, to whom he, and all mankind in Flanders, impute all that has happened. It is a whimsical circ.u.mstance, and hardly to have been foreseen, that in a war which we carry on conjointly with Austria, the great want which we experience should be that of Austrian Generals, of capacity sufficient to command the excellent troops which are acting in the Netherlands.

My American negotiation is, I think, going on promisingly. I have nothing else to tell you; and am, indeed, so completely knocked up by this last week's f.a.gging, as hardly to be able to write at all.

This evening I am going to Dropmore, for a little respite.

Ever most affectionately yours, G.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

(Private.) Vienna, August 24th, 1794.

DEAR DUKE OF PORTLAND,

It had been very much my intention to have written to you by our messenger of the 16th instant, because, although our despatches have been very much detailed, and have not, therefore, left much to be said in private letters, it is upon these occasions, I know, some satisfaction to hear that nothing remains behind, which is material to the subject; but having been hitherto prevented, by the very entire occupation of our time here, I take the opportunity of writing to you, a little at large, by the messenger who is going to England to-night.

You know that upon the slight view which the shortness of the time allowed me to take of the business in question here, I was persuaded that we probably might, in some degree, succeed in our expedition; because, if the course of things here could not be improved by our journey, yet I should consider the being able to ascertain what that state was, as an object very useful to pursue, and one which, if pursued with attention, we might probably succeed in possessing ourselves of. How far we have already obtained this information you will have seen by the communications which we have made; and I much fear that our journey will not produce any advantage of a more solid and substantial description. To say that it might not be possible to procure from the Government here a formal consent to such an arrangement as we have to propose, is more than I would a.s.sert: although, the condition which they positively insist upon of being paid for it by loan and subsidy, as well as all the difficulties which they throw upon the subject of the proposed barrier, and upon that of acting in the Netherlands, might well seem to justify the opinion of its being improbable that anything like the proposed arrangement would be consented to. But the misfortune is, that--in my judgment, at least--the evil lies much deeper, and is such as would leave me little hope of seeing any effectual purpose served, even by the signature of a Convention between the two Courts.

I do not know of any good ground for believing the common report of treachery, either in the civil or military government of the country; but I know, that if the principle upon which our Government act in the prosecution of the war is not cordially felt here--if the greatness of those interests, which we think now at stake, is not to the same degree here considered as being of the very essence and existence of all regulated government, a Convention will not give them a livelier perception of this common danger, or teach them to see in it a crisis such as demands greater energy and exertions, than any other state of things could call for. But this common principle is not all that is wanting in the present case: we think, in England, that the preservation of the Austrian Netherlands is an object important to us as providing a defence for Holland, and important to the Court of Vienna as forming a rich and considerable possession to the House of Austria, and, therefore, making an object of common interest, though touching Austria still more sensibly than England. If this obvious view of the interests of both countries prevailed in the Governments of both--as one might rationally expect that it would--it would naturally furnish, by common consent, a very leading and governing motive, as well to the operations of the war, as to the ultimate issue of it. This, however, is not the view which is entertained here, or which I can persuade myself is really acted upon by those whose influence is decisive here.

M. de Thugut, the efficient Minister of this Court, is personally very much disposed (and long has been so) to the old project of an exchange of the Netherlands; and though that project appears to be laid aside for the purpose of conciliating Great Britain and Holland, yet it is evident that M. de Thugut's opinions are such as lead him to set but little value upon the possession of the Netherlands, and, therefore, that every circ.u.mstance, either of expense or of military enterprise, which looks towards the acquisition and defence of those provinces, is as much discouraged by him as he can venture to do, without openly declaring the whole bias of his mind: and it is very remarkable that, much as we have made it our business to press this to him in all our conversations, we have never yet been able to draw from him even a cold a.s.sent to the idea of the Low Countries being of any real value in themselves to the Emperor; though he sometimes feebly admits that, with a considerable addition to them, they might be made so.

It may be said, that a Convention might engage them on this point, whatever their inclinations may be; but the answer is, first, that in point of fact they do object to bind themselves to the employing one hundred thousand men _in the Netherlands_, though they have not finally refused it; and secondly, that be there what agreement there may, the only substantial security for a hearty co-operation in fighting for that country, or for any manly system to be adopted hereafter for the preservation of it, must arise from a sense--in the owners--of the value of its possession, and not from the words employed in any treaty respecting it. I am aware that part of the indifference which I so much remark in M. de Thugut may be affected, for the purpose of throwing the whole weight of the defence of the Low Countries upon the Maritime Powers; but if that is his policy, he must mean to support it by abstaining from any vigorous exertions in behalf of it, and in the end, whether his coolness and inactivity shall have been produced by a real or disguised opinion, the result will equally have been fatal to that earnest and animated concert, which is so much to be wished for on this occasion.

You see that I have so far considered the Convention, as taking place upon the terms proposed by us; but you will have known, long before you receive this letter, that they have persisted from the first in asking, as indispensable conditions, that their loan must be completely satisfied in England to enable them to answer the demands of this year, and that they must receive from England a considerable subsidy for next campaign, if it is expected that they should act vigorously in the prosecution of the war, which they a.s.sert themselves to be utterly unable to do without pecuniary a.s.sistance from England. We have urged them very ineffectually on this point: they declare that they have good hopes of M. de Merey's succeeding in obtaining these demands at London, and the negotiation actually hangs upon the report which they hourly expect from him on this subject; though we have repeatedly told them that their expectation was hopeless, and that, meanwhile, the delay occasioned by it might be fatal to those exertions which required immediate action and enterprise.

What decision the Cabinet will make upon this heavy demand of subsidy, is doubtless a very important question, of which they will be the fit and competent judges; but if that question simply turned upon the supposed probability of our being able to purchase, even at that dear rate, a proportionate degree of energy and activity in the war from this Government, I confess I do not hesitate to say that, from what I see here, I should not believe, if the experiment is tried, it will well answer their expectations. There is no soul in the bodies of these men--none, at least, which is alive to the magnitude of all the objects now at stake, or which leads them to share with you, as it ought the great points of common danger and common interest; and while these mainsprings are wanting, it is in vain to look for such movements and effects as cannot be produced without them. If this radical defect did not exist; if the Government here was as earnest as it ought to be in its contemplation of this war, but really was without the means of prosecuting it; if it acknowledged and took its proper interest in the possession of the Netherlands, and asked your a.s.sistance to that object, only because they had exhausted all their own resources, there might be great inducements to hope that, in furnis.h.i.+ng to them the supply which they wish, you might on your side expect all the active effects which ought to be produced by it; but I know not how to hope that a subsidy will give vigour to their councils or enterprise to their armies; still less can I hope that a subsidy, given for the preservation of the Netherlands, will teach them to put a proper value upon those possessions on their own account, though it certainly would teach them how highly you value their retaining them on your account.

All M. de Thugut's conversation, even upon the idea of the subsidy taking place, is evidently adverse to the prosecuting of the war in the Netherlands; and even when the danger of Holland is urged as a powerful argument for this course, he very coldly answers that, supposing the French to succeed in Holland for a time, they would be glad enough to relinquish it if the arms of the allies were successful in the interior of France. How, then, can one easily hope that the payment of a subsidy will reconcile views so remote--as I apprehend these are--from the wishes of the English Cabinet, or prevent much of thwarting and contradiction in the operations of the campaign? I confess that I suspect this disinclination to the defence of the Netherlands to arise, not only from a habit of undervaluing them, but partly, too, from a persuasion that the Maritime Powers must and will, at their own expense, protect them; and partly, also, from a narrow and timid view of collecting the whole Austrian force on the German frontier, so as to be more immediately ready for the defence of the imperial dominions, as well as to have less reason to fear in their jealousy of the intentions of the King of Prussia.

Upon this latter point the difficulties are, perhaps, much more likely to be increased than to be relieved, by transferring the Prussian subsidy to the army of Austria, because the Court of Berlin will doubtless express great dissatisfaction at that measure; and everything which excites their apprehension here, will naturally more or less interfere with the energy of their operations against France. I do not mean that these arguments would be stated as reasons against their acting up to the conditions of the subsidy; but I fear they would nevertheless be found to have too much influence and effect in practice.

The objections which have seemed to me to arise against a large subsidy to Austria--from the little hope which I should have of its producing from hence that exertion of force, and that course of military operations which, with a view to Holland, we should think ourselves fully ent.i.tled to--are of course much increased by my apprehension of the bad and dangerous consequences which would affect our Government at home, from a second disappointment of so costly an experiment, which I must hope need not be considered as necessary to the prosecution of the war.

If it is true--as it may, perhaps, be found--that much of the languor and apathy of this Court arises out of a confidence in the greatness of our exertions, which may allow them to be sparing of their own, if (as there is reason to believe) they have still the fair means of recruiting their armies and maintaining their present military force, is it not to be hoped that the necessity of the case will rouse them to the use of those means, when they see no other prospect of safety open to them? They sometimes talk stoutly of all that they would do by arming the empire, and other vigorous measures, in case the French succeeded in forcing their way to menace Germany. But why are these exertions to be reserved for any other situation of things? and why are we to pay them a million and a half, rather than put them to the full extent of all their own exertions and resources? Nor is it, perhaps, to be overlooked, in this view of the subject, that the crooked policy of Prussia would perhaps acquiesce in the loss of his own subsidy much more readily, if he does not see it given to Austria, but has the satisfaction of seeing Austria fight her own battles with her own men and money.

They always insist here, too, that they are sure the King of Prussia, even if his bargain should not be renewed with England, will not withdraw entirely from the war, and still less will take a part hostile to the combined Powers. And whether this speculation of theirs is true or not, while they believe it, they are more at liberty to act solely against France, without fearing any attack from the quarter of Berlin.

The great danger, perhaps, of trying another campaign without subsidizing either Prussia or Austria, might first be found with respect to Holland (at least, if the Government here act as they threaten in the case of being unsubsidized), by their withdrawing of the Austrian army from the neighbourhood of Maestricht, and contracting their defence to the limits of their German frontier.

But even if they did so--which may be much doubted--might not England and Holland, at a smaller expense than that paid to the King of Prussia, subsidize an army of auxiliary troops to act for the defence of Holland, and for carrying on the war in the Netherlands, and have that army really and effectually at their own disposal, and doing the service which they were paid for. How far this may be practicable, I do not pretend to judge. If it is so, n.o.body could doubt that it would be an expense more grateful to the public of our own country than that of paying for a force which we cannot bring as we ought into action, and which we must consider as compelled by their own interests to continue the war, whether we pay them or not for doing so. By subsidizing Austria, we acquire no greater force than that of the last campaign, and we put the justification of that enormous expense upon the unpromising chance of a vigour and energy on their part such as they appear to be altogether incapable of exerting, unless under the pressure of such a danger as would force them to act without hiring them to do so.

The length of this letter is such as I am really ashamed to add to.

Lord Spencer writes to Lord Grenville by the same opportunity.

Neither he nor I see much prospect of making ourselves useful in the shape and with the views proposed, and we are therefore naturally anxious to see the ordinary course resumed in some other person, and any such arrangements taken as may admit of our return as soon as without inconvenience might be. We speak the more directly on this matter, from the entire and perfect agreement of our view of it, and our opinions concerning it; at the same time, if, in your determinations at home, it should seem to you that Lord Spencer can and ought to stay longer, with any fair prospect of such advantages to this great subject as his peculiar situation alone could promise, I do not doubt but that he would consent to protract his stay a little longer; and while he does, I certainly will not ask to desert him, _bien entendu_, that I cannot think of staying one hour after him.

Ever, my dear Duke, Very truly and faithfully yours.

The session had been protracted to the beginning of July, not merely by the interest of pa.s.sing occurrences, but by the efforts of the Opposition to damage the character and embarra.s.s the action of Ministers. The most remarkable of these movements was a string of resolutions moved in the Upper House by the Duke of Bedford, and in the Lower by Mr. Fox, and urged upon the consideration of both Houses with an amount of ability that could not have failed of its object, had that object been a sound one, or sustained by the public opinion of the country. The main purpose was to obtain from Parliament a protest against the war, and to compel the Government to enter into proposals for a peace with France. After setting forth that the policy of the Administration had been that of strict neutrality before the commencement of hostilities, and that, after the declaration of war, Ministers adopted the policy of resistance to the ambition and aggrandis.e.m.e.nt of France, the resolutions went on to state, that at the beginning of the war it was considered a matter of general concern in which His Majesty was to have the cordial co-operation of the powers united with him by the ties of interest and alliance; that His Majesty had not received that co-operation; that Russia had not contributed in any shape to the common cause; that Denmark and Sweden had coalesced to defend themselves against any attempt to force them into it; that Venice and Switzerland remained neuter; that Sardinia was subsidized merely to act on the defensive; and that Great Britain was loaded with a subsidy which ought properly to be borne by Prussia; and, finally, that the time was now come when peace might be secured on a permanent basis, and that it was the duty of His Majesty's Ministers to avail themselves of the opportunity.

There was some truth in these statements, although the general deduction was erroneous, and the colouring throughout false. The allies had not given that cordial co-operation to Great Britain which they were bound to do, and Prussia had evaded the onus of the coalition. Mr. Thomas Grenville's letter to the Duke of Portland discovers a great deal more than was known to the Duke of Bedford or Mr. Fox in ill.u.s.tration of these facts; and the correspondence that follows, which is of the highest importance from the confidential character of its details, confirms them. But the attempt to cast the responsibility of these circ.u.mstances upon the English Cabinet was equally ungenerous and unjust. The policy of Ministers had undergone no change, except that which was contingent upon the altered situation of affairs. To preserve a strict neutrality in the face of a declaration of war, was clearly impossible; and to abandon the war, from an abstract desire for peace, at a time when the common enemy had gained enormous advantages, and were menacing the tranquillity and liberties of other nations, and threatening an invasion of England, would have precipitated results the very reverse of those contemplated by the Opposition. To have made proposals to France on what the resolutions termed "equitable and moderate conditions of reconciliation," would have involved two serious difficulties--the negotiation, in the first place, with a Government of anarchy which England had justifiably refused to treat with from the outset; and, in the second place, the admission of the power of France to dictate terms which England could not accept without degradation, or refuse without aggravating the existing grounds of hostility.

Circ.u.mstances might arise--such as a change in the Government--to obviate the former difficulty; but the latter was insuperable. It would have been inconsistent with the principles upon which the war was undertaken to have proposed or submitted to any conditions which France, exulting over her recent successes, could have been expected to approve; and the result of such a negotiation at such a moment must have been, in any event, fruitless and inglorious. The decision of Parliament was unequivocal and decisive. The Duke of Bedford's motion was lost on the question of adjournment, and Mr. Fox's thrown out by a majority of 210 against 57 votes. The influence of the Opposition was overthrown. The country was against them, and their ranks were daily weakened by secessions. So strongly and unanimously had the Parliament p.r.o.nounced its judgment in favour of the maintenance of the war, that His Majesty at the close of the session was enabled to urge both Houses "to persevere with increased vigour and exertion in the present arduous contest against a power irreconcilably hostile in its principles and spirit to all regular and established government."

Immediately after the close of the session, some changes took place in the _materiel_ of the Administration, arising out of the accession of power the Ministry had obtained by the adhesion of some of the leading Whigs. The Duke of Portland (to whom Mr. Thomas Grenville addressed his first letters from Vienna) was appointed Third Secretary of State; Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord President of the Council; Earl Spencer, Privy Seal; and Mr. Wyndham, Secretary at War. Further changes took place before the close of the year, when Lord Fitzwilliam accepted the Government of Ireland, and was succeeded as President of the Council by Earl Mansfield. Lord Spencer, at the same time, was placed at the head of the Admiralty; and Lord Chatham, the brother of the Premier, who had for some years occupied that department, was made Lord Privy Seal.

The junction with the Whigs was, as far as it went, a new coalition; but, under the circ.u.mstances which led to it, a coalition of a very different character from that which had been entered into by Mr. Fox and Lord North. The old elements of the Cabinet still held the ascendancy; and although some sincere friends of Mr. Pitt doubted the prudence of admitting the Whigs to office, no actual disturbance of the existing system was apprehended from it. All agreed upon the question of the war--the one great question upon which agreement was essential to the repose and security of the country. In forming this alliance, however, another question had been overlooked, which was now daily rising into importance, and upon which the Whigs differed widely from Mr. Pitt, not so much in principles, as in the time and mode of their application.

That question, the clog and difficulty of every Administration, was Ireland. But the moment had not yet arrived when the dangers of this question became manifest.

The following series of letters trace the whole course of the negotiations going forward on the continent, and exhibit in minute detail the actual position in which England stood in her relation to the rest of the allies, and the incessant energy she exerted in vain to awaken them to a just sense of their obligations.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 26th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I have to acknowledge your private letters, which I do not attempt to answer by this conveyance for obvious reasons, and only write that you may not receive my public despatch without a line to tell you that your private letters have reached me, and that I will state to you, by a safer opportunity, what occurs to me upon them.

I am a little out of humour with you for not telling me how you bore your journey, and how you are, but I am willing to hope it has not renewed any symptoms of your former complaint. There never was such a succession of cross-incidents as seem to have accompanied every part of poor Merey's mission, and I fear his loss is a serious one to us all. What do you think of Robespierre's death? I look upon it as a very favourable event, not from any opinion that I ever entertained of his personal talents, but because those who succeed him are evidently under the necessity of lowering the despotism of the Revolutionary Government, and of giving up thereby the great instrument with which they worked. A strong proof of this, and a circ.u.mstance very favourable in itself, is, that instead of a Committee of six or eight efficient persons who conducted the Government in all its branches, and with absolute power, they have already been obliged to inst.i.tute twelve Committees, who are to be chosen with a sort of rotation, those who go out not being re-eligible. This is, in fact, a subst.i.tution of the weakest possible form of Executive Government in lieu of the strongest.

G.o.d bless you, my dearest brother, and believe me Ever most affectionately yours, G.

We have received this morning accounts from Italy, mentioning the reduction of Calvi. You will probably have heard it by this time.

It was in the beginning of this month of August, that the Duke of York, at that time stationed at Breda, retreated before the French towards Bois-le-Duc; and afterwards, upon the advance of General Pichegru, crossed the Maese, and took up a fresh position near Grave. Seeing the necessity of placing the conduct of the campaign in more experienced hands, Ministers now proposed to give the command in chief to Lord Cornwallis; but before this step could be finally resolved upon, it was necessary to consult the feelings of His Majesty on the subject. Mr.

Pitt therefore submitted a statement to the King, a.s.signing the reasons which induced him to urge the appointment of Lord Cornwallis upon His Majesty's consideration; and suggesting that Mr. Wyndham should be sent on a mission to the army. The following was His Majesty's answer:

Weymouth, August 27th, 1704. Thirty-five minutes past One, P.M.

I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's letter accompanying the Paper of Considerations, which I undoubtedly should wish to keep; but not knowing whether Mr. Pitt has a fair copy of it, I have thought it safest to return.

Whatever can give vigour to the remains of the campaign, I shall certainly as a duty think it right not to withhold my consent; but I own, in my son's place, I should beg my being allowed to return home, if the command is given to Lord Cornwallis, though I should not object to the command being entrusted to General Clairfayt.

From feeling this, I certainly will not write, but approve of Mr.

Wyndham's going to the army, and shall be happy if my son views this in a different light than I should.

I will not delay the messenger, as I think no time ought to be lost in forming some fixed plan, and that the measure of sending Mr.