A Fantasy of Far Japan Part 27

The French and the j.a.panese have some sort of resemblance in their character, and therefore they are not wholly antagonistic to each other by nature. France once committed a great error, it is true, together with another country, in backing Russia against j.a.pan after the Sino-j.a.panese war, but j.a.pan has forgiven her for it, and has even forgotten it long since. It therefore mainly depends on France if the friendly relations.h.i.+p subsisting between her and j.a.pan shall be maintained.

There are two things which we have to examine in this connection: first, the question of Indo-China; second, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs.

Much has been talked about j.a.pan's having designs upon Indo-China. It is, in truth, nothing more than a resuscitation in part of the old bogey of the Yellow Peril. According to that bogey, j.a.pan is to pick quarrels with every civilised nation, and is ultimately to swallow up the whole world. Nothing can be more absurd than that; but at times it has been made use of by the Russians and Russophiles with a certain amount of success. To me it appears almost amazing that so great a psychological incongruity should exist simultaneously in the minds of some of the Occidentals, in that, while they exhibit almost unreasonable contempt of the Orientals on the one hand, they give credit for almost superhuman potentiality to the same people on the other. Whatever this may be, the question of Indo-China resolves itself into this:

The yellow peril alarmists began to talk about j.a.pan as being intent upon seizing Indo-China. The Colonial party of France has utilised this theme for the promotion of its own object, and the Russophiles have utilised it for inciting the public to hate and detest j.a.pan in favour of Russia. Surely an act of gross injustice and cowardice! For, as a matter of fact, on the part of j.a.pan there is no such intention whatever. Indo-China is very different from Korea and Manchuria in respect of its relative position to j.a.pan. There is nothing worth mentioning politically, strategically, historically, or economically in the mutual relations between j.a.pan and Indo-China. All this I have shown in the utmost detail in an article which I have contributed and published in a well-known French review. Sensible French people have now begun to see the truth of it, so that they have almost ceased to pay serious attention to the false alarms of the yellow peril agitators.

Indeed, the France of to-day appears to be very different from the France of this time last year. The lapse of one year has been sufficient to disclose many falsehoods by which the public was once taken in. It has also disclosed the relative merit of Russia and j.a.pan in many things. Which government--the Russian or the j.a.panese--is the more enlightened? Which troops--the Russian or the j.a.panese--are more humane and orderly? Which people--Russia or j.a.pan--is more compact as a nation?

Which of them--Russia or j.a.pan--has better ethics and morality? In which of them--Russia or j.a.pan--are laws better administered and more loyally adhered to? In which of them--Russia or j.a.pan--are philanthropical works, such as the Red Cross Society, better organised and more honestly carried out? Above all, in which of them--Russia or j.a.pan--does the justice of its cause in the present war lie? All these things have now become very widely known to the public, hence the difference of their att.i.tude. I do not think France ever will be foolish enough to stretch forward her fists against j.a.pan on account of the yellow peril bogey concerning Indo-China. I am rather in hope that the day will come when those Russophiles will repent the mistake they made when they abused j.a.pan contrary to the dictates of justice and equity.

The second question, namely, the effect of the Franco-Russian alliance upon Far Eastern affairs, is rather a delicate one to discuss. On the whole, however, I can say this:

Considering the delicate position in which she is placed, France has managed things well to the extent that we have not much to complain of (except one important matter, which I will elucidate presently). True it is that she has made many unfair accusations against us with regard to the commencement of the war and also with regard to the yellow peril bogey, but then the same, if not a harsher thing, has also been done or said in some other quarters where we might have expected more impartiality. Her general conduct as a neutral has not been very satisfactory. But then we remember that in some other quarters also very bitter pills were given us to swallow, altogether beyond our reasonable antic.i.p.ation. We put up with all this unfairness, because we are quite confident that sooner or later the time will come when the world will clearly see how undeserving we are of such calumny.

The important exception I made above is the question of French neutrality concerning the treatment of the Baltic Fleet. In this respect j.a.pan has grave reasons to complain of what France has been doing. As the whole world knows, the Russian Fleet has been obtaining abundant facilities from France all the way along from European waters to those of the Far East. It was abusing French hospitality in Madagascar for a very long period. j.a.pan repeated her protest, or at least called French attention from time to time. When France pleaded her innocence at Madagascar on the pretext that the fleet was outside the territorial waters of France, j.a.pan, relying on incontestable proof to the contrary, remonstrated. France was very tardy in executing what she said she would do, but j.a.pan showed much patience, almost beyond common endurance. The same thing began to be repeated in the waters of Indo-China, the very door of the seat of the war. However moderate and good-natured j.a.pan may be, this was more than she could endure. This was the real cause of the strain of an event which has been recently threatening the continuance of friendly relations between France and j.a.pan.

According to some French papers, the view is held that France has not infringed her duty as a neutral, but j.a.pan does not coincide. The French contention is that, according to the French law of neutrality, there is no time limit for affording asylum to a belligerent s.h.i.+p, and therefore, whatever length of time Russian s.h.i.+ps may spend in French waters, France is under no obligation to tell them to quit the place (so long as they are not accompanied by prizes), and also they may be supplied with victuals and even coals. j.a.pan contends that this is not a just interpretation of the laws of nations. j.a.pan's view may be formulated as follows:

1. The twenty-four hours rule may not be a condition universally accepted, but justice and equity demand that in its spirit it should be followed by all nations. It has already been adopted by many nations, including Russia herself; as a matter of fact, the world has come to view it as though it were already a rule universally accepted, and it behoves every civilised nation to promote its adoption, or at least a practice similar to it in spirit, for the sake of consolidating international morality, viz. justice and equity. At the time when Russian s.h.i.+ps, after the sea-battle of August 10th last year, sought asylum in the waters of Kiao-Chow and Saigon, both the German and French authorities respectively hastened to dismantle them, because the s.h.i.+ps would not leave the place indicated at the prescribed time; this was done in exact accordance with the spirit of international law, and in reality it amounted almost to the same thing as observing the twenty-four hours rule. Why should France now say that no time limit can be made in the case of the Baltic Fleet, which requires all the more vigilance than would the case of a few solitary s.h.i.+ps?

2. The so-called French law of neutrality is not in fact a law in the strict sense of the term. It is a sort of an instruction issued in the beginning of the present war by the French Minister of Marine, although based upon a similar doc.u.ment issued at the time of the Spanish-American war. It is immaterial whether or not it is a law in the strict sense, but we cannot deem it has a just rule if it were to be interpreted as has been done by some of the French papers. True it is that in that doc.u.ment no time is mentioned, but does it mean that France has to or must allow all belligerent s.h.i.+ps to stay in her waters whatever length of time they like? Certainly not, I should think. If it is so, why should France adhere to that sort of interpretation even when its adherence is obviously contrary to justice and equity?

3. Even if we admit for a moment that the French rule as interpreted by those papers be applicable to the cases of some solitary s.h.i.+ps seeking asylum; it is certainly not applicable to cases like that which we now have in view, because no such case as that of the Baltic Fleet has ever been within the contemplation of those who framed such a rule. As a matter of fact, however, it would be inapplicable even to the cases of a few solitary s.h.i.+ps if it were to be interpreted in the way that was done by those journals.

4. Even admitting for a moment that the interpretation of those French journals is correct as far as the strict letter of the rule is concerned, it does not give them the right to say that their doings are _internationally_ correct. It must be known that in the laws of nations the spirit of international morality, namely, justice and equity, has greater weight than munic.i.p.al laws, _lex loci_. If this were not so, how was it that England had to apologise to Russia a long time ago for an act--personal seizure of an amba.s.sador--which had been done in a civil matter perfectly in accordance with her law? Therefore the mere fact that France has her own law of neutrality (in fact no law in a strict sense) is no defence for her doings unless its justice and equity can be maintained in the eyes of the law of nations. I may further add that the above is the _raison d'etre_ why prize courts of different countries make it their theory, unlike ordinary civil or criminal courts, that they administer _prima facie_ the law of nations and not _lex loci_. It is another _raison d'etre_ why matters relating to neutrality, prizes, and cognate matters are generally dealt with in the shape of instructions (in other words, interpretations of the law of nations), and not in the shape of a law of the land in the strict sense. j.a.pan, therefore, cannot submit to the ruling of those French instructions as interpreted by those journals, inasmuch as she does not think it internationally just and equitable.

5. And, moreover, that part of the French instruction which those journals so habitually quote is not the only part which has an important bearing on the question. In the instruction it is also mentioned that no belligerent may use a French port for purposes of war (_dans un but de guerre_); and also that belligerents sojourning in such ports may not make use of them as the base of operations of any kind against the enemy. j.a.pan's insistence is that France should adhere to that spirit.

My wonder is why those French papers which try to uphold one part of the instruction should totally ignore other parts of the same instruction.

6. The theory of asylum in the case of the s.h.i.+ps is not so rigid as the case of an army. I admit it. j.a.pan does not demand that it should be made on the seas as rigid as it is on land. But it must never be allowed to go beyond the limit which justice and equity allow. I take the theory of asylum on the seas to be this: No neutral is justified in helping either of the combatants, but the nature of the seas is such that the neutral may give a certain grace of time to combatant vessels which seek shelter in its neutral waters, before it proceeds to dismantle,--(no immediate internment as in the case of the land force),--and it may also give them certain victuals--even a certain amount of coals--as it would also be contrary to humanity if they were to hang about, or to cause starvation of the men on board in mid-voyage on account of the mere lack of coal or food. Beyond this, the spirit of the law of nations is that a neutral ought to allow nothing. Can any one boldly a.s.sert that the theory of asylum can be applied with fairness to a case like that of the Baltic Fleet, which is far from seeking asylum, but is deliberately endeavouring to administer coups to its adversary and proceeding to the very seat of war. If he can do so, where is the justice and equity of the so-called law of nations, which the Occidentals boast of, not without just t.i.tle, and claim that it forms one of the essential parts of Christian morality?

7. As to the talk about the three-mile limit of the territorial waters, there is already much divergency of opinion even amongst the jurists. To put it forth as a defence in a case like that of the Baltic Fleet affairs seems to me too puerile. The matter, however, becomes all the more grave when even that limit is not observed, and it has been constantly ignored by the Baltic Fleet.

Such are the views which we j.a.panese have taken in the matter. Some French journals (erroneously basing their a.s.sertions on the views I have personally expressed) say that j.a.pan has taken up English views of international law in opposition to the Continental views, so that France ought not to yield to j.a.pan's protest. This contention is not correct.

We do not hold these views because they are English ones: we do so because they are in our opinion the only views which are _internationally_ just and equitable. We are now fighting against a foe so formidable, as the whole world knows, that to us it is a matter of life and death. We have sufficient patience and fort.i.tude, but we cannot run the risk of sacrificing our very existence without some protest when we think that we are not being treated with justice and equity.

I am glad to add that the views we hold seem to have come at last to be shared by the more responsible part of the French amongst the governmental circle, as well as by the general public. The newspapers which are still sticking to their old contention are very few in number, and they seem to have some particular reasons of their own. I can never think a nation like France could consciously and wilfully offend against justice and equity, and the only thing we anxiously hope for is that the declaration of the French Government may be honestly and effectually followed up. Whatever may be one's intention, the drift of events often creates unlooked-for incidents, and that too often against one's will, when it is too late to avoid the consequences. Let all parties concerned be careful in this matter of vital importance.

[1] The _Deutsche Revue_, June 1905.

X

j.a.pAN AND EUROPE[1]

You ask my opinion on the future of the Yellow Peril cry. From an ethical point of view it is an unjust and unreasonable accusation. From a practical point of view it is idle and useless talk.

I have spoken and written on these particular points so often that I do not feel inclined to reiterate any more. I will, however, consider the matter from a different point of view and solicit any answer which may be advanced against my conviction. I do not do this from any thought of vanity; I should be very sorry if it were ever taken in that sense. I would simply ask those who agitate and cry the Yellow Peril, the means they would suggest for the adopting of their propaganda, if their words are not to be empty ones.

Suppose any country wanted to subjugate j.a.pan, and should want to send an army to fight on the soil of j.a.pan, what number of men do they think would suffice? No general in the whole world would, I am sure, be bold enough to undertake the task with under one million men. I have reason to believe even that number would not suffice, but for a moment let it be that number. What country in the world can send that number over the broad ocean? Germany, France, England, or America? Russia seems to have the greatest chance, being nearer to j.a.pan. But her experience is already known.

Suppose the idea of a land campaign be abandoned, and only a fleet be sent to intimidate j.a.pan by sea battles, or by hara.s.sing her commerce.

There would certainly be a better chance for any of the Occidental fleets than for the armies, in coping with the forces of j.a.pan. Above all, I frankly admit that England would be the most formidable foe in that respect. But excepting England, is there any other country that can say with certainty that it can easily crush the j.a.panese navy? Is it Germany? is it France? or is it--America?

But supposing our navy were crushed; what next? It would, of course, be a very ugly thing for us, but it would not mean the subjection of j.a.pan.

Our sea-coast towns may be bombarded, our commerce may be hara.s.sed, but j.a.pan will still subsist within her soil, for she can live without depending on any other country for food. And, besides, disturbance of commerce would not be a loss only to her.

Moreover, any country which should embark on such an enterprise would have need to think it over twice (or, indeed, three or four times) before undertaking it, and to calculate the probable benefit it could get therefrom, and the probable expenses it would incur; not to speak of the result of any possible failure. It may be presumed that j.a.pan would not tamely be intimidated by any action undertaken by any country which is not based on justice and equity, and which, therefore, is not open to reason.

Further, is there any country which would willingly embark on such an enterprise single-handed? I think not. The reason is too obvious for me to elucidate.

Putting aside altogether any question of justice and equity, if such an enterprise is to be embarked upon at all, it would have to be by common action of all the Western Powers, somewhat similar to that when the combined forces of Europe rose against France some hundred years ago.

But let me ask if such a thing is possible under the present circ.u.mstances? The claims of j.a.pan to the kind consideration of humanity have already become so widely spread that she could no longer be trampled upon easily. Man is, after all, a rational being. Do the writers of the articles on the Yellow Peril (articles which even now repeatedly make their appearance) not know the fact that even in France there is a large number of people who have recently purchased j.a.panese bonds, not to speak of Germany, where those bonds have been openly floated by banks of high standing? Even if all the governments of the West should be willing to agree to such an enterprise, I do not think the people at large would move with them.

j.a.pan is modest enough, j.a.pan is honest enough. Why does she deserve a general ostracism? She might become, it is possible, a Power of the world. She might become, it is possible, more civilised on the lines of occidental civilisation, after which she strives so earnestly. Are these to be blamed as her sins?

To me the Yellow Peril cry, which is so often revived in some quarters of the Continent, is either a sort of what we call 'guchi,' that is to say, useless repet.i.tion of complaint of some unreasonable disappointment, or a perpetuation of wicked instigation and selfish intention. In either case, it is not at all a laudable action; indeed, I may say it is wasteful calumny for no material good will come of it inasmuch as its object can never be achieved from the very condition of the world. The people who entertain that idea would be doing far better service to their country, to the progress of civilisation, to the general cause of humanity, if only they put aside such a silly notion, and busy themselves in teaching their fellow country-folks to accustom themselves to the changed circ.u.mstances of the time. It would be a far more manly and n.o.ble act if they revised their old notions, which in a measure may be called prejudice.

As to ourselves, the j.a.panese, we shall only be glad if we can enjoy a peaceful and harmonious life in the happy family of the world, as we are determined to do, in spite of all the obstacles which may be laid before us.

[1] Written for the _Potentia Organisation_, July 1905.

XI

THE INDO-CHINA QUESTION[1]

INTERVIEW WITH THE BARON SUYEMATSU

The eminent statesman, Baron Suyematsu, kindly dictated in English to one of our editors answers relating to certain questions with regard to the relation between j.a.pan and Europe, especially France and Germany.

With the disclosure of the alleged Kodama report in view, how far may one give credit to the alleged j.a.panese plan of invasion of Indo-China?

I know all that has been written in France on the subject. All those rumours appear to me to have come originally from Russia, and to have been put into circulation in order to excite French opinion against j.a.pan, in other words, it is nothing else than a mere repet.i.tion of the Yellow Peril cry.

j.a.pan does not covet Indo-China. I have shown elsewhere that the French colonies in the Far East have no perceptible influence upon the situation of j.a.pan, either from a political or an economical point of view. j.a.pan has sufficient to do at home, she does not want to plunge into external adventures, such as meddling with Indo-China or picking a quarrel with a country like France. You may be sure that it would be more politic for France to cultivate amicable relations with j.a.pan than irritate her by such accusations. Even if those accusations honestly represent the true sentiment of the French, the j.a.panese would only take them for malicious manuvres directed to aid Russia, and they could not produce any good impression on the minds of the j.a.panese.

Is there any reason to believe that the so-called Kodama report was forged in Russia rather than in France?

I have demonstrated elsewhere that the doc.u.ment which was recently made public and attributed to Kodama containing some military indications on the plan of an invasion of Indo-China is a perfect forgery. I have exposed elsewhere several technical errors therein which would never appear in an authentic official doc.u.ment. But whether it is authentic or not, I do not attach any importance to the matter, from a political point of view at least. It is the duty of all the military and naval authorities to keep themselves ready for any emergency. For example, France ought to keep herself always prepared for any possible difficulties which may arise on her frontiers in the east, and in the south, and on the western coasts; the same with Germany, with Austria, with Italy, even with the United States.