Life and Times of Washington Part 5

Gates was appointed president of the board, with many flattering expressions from Congress. His recent triumph over Burgoyne had gained him many friends among the members of Congress and a few among the officers of the army. His head, naturally not over-strong, had been turned by success, and he entered into the views of a certain clique which had recently been formed, whose object was to disparage Was.h.i.+ngton and put forward rather high pretensions in favor of the "hero of Saratoga." This clique, called from the name of its most active member, General Conway, the "Conway Cabal," we shall notice hereafter. At the time of this change in the const.i.tution of the Board of War it was in full activity, and its operations were well known to Was.h.i.+ngton. In fact, he had already applied the match which ultimately exploded the whole conspiracy and brought lasting disgrace on every one of its members.

General Howe in the meantime was preparing to attack Was.h.i.+ngton in his camp, and, as he confidently threatened, to "drive him beyond the mountains."

On the 4th of December (1777), Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer on the lines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp at White Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information to Was.h.i.+ngton. In the evening of the same day General Howe marched out of Philadelphia with his whole force, and about 11 at night, M'Lane, who had been detached with 100 chosen men, attacked the British van at the Three Mile Run on the Germantown road, and compelled their front division to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army, galling them severely until 3 next morning, when the British encamped on Chestnut Hill in front of the American right, and distant from it about three miles. A slight skirmish had also taken place between the Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, and the advanced light parties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded and the militia without much other loss were dispersed.

The range of hills on which the British were posted approached nearer to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward. Having pa.s.sed the day in reconnoitering the right Howe changed his ground in the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right took an advantageous position about a mile in front of the American left.

The next day he inclined still further to his right, and in doing so approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing a general engagement to be approaching Was.h.i.+ngton detached Gist, with some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to attack the flanking and advanced parties of the enemy. A sharp action ensued in which Major Morris, of New Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan's regiment was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties first attacked were driven in, but the enemy reinforcing in numbers and Was.h.i.+ngton unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of the skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat.

Howe continued to maneuver toward the flank and in front of the left wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in full force Was.h.i.+ngton made such changes in the disposition of his troops as the occasion required, and the day was consumed in these movements.

In the course of it Was.h.i.+ngton rode through every brigade of his army, delivering in person his orders respecting the manner of receiving the enemy, exhorting his troops to rely princ.i.p.ally on the bayonet, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words, to a vigorous performance of their duty. The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning, but in the afternoon of the 8th the British suddenly filed off from their right, which extended beyond the American left, and retreated to Philadelphia. The parties detached to hara.s.s their rear could not overtake it. [3]

The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the official letter of General Howe, rather exceeded 100 in killed, wounded, and missing, and was sustained princ.i.p.ally in the skirmish of the 7th (December, 1777) in which Major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of the British was then stated at 12,000 men. Stedman, the historian, who then belonged to Howe's army, states its number to have been 14,000. The American army consisted of precisely 12,161 Continental troops and 3,241 militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies occupied heights fronting each other neither could attack without giving to its adversary some advantage in the ground, and this was an advantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish.

The return of Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action after marching out with the avowed intention of fighting is the best testimony of the respect which he felt for the talents of his adversary and the courage of the troops he was to encounter.

The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an army neither well-clothed nor sufficiently supplied with blankets longer to keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place the troops in winter quarters, but in the existing state of things the choice of winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was impossible to place them in villages without uncovering the country or exposing them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment.

To avoid these calamities it was determined to take a strong position in the neighborhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from the Delaware above and below that city, and there to construct huts in the form of a regular encampment which might cover the army during the winter.

A strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was selected for that purpose, and some time before day on the morning of the 11th of December (1777) the army marched to take possession of it.

By an accidental concurrence of circ.u.mstances Lord Cornwallis had been detached the same morning at the head of a strong corps on a foraging party on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had fallen in with a brigade of Pennsylvania militia commanded by General Potter which he soon dispersed, and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights opposite Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridge for the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops to command the defile called the Gulph just as the front division of the American army reached the bank of the river. This movement had been made without any knowledge of the intention of General Was.h.i.+ngton to change his position or any design of contesting the pa.s.sage of the Schuylkill, but the troops had been posted in the manner already mentioned for the sole purpose of covering the foraging party.

Was.h.i.+ngton apprehended from his first intelligence that General Howe had taken the field in full force. He therefore recalled the troops already on the west side and moved rather higher up the river for the purpose of understanding the real situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and in the course of the night the American army crossed the river.

Here the Commander-in-Chief communicated to his army in general orders the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during the winter.

He expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct, presented them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their country, exhorted them to bear with continuing fort.i.tude the hards.h.i.+ps inseparable from the position they were about to take, and endeavored to convince their judgments that those hards.h.i.+ps were not imposed on them by unfeeling caprice, but were necessary for the good of their country.

The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of the army were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings were considerably diminished by the erection of logged huts, filled up with mortar, which, after being dried, formed comfortable habitations, and gave content to men long unused to the conveniences of life. The order of a regular encampment was observed, and the only appearance of winter quarters was the subst.i.tution of huts for tents.

Stedman, who, as we have already remarked, was in Howe's army, has not only given a vivid description of the condition of Was.h.i.+ngton's army, which agrees in the main with those of our own writers, but he has also exhibited in contrast the condition and conduct of the British army in Philadelphia. We transcribe this instructive pa.s.sage:

"The American general determined to remain during the winter in the position which he then occupied at Valley Forge, recommending to his troops to build huts in the woods for sheltering themselves from the inclemency of the weather. And it is perhaps one of the most striking traits in General Was.h.i.+ngton's character that he possessed the faculty of gaining such an ascendancy over his raw and undisciplined followers, most of whom were dest.i.tute of proper winter clothing and otherwise unprovided with necessaries, as to be able to prevail upon so many of them to remain with him during the winter in so distressing a situation.

With immense labor he raised wooden huts, covered with straw and earth, which formed very uncomfortable quarters. On the east and south an entrenchment was made--the ditch six feet wide and three in depth; the mound not four feet high, very narrow, and such as might easily have been beat down by cannon. Two redoubts were also begun but never completed. The Schuylkill was on his left with a bridge across. His rear was mostly covered by an impa.s.sable precipice formed by Valley creek, having only a narrow pa.s.sage near the Schuylkill. On the right his camp was accessible with some difficulty, but the approach on his front was on ground nearly on a level with his camp. It is indeed difficult to give an adequate description of his misery in this situation. His army was dest.i.tute of almost every necessary of clothing, nay, almost naked, and very often on short allowance of provisions; an extreme mortality raged in his hospitals, nor had he any of the most proper medicines to relieve the sick. There were perpetual desertions of parties from him of ten to fifty at a time. In three months he had not 4,000 men and these could by no means be termed effective. Not less than 500 horses perished from want and the severity of the season. He had often not three days'

provisions in his camp and at times not enough for one day. In this infirm and dangerous state he continued from December to May, during all which time every person expected that General Howe would have stormed or besieged his camp, the situation of which equally invited either attempt. To have posted 2,000 men on a commanding ground near the bridge, on the north side of the Schuylkill, would have rendered his escape on the left impossible; 2,000 men placed on a like ground opposite the narrow pa.s.s would have as effectually prevented a retreat by his rear, and five or six thousand men stationed on the front and right of his camp would have deprived him of flight on those sides. The positions were such that if any of the corps were attacked they could have been instantly supported. Under such propitious circ.u.mstances what mortal could doubt of success? But the British army, neglecting all these opportunities, was suffered to continue at Philadelphia where the whole winter was spent in dissipation. A want of discipline and proper subordination pervaded the whole army, and if disease and sickness thinned the American army encamped at Valley Forge, indolence and luxury perhaps did no less injury to the British troops at Philadelphia. During the winter a very unfortunate inattention was shown to the feelings of the inhabitants of Philadelphia, whose satisfaction should have been vigilantly consulted, both from grat.i.tude and from interest. They experienced many of the horrors of civil war. The soldiers insulted and plundered them, and their houses were occupied as barracks without any compensation being made to them. Some of the first families were compelled to receive into their habitations individual officers who were even indecent enough to introduce their mistresses into the mansions of their hospitable entertainers. This soured the minds of the inhabitants, many of whom were Quakers. But the residence of the army at Philadelphia occasioned distresses which will probably be considered by the generality of mankind as of a more grievous nature. It was with difficulty that fuel could be got on any terms. Provisions were most exorbitantly high. Gaming of every species was permitted and even sanctioned. This vice not only debauched the mind, but by sedentary confinement and the want of seasonable repose enervated the body. A foreign officer held the bank at the game of faro by which he made a very considerable fortune, and but too many respectable families in Britain had to lament its baleful effects. Officers who might have rendered honorable service to their country were compelled, by what was termed a bad run of luck, to dispose of their commissions and return penniless to their friends in Europe. The father who thought he had made a provision for his son by purchasing him a commission in the army ultimately found that he had put his son to school to learn the science of gambling, not the art of war. Dissipation had spread through the army, and indolence and want of subordination, its natural concomitants.

For if the officer be not vigilant the soldier will never be alert.

"Sir William Howe, from the manners and religious opinions of the Philadelphians, should have been particularly cautious. For this public dissoluteness of the troops could not but be regarded by such people as a contempt of them, as well as an offense against piety; and it influenced all the representations which they made to their countrymen respecting the British. They inferred from it, also, that the commander could not be sufficiently intent on the plans of either conciliation or subjugation; so that the opinions of the Philadelphians, whether erroneous or not, materially promoted the cause of Congress. During the whole of this long winter of riot and dissipation, General Was.h.i.+ngton was suffered to continue with the remains of his army, not exceeding 5,000 effective men at most, undisturbed at Valley Forge, considerable arrears of pay due to them; almost in a state of nature for want of clothing; the Europeans in the American service disgusted and deserting in great numbers, and indeed in companies, to the British army, and the natives tired of the war. Yet, under all these favorable circ.u.mstances for the British interest, no one step was taken to dislodge Was.h.i.+ngton, whose cannon were frozen up and could not be moved. If Sir William Howe had marched out in the night he might have brought Was.h.i.+ngton to action, or if he had retreated, he must have left his sick, cannon, ammunition, and heavy baggage behind. A nocturnal attack on the Americans would have had this further good effect: it would have depressed the spirit of revolt, confirmed the wavering, and attached them to the British interest. It would have opened a pa.s.sage for supplies to the city, which was in great want of provisions for the inhabitants. It would have shaken off that lethargy in which the British soldiers had been immerged during the winter. It would have convinced the well-affected that the British leader was in earnest. If Was.h.i.+ngton had retreated the British could have followed. With one of the best-appointed in every respect and finest armies (consisting of at least 14,000 effective men) ever a.s.sembled in any country, a number of officers of approved service, wis.h.i.+ng only to be led to action, this dilatory commander, Sir William Howe, dragged out the winter without doing any one thing to obtain the end for which he was commissioned. Proclamation was issued after proclamation calling upon the people of America to repair to the British standard, promising them remission of their political sins and an a.s.surance of protection in both person and property, but these promises were confined merely to paper. The best personal security to the inhabitants was an attack by the army, and the best security of property was peace, and this to be purchased by successful war. For had Sir William Howe led on his troops to action victory was in his power and conquest in his train. During Sir William Howe's stay at Philadelphia a number of disaffected citizens were suffered to remain in the garrison; these people were ever upon the watch and communicated to Was.h.i.+ngton every intelligence he could wish for."

We have copied this pa.s.sage from Stedman, with a view to show the contrast between the situation of Was.h.i.+ngton and Howe and their respective armies, as exhibited by an enemy to our cause. It is literally the contrast between virtue and vice. The final result shows that Providence in permitting the occupation of Philadelphia by the British army was really promoting the cause of human liberty.

Stedman's statement of the numbers of Was.h.i.+ngton's army is erroneous, even if it refers only to effective men, and his schemes for annihilating Was.h.i.+ngton's army would probably not have been so easily executed as he imagined. Still the army was very weak. Marshall says that although the total of the army exceeded 17,000 men (February, 1778), the present effective rank and file amounted to only 5,012. This statement alone suggests volumes of misery, sickness, dest.i.tution, and suffering.

We must now call the reader's attention to the northern campaign of 1777 which, remote as it was from Was.h.i.+ngton's immediate scene of action, was not conducted without his aid and direction.

1. Footnote: This was Lieut.-Col. Samuel Smith, of the Maryland line.

After serving in this perilous post at Fort Mifflin, he was made general, and in that rank a.s.sisted in the defense of Baltimore in the War of 1812. See Doc.u.ment [A] at the end of this chapter.

2. Footnote: Donop was a brave officer. He was found on the battlefield by Captain Mauduit Duplessis, a talented French engineer, who had a.s.sisted Greene in defense of the fort, and who attended the unfortunate count on his death-bed till he expired, three days after the battle, at the early age of thirty-seven. "I die," said he, in his last hour, "a victim of my ambition, and of the avarice of my sovereign." A fine commentary on the mercenary system of the German princes. The government of Hesse Ca.s.sel quite recently caused the remains of Count Donop to be removed from Red Bank, to be interred with distinguished honor in his own country.

3. Footnote: Judge Marshall, the biographer of Was.h.i.+ngton, on whose account of this affair ours is founded, was present on the occasion. He served in the army from the beginning of the war; was appointed first lieutenant in 1776, and captain in 1777. He resigned his commission in 1778, and, devoting himself to the practice of the law, subsequently rose to the eminent office of Chief Justice of the United States. He died at Philadelphia, July 6th, 1836, aged seventy-nine.

CHAPTER XII.

BURGOYNE'S INVASION OF NEW YORK PUNISHED BY SCHUYLER AND GATES. 1777.

We have already had occasion to refer to what was pa.s.sing in the North during the time when Was.h.i.+ngton was conducting the arduous campaign in Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. General Schuyler had held the chief command of the army operating against Canada since the opening of the war in 1775. Under his direction the force of Montgomery was sent to Quebec in the disastrous expedition of which we have already related the history, and Arnold was acting in a subordinate capacity to Schuyler when he so bravely resisted the descent of Carleton on the lakes.

Schuyler also performed the best part of the service of resisting the invasion of New York from Canada, and nearly completed the campaign which terminated in the surrender of Burgoyne to Gates. To the events of this campaign we now call the reader's attention.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1777 the American army on the frontier of Canada having been composed chiefly of soldiers enlisted for a short period only, had been greatly reduced in numbers by the expiration of their term of service.

The cantonments of the British northern army, extending from Isle aux Noix and Montreal to Quebec, were so distant from each other that they could not readily have afforded mutual support in case of an attack, but the Americans were in no condition to avail themselves of this circ.u.mstance. They could scarcely keep up even the appearance of garrisons in their forts and were apprehensive of an attack on Ticonderoga as soon as the ice was strong enough to afford an easy pa.s.sage to troops over the lakes. At the close of the preceding campaign General Gates had joined the army under Was.h.i.+ngton, and the command of the army in the northern department, comprehending Albany, Ticonderoga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, remained in the hands of General Schuyler. The services of that meritorious officer were more solid than brilliant, and had not been duly valued by Congress, which, like other popular a.s.semblies, was slow in discerning real and unostentatious merit. Disgusted at the injustice which he had experienced he was restrained from leaving the army merely by the deep interest which he took in the arduous struggle in which his country was engaged, but after a full investigation of his conduct during the whole of his command, Congress was at length convinced of the value of his services and requested him to continue at the head of the army of the northern department. That army he found too weak for the services which it was expected to perform and ill-supplied with arms, clothes, and provisions.

He made every exertion to organize and place it on a respectable footing for the ensuing campaign, but his means were scanty and the new levies arrived slowly. General St. Clair, who had served under Gates, commanded at Ticonderoga, and, including militia, had nearly 2,000 men under him, but the works were extensive and would have required 10,000 men to man them fully. [1]

The British ministry had resolved to prosecute the war vigorously on the northern frontier of the United States, and appointed Burgoyne, who had served under Carleton in the preceding campaign, to command the royal army in that quarter. The appointment gave offense to Carleton, then Governor of Canada, who naturally expected to be continued in the command of the northern army, and that officer testified his dissatisfaction by tendering the resignation of his government.

But although displeased with the nomination, he gave Burgoyne every a.s.sistance in his power in preparing for the campaign.

Burgoyne had visited England during the winter, concerted with the ministry a plan of the campaign and given an estimate of the force necessary for its successful execution. Besides a fine train of artillery and a suitable body of artillerymen, an army, consisting of more than 7,000 veteran troops, excellently equipped and in a high state of discipline, was put under his command. Besides this regular force he had a great number of Canadians and savages.

The employment of the savages had been determined on at the very commencement of hostilities, their alliance had been courted and their services accepted, and on the present occasion the British ministry placed no small dependence on their aid. Carleton was directed to use all his influence to bring a large body of them into the field, and his exertions were very successful. General Burgoyne was a.s.sisted by a number of distinguished officers, among whom were Generals Philips, Fraser, Powel, Hamilton, Riedesel, and Specht. A suitable naval armament, under the orders of Commodore Lutwych, attended the expedition.

After detaching Colonel St. Leger with a body of light troops and Indians, amounting to about 800 men, by the way of Lake Oswego and the Mohawk river, to make a diversion in that quarter and to join him when he advanced to the Hudson, Burgoyne left St. John's on the 16th of June, and, preceded by his naval armament, sailed up Lake Champlain and in a few days landed and encamped at Crown Point earlier in the season than the Americans had thought it possible for him to reach that place.

He met his Indian allies and, in imitation of a savage partisan, gave them a war feast, at which he made them a speech in order to inflame their courage and repress their barbarous cruelty. He next issued a lofty proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of the country in which, as if certain of victory, he threatened to punish with the utmost severity those who refused to attach themselves to the royal cause. He talked of the ferocity of the Indians and their eagerness to butcher the friends of independence, and he graciously promised protection to those who should return to their duty. The proclamation was so far from answering the general's intention that it was derided by the people as a model of pomposity.

Having made the necessary arrangements on the 30th of June, Burgoyne advanced cautiously on both sides of the narrow channel which connects Lakes Champlain and George, the British on the west and the German mercenaries on the east, with the naval force in the center, forming a communication between the two divisions of the army, and on the 1st of July his van appeared in sight of Ticonderoga.

The river Sorel issues from the north end of Lake Champlain and throws its superfluous waters into the St. Lawrence. Lake Champlain is about eighty miles long from north to south, and about fourteen miles broad where it is widest. Crown Point stands at what may properly be considered the south end of the lake, although a narrow channel, which retains the name of the lake, proceeds southward and forms a communication with South river and the waters of Lake George.

Ticonderoga is on the west side of the narrow channel, twelve miles south from Crown Point. It is a rocky angle of land, washed on three sides by the water and partly covered on the fourth side by a deep mora.s.s. On the s.p.a.ce on the northwest quarter, between the mora.s.s and the channel, the French had formerly constructed lines of fortification, which still remained, and those lines the Americans had strengthened by additional works.

Opposite Ticonderoga on the east side of the channel, which is here between three and four hundred yards wide, stands a high circular hill called Mount Independence, which had been occupied by the Americans when they abandoned Crown Point, and carefully fortified. On the top of it, which is flat, they had erected a fort and provided it sufficiently with artillery. Near the foot of the mountain, which extends to the water's edge, they had raised entrenchments and mounted them with heavy guns, and had covered those lower works by a battery about half way up the hill.

With prodigious labor they had constructed a communication between those two posts by means of a wooden bridge which was supported by twenty-two strong wooden pillars placed at nearly equal distances from each other.

The s.p.a.ces between the pillars were filled up by separate floats, strongly fastened to each other and to the pillars by chains and rivets.

The bridge was twelve feet wide and the side of it next Lake Champlain was defended by a boom formed of large pieces of timber, bolted and bound together by double iron chains an inch and a half thick. Thus an easy communication was established between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and the pa.s.sage of vessels up the strait prevented.

Immediately after pa.s.sing Ticonderoga the channel becomes wider and, on the southeast side, receives a large body of water from a stream at that point called South river, but higher up named Wood creek. From the southwest come the waters flowing from Lake George, and in the angle formed by the confluence of those two streams rises a steep and rugged eminence called Sugar Hill, which overlooks and commands both Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. That hill had been examined by the Americans, but General St. Clair, considering the force under his command insufficient to occupy the extensive works of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and flattering himself that the extreme difficulty of the ascent would prevent the British from availing themselves of it, neglected to take possession of Sugar Hill. It may be remarked that the north end of Lake George is between two and three miles above Ticonderoga, but the channel leading to it is interrupted by rapids and shallows and is unfit for navigation. Lake George is narrow, but is thirty-five miles long, extending from northeast to southwest. At the head of it stood a fort of the same name, strong enough to resist an attack of Indians, but incapable of making any effectual opposition to regular troops. Nine miles beyond it was Fort Edward on the Hudson.

On the appearance of Burgoyne's van St. Clair had no accurate knowledge of the strength of the British army, having heard nothing of the reinforcement from Europe. He imagined that they would attempt to take the fort by a.s.sault and flattered himself that he would easily be able to repulse them. But, on the 2d of July, the British appeared in great force on both sides of the channel and encamped four miles from the forts, while the fleet anch.o.r.ed just beyond the reach of the guns. After a slight resistance Burgoyne took possession of Mount Hope, an important post on the south of Ticonderoga, which commanded part of the lines of that fort as well as the channel leading to Lake George, and extended his lines so as completely to invest the fort on the west side. The German division under General Riedesel occupied the eastern bank of the channel and sent forward a detachment to the vicinity of the rivulet which flows from Mount Independence. Burgoyne now labored a.s.siduously in bringing forward his artillery and completing his communications. On the 5th of the month (July, 1777) he caused Sugar Hill to be examined, and being informed that the ascent, though difficult, was not impracticable, he immediately resolved to take possession of it and proceeded with such activity in raising works and mounting guns upon it that his battery might have been opened on the garrison next day.

These operations received no check from the besieged, because, as it has been alleged, they were not in a condition to give any. St. Clair was now nearly surrounded. Only the s.p.a.ce between the stream which flows from Mount Independence and South river remained open, and that was to be occupied next day.

In these circ.u.mstances it was requisite for the garrison to come to a prompt and decisive resolution, either at every hazard to defend the place to the last extremity or immediately to abandon it. St. Clair called a council of war, the members of which unanimously advised the immediate evacuation of the forts, and preparations were instantly made for carrying this resolution into execution. The British had the command of the communication with Lake George, and consequently the garrison could not escape in that direction. The retreat could be effected by the South river only. Accordingly the invalids, the hospital, and such stores as could be most easily removed, were put on board 200 boats and, escorted by Colonel Long's regiment, proceeded, on the night between the 5th and 6th of July, up the South river towards Skeenesborough. The garrisons of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence marched by land through Castleton, towards the same place. The troops were ordered to march out in profound silence and particularly to set nothing on fire. But these prudent orders were disobeyed, and, before the rear guard was in motion, the house on Mount Independence, which General Fermoy had occupied, was seen in flames. That served as a signal to the enemy, who immediately entered the works and fired, but without effect, on the rear of the retreating army.