Memoirs of the Private Life, Return, and Reign of Napoleon in 1815 Volume II Part 24

In the evening they had a fresh conference with this general, which gave occasion to the following despatch:

"Louvres, July the 1st, half after 8 in the evening.

"Lord Wellington has communicated to us a letter from Manheim, written in the names of the Emperors of Russia and Austria by MM. de Nesselrode and de Metternich. This letter strongly urged the continuance of operations; and declares, that, if any armistice be entered into by the generals, who are at this moment near Paris, their majesties will not consider it as putting any stop to their march, but will order their troops, to approach Paris.

"The Count d'Artois has just arrived at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington, who received us alone in his saloon. We did not perceive the prince; he was in a separate apartment.

"We insisted on the execution of the promise given us. The Duke of Wellington answered, that he had always declared to us, he could enter into no definitive engagements, till he had conferred with Marshal Prince Blucher; to whom he would go, to prevail on him to join with him in agreeing on an armistice.

"He added, he would not conceal from us, that the Field Marshal had an extreme aversion to every thing, that would stay his operations, which extended already to the left bank of the Seine; and that he could not avoid supporting his movements, if he could not bring him to agree in his opinion.

"He communicated to us a proposal for an armistice, made by the Prince of Eckmuhl, which he had just received.

"He a.s.sured us, that, as soon as he had seen Prince Blucher, he would return, and join us at Louvres; and sent to request us, to repair to Gonesse.

"In talking on the possible conditions of an armistice, he insinuated, that he should require the army to quit Paris; which we declined, objecting, that on the contrary it was proper for the army of the allies, to take remote positions; otherwise it would be impossible, to deliberate freely on the important interests of our country, the influence of which on those of Europe he appeared to acknowledge.

"The conference thus terminating, we have some reason to think, that Lord Wellington will give the Count d'Artois to understand, that he ought to remain at a much more considerable distance from Paris."

To this Baron Bignon immediately sent the following answer:

"_To Messieurs the Commissioners charged with the Armistice._

July the 1st.

"You announced to us, gentlemen, that you were authorized to believe, that, if Napoleon Bonaparte were away, a suspension of hostilities might be signed, during which a treaty for peace might be entered into. _The desired condition being fulfilled_, there is at the present moment no motive, that can oppose a suspension of hostilities, and an armistice. It is strongly to be desired, that the suspension of hostilities, instead of being for three days only, should be at least for five.

"We do not think, that the English and Prussians alone will attempt to force our lines. It would be gratuitously incurring useless losses.

According to their own account, they can be joined by the Bavarians only in the first fortnight of this month: so that it may be convenient to them to wait for this reinforcement, which is an additional reason for their not refusing an armistice, that will be attended with as much or more advantage to themselves than to us. In fine, if the allies do not choose, to forget altogether their solemn declarations, what do they now require? The only obstacle, that, according to them, opposed the conclusion of peace, is irrevocably removed: thus nothing any longer opposes its re-establishment; and, to arrive at peace, nothing is more urgent than an armistice.

"The committee of government has had laid before it all the particulars, that you have transmitted, of the language held to you by the Duke of Wellington. It desires, gentlemen, that you will persist in distinguis.h.i.+ng the political question of the form of government of France from the actual question, the conclusion of an armistice.

Without repelling any of the overtures made you, it is easy, to give the Duke of Wellington to understand, that, if, in the present state of affairs, the political question of the government of France _must inevitably become the subject of a sort of discussion between France and the allied powers_, the general interest of France, and of the powers themselves, is to do nothing precipitately; and not to decide on a definitive part, till after having maturely weighed what will offer real guarantees for the future. It is possible, that the allied powers themselves, when better informed of the sentiments of the French nation, will not persevere in the resolutions they may have formed from different data. Napoleon is no longer at Paris, and has not been for nearly a week. His political career is at an end. If any national disposition in favour of the Bourbons existed, this disposition would have been loudly manifested, and their recall would have been already consummated. It is evident, therefore, that the re-establishment of this family is not the will of the nation. It remains for the allied sovereigns to examine, whether, in wis.h.i.+ng to impose it on the nation in despite of its will, they do not themselves act contrary to their own intentions; since, instead of securing the internal peace of France, they would only be sowing in it the seeds of fresh discord.

"The proclamations of Louis XVIII. are known here: and the nature of these proclamations already destroys all the hopes, that the language of the Duke of Wellington might give. It may be judged from the spirit that breathes in these pieces recently published, that the present royal ministry either could not, or would not prevent, what the French nation might expect from that government.

"For the rest, gentlemen, you should confine yourselves to hearing every thing: you ought to affirm, that France itself desires nothing, but what will be of the greatest benefit to the general interest: and that, if it would prefer any plan to the re-establishment of the Bourbons, it is because there is none, that offers it so many inconveniences, and so few advantages.

"You must strongly repeat, gentlemen, to the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher, that, if the French government warmly insist on an armistice, it is because it perceives the possibility of coming to a good understanding on points, on which opinions appear to be farthest divided. It is because the communications and connexions, established between their head-quarters and us, enable us thoroughly to appreciate the true spirit of France. We think in particular, that the n.o.bleness of the Duke of Wellington's character, and the wisdom of the allied sovereigns, cannot lead them to a desire, to force the French nation to submit to a government, that is repugnant to the real wishes of the great majority of the population."

This language, so remarkable for its moderation, was corroborated by the _ostensible_ letter below, which the Duke of Otranto thought proper to address to each of the generals in chief of the besieging armies.

"My Lord (or Prince),

"Independently of the course of our negotiations, I make it my duty, to write personally to your lords.h.i.+p on the subject of an armistice, the refusal of which, I confess, seems to me inexplicable. Our plenipotentiaries have been at head-quarters ever since the 28th of June, and we have not yet a positive answer.

"Peace already exists, since the war has no longer an object. Our right to independence, and the engagement taken by the sovereigns to respect it, would not the less subsist after the taking of Paris. It would be inhuman, therefore, it would be atrocious, to engage in sanguinary battles, that would make no alteration in the questions to be decided.

"I must speak candidly to your lords.h.i.+p; our state of possession, our legal state, _which has the double sanction of the people and of the chambers, is that of a government, where the grandson of the Emperor of Austria is the head of the state. We cannot think of altering this state of things, unless the nation acquires a certainty, that the powers revoke their promises, and that the preservation of our present government is in opposition to their common wishes_.

"What then can be more just, than to conclude an armistice? Are there any other means of allowing the combined powers time to explain themselves, and France time to be acquainted with their wishes?

"It will not escape your lords.h.i.+p, that already one great power finds in our state of possession a personal right to interest itself in our interior concerns. As long as this state remains unaltered, the two chambers have hence an additional obligation, not to consent at present to any measure capable of altering our possession.

"Is not the step, that has been adopted on our eastern frontier, the most natural to follow? It was not confined to an armistice between General Bubna and Marshal Suchet: it was stipulated, that we should return to our limits according to the treaty of Paris; because, in fact, the war ought to be considered as ended by the simple fact of the abdication of Napoleon.

"Field-marshal Frimont, on his part, has agreed to the armistice, to meet by preliminary arrangements those, that may take place between the allies. We do not even know, whether England and Prussia have changed their minds on the subject of our independence; for the march of the armies cannot be any certain indication of the minds of the cabinets. Neither can the will of two powers suffice us; it is their general agreement we want to know. Would you antic.i.p.ate this agreement? Would you oppose an obstacle to it, in order to give rise to a new political tempest from a state of things so near to peace?

"I am not afraid, for my own part, to antic.i.p.ate all objections.

Perhaps you suppose, that the occupation of Paris by two of the allied armies will second the views you may entertain of restoring Louis XVIII. to the throne. But can an augmentation of the evils of war, which can be ascribed to this motive alone, be a means of reconciliation?

"I must declare to your lords.h.i.+p, that every sinister attempt to impose on us a government, before the allied powers have explained themselves, would immediately oblige the chambers to take measures, that would not leave the possibility of a reconciliation in any case.

It is even the interest of the King, that every thing should remain in a state of suspension: force may replace him on the throne, but cannot keep him there. It is neither by force, nor by surprise, nor by the wishes of one party, that the national will can be brought to change its government. It would even be in vain, at the present moment, to offer us conditions, to render a new government more supportable.

There are no conditions that can be examined, as long as the necessity of bending our necks to the yoke, of renouncing our independence, is not proved to us. Now, my lord, this necessity cannot even be suspected, before the allied powers are in accord. None of their engagements have been revoked: our independence is under their protection: it is we, who enter into their views; and, according to the sense of their declaration, it is the besieging armies, that deviate from them.

"According to these declarations, and never were there any more solemn, every employment of force, in favour of the King, by these armies, on that part of our territory, which is solely in their power, will be considered by France as an avowal of the formal design of imposing on us a government against our will. We may be allowed to ask your lords.h.i.+p, whether you have received any such authority. Besides, force is not a pacificator: a moral resistance repelled the late government, that the King had been made to adopt: the more violence is employed toward the nation, the more invincible would this resistance be rendered. It cannot be the intention of the generals of the besieging armies, to compromise their own governments; and to revoke in fact the law, that the allied powers have imposed on themselves.

"My lord, the whole question lies in the compa.s.s of these few words.

"Napoleon has abdicated, as the allied powers desired: peace is therefore restored: who the prince shall be, that is to reap the fruit of this abdication, ought not even to be brought into the question.

"Is our state of possession to be altered by force? The allied powers would not only violate their promises, promises made in the face of the whole world, but they would not obtain their end. Is the change to come from the will of the nation? Then it is necessary, in order to lead this will to declare itself, for the allied powers first to make known their formal refusal, to let our present government subsist. An armistice, therefore, is indispensable.

"The full force of these considerations, my lord, it is impossible not to perceive. Even in Paris, should the event of a battle open its gates to you, I should still hold to your lords.h.i.+p the same language.

It is the language of all France. Were rivers of blood made causelessly to flow, would the pretensions, that gave rise to them, be more secure, or less odious?

"I hope soon to have an intercourse with your lords.h.i.+p, that will lead us both to the work of peace, by means more conformable to reason and justice. An armistice would allow us, to treat in Paris: and it will be easy for us to come to an understanding on the great principle, that the tranquillity of France is a condition inseparable from the tranquillity of Europe. It is only from a close inspection of the nation and of the army, that you can judge, on what the quietness and stability of our future condition depend.

"I beg, &c. &c."

Though in this letter the Duke of Otranto pleaded the cause of Napoleon IL, and pretended to be ignorant of the dispositions of the allies, it was nevertheless very easy to perceive, that he considered the question as irrevocably decided in favour of the Bourbons. Their name, which he had long avoided mentioning, was incessantly on his lips: but always the same, always inclined naturally and systematically, to have more strings than one to his bow, he appeared to incline alternately _for the younger branch, and for the reigning branch_. At one time the former seemed to him to offer preferably, and in a higher degree, all the guarantees the nation could desire: at another he insinuated, that it would be possible, to come to an accommodation with the King, if he would consent, to dismiss certain dangerous persons, and make fresh concessions to France.

This change, too sudden not to be noticed, drew on his conduct more than ever the scrutinizing eyes and reproaches of the antagonists of the Bourbons.

He was accused of encouraging by impunity the newspaper writers and pamphleteers, who openly advocated the recall of the ancient dynasty of protecting the royalist party; and of having restored to liberty one of its most subtle agents, Baron de Vitrolles.

He was charged with holding nocturnal conferences with this same M. de Vitrolles, and several eminent royalists; and with daily sending emissaries, unknown to his colleagues, to the King, to M. de Talleyrand, and to the Duke of Wellington.

Two of the deputies, M. Durbach and General Solignac, went to him, and declared, that they were acquainted with his manoeuvres; that his ambition blinded him; that no compact could ever subsist between Louis XVIII. and the murderer of his brother; and that sooner or later France would take vengeance on this treason.

An old minister of state, M. Deferment, reproached him to his teeth with privately selling the lives and liberties of the French.

Other accusations, not less serious, or less virulent, were addressed to him by M. Carnot, and by General Grenier. "If he betray us," said the latter, "I will blow his brains out."

The Duke of Otranto, accustomed to brave political storms, coolly repelled these imputations. He reminded his accusers of the numerous pledges he had given to the revolution. He offered his head as the guarantee of his fidelity. His protestations, his oaths, and the imperturbable a.s.surance, with which he answered for the safety and independence of the nation, if he were suffered to go on his own way, allayed the storms: but he had too much penetration, not to be aware of the ground on which he stood; he could not but feel, that he was lost, if he did not hasten to a conclusion; and there is every reason to believe, that he rejected _no means_ of arriving speedily at a decisive result[83].