The Panama Canal and its Makers Part 9

{New York _via_ Panama, } { San Francisco and by } { Great Circle 9,835} Yokohama {Liverpool _via_ Suez, Aden, } 1,805 miles.

{ Colombo, Singapore, } { Hong Kong and } { Shanghai 11,640}

{New York _via_ Panama } { and Tahiti 9,852} Sydney {Liverpool _via_ Suez, Aden, } { Colombo, King George's } 2,383 miles { Sound, Adelaide and } { Melbourne 12,234}

{New York _via_ Panama } Wellington,{ and Tahiti 8,872} N.Z. {Liverpool _via_ Panama and } 2,759 miles.[32]

{ Tahiti 11,631}

[32] Liverpool to Colon, 4,720; New York to Colon, 1,961: difference, 2,759, the subsequent routes being identical.

Let us take a chart of the world and examine the portion comprised between the parallels of 40 North and 40 South and the meridians of 120 East and 160 East of Greenwich. This band, in which are included j.a.pan and Korea, Shanghai and the Philippines, New Guinea and most of Australia, is of particular interest in relation to Ca.n.a.l trade. Let us take the standpoint, not of Europe or of America, but of traders residing in this area. Near its western margin the Suez and the Panama routes to New York are equal in length.

Near its eastern margin, which lies, however, outside j.a.pan and Australia and only pa.s.ses among small islands, the Suez and Panama routes to Liverpool are of equal length.

On a line rather west of the centre and running from rather west of north to rather east of south, all places are equidistant from New York and Liverpool--the latter _via_ Suez, the former _via_ Panama.

It needs no prophet to foresee interesting commercial developments in a region where the alternative routes and alternative sources of manufacturing supply offer almost equal allurements.

I must also draw attention to the position of New Orleans and other ports on the Gulf of Mexico in relation to the Ca.n.a.l. At present New Orleans by sea is further than New York from Valparaiso and San Francisco, Yokohama and Shanghai, but it is 581 miles nearer to Colon.

Hence, when the Panama Ca.n.a.l is open it will be 581 miles nearer than New York to those ports, and to Sydney, Melbourne, and Wellington.

Thus, as the Mississippi waterway is improved, an increasing proportion of the manufactures and other products of the great Mississippi basin will find their way to foreign markets _via_ the Gulf ports, and an increasing proportion of imports will find their way to the Mississippi basin through these ports.[33]

[33] Among West Indian ports affected by the Ca.n.a.l, Kingston, Jamaica, must be particularly mentioned. Now situate at the entrance of a _cul de sac_, it will then be placed in a position of much greater centrality for the world's commerce, and astride the route from Colon to the North American Atlantic ports. Thus the importance of Jamaica as a const.i.tuent of the British Empire will be enhanced. May the opening of the Ca.n.a.l increase the prosperity of our fellow subjects who have suffered so greatly from hurricane and earthquake!

In dealing with the shortening of sea routes it was shown that the greatest reduction was that between the two coasts of North America, but even so the sea route remains longer than that by land, so that the question of commercial advantage is not settled by a mere statement of sea distances, and the indisputable and undiluted advantages of the Ca.n.a.l route for the Atlantic and Gulf ports of North America are those of commerce with the Pacific coast of South America, with New Zealand, Australia, j.a.pan, Northern China, Manchuria, and Eastern Siberia.

From the naval point of view, however, the results of shortening the sea distance from New York to San Francisco are scarcely diminished by the fact of railway communication, since only crews and stores, and not wars.h.i.+ps, can be transported by rail.

In order to understand the effect of the Ca.n.a.l upon the naval position of the United States the student of affairs must, in addition to the information given above, examine the positions relatively to the Ca.n.a.l of the possessions, particularly the insular possessions, of the United States and of other naval Powers. This will enable him to gauge for himself the more permanent factors which determine the value of the new line of communication, the opportunities it affords for concentrating force where wanted, and the responsibilities of defence which it entails. With the aid of a fairly good atlas this can easily be done by anyone acquainted with the general facts of naval power at the present time. The geographical facts, which are perhaps the only ones beyond question or dispute, are sufficiently simple.

[Ill.u.s.tration: VIEW FROM SPANISH FORT, PANAMA.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: CATHEDRAL SQUARE, PANAMA.]

_On the Steams.h.i.+ps Available for Ca.n.a.l Transit._

The Isthmian Ca.n.a.l Commission, in the Report of 1899, distinguishes between the commercial and the industrial benefits of the Ca.n.a.l, meaning by the former term the increased carrying of goods, and by the latter the development of production induced by improved facilities of carriage.

The tables of distances already given show the _potential_ commercial advantages, and how they are distributed in different measure among different countries, and these figures have all the permanence which makes geographical figures of such enduring importance.

But the actual commercial advantage of a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l depends equally upon a second factor, viz., the available s.h.i.+p-tonnage. Supposing a Panama Ca.n.a.l to be open at the present time, there would be hardly any United States s.h.i.+ps to use it, except in transport between home ports from which s.h.i.+ps flying foreign flags are debarred. The transport to South America, New Zealand, Australia, Northern China, and j.a.pan would necessarily be almost wholly carried on by s.h.i.+ps of other nations, especially British.

The absence of an American merchant marine trading with foreign ports is indeed a circ.u.mstance without parallel among other nations engaged in modern manufacture. Many interesting facts relating to this strange phenomenon were put on record in the debates of the United States Senate in the early part of 1908.[34]

[34] _Congressional Record_, February 24, 1908.

At that time there was not one steams.h.i.+p flying the flag of the United States between her ports and those of Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, or Peru.

The three steams.h.i.+ps of the Oceanic Line formerly plying to Australia were then laid up in the harbour of San Francisco, being unable, although subsidised for mails by the United States Government, to compete with foreign vessels. There were, however, three United States steamers plying from Puget Sound to j.a.pan and China, occasionally reaching the Philippines.

The mails from New York and the other Atlantic ports of the United States to Brazil and the Argentine go _via_ Europe, so that in this important matter New York is actually 3,000 miles further than Europe, instead of being 370 miles nearer to those countries.[35]

[35] Senator Gallinger, _loc. cit._

In the same debate Senator Depew said that s.h.i.+ps receiving the United States mail subsidy, the only form of subsidy given, have to be American built, manned by Americans, and the diet of the sailors as prescribed by law. He added that--

"The labour unions have rightly and properly taken care of their wages.

The result is that the cost in wages and food to run American s.h.i.+ps under American conditions across the Pacific is double that of European or j.a.panese steamers."

The relative cost of operating American and European vessels was given by the Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of State, in an address delivered November 30, 1906,[36] as follows:--

The operation of an American steams.h.i.+p of 2,500 tons costs $18,289 per annum more than that of a British s.h.i.+p of this tonnage, or $7.31 more per ton; and

The operation of an American steams.h.i.+p of 3,500 tons costs $15,315 per annum more than that of a German s.h.i.+p of the same size, or $4.37 more per ton.

[36] Address to Mississippi Commercial Congress, Kansas City, revised by Mr. Root and published _Nat. Geogr. Mag._, 1907, vol. xviii. pp. 61-72.

Thus it is evident that, in spite of geographical advantages, there are at present some grounds for the extreme opinion sometimes expressed in the United States that the Ca.n.a.l is being built with American money for the use of Europe--and, one may add, of j.a.pan.

What attempts may be made to remedy this state of things, and what effects such attempts may have, are matters on which I shall not stay to speculate.

CHAPTER VII

THE COST OF THE Ca.n.a.l

OF the existing ca.n.a.ls for ocean-going s.h.i.+ps, that of Suez was built by a company as a commercial undertaking to earn dividends by tolls. It cost $90,000,000.

The Manchester s.h.i.+p Ca.n.a.l was partly commercial, partly industrial, _i.e._, the large contribution of the city of Manchester was made not as a financial speculation, but in order to promote an undertaking likely to develop the industries of the city. This ca.n.a.l, partly commercial, partly industrial, cost $75,000,000.

The Kiel Ca.n.a.l has further a military purpose, providing a short line of communication for wars.h.i.+ps. It cost $40,000,000. The Panama Ca.n.a.l is commercial, industrial, and military, and will cost more than all the above put together.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PALACE OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: OLD FLAT ARCH AT PANAMA.]

Up to June 30, 1908, the United States Government have spent $126,047,062 on the Panama Ca.n.a.l, made up as follows:--

Payment to New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company $40,000,000, and to Republic of Panama $10,000,000 $50,000,000

Expenditure on work prior to July 1, 1907 43,172,408