The Catholic World Volume Iii Part 44

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THE CATHOLIC WORLD.

VOL. III., NO. 15.--JUNE, 1866.

[ORIGINAL]

PROBLEMS OF THE AGE.

III.

THE BELIEF IN G.o.d IS THE FIRST ARTICLE OF A RELIGIOUS CREED.

The first article of the Christian Creed is "Credo in Deum"--"I believe in G.o.d." The Christian child receives this originally by instruction before it attains the complete use of reason, and believes it by a natural faith in the word of those who teach it. Afterward it attains to a clearer and more distinct conception of its meaning and truth. This conception, however, is still furnished to it by Christian theology, and by theology itself is referred back to a revelation whose beginning is coeval with the human race. The fact just stated in regard to the belief of the Christian child is also true in regard to the belief of mankind universally. Wherever the idea of G.o.d, as exhibited by pure, theistic philosophy, is contained in the common belief of the people, it is held as a portion of some religious system purporting to be derived from revelation. It is learned from the instruction of religious teachers, and transmitted by a sacred tradition. We do not attain to the conception of G.o.d by the spontaneous, unaided evolution of it in our individual reason. Those nations which remain in the state of infancy, through a lack of the civilizing and instructing power, do not attain to that conception.

The only way in which pure, theistic conceptions have ever been communicated to any considerable number of persons previously dest.i.tute of them, has been by the instruction of those who already possessed them.

This tradition goes back to the original creation of the race. Mankind was originally const.i.tuted by the Almighty in a state of civilized and enlightened society, fully furnished with that sacred treasure which tradition diffuses universally, and which const.i.tutes {290} the inherited capital on which all the precious gain and increase in science, civilization, and every kind of intellectual and moral wealth, are based. It is in this way that the conception of G.o.d, which the founders of the human race received by immediate revelation, has been preserved and transmitted by universal tradition. In the pure and legitimate line of descent it has come down uncorrupted through the line of patriarchs and prophets to Jesus Christ, who has promulgated it anew in such a manner as to secure its inviolable preservation to the end of time. Indirectly, and subject to various changes and corruptions, it has descended through human language and law, through civilization and science, through Gentile literature and mythology, and through philosophy. Directly or indirectly, all the conceptions of mankind respecting G.o.d, whether perfect or imperfect, crude or mature, have been transmitted by tradition from the original and primitive revelation made to the founders of the race.

The universal utterance of mankind is, and always has been, "Credo in Deum." This is a common credence, possessed by the race from the beginning, which the individual mind receives and acquiesces in with more or less of intelligent belief and understanding, but never totally eradicates from among its conceptions. It is a credence perfectly enunciated in that divine revelation which the Christian church possesses in its integrity, and communicates in the most complete and explicit manner to all those who receive her instructions.

Here may easily arise a misunderstanding. Some one will say: "You appear to resolve all our knowledge of G.o.d into an act of faith in a revelation handed down from the past. But the very conception of revelation implies the previous conception of G.o.d, who makes the revelation. Faith in a revealed doctrine is based on the veracity of G.o.d, who reveals it. But in order that one may be able to make this act of faith, he must previously know that G.o.d is, and that he is veracious. Thus, we must believe that G.o.d is veracious because it is revealed, and believe this revealed doctrine that he is veracious because of his veracity. This is a vicious circle, and gives no basis whatever for rational belief."

This objection has really been antic.i.p.ated and obviated in the preceding chapter. A full understanding of the answer to it will require a careful reading of the present chapter entire, and perhaps of the greater part of the succeeding ones. Just now, we simply reply to the objector that we do not, as he imagines, resolve the evidence of G.o.d's existence, and of other rational truths, into a tradition or revelation. We hold firmly that these truths are provable by reason.

In speaking of revelation or tradition as our instructor in the doctrine of G.o.d, what is meant is this: The correct and complete formula, the divine word, or infallible speech, expressing in the sensible signs of human language the explicit conception of that divine idea which is const.i.tutive of the soul's very rational existence,--this _formula_ has been handed down by tradition from the origin of the race. We do not propose this tradition as a mere exterior authority to which the mind must submit blindly, from which it must derive its rational activity, or in which it must locate its criterion of rational cert.i.tude. We admit the obligation of proving that this tradition is universal and divine. So far as the doctrines it proposes are within the sphere of reason, we hold that reason receives them because they are self-evident, or capable of being deduced from that which is self-evident. Thus, for instance, in proposing the veracity of G.o.d as the ground of faith in his revelation, it is proposed as a truth evident by the light of reason.

Reason, however, is indebted to the instruction which comes by tradition for that clear and distinct statement of the being and attributes {291} of G.o.d, including his infinite and eternal veracity, which brings the mind to a reflective consciousness of its own primitive idea.

This may be ill.u.s.trated by a comparison of the exterior word or revelation with that interior word or revelation which creates the soul and gives it the natural light of reason. The word of G.o.d spoken in the creative act creates the rational soul, and affirms to it his being and the existence of creatures, including that of the soul itself. This is a revelation. All natural knowledge is a revelation from G.o.d. Our belief in the reality of the outward world, and of our own existence, is resolved into a belief in the reality of the creative act of G.o.d, or of that spoken word by which he creates the world. We see no difficulty here, because we see that the word of G.o.d, in this case, enlightens the soul to see the truth of that which it declares to it. We need not find any more difficulty in the case of the exterior word. When this exterior, word declares plainly to an ignorant mind the nature and attributes of G.o.d, and the obligation of believing and obeying the truth revealed by him, this word also enlightens that mind to perceive the truth of what it declares. It illuminates the soul to see more distinctly the truths that are within the sphere of reason by direct, rational perception; and to see indirectly and indistinctly those truths which are above reason, in the self-evident truth of G.o.d's veracity, and in the a.n.a.logies and correspondences which exist between these truths and those which are directly apprehended by reason.

This is antic.i.p.ating what is to be treated of expressly hereafter. We trust it is now plain that we do not profess to derive the idea of G.o.d in the human race, and in each individual mind, from a mere outward tradition, or to prove its reality from a mere authoritative dictum of revelation. What we really intend to do is, to exhibit the conception of G.o.d contained in Christian theology, for the purpose of showing its objective truth and reality by a rational method. In the first place, we wish to bring out the conception itself as clearly as possible; to describe a circle in language vast and perfect enough to include all that is intelligible to human reason respecting G.o.d and his perfections. In the second place, to review the different methods of proving to reason the objective reality of this conception. And finally, to propose what we believe to be the best and most complete method of presenting to the reflective consciousness of the soul the cert.i.tude of its positive judgment, affirming the being of G.o.d.

[Footnote 47]

[Footnote 47: In the actual treatment of the subject, this order has been changed for the sake of convenience.]

A great task, certainly! Some may regard it as on evidence of presumption to undertake it. Truly, if one should propose the conception of the being of the infinite G.o.d as a mere hypothesis; criticising and condemning the arguments of great men respecting it as illogical and unsuccessful attempts to prove it; professing to have discovered or invented some new process of demonstrating the problem, and thus pretend to make that certain which has. .h.i.therto been doubtful or probable, it would argue the height of arrogance and presumption.

We do not, however, propose any such thing. The idea of G.o.d const.i.tutes the very existence and life of the human soul. The conception of G.o.d, more or less perfectly explicated, is the possession of the human race universal, and in its completely explicated form it is the possession of the church universal of all ages. It is the treasure of universal theology and philosophy, handed down by an universal and inviolable tradition not of mere dead words and logical forms, but of the living thought and belief of all the sages and saints of the earth. The truth that {292} G.o.d is, and is infinitely perfect in his attributes, is the infallible and irreversible judgment of the reason of mankind, whether naturally or supernaturally enlightened. All that an individual can do is to attempt to gain a distinct apprehension and a correct verbal expression of the self-luminous idea which s.h.i.+nes in all philosophy, but especially in Christian Catholic philosophy. It is a mistake, then, to consider an argument respecting the being of G.o.d as a mere logical process, conducting from some known premises to an unknown conclusion; a process in which any incorrectness in a.n.a.lysis or deduction vitiates the result and leaves the unsolved problem to the efforts of some new candidate for the honor of first discovering the solution. The reflex conceptions of that infallible affirmation of G.o.d to the soul which const.i.tutes its rational existence must be substantially correct. This is especially the case where revelation furnishes a perfect and infallible outward expression of that inward conception which the reflective reason is laboring to acquire.

Therefore we consider that there is a real agreement among all theistic and Christian philosophers. All have true intellectual conceptions of the idea of G.o.d. Yet there may be some of these conceptions which, though true, are confused. Again, in the multiplied reflex action of the mind upon itself and its own judgments and conceptions, there may be some imperfections in the a.n.a.lysis or critical examination of the component parts of the idea, in the synthesis or construction of these component parts into an ideal formula, and in the language by which verbal expression is given to the conceptions of the mind. What is to be aimed at is, to obtain intellectual conceptions which are clear and adequate to the idea, and a verbal expression which is also clear and adequate to the mental conception. In this direction lies the true path of progress in Christian philosophy. It is a continual effort to apprehend more clearly and adequately in the intelligence the conceptions given to our reflective reason by revelation, and to express these conceptions more clearly and intelligibly in language. Hence, so far as the doctrine of G.o.d is concerned, philosophy can only strive after formulas which express adequately the conception existing in every mind which has brought the idea of G.o.d into reflective consciousness.

If this be true relatively to the common mind, it must be so much more relatively to the instructed philosophic mind of the world, especially the instructed theological mind of the church, where philosophy and theology are developed in a scientific form. The individual may reflect on that part of theology which his own intelligence has appropriated and a.s.similated to itself, and may possibly advance science by his reflections. But he cannot possibly cut himself off from the intellectual tradition and the continuity of intellectual life by which his reason lives and acts, without perpetrating intellectual suicide. We despise and reject, therefore, all philosophy or theology which severs itself from the great vital current and pulsation of traditional wisdom and science. We despise also that which merely repeats what it has learned, unless it has first made an intelligent judgment that this is, in regard to whatever matter is under discussion, the ultimatum that human reason can attain. One may do some good by repeating and explaining to others what are, for him, the last and most perfect words of wisdom which he has found in studying the works of the great and wise teachers of men. This gives him no claim to be honored as an original thinker or writer. He diffuses but he does not advance science. It is better to do this than to fall into error and folly, or at least to waste time and paper, by vainly striving after originality for its own sake, or from a silly motive of {293} vain-glory. Or one may really advance science by original and valuable thoughts which are an elaboration of the truth that has. .h.i.therto remained in a crude form; by a better a.n.a.lysis or synthesis of common, universal conceptions; if nothing more, at least by a better verbal expression and a more distinct and intelligible method of exposition. For ourselves, we are satisfied to explain and diffuse that wisdom which we have found in the writings of the greatest and most profound thinkers, especially those who have created or embellished Catholic theology. We strike out no new and unknown path. We do not pretend even to push forward into any unexplored region in the old one. All that is in this treatise may probably be found elsewhere, and by many will be recognized as already familiar to them. Although we do not choose to burden our pages with citations and references, the reader may rely on it that in the main we follow the common current of Catholic theology. If we sometimes deviate from it, we are still, in most instances, following the steps of some one or more of the giant pioneers who have gone on before, leaving a broad trail to direct the weaker traveller in the path of science.

What has just been said is applicable to every subject treated in these essays. In relation to the special subject now under consideration, we are very anxious not to seem captious or rash in criticising the common methods of argument employed by theologians. We recognize the substantial solidity of the doctrine of G.o.d contained in the best philosophers of all ages, so far as it agrees with revelation; and the perfect soundness and completeness of the doctrine as taught by Christian theologians. It is only the form and method that we intend to criticise, so far as theological doctrine is concerned; and, so far as relates to the purely human and rational element of philosophy, only that which is peculiar to individuals, schools, or periods, and not that which is common and universal. Let us remember that we are not reasoning as sceptics, and, beginning from a principle of philosophic doubt, ignoring all knowledge and belief, and striving to work our way upward to something positive and certain.

Whether we are positively Christian in our belief or not, we are taking the viewing-point of Christian faith, and making a survey of the prospect visible to the eye from that point. It presents to us the completely developed idea of G.o.d as always known and always believed with cert.i.tude. What we are to do, then, is to find the most adequate expression of that which faith has believed and reason been able to understand during all time respecting G.o.d. We stand not alone, in the ignorance of our isolated, individual minds, to create by a slow and laborious task the truth and the belief of which our souls feel the need. We stand in union with the human race, always in possession of at least the elements of truth. We stand in union with that favored portion of the human race which has always clearly and distinctly believed in the absolute truth of the being and infinite perfection of G.o.d, and in a distinct revelation from him. We are about to examine this universal belief, and these intelligent judgments of cultivated universal human reason, and to compare them with the principles and judgments of our own reason. To ascertain what Christian Catholic faith is, and how it is radicated in an intelligent indubitable cert.i.tude of reason--this is what we are about to attempt; and the first part of our task is to examine the Christian conception of G.o.d, as expressed in theistic philosophy and Catholic theology. We intend to prove that it is the original, permits have, const.i.tutive idea of human reason, brought, into distinct, reflective consciousness; made intelligible to the understanding, so far as it is not immediately intelligible in itself, by a.n.a.logy; and correctly expressed by the sensible signs of language.

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IV.

DIFFERENT METHODS OF PROVING THE BEING OF G.o.d.

It is evident that we have no direct intellectual vision or beholding of G.o.d. The goal is separated from him by an infinite and impa.s.sable abyss. We cannot now take into account the person of Jesus Christ, or of any who have been elevated to an intellectual condition different from that which is proper to our present state on earth. Apart from such exceptions, the soul even of the highest contemplative never directly beholds G.o.d himself. In the words of St. Augustine; _"Videri autem divinitas humano visu nullo modo potest; sed eo visu videtur, quo jam qui vident, non homines sed ultra homines sunt."_ "The divinity can in no way be seen by human vision: but it is seen by a vision of such a kind that they who see by it are not men, but are more than men." [Footnote 48] Neither have we the power to comprehend the intrinsic necessity of G.o.d's being and the intimate reason and nature of his self-existence. If we had a natural power of seeing G.o.d immediately, we would be naturally beatified, and all error or sin would be impossible. Moreover, we have not even a formed and developed conception of G.o.d innate to our reason, such as that which the instructed and educated reason can acquire. For, if we had, it would be in all minds alike without exception; everywhere and under all circ.u.mstances the same, without any need of previous reflection or instruction. What, then, is the genesis of our rational conception and belief of the divine being and attributes? How is it evident that G.o.d really is?

[Footnote 48: De Trin. lib. ii. c. ii.]

The arguments employed by philosophers are usually divided into two cla.s.ses, those called _a priori_, and those called _a posteriori_.

An argument _a priori_ is one which deduces a truth from another truth of a prior and more universal order. Therefore, to prove the being of G.o.d _a priori_ we must go back to a truth either really and in itself antecedent to his being, or antecedent in the primitive idea of reason. That is to say, there must be an ideal world of truth logically antecedent to G.o.d, and independent of him; an eternal nature of things which is in itself necessary, and intelligible to our reason, before it has any idea of G.o.d. Or else, the primitive, const.i.tutive idea of our reason must be an idea of some abstract being of this nature which is not G.o.d, and which in the real order is not antecedent to G.o.d, but only antecedent to him in the order of human thought and knowledge. If the first is true, G.o.d is not the first cause, the first principle, the infinite and eternal truth in himself, the absolute essence, and the immediate object of his own intelligence. The very conception of G.o.d which is sought to be proved is destroyed and rendered unintelligible. This will appear more clearly when we come to develop more fully hereafter the idea of G.o.d and his attributes. In the order of real being there is and can be nothing before G.o.d. There is no cause, no principle, no truth, no intelligible idea more universal than G.o.d, and prior to him, from which his being can be deduced as a consequence. In this sense, then, an _a priori_ argument for the being of G.o.d is impossible.

If the second alternative is true, that we have a primitive idea of something in our minds which is before the idea of G.o.d, the order of ideas, of reason, of human thought, is not in harmony with the real order. We apprehend the unreal and not the real. We see things as they are not, and not as they are. The reason apprehends the abstract, ideal universe, the eternal nature of things, the world of necessary truth, as antecedent to G.o.d and independent of him, when it is not so.

If this were so, we could never attain to the true idea of G.o.d as before all things and the principle of all. For reason most develop {295} according to its primary and const.i.tutive idea and its necessary law of thought. If in this const.i.tutive idea there is something before G.o.d from which, as a prior principle, a more universal truth, the being of G.o.d is deduced as a consequence and a secondary truth, we must always look at things in this way, and can never directly behold the real order of being as it is. Thus we can never attain the true idea of G.o.d while we apprehend any intelligible object of thought as prior to him who is really prior to all, and must be apprehended as prior or else falsely apprehended.

An _a priori_ argument in this sense is, therefore, as impossible as in the other.

Let us now examine more particularly some of the so-called _a priori_ arguments.

One is an argument from the conceptions, or, as they are commonly called, the _ideas_, of s.p.a.ce and time. It proceeds thus: We have an idea of infinite s.p.a.ce, and of infinite time, as necessary in the eternal nature of things. Do what we will, we cannot banish these ideas, or avoid thinking of s.p.a.ce and time as necessary and eternal.

Therefore, there is an infinite, eternal being, of whose existence s.p.a.ce and time are the necessary effects.

This argument dazzles the mind by a certain splendor and overwhelms it by a certain profundity and vastness of conception, but yet leaves it confused and overpowered rather than convinced. It will not bear a.n.a.lysis, as Leibnitz has successfully proved in his letters to Adam Clarke, who defended it with all the acuteness and ingenuity which his subtle and penetrating intellect could bring to bear on the question.

Nothing is, or can be, which is not either G.o.d or the creation of G.o.d.

s.p.a.ce and time, therefore, are either attributes of G.o.d, or created ent.i.ties, if they have any being or existence in themselves at all.

They are either identical with the essence of G.o.d, or they are included within the creation and only coeval and co-extensive with it; that is, bounded by finite and precise limits of succession and extension. If the former, in perceiving them we perceive G.o.d directly.

This is not affirmed by the argument, which a.s.serts that they are effects of G.o.d's being and external to it. If the second, they are not infinite; the idea of their infinity and necessity is an illusion, and no argument can be derived from it. It is, beside, impossible to conceive of s.p.a.ce and time as ent.i.ties, or existing things, distinct and separate from other existences, and having certain defined limits.

The language used by those who distinguish them both from G.o.d and creation, and call them necessary effects of the being of G.o.d, is simply unintelligible. Their conception of infinite s.p.a.ce and time is, as Leibnitz calls it, a mere idol of the fancy, a phantasm representing nothing real. There is no intelligible conception of s.p.a.ce and time as distinct both from G.o.d and creation. There is no such thing in the order of reality or of thought as a _necessary_ effect of G.o.d's being, or any effect except that produced by his free creative act. Into the idea of G.o.d nothing enters except G.o.d himself.

Supposing that G.o.d exists alone without having created, when we think of G.o.d we think of all that can be thought as actual. His being fills up his own intelligence, of which it is the only and complete object.

Into a true conception of that being our notions of s.p.a.ce and time cannot enter. Nevertheless, in apprehending s.p.a.ce and time there must be some real and intelligible idea which is apprehended. This idea is the possibility of creation, which in G.o.d is necessary and infinite.

By his very essence, G.o.d has the power to create, and this power is unlimited. The idea of a created universe necessarily includes the idea of its existence in s.p.a.ce and time. The possibility of s.p.a.ce and time are, therefore, included in the possibility of creation, and as no limits can be placed to {296} the one, so none can be placed to the other. Our apprehension of infinite s.p.a.ce and time is an apprehension of the infinite possibility of creation in G.o.d. We apprehend G.o.d under the intuition of the infinite, the necessary, and the eternal. This intuition of the infinite enters into all our thoughts. And therefore, however much we may extend our conception of actual duration or extension in regard to the created universe, we must always think the possibility of that duration and extension being increased even to infinity. Ideal s.p.a.ce and time is that which we apprehend of real s.p.a.ce and time, with the thought of their possible extension to infinity included. Real s.p.a.ce and time are not ent.i.ties distinct in themselves, but relations of succession and co-existence among created things. As in G.o.d alone, as distinct from creation, there is nothing intelligible but the divine being, so in the creation there is nothing intelligible but that which G.o.d has created. G.o.d and the existences which G.o.d has made are all that the mind can think. Take away G.o.d and finite, real things; nothing remains. Think of G.o.d as not creating, and G.o.d is the sole object of thought. Add to this the thought of G.o.d creating, and you have finite created ent.i.ties. But you have nothing more; and if you fancy there is anything more, such as s.p.a.ce and time in the abstract, you have a phantasm or idol of the imagination, which is nothing. Real s.p.a.ce and time must be relations of existing things, and ideal s.p.a.ce and time the possibility of relations among things which might be; or they are nothing. Destroy real ent.i.ties, and you destroy all real relations. Deny the possibility of real ent.i.ties, and you destroy all ideal relations. This answers the puzzling question sometimes asked, "Can G.o.d annihilate s.p.a.ce?" He can annihilate real s.p.a.ce by annihilating the real universe from which it is inseparable.

He cannot annihilate ideal s.p.a.ce, because it is in himself, as included in his eternal idea of the possible creation, or of his own infinite power to create. Our apprehensions of s.p.a.ce and time are in the intelligible and not in the sensible world. The sensible form which they have results from the universal law that all intelligible conceptions come to us through the sensible, and represented to us through sensible signs. They must ultimately terminate in the idea of G.o.d as pure spirit, without extension or successive duration. When we think of extension in s.p.a.ce we imagine a material figure, or an atmosphere whose circ.u.mference we extend further and further in all directions. When we think of duration in time, we think of a succession of material or intellectual actions, whose series we extend backward into the past or forward into the future. But, no matter how far we carry these processes, a definite and limited extension and duration is all that we reach. It is impossible that the idea of infinite s.p.a.ce and duration should be actually realized in the order of finite and created things. The impossibility of placing any limit to them which shall be final must, therefore, be referred to an idea beyond all relations of s.p.a.ce and time, and truly infinite, which we imperfectly apprehend by a.n.a.logy through these relations. This is the idea of G.o.d as having an infinite power to create which is inexhaustible by any actual creation, however vast. Only in this way is the idea intelligible, and we must affirm G.o.d as real and infinite being before we can correctly apprehend it.

It may be said that this is what is really meant by the argument from s.p.a.ce and time. We are willing to admit that it is what these eminent writers really had in their minds. But it appears to us that they have expressed it without sufficient clearness and precision, by reason of the confusion which prevails in modern philosophy, and that it is not really an _a priori_ argument, since it cannot be made {297} intelligible without affirming the idea of G.o.d as prior to all other ideas in the order of thought as well as in the order of being.

Another argument is derived from the possibility of conceiving that there is a being absolutely perfect. We can conceive that there is a being possessing all possible perfections. But actual existence is a perfection. Therefore if we conceive of a being possessing _all_ perfection, we must conceive of him as having actual existence.

This amounts merely to saying that actual existence enters into our conception of G.o.d. Where is the proof that that conception is not merely in our mind? Does the fact that we are able to form a conception of G.o.d prove that G.o.d really exists? Some will answer. Yes.

Because it is absurd to suppose that the mind can form an idea greater than itself, and conceive of a possible order of being greater than the real order. It is, indeed, absurd; but the absurdity cannot be shown without at the same time showing the impossibility of finding any principle of reason prior to the idea of G.o.d. Is that which the reason perceives real being? Then the idea of the infinite is the affirmation of an infinite being. It is impossible to conceive of a possible being greater than the real being, because the real being is directly affirmed as infinite in the idea of reason. The very idea we are seeking to prove real presents itself as real to the reason before we can even begin the process of proving it. It is itself prior to every principle we are looking for as the most ultimate and the most universal. There cannot be found anything from which we can reason _a priori_ to that which is itself prior to all. We have began by affirming our conclusion as the basis of our proof. At the end of our argument we come back to our starting-point.

Is that which the reason perceives not real being? What, then, is it?

It will be said that it is an a idea. If so, this _a priori_ argument proves only that the actual existence of G.o.d is conceivable, and that it cannot be proved that there is no G.o.d. It may even make his real existence appear to be probable, taken in connection with the other arguments usually employed. At best, however, it leaves the idea of G.o.d always under the form of an hypothesis, and affords no protection against the corruption of the idea by pantheistic and materialistic notions. Where is the pa.s.sage from the abstract to the concrete, from the mental conception to the objective reality? If our conceptions of G.o.d lie in the order of an abstract world, and it is not the reality which is the ultimate object of reason, how can we ever obtain cert.i.tude that there is a real world corresponding to that abstract world which exists in our own mind? Such is the reasoning of modern materialism which is conducting vast numbers as near to absolute atheism as the mind by its own nature is able to go. For the cla.s.s of men alluded to there are no realities except those of the sensible world. The spiritual world of dogmatic truth, religious obligation, and supernatural hopes, is ignored and neglected as merely abstract, hypothetical, and having at best but a dubious claim on our attention; one which may with safety and prudence be practically set aside for the more obvious claims of the present life. The entire falsity of this whole philosophy of the abstract, and the nullity of all abstractions considered as self-subsisting objects of thought, will be more directly shown hereafter. For the present we say no more on this head, but proceed to consider another form in which the argument from abstract, _a priori_ principles is presented.

We have an idea of the good, the beautiful, the true, as being necessary, universal, and eternal. Therefore there must be a being in whose mind these ideas exist, or of whom these qualities can be affirmed. This argument has been answered in answering {298} the foregoing one, with which it nearly coincides. Are these ideas abstract, independent of reality, antecedent to the idea of real, concrete being? Then they are forms of the mind, and leave it without a direct perception of the existence of a real, concrete being, infinitely good, beautiful, and true; or rather, the infinite goodness, beauty, and truth in himself. Are these ideas immediate affirmations of this real being? Then we have lost again our _a priori_ principle, by finding that the conclusion is actually prior to it. Either we affirm the intuition of the concrete, real object, from which the abstract conception of the good, the beautiful, and the true is derived, or we can prove only the existence of these conceptions in the mind, and cannot argue from the conceptions to the reality, or in any way perceive clearly the existence of the reality in an order external to our own mind.

Let us pa.s.s now to the argument called _a posteriori_. This is a method of reasoning exactly the reverse of the former; in which we proceed from effects to their causes, and from particulars to the universal. We endeavor to prove the existence of G.o.d from certain facts which cannot be accounted for unless they are regarded as effects of an absolute first cause.

We may consider this argument from two distinct points of view. First, we may take it as an effort to deduce the existence of G.o.d from a great number of facts, as the result of our knowledge of these particular facts; an effort to prove by experiment and observation an hypothesis which is proposed as a probable solution of the problem of the universe. We suppose that we begin without the idea of G.o.d. We acquire the knowledge of particular facts through sensation and reflection. By noting a great number of facts, and reflecting upon them, we ascend to general and abstract truths, and as a last result arrive at the conception of the being of G.o.d as the most universal truth, and the one which is the sum of all probabilities.