Logic: Deductive and Inductive Part 14

? All S is P. <------------------- no="" s="" is="" p="">

There is, then, only one fundamental syllogism.

-- 7. A new version of the mnemonic lines was suggested in _Mind_ No. 27, with the object of (1) freeing them from all meaningless letters, (2) showing by the name of each Mood the Figure to which it belongs, (3) giving names to indicate the ostensive reduction of Baroco and Bocardo.

To obtain the first two objects, _l_ is used as the mark of Fig. I., _n_ of Fig II., _r_ of Fig. III., _t_ of Fig. IV. The verses (to be scanned discreetly) are as follows:

Balala, Celalel, Dalii, Felioque prioris:

{Faksnoko} Cesane, Camenes, Fesinon, { } secundae: { Banoco,}

Tertia, Darapri, Drisamis, Darisi, Ferapro,

Doksamrosk} }, Ferisor habet: Quarta insuper addit.

Bocaro }

Bamatip, Cametes, Dimatis, Fesapto, Fesistot.

De Morgan praised the old verses as "more full of meaning than any others that ever were made"; and in defence of the above alteration it may be said that they now deserve that praise still more.

-- 8. Indirect reduction is the process of proving a Mood to be valid by showing that the supposition of its invalidity involves a contradiction.

Take Baroco, and (since the doubt as to its validity is concerned not with the truth of the premises, but with their relation to the conclusion) a.s.sume the premises to be true. Then, if the conclusion be false, its contradictory is true. The conclusion being in O., its contradictory will be in A. Subst.i.tuting this A. for the minor premise of Baroco, we have the premises of a syllogism in Barbara, which will be found to give a conclusion in A., contradictory of the original minor premise; thus:

Baroco. Barbara.

All P is M; -----------------> All P is M;

Some S is not M: <----- ----=""> All S is P: / contradictory / / contradictory / ? Some S is not P ------/ ------ ? All S is M.

But the original minor premise, _Some S is not M_, is true by hypothesis; and therefore the conclusion of Barbara, _All S is M_, is false. This falsity cannot, however, be due to the form of Barbara, which we know to be valid; nor to the major premise, which, being taken from Baroco, is true by hypothesis: it must, therefore, lie in the minor premise of Barbara, _All S is P_; and since this is contradictory of the conclusion of Baroco _Some S is not P_, that conclusion was true.

Similarly, with Bocardo, the Indirect Reduction proceeds by subst.i.tuting for the major premise the contradictory of the conclusion; thus again obtaining the premises of a syllogism in Barbara, whose conclusion is contradictory of the original major premise. Hence the initial B in Baroco and Bocardo: it points to a syllogism in Barbara as the means of Indirect Reduction (_Reductio ad impossibile_).

Any other Mood may be reduced indirectly: as, for example, Dimaris. If this is supposed to be invalid and the conclusion false, subst.i.tute the contradictory of the conclusion for the major premise, thus obtaining the premises of Celarent:

Dimaris. Celarent.

contradictory Some P is M; <--------- --------=""> No S is P; / / All M is S: -----------/---------> All M is S: / contradictory/ ? Some S is P. ----------- -------- ? No M is P} } simply converted ? No P is M}

The conclusion of Celarent, simply converted, contradicts the original major premise of Dimaris, and is therefore false. Therefore the major premise of Celarent is false, and the conclusion of Dimaris is true. We might, of course, construct mnemonic names for the Indirect Reduction of all the Moods: the name of Dimaris would then be Cicari.

-- 9. The need or use of any Figure but the First has been much discussed by Logicians. Since, in actual debate, arguments are rarely stated in syllogistic form, and, therefore, if reduced to that form for closer scrutiny, generally have to be treated with some freedom; why not always throw them at once into the First Figure? That Figure has manifest advantages: it agrees directly with the _Dictum_; it gives conclusions in all four propositional forms, and therefore serves every purpose of full affirmation or denial, of showing agreement or difference (total or partial), of establis.h.i.+ng the contradictories of universal statements; and it is the only Figure in which the subject and predicate of the conclusion occupy the same positions in the premises, so that the course of argument has in its mere expression an easy and natural flow.

Still, the Second Figure also has a very natural air in some kinds of negative arguments. The parallelism of the two premises, with the middle term as predicate in both, brings out very forcibly the necessary difference between the major and minor terms that is involved in their opposite relations to the middle term. _P is not, whilst S is, M_, says Cesare: that drives home the conviction that _S is not P_. Similarly in Camestres: _Deer do, oxen do not, shed their horns_. What is the conclusion?

The Third Figure, again, furnishes in Darapti and Felapton, the most natural forms of stating arguments in which the middle term is singular:

Socrates was truthful; Socrates was a Greek: ? Some Greek was truthful.

Reducing this to Fig I., we should get for the minor premise, _Some Greek was Socrates_: which is certainly inelegant. Still, it might be urged that, in relation to proof, elegance is an extraneous consideration. And as for the other advantage claimed for Fig.

III.--that, as it yields only particular conclusions, it is useful in establis.h.i.+ng contradictories against universals--for that purpose none of its Moods can be better than Darii or Ferio.

As for Fig. IV., no particular advantage has been claimed for it. It is of comparatively late recognition (sometimes called the 'Galenian,'

after Galen, its supposed discoverer); and its scientific claim to exist at all is disputed. It is said to be a mere inversion of Fig. I.; which is not true in any sense in which Figs. II. and III. may not be condemned as partial inversions of Fig. I., and as having therefore still less claim to recognition. It is also said to invert the order of thought; as if thought had only one order, or as if the order of thought had anything to do with Formal Logic. Surely, if distinction of Figure be recognised at all, the Fourth Figure is scientifically necessary, because it is inevitably generated by an a.n.a.lysis of the possible positions of the middle term.

-- 10. Is Reduction necessary, however; or have not all the Figures equal and independent validity? In one sense not only every Figure but each Mood has independent validity: for any one capable of abstract thinking sees its validity by direct inspection; and this is true not only of the abstract Moods, but very frequently of particular concrete arguments.

But science aims at unifying knowledge; and after reducing all possible arguments that form categorical syllogisms to the nineteen Moods, it is another step in the same direction to reduce these Moods to one form.

This is the very nature of science: and, accordingly, the efforts of some Logicians to expound separate principles of each Figure seem to be supererogatory. Grant that they succeed; and what can the next step be, but either to reduce these principles to the _Dictum_, or the _Dictum_ and the rest to one of these principles? Unless this can be done there is no science of Formal Logic. If it is done, what is gained by reducing the principles of the other Figures to the _Dictum_, instead of the Moods of the other Figures to those of the first Figure? It may, perhaps, be said that to show (1) that the Moods of the second, third, and fourth Figures flow from their own principles (though, in fact, these principles are laboriously adapted to the Moods); and (2) that these principles may be derived from the _Dictum_, is the more uncompromisingly gradual and regular method: but is not Formal Logic already sufficiently enc.u.mbered with formalities?

-- 11. Euler's diagrams are used to ill.u.s.trate the syllogism, though not very satisfactorily, thus:

Barbara--

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 5.]

Celarent--

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 6.]

Darii--

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 7.]

Remembering that 'Some' means 'It may be all,' it is plain that any one of these diagrams in Fig. 7, or the one given above for Barbara, may represent the denotative relations of P, M and S in Darii; though no doubt the diagram we generally think of as representing Darii is No. 1 in Fig. 7.

Remembering that A may be U, and that, therefore, wherever A occurs there may be only one circle for S and P, these syllogisms may be represented by only two circles, and Barbara by only one.

Ferio--

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 8.]

Here, again, probably, we generally think of No. 1 as the diagram representing Ferio; but 2, or 3, or that given above for Celarent, is compatible with the premises.

If instead of dealing with M, P, and S, a concrete example be taken of Darii or Ferio, a knowledge of the facts of the case will show what diagram is suitable to it. But, then, surely it must be possible to do without the diagram. These diagrams, of course, can be used to ill.u.s.trate Moods of the other Figures.

CHAPTER XI

ABBREVIATED AND COMPOUND ARGUMENTS

-- 1. In ordinary discussion, whether oral or written, it is but rarely that the forms of Logic are closely adhered to. We often leave wide gaps in the structure of our arguments, trusting the intelligence of those addressed to bridge them over; or we invert the regular order of propositions, beginning with the conclusion, and mentioning the premises, perhaps, a good while after, confident that the sagacity of our audience will make all smooth. Sometimes a full style, like Macaulay's, may, by means of amplification and ill.u.s.tration, spread the elements of a single syllogism over several pages--a pennyworth of logic steeped in so much eloquence. These practices give a great advantage to sophists; who would find it very inconvenient to state explicitly in Mood and Figure the pretentious antilogies which they foist upon the public; and, indeed, such licences of composition often prevent honest men from detecting errors into which they themselves have unwittingly fallen, and which, with the best intentions, they strive to communicate to others: but we put up with these drawbacks to avoid the inelegance and the tedium of a long discourse in accurate syllogisms.

Many departures from the strictly logical statement of reasonings consist in the use of vague or figurative language, or in the subst.i.tution for one another of expressions supposed to be equivalent, though, in fact, dangerously discrepant. Against such occasions of error the logician can provide no safeguard, except the advice to be careful and discriminating in what you say or hear. But as to any derangement of the elements of an argument, or the omission of them, Logic effectually aids the task of restoration; for it has shown what the elements are that enter into the explicit statement of most ratiocinations, namely, the four forms of propositions and what that connected order of propositions is which most easily and surely exposes the validity or invalidity of reasoning, namely, the premises and conclusion of the Syllogism. Logic has even gone so far as to name certain abbreviated forms of proof, which may be regarded as general types of those that actually occur in debate, in leading articles, pamphlets and other persuasive or polemic writings--namely, the Enthymeme, Epicheirema and Sorites.

-- 2. The Enthymeme, according to Aristotle, is the Syllogism of probable reasoning about practical affairs and matters of opinion, in contrast with the Syllogism of theoretical demonstration upon necessary grounds.

But, as now commonly treated, it is an argument with one of its elements omitted; a Categorical Syllogism, having one or other of its premises, or else its conclusion, suppressed. If the major premise be suppressed, it is called an Enthymeme of the First Order; if the minor premise be wanting, it is said to be of the Second Order; if the conclusion be left to be understood, there is an Enthymeme of the Third Order.