History of the United States Volume V Part 22

[Ill.u.s.tration]

Gen. Frederick Funston, Gen. A. McArthur.

It being already obvious that Spain had not redressed, and had no intention of redressing, abuses in the Philippines, Aguinaldo and his aides planned to return. The American war was their opportunity.

Conferences were had with Consul Wildman at Hong-Kong and with Commodore Dewey. Aguinaldo and those about him declared that Wildman, alleging authority from Was.h.i.+ngton, promised the Filipinos independence; and other Hong-Kong consuls and several press representatives received the impression that this was the case. Wildman absolutely denied having given any a.s.surance of the kind. Admiral Dewey also denied in the most positive manner that he had done so.

Whatever the understanding or misunderstanding at Hong-Kong, Aguinaldo came home with Dewey in the evident belief that the American forces and his own were to work for Filipino independence. He easily resumed his leaders.h.i.+p and began planning for an independent Filipino State. Dewey furnished him arms and ammunition. The insurrection was reorganized on a grander scale than ever, with extraordinary ability, tact, energy, and success. Nearly every one of the Luzon provinces had its rebel organization. In each Aguinaldo picked the leader and outlined the plan of campaign. His scheme had unity; his followers were aggressive and fearless. Everywhere save in a few strongholds Spain was vanquished. At last only Manila remained. The insurgents must have captured 10,000 prisoners, though part of those they had at the Spanish evacuation were from the Americans. They hemmed in Manila by a line reaching from water to water. We could not have taken Manila as we did, by little more than a show of force, had it not been for the fact that Spain's soldiers, thus, hemmed in by Aguinaldo's, could not retreat beyond the range of our naval guns. January 21, 1899, a Philippine Republic was set up, its capital being Malolos, which effectively controlled at least the Tagal provinces of Luzon. Its methods were irregular and arbitrary--natural in view of the prevalence of war. Aguinaldo, its soul from the first moment, became president.

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A Company of Insurrectos near Bongued, Abra Province, just previous to surrendering early in 1901.

[Ill.u.s.tration: About twenty soldier landing on the beach in a small boat.]

11th Cavalry Landing at Vigan, Ilocos, April, 1902.

The Philippine Republic wished and a.s.sumed to act for the archipelago, taking the place of Spain. It, of course, had neither in law nor in fact the power to do this, nor, under the circ.u.mstances, could the Administration at Was.h.i.+ngton, however desirable such a course from certain points of view, consent that it should at present even try. The Philippine question divided the country, raising numerous problems of fact, law, policy, and ethics, on which neither Congress nor the people could know its mind without time for reflection.

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Copyright, 1899, by Frances B. Johnston.

Jules Cambon, the French Amba.s.sador, acting for Spain, receiving from the Honorable John Hay, the U. S. Secretary of State, drafts to the amount of $20,000,000, in payment for the Philippines.

When our commissioners met at Paris to draft the Treaty of Peace, one wished our demands in the Orient confined to Manila, with a few harbors and coaling stations. Two thought it well to take Luzon, or some such goodly portion of the archipelago. That the treaty at last called for the entire Philippine domain, allowing $20,000,000 therefor, was supposed due to insistence from Was.h.i.+ngton. Only the Vice-President's casting vote defeated a resolution introduced in the Senate by Senator Bacon, of Georgia, declaring our intention to treat the Filipinos as we were pledged to treat the Cubans. After ratification the Senate pa.s.sed a resolution, introduced by Senator McEnery, of Louisiana, avowing the purpose not to make the Filipinos United States citizens or their land American territory, but to establish for them a government suited to their needs, in due time disposing of the archipelago according to the interests of our people and of the inhabitants.

CHAPTER XV.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE ORIENT

WAR, CONTROVERSY, PEACE

[1899-1901]

It was wholly problematical how long Aguinaldo unaided could dominate Luzon, still more so whether he would rule tolerably, and more uncertain yet whether centre or south would ever yield to him. The insurgents had foothold in four or five Visayan islands, but were never admitted to Negros, which of its own accord raised our flag. In Mindanao, the Sulu Islands, and Palawan they practically had no influence. Governor Taft was of opinion that they could never, unaided, have set up their sway in these southern regions. But should they succeed in establis.h.i.+ng good government over the entire archipelago, clearly they must be for an indefinite period incompetent to take over the international responsibilities connected with the islands. To have at once conceded their sovereignty could have subserved no end that would have been from any point of view rational or humane.

The American situation was delicate. We were present as friends, but could be really so only by, for the time, seeming not to be so. At points we failed in tact. We too little recognized distinctions among cla.s.ses of Filipinos, tending to treat all alike as savages. When our thought ceased to be that of ousting Spain, and attacked the more serious question what to do next, our manner toward the Filipinos abruptly changed. Our purposes were left unnecessarily equivocal. Our troops viewed the Filipinos with ill-concealed contempt. "Filipinos"

and "n.i.g.g.e.rs" were often used as synonyms.

Suspicion and estrangement reached a high pitch after the capture of Manila, when Aguinaldo, instead of being admitted to the capital, was required to fall still farther back, the American lines lying between him and the prize. December 21, 1898, the President ordered our Government extended with despatch over the archipelago. That the Treaty of Paris summarily gave not only the islands but their inhabitants to the United States, entirely ignoring their wishes in the matter, was a snub. Still worse, it seemed to guarantee perpetuation of the friar abuses under which the Filipinos had groaned so long. Outside Manila threat of American rule awakened bitter hostility. In Manila itself thousands of Tagals, lip-servants of the new masters, were in secret communion with their kinsmen in arms.

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Native Tagals at Angeles, fifty-one miles from Manila.

No blood flowed till February 4, 1898, when a skirmish, set off by the shot of a bullyragged American sentry, led to war. February 22, 1899, the insurgents vainly attempted to fire Manila, but were pushed back with slaughter, their forces scattered.

March 20, 1899, the first Philippine Commission--Jacob G. Schurman, of New York; Admiral Dewey; General Otis; Charles Denby, ex-minister to China; and Dean C. Worcester, of Michigan-began their labors at Manila.

They set to work with great zeal and discretion to win to the cause of peace not only the Filipinos but the government of the Philippine Republic itself. In this latter they succeeded. Their proclamation that United States sway in the archipelago would be made "as free, liberal, and democratic as the most intelligent Filipino desired," "a firmer and surer self-government than their own Philippine Republic could ever guarantee," operated as a powerful agent of pacification.

May 1, 1899, the Philippine Congress almost unanimously voted for peace with the United States. Aguinaldo consented. Mabini's cabinet, opposing this, was overturned, and a new one formed, pledged to peace. A commission of cabinet members was ready to set out for Manila to effectuate the new order.

A revolution prevented this. General Luna, inspired by Mabini, arrested the peace delegates and charged them with treason, sentencing some to prison, some to death. This occurred in May, 1899. After that time not so much as the skeleton of any Philippine public authority--president, cabinet, or other official--existed. Later opposition to the American arms seemed to proceed in the main not from real Filipino patriotism, but from selfishness, l.u.s.t of power, and the spirit of robbery.

Everywhere and always Americans had to guard against treachery. In Samar false guides led an expedition of our Marine Corps into a wilderness and abandoned the men to die, cruelty which was deemed to justify retaliation in kind. Eleven prisoners subsequently captured were shot without trial as implicated in the barbarity. For this Major Waller was court-martialed, being acquitted in that he acted under superior orders and military necessity. A sensational feature of his trial was the production of General Smith's command to Major Waller "to kill and burn"; "make Samar a howling wilderness"; "kill everything over ten"

(every native over ten years old). General Smith was in turn court-martialed and reprimanded. President Roosevelt thought this not severe enough and summarily retired him from active service.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Soldier on a train.]

Bringing ammunition to the front for Gen. Otis's Brigade, north of Manila.

Despite vigilant censors.h.i.+p by the War Department, rumors of other cruelties on the part of our troops gained credence. It appeared that in not a few instances American soldiers had tortured prisoners by the "water cure," the victim being held open-mouthed under a stream of water, the process sometimes supplemented by pounding on the abdomen with rifle-b.u.t.ts.

These disgraces were sporadic, not general, and occurred, when they did occur, under terrible provocation. Devotion to duty, however trying the circ.u.mstances, was the characteristic behavior of our officers and men.

Deeds of daring occurred daily. On November 14, 1900, Major John A.

Logan, son of the distinguished Civil War general, lost his life in battle near San Jacinto. December 19th the brave General Lawton was killed in attacking San Mateo. Systematic opposition to our arms was at last ended by an enterprise involving both nerve and cleverness in high degree.

Our forces captured a message from Aguinaldo asking reenforcements. This suggested to General Frederick Funston, who had served with Cuban insurgents, a plan for seizing Aguinaldo. Picking some trustworthy native troops and scouts, Funston, Captain Hazzard, Captain Newton, and Lieutenant Mitch.e.l.l, pa.s.sed themselves off as prisoners and their forces as the reenforcements expected. When the party approached Aguinaldo's headquarters word was forwarded that reenforcements were coming, with some captured Americans. Aguinaldo sent provisions, and directed that the prisoners be treated with humanity. March 23, 1901, he received the officers at his house. After brief conversation they excused themselves.

Next instant a volley was poured into Aguinaldo's body-guard, and the American officers rushed upon Aguinaldo, seized him, his chief of staff, and his treasurer. April 2, 1901, Aguinaldo swore allegiance to the United States, and, in a proclamation, advised his followers to do the same. Great and daily increasing numbers of them obeyed.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Stone fort with many large sh.e.l.l holes.]

Fort Malate, Cavite.

To the Philippines, though Spain's de facto sovereignty there was hardly more than nominal, our t.i.tle, whether or not good as based on conquest, was unimpeachable considered as a cession by way of war indemnity or sale. Nor, according to the weight of authority, could the right of the federal power to acquire these islands be denied. But did "the Const.i.tution follow the flag" wherever American jurisdiction went? If not, what were the relations of those outlands and their peoples to the United States proper? Could inhabitants of the new possessions emigrate to the United States proper? Did our domestic tariff laws apply there as well as here? Must free trade exist between the nation and its dependencies? Were rights such as that of peaceable a.s.semblage and that to jury trial guaranteed to Filipinos, or could only Americans to the manner born plead them?

On the fundamental question whether the dependencies formed part of the United States the Supreme Court pa.s.sed in certain so-called "insular cases" which were early brought before it. Four of the justices held that at all times after the Paris Treaty the islands were part and parcel of United States soil. Four held that they at no time became such, but were rather "territories appurtenant" to the country.

[Ill.u.s.tration: River crowded with small boats.]

The Pasig River, Manila.

Mr. Justice Brown gave the "casting" opinion. Though reasoning in a fas.h.i.+on wholly his own, he sided, on the main issue, with the latter four of his colleagues, making it the decision of the court that Porto Rico and the Philippines did not belong to the United States proper, yet, on the other hand, were not foreign. The revenue clauses of the Const.i.tution did not, therefore, forbid tariffing goods from or going to the islands. In the absence of express legislation, the general tariff did not obtain as against imports from the dependencies. This reasoning, it was observed, was equally applicable to mainland territories and to Alaska. The court intimated that, so far as applicable, the Const.i.tution's provisions in favor of personal rights and human liberty accompanied the Stars and Stripes beyond sea as well as between our old sh.o.r.es.

Unsatisfactory to nearly all as was this utterance of a badly divided court, it sanctioned the Administration policy and opened the way for necessary legislation. It did nothing, however, to hush the anti-imperialist's appeal, based more upon the Declaration of Independence and the spirit of our national ideals.

It was said that having delivered the Filipinos from Spain "we were bound in all honor to protect their newly acquired liberty against the ambition and greed of any other nation on earth, and we were equally bound to protect them against our own. We were bound to stand by them, a defender and protector, until their new government was established in freedom and in honor; until they had made treaties with the powers of the earth and were as secure in their national independence as Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Santo Domingo, or Venezuela." But we ought to bind ourselves and promise the world that so soon as these ends could be realized or a.s.sured we would leave the Filipinos to themselves, Such was the view of eminent and respected Americans like George F.

h.o.a.r, George S. Boutwell, Carl Schurz, and William J. Bryan.

These and others urged that the Filipinos had inalienable right to life and to liberty; that our policy in the Philippines was in derogation of those rights; that j.a.pan, left to herself, had stridden farther in a generation than England's crown colony of India in a century; that the Filipinos could be trusted to do likewise; that our increments of territory hitherto had been adapted to complete incorporation in the American empire while the new were not; and that growth of any other character would mean weakness, not strength. The mistakes, expense, and difficulties incident to expansion, and the misbehavior and crimes of some of our soldiers were exhibited in their worst light.

Rejoinder usually proceeded by denying the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government without long training. Even waiving this consideration, men found in international law no such mid-status between sovereignty and non-sovereignty as anti-imperialists wished to have the United States a.s.sume while the Filipinos were getting upon their feet. Many made great point of minimizing the abuses of our military government and of dilating upon native atrocities. The material wealth of the archipelago was described in glowing terms. Only American capital and enterprise were needed to develop it into a mine of national riches. The military and commercial advantages of our position at the doorway of the East, our duty to protect lives and property imperilled by the insurgents, and our manifest destiny to lift up the Filipino races, were dwelt upon. The argument having chief weight with most was that there seemed no clear avenue by which we could escape the policy of American occupation save the dishonorable and humiliating one of leaving the islands to their fate--anarchy and intestine feuds at once, conquest by j.a.pan, Germany, or Spain herself a little later.