The Inquisition Part 13

We will now ask how the theologians and canonists interpreted this legislation, and how the tribunals of the Inquisition enforced it.

CHAPTER VIII THEOLOGIANS, CANONISTS, AND CASUISTS OF THE INQUISITION

THE gravity of the crime of heresy was early recognized in the Church. Gratian discussed this question in a special chapter of his _Decretum._[1] Innocent III, Guala, the Dominican, and the Emperor Frederic II, as we have seen, looked upon heresy as treason against Almighty G.o.d, i.e., the most dreadful of crimes.

[1] _Causa_ xxii, q. vii, cap. 16.

The theologians, and even the civil authorities, did not concern themselves much with the evil effects of heresy upon the social order, but viewed it rather as an offense against G.o.d. Thus they made no distinction between those teachings which entailed injury on the family and on society, and those which merely denied certain revealed truths. Innocent III, in his const.i.tution of September 23, 1207, legislated particularly against the Patarins, but he took care to point out that no heretic, no matter what the nature of his error might be, should be allowed to escape the full penalty of the law.[1]

Frederic II spoke in similar terms in his Const.i.tutions of 1220, 1224, and 1232. This was the current teaching throughout the Middle Ages.

[1] Ep. x, 130.

But it is important to know what men then understood by the word heresy. We can ascertain this from the theologians and canonists, especially from St. Raymond of Pennafort and St. Thomas Aquinas. St.

Raymond gives four meanings to the word heretic, but from the standpoint of the canon law he says: "A heretic is one who denies the faith."[1] St. Thomas Aquinas is more accurate. He declares that no one is truly a heretic unless he obstinately maintains his error, even after it has been pointed out to him by ecclesiastical authority. This is the teaching of St. Augustine.[2]

[1] S. Raymundi, _Summa_, lib. i, cap. _De Haereticis_, sect. i, Roman Edition, 1603, p. 39.

[2] _Summa_, IIa, IIae, quaest. xi, Conclusio; cf. ibid., ad 3um, quotations from St. Augustine.

But by degrees the word, taken at first in a strict sense, acquired a broader meaning. St. Raymond includes schism in the notion of heresy.

"The only difference between these two crimes," he writes, "is the difference between genus and species;" every schism ends in heresy.

And relying on the authority of St. Jerome, the rigorous canonist goes so far as to declare that schism is even a greater crime than heresy. He proves this by the fact that Core, Dathan, and Abiron,[1]

who seceded from the chosen people, were punished by the most terrible of punishments. "From the enormity of the punishment, must we not argue the enormity of the crime?" St. Raymond therefore declares that the same punishment must be inflicted upon the heretic and the schismatic.[2]

[1] Num. xvi. 31-33.

[2] Loc. cit., lib. i, cap. _De Schismaticis_, pp. 45-47

"The authors of the treatises on the Inquisition," writes Tanon, "cla.s.sed as heretics all those who favored heresy, and all excommunicates who did not submit to the Church within a certain period. They declared that a man excommunicated for any cause whatever, who did not seek absolution within a year, incurred by this act of rebellion a light suspicion of heresy; that he could then be cited before the Inquisitor to answer not only for the crime which had caused his excommunication, but also for his orthodoxy. If he did not answer this second summons, he was at once considered excommunicated for heresy, and if he remained under this second excommunication for a year, he was liable to be condemned as a real heretic. The light suspicion caused by his first excommunication became in turn a vehement and then a violent suspicion which, together with his continued contumacy, const.i.tuted a full proof of heresy."[1]

[1] Tanon, op. cit., pp. 235, 236.

The theologians insisted greatly upon respect for ecclesiastical and especially Papal authority. Everything that tended to lessen this authority seemed to them a practical denial of the faith. The canonist Henry of Susa (Hostiensis + 1271), went so far as to say that "whoever contradicted or refused to accept the decretals of the Popes was a heretic."[1] Such disobedience was looked upon as a culpable disregard of the rights of the papacy, and consequently a form of heresy.

[1] In Baluze-Mansi, _Miscellanea_, vol. ii. p. 275.

Superst.i.tion was also cla.s.sed under the heading of heresy. The canonist Zanchino Ugolini tells us that he was present at the condemnation of an immoral priest, who was punished by the Inquisitors not for his licentiousness, but because he said Ma.s.s every day in a state of sin, and urged in excuse that he considered himself pardoned by the mere fact of putting on the sacred vestments.[1]

[1] _Tractat. de Haeret_., cap. ii.

The Jews, as such, were never regarded as heretics. But the usury they so widely practiced evidenced an unorthodox doctrine on thievery, which made them liable to be suspected of heresy. Indeed, we find several Popes upbraiding them "for maintaining that usury is not a sin." Some Christians also fell into the same error, and thereby became subject to the Inquisition. Pope Martin V, in his bull of November 6, 1419., authorizes the Inquisitors to prosecute these usurers.[1]

[1] Bull _Inter caetera_, sent to the Inquisitor Pons Feugeyron.

Sorcery and magic were also put on a par with heresy. Pope Alexander IV had decided that divination and sorcery did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, unless there was manifest heresy involved.[1] But casuists were not wanting to prove that heresy was involved in such cases. The belief in the witches' nightly rides through the air, led by Diana or Herodias of Palestine, was very widespread in the Middle Ages, and was held by some as late as the fifteenth century. The question whether the devil could carry off men and women was warmly debated by the theologians of the time. "A case adduced by Albertus Magnus, in a disputation on the subject before the Bishop of Paris, and recorded by Thomas of Cantimpre, in which the daughter of the Count of Schwalenberg was regularly carried away every night for several hours, gave immense satisfaction to the adherents of the new doctrine, and eventually an ample store of more modern instances was acc.u.mulated to confirm Satan in his enlarged privileges."[2] Satan, it seems, imprinted upon his clients an indelible mark, the _stigma diabolic.u.m_.

[1] Bull of December 9, 1257.

[2] Lea, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 497.

"In 1458, the Inquisitor Nicholas Jaquerius remarked reasonably enough that even if the affair was an illusion, it was none the less heretical, as the followers of Diana and Herodias were necessarily heretics in their waking hours."[1]

[1] Lea, op. cit., pp. 497, 498.

About 1250, the Inquisitor Bernard of Como taught categorically that the phenomena of witchcraft, especially the attendance at the witches' Sabbath, were not fanciful but real: "This is proved," he says, "from the fact that the Popes permitted witches to be burned at the stake; they would not have countenanced this, if these persons were not real heretics, and their crimes only imaginary, for the Church only punishes proved crimes."[1] Witchcraft was, therefore, amenable to the tribunals of the lnquisition.[2]

[1] _Lucerna Inquisitorium_, Romae, 1584, p. 144.

[2] In a letter to one of the cardinals of the Holy Office, dated 1643, witchcraft is cla.s.sed with heresy. Douais, _Doc.u.ments_, vol. i, p. ccliv. In practice, the heretical tendency of witchcraft was hard to determine. Each judge, therefore, as a rule, p.r.o.nounced sentence according to his own judgment.

While the casuists thus increased the number of crimes which the Inquisition could prosecute, on the other hand, they shortened the judicial procedure then in vogue.

Following the Roman law, the Inquisition at first recognized three forms of action in criminal cases--_accusatio, denuntiatio_, and _inquisitio_. In the _accusatio_, the accuser formally inscribed himself as able to prove his accusation; if he failed to do so, he had to undergo the penalty which the prisoner would have incurred (_poena talionis_).[1] "From the very beginning, he was placed in the same position as the one he accused, even to the extent of sharing his imprisonment."[2] The _denuntiatio_ did not in any way bind the accuser; he merely handed in his testimony, and then ceased prosecuting the case; the judge at once proceeded to take action against the accused. In the _inquisitio_, there was no one either to accuse or denounce the criminal; the judge cited the suspected criminal before him and proceeded to try him. This was the most common method of procedure; from it the Inquisition received its name.[3]

[1] Tanon, op. cit., p. 260, n. 4.

[2] Tancrede, _Ordo judiciorum_, lib. ii.

[3] On these three forms of action, cf. Eymeric, _Directorium_, 3a pars, p. 413 et seq.

The Inquisitorial procedure was therefore inspired by the Roman law.

But in practice the _accusatio_, which gave the prisoner a chance to meet the charges against him, was soon abandoned. In fact the Inquisitors were always most anxious to set it aside. Urban IV enacted a decree, July 28, 1262, whereby they were allowed to proceed _simpliciter et de plano, absque advocatorum strepitu et figura_.[1]

Bernard Gui insisted on this in his _Practica_.[2] Eymeric advised his a.s.sociates, when an accuser appeared before them who was perfectly willing to accept the _poena talionis_ in case of failure, to urge the imprudent man to withdraw his demand. For he argued that the _accusatio_ might prove harmful to himself, and besides give too much room for trickery.[3] In other words, the Inquisitors wished to be perfectly untrammeled in their action.

[1] Bull _Prae cunctis_ of July 28, 1262.

[2] _Practica_, 4a pars. ed. Douais, p. 192.

[3] _Directorium_, p. 414. col. 1.

The secrecy of the Inquisition's procedure was one of the chief causes of complaint.

But the Inquisition, dreadful as it was, did not lack defenders. Some of their arguments were most extravagant and far-fetched. "Paramo, in the quaint pedantry with which he ingeniously proves that G.o.d was the first Inquisitor, and the condemnation of Adam and Eve the first model of the Inquisitorial process, triumphantly points out that he judges them in secret, thus setting the example which the Inquisition is bound to follow, and avoiding the subtleties which the criminals would have raised in their defence, especially at the suggestion of the crafty serpent. That he called no witnesses is explained by the confession of the accused, and ample legal authority is cited to show that these confessions were sufficient to justify the conviction and punishment."[1]

[1] Lea, op. cit., vol. i, p. 406.

The subtlety of the casuists had full play when they came to discuss the torture of the prisoner who absolutely refused to confess.

According to law, the torture could be inflicted but once, but this regulation was easily evaded. For it was lawful to subject the prisoner to all the various kinds of torture in succession; and if additional evidence were discovered, the torture could be repeated.

When they desired, therefore, to repeat the torture, even after an interval of some days, they evaded the law by calling it technically not a "repet.i.tion" but a "continuance of the first torture:" _Ad continuandum tormenta, non ad iterandum_, as Eymeric styles it.[1]

This quibbling of course gave full scope to the cruelty and the indiscreet zeal of the Inquisitors.

[1] Eymeric, _Directorium_, 3a pars, p. 481, col. 2.

But a new difficulty soon arose. Confessions extorted under torture, had, as we have seen, no legal value. Eymeric himself admitted that the results obtained in this way were very unreliable, and that the Inquisitors should realise this fact.