A Political History of the State of New York Volume III Part 12

[Footnote 1010: _Ibid._, September 16.]

Seymour's action was variously interpreted. Some p.r.o.nounced it tricky; others, that he declined because he feared defeat.[1011] But there was no evidence of insincerity. He wanted the office less in 1864 than he did in 1862. It had brought labour and anxiety, and no relief from increasing solicitude was in sight if re-elected. But his friends, resenting the New York delegation's action in withholding from him its support for President, determined to be avenged by renominating him for governor. They knew that Dean Richmond, whose admiration for the Governor had not been increased by the latter's performance at Chicago, wanted a candidate of more p.r.o.nounced views respecting a vigorous prosecution of the war, and that in his support of Allen he had the convention well in hand. Wisely distrusting the Regency, therefore, they worked in secret, talking of the honour and prestige of a complimentary vote, but always declaring, what Seymour himself emphasised, that the Governor would not again accept the office. Not a misstep left its print in the proceedings. Before the chairman put the motion for his renomination, a delegate from Oneida, rising to withdraw the name, was quieted by the a.s.surance that it was only complimentary. An Albany lieutenant of Dean Richmond, obtaining the floor with the help of a stentorian voice, began to block the movement, but quickly subsided after hearing the explanation from a delegate at his side that it was only complimentary. When the motion had carried, however, and the Oneida gentleman began fulfilling the Governor's directions, came the cry, "Too late, too late. We have nominated the candidate!" So perfectly was the _coup d'etat_ arranged that the prime mover of the scheme was appointed chairman of the committee to wait upon the Governor. Afterwards people recalled, with a disposition to connect Seymour with this master-stroke in politics, that he had never declined by letter, and that the reasons given, like the illness that kept him from facing the convention, were largely imaginary. "That crowd saw how beautifully they were done,"

said Depew, then secretary of state at Albany, "while Dean Richmond's language was never printed."[1012]

[Footnote 1011: "Seymour tried to get the nomination at Chicago by the same tricky means he has secured it at Albany,--by declaring beforehand that he would not be a candidate. He failed at Chicago because of the overwhelming popularity of McClellan; he succeeded at Albany by his friends seizing a moment to nominate him when the convention was in a delirium of enthusiasm at his apparent self-sacrifice in persisting to decline."--New York _Herald_ (editorial), September 17, 1864.]

[Footnote 1012: From Chauncey M. Depew's speech, March 23, 1901.--_Addresses of_, p. 105.

"The ticket nominated is as follows: Governor, Horatio Seymour of Oneida; Lieutenant-Governor, David R. Floyd Jones of Queens; Ca.n.a.l Commissioner, Jarvis Lord of Monroe; Prison Inspector, David B. McNeil of Clinton; electors-at-large, William E. Kelley of Dutchess and Was.h.i.+ngton Hunt of Niagara."--New York _Herald_, September 16, 1864.]

Scarcely had the convention adjourned before the brilliant achievements in the Shenandoah valley thrilled the North from Maine to California. On September 19, at the battle of Winchester, General Sheridan defeated General Early, and on the 22d, at Fisher's Hill, put him to flight. "Only darkness," Sheridan telegraphed Grant, "has saved the whole of Early's army from total destruction. I do not think there ever was an army so badly routed."[1013] These victories, recalling those of Stonewall Jackson in 1862, appealed to the popular imagination and quickly rea.s.sured the country. Besides, on September 21, the withdrawal of Fremont and Cochrane, the Cleveland candidates, united Radical and Conservative in a vigorous campaign for Lincoln. A private letter from Grant, who partic.i.p.ated in the glory accorded Sherman and Sheridan, told the true condition of the Confederacy. "The rebels," he said, "have now in their ranks their last man. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force.

Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing, from desertions and other causes, at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is not far distant, if we only be true to ourselves."[1014]

[Footnote 1013: Official Records, Vol. 43, Part 1, p. 26.]

[Footnote 1014: New York _Times_, September 9, 1864; Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1864, p. 134.]

This story, coupled with recent victories, turned the Democratic platform into a lie. Instead of being a failure, the war was now recognised as a grand success, and radical speakers, replying to the clamour for a cessation of hostilities, maintained that the abolition of slavery was the only condition that promised a permanent peace.

Brilliant descriptions of Grant's work, aided by his distinguished lieutenants, were supplemented later in the campaign by the recital of "Sheridan's Ride," which produced the wildest enthusiasm. Indeed, the influence of the army's achievements, dissipating the despondency of the summer months, lifted the campaign into an atmosphere of patriotism not before experienced since the spring of 1861, and established the belief that Lincoln's re-election meant the end of secession and slavery. "There will be peace," said John Cochrane, "but it will be the peace which the musket gives to a conquered host."[1015]

[Footnote 1015: New York _Tribune_, October 11, 1864.]

Referring to the farewell speech of Alexander H. Stephens upon his retirement from public life in 1859, George William Curtis, with the eloquence that adorned his addresses at that period, thrilled his audience with an exciting war picture: "Listen to Mr. Stephens in the summer suns.h.i.+ne six years ago. 'There is not now a spot of the public territory of the United States over which the national flag floats where slavery is excluded by the law of Congress, and the highest tribunal of the land has decided that Congress has no power to make such a law. At this time there is not a ripple upon the surface. The country was never in a profounder quiet.' Do you comprehend the terrible significance of those words? He stops; he sits down. The summer sun sets over the fields of Georgia. Good-night, Mr.

Stephens--a long good-night. Look out from your window--how calm it is! Upon Missionary Ridge, upon Lookout Mountain, upon the heights of Dalton, upon the spires of Atlanta, silence and solitude; the peace of the Southern policy of slavery and death. But look! Hark! Through the great five years before you a light is s.h.i.+ning--a sound is ringing.

It is the gleam of Sherman's bayonets, it is the roar of Grant's guns, it is the red daybreak and wild morning music of peace indeed, the peace of national life and liberty."[1016]

[Footnote 1016: Edward Cary, _Life of G.W. Curtis_, pp. 186-187.]

The sulkers now came out of their tents. Daniel S. d.i.c.kinson, no longer peddling his griefs in private ears, declared "there was no doubt of the President's triumphant election;"[1017] the tone of Bryant and the _Evening Post_ changed; Beecher renewed hope through the _Independent_ and preached a political sermon every Sunday evening; Weed and Raymond discontinued their starless letters to Lincoln; George Opd.y.k.e cancelled the call for a second national convention and another candidate for President; and Horace Greeley, silent as to his part in the recent conspiracy, joined the army of Union orators.

Catching again the spirit of the great moral impulse and that lofty enthusiasm which had aroused the people of the North to the decisive struggle against slavery, these leaders sprang to the work of advancing the cause of liberty and human rights.

[Footnote 1017: New York _Sun_, June 30, 1889.]

The Democrats sought to evade Vallandigham's words of despair, written into the Chicago platform, by eulogising McClellan, but as the glory of Antietam paled in the presence of Sherman's and Sheridan's victories, they declared that success in the field did not mean peace.

"Armed opposition is driven from the fields of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and parts of Louisiana," said Horatio Seymour, "and yet this portion of country, already conquered, requires more troops to hold it under military rule than are demanded for our armies to fight the embattled forces of the Confederacy. You will find that more men will be needed to keep the South in subjection to the arbitrary projects of the Administration than are required to drive the armies of rebellion from the field. The peace you are promised is no peace, but is a condition which will perpetuate and make enduring all the worst features of this war."[1018]

[Footnote 1018: _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, p. 254.]

In their eagerness Democratic speakers, encouraged by the New York _World_, then the ablest and most influential journal of its party, turned with bitterness, first upon Lincoln's administration, and finally upon Lincoln himself. "Is Mr. Lincoln honest?" asked the _World_. "That he has succ.u.mbed to the opportunities and temptations of his present place is capable of the easiest proof."[1019] This was sufficient for the stump orator and less influential journal to base angry and extravagant charges of wrong-doing, which became frequent and noisy.[1020] John Van Buren called Lincoln a "twenty-second-rate man," and declared the country "irretrievably gone" if McClellan was defeated.[1021] Seymour did not charge Lincoln with personal dishonesty, but he thought his administration had rendered itself a partner in fraud and corruption. "I do not mean to say," he declared, "that the Administration is to be condemned because, under circ.u.mstances so unusual as those which have existed during this war, bad men have taken advantage of the confusion in affairs to do wrong.

But I do complain that when these wrongs are done, the Government deliberately pa.s.ses laws that protect the doer, and thus make wrong-doing its own act. Moreover, in an election like this, when the Government is spending such an enormous amount of money, and the liability to peculation is so great, the Administration that will say to contractors, as has been openly said in circulars, 'You have had a good contract, out of which you have made money, and we expect you to use a part of that money to a.s.sist to replace us in power,' renders itself a partner in fraud and corruption."[1022]

[Footnote 1019: New York _World_, September 22, 23, 1864.]

[Footnote 1020: "The _Journal of Commerce_ of yesterday indulges in a general fling against the personal habits of the President and other members of his family."--New York _Herald_, October 11, 1864.]

[Footnote 1021: _Ibid._, November 5.]

[Footnote 1022: _Public Record of Horatio Seymour_, p. 257.]

After Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana swung into line on October 10 no doubt remained as to the general result. But Republican confidence in New York was greatly shaken by the disclosure of a conspiracy to use the soldier vote for fraudulent purposes. Under an amendment to the Const.i.tution, ratified in March, 1864, soldiers in the field were allowed to vote, provided properly executed proxies were delivered to election inspectors in their home districts within sixty days next previous to the election, and to facilitate the transmission of such proxies agents for the State were appointed at Baltimore, Was.h.i.+ngton, and other points. Several of these agents, charged with forgery, were arrested by the military authorities, one of whom confessed that enough forged proxies had been forwarded from Was.h.i.+ngton "to fill a dry-goods box." Of these spurious ballots several hundred were seized, and two of the forgers committed to the penitentiary.[1023] "We are informed," said the _Tribune_, "that Oswego county is flooded with spurious McClellan votes of every description. There are forged votes from living as well as from dead soldiers; fict.i.tious votes from soldiers whose genuine votes and powers of attorney are in the hands of their friends. These packages correspond with the work described in the recent Baltimore investigation."[1024] Meantime Governor Seymour, uneasy lest the liberties of his agents be limited, directed Amasa J.

Parker, William F. Allen, and William Kelly to proceed to Was.h.i.+ngton and "vindicate the laws of the State" and "expose all attempts to prevent soldiers from voting, or to detain or alter the votes already cast." These commissioners, after a hurried investigation, reported that "although there may have been irregularities, they have found no evidence that any frauds have been committed by any person connected with the New York agency."[1025] Nevertheless, the sequel showed that this plot, if not discovered, would probably have changed the result in the State.

[Footnote 1023: Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1864, pp. 584-8; New York _Herald_, November 4 and 5; New York _Tribune_, October 27, 28, 29, November 2, 4. 5.]

[Footnote 1024: _Ibid._, November 5, 1864.]

[Footnote 1025: Appleton's _Cyclopaedia_, 1864, pp. 584-588.]

During the last month of the campaign the interest of the whole country centred in New York. Next to the election of Lincoln, Republicans everywhere desired the defeat of Seymour. To them his speech at Chicago had been a malignant indictment of the Government, and his one address in the campaign, while it did not impute personal dishonesty to the President, had branded his administration as a party to fraud. Lincoln regarded the contest in New York as somewhat personal to himself, and from day to day sought information with the anxious persistency that characterised his inquiries during the canva.s.s in 1860. Fenton fully appreciated the importance of vindicating the President, and for the admirable thoroughness of the campaign he received great credit.

After the polls had closed on November 8 it soon became known that although the President had 179 electoral votes to 21 for McClellan, New York was in grave doubt. On Wednesday approximated returns put Republicans 1,400 ahead. Finally it developed that in a total vote of 730,821, Lincoln had 6,749 more than McClellan, and Fenton 8,293 more than Seymour. Fenton's vote exceeded Lincoln's by 1,544. "We believe this the only instance," said the _Tribune_, "in which a Republican candidate for governor polled a heavier vote than that cast for our candidate for President at the same election."[1026] The Legislature was largely Republican, and the twenty congressmen, a gain of five, included Roscoe Conkling and John A. Griswold, an intrepid, energetic spirit--the very incarnation of keen good sense. Like Erastus Corning, whom he succeeded in Congress, Griswold was a business man, whose intelligent interest in public affairs made him mayor of Troy at the age of twenty-eight. In 1862 he carried his district as a Democrat by over 2,000 majority, but developing more political independence than friend or foe had antic.i.p.ated, he refused to follow his party in war legislation, and with Moses F. Odell, a Democratic colleague from Brooklyn, boldly supported the Thirteenth Amendment. This made him a Republican.

[Footnote 1026: New York _Tribune_, January 18, 1869.]

To this galaxy also belonged Henry J. Raymond. He had come into possession of great fame. His graceful and vigorous work on the _Times_, supplemented by his incisive speeches and rare intelligence in conventions, had won many evidences of his party's esteem, but with a desire for office not less p.r.o.nounced than Greeley's[1027] he coveted a seat in Congress from a district which gave a Tammany majority of 2,000 in 1862. To the surprise of his friends he won by a plurality of 386. It was the greatest victory of the year, and, in the end, led to the saddest event of his life.

[Footnote 1027: Apropos of Greeley's desire for office, Waldo M.

Hutchins when in Congress in 1879 told Joseph G. Cannon, now the distinguished speaker of the House of Representatives, that in September, 1864, during a call upon Greeley, the latter exhibited a letter from Lincoln two days old, inviting him to the White House.

Greeley, mindful of his efforts to subst.i.tute another candidate for Lincoln, said he would not reply and should not go, but Hutchins finally gained consent to represent him. Hutchins reached Was.h.i.+ngton very early the next morning, and the President, although clad only in unders.h.i.+rt and trousers, received him and began enlarging upon the importance of a re-election, suggesting that in such event Seward would enjoy being minister to England, and that Greeley would make an admirable successor to Benjamin Franklin, the first postmaster-general.

Hutchins reported this to Greeley, who immediately turned the _Tribune_ into a Lincoln organ. In the following April Greeley recalled Lincoln's statement to Hutchins, who at once left for the capital. He reached Was.h.i.+ngton the morning after the President's a.s.sa.s.sination.]

CHAPTER X

A COMPLETE CHANGE OF POLICY

1865

For the moment the surrender of Lee and the collapse of the Confederacy left the Democrats without an issue. The war had not been a failure, peace had come without the intervention of a convention of the States, the South was "subjugated," the abolition of slavery accomplished, arbitrary arrests were forgotten, the professed fear of national bankruptcy had disappeared, and Seymour's prophetic gift was in eclipse. Nothing had happened which he predicted--everything had transpired which he opposed. Meanwhile, under the administration of Andrew Johnson, the country was gradually recovering from the awful shock of Abraham Lincoln's a.s.sa.s.sination.

Substantially following Lincoln's policy, the President had issued, on May 29, 1865, a proclamation of amnesty pardoning such as had partic.i.p.ated in rebellion,[1028] with restoration of all rights of property except as to slaves, on condition that each take an oath to support the Const.i.tution and to obey the laws respecting emanc.i.p.ation.

He also prescribed a mode for the reconstruction of States lately in rebellion. This included the appointment of provisional governors authorised to devise the proper machinery for choosing legislatures, which should determine the qualification of electors and office-holders. In this preliminary scheme Johnson limited the voters to white men. Personally he declared himself in favour of a qualified suffrage for negroes, but he thought this a matter to be determined by the States themselves.

[Footnote 1028: Except certain specified cla.s.ses, the most important of which were civil or diplomatic officers of the Confederacy, military officers above the rank of colonel, governors of States, former members of Congress who had left their seats to aid the rebellion, and all who owned property to exceed $20,000 in value. But these excepted persons might make special application to the President for pardon and to them clemency would be "liberally extended."]

A policy that excluded the negro from all partic.i.p.ation in public affairs did not commend itself to the leaders of the Radicals. It was believed that Mississippi's denial of even a limited suffrage to the negro, such as obtained in New York, indicated the feeling of the Southern people, and the Union conventions of Pennsylvania, dominated by Thaddeus Stevens, and of Ma.s.sachusetts, controlled by Charles Sumner, refused to endorse the President's scheme. During the summer Horace Greeley, in several earnest and able editorials, advocated negro suffrage as a just and politic measure, but he carefully avoided any reflection upon the President, and disclaimed the purpose of making such suffrage an inexorable condition in reconstruction.[1029]

Nevertheless, the Radicals of the State hesitated to leave the civil status of coloured men to their former masters.

[Footnote 1029: New York _Tribune_, June 14, 15, 20, 26, 28, July 8, 10, 31, August 26, September 20, October 7, 19, 1864.]

Johnson's policy especially appealed to the Democrats, and at their State convention, held at Albany on September 9 (1865), they promised the President their cordial support, commended his reconstruction policy, pledged the payment of the war debt, thanked the army and navy, and denounced the denial "of representation to States in order to compel them to adopt negro equality or negro suffrage as an element of their Const.i.tutions."[1030] Indeed, with one stroke of the pen the convention erased all issues of the war, and with one stroke of the axe rid itself of the men whom it held responsible for defeat. It avoided Seymour for president of the convention; it nominated for secretary of state Henry W. Sloc.u.m of Onondaga, formerly a Republican office-holder, whose superb leaders.h.i.+p as a corps commander placed him among New York's most famous soldiers; it preferred John Van Buren to Samuel J. Tilden for attorney-general; and it refused Manton Marble's platform, although the able editor of the _World_ enjoyed the hospitality of the committee room. Further to popularise its action, it welcomed back to its fold Lucius Robinson, whom it nominated for comptroller, an office he was then holding by Republican suffrage.

[Footnote 1030: New York _Herald_, September 9.]

Robinson's political somersault caused no surprise. His dislike of the Lincoln administration, expressed in his letter to the Cleveland convention, influenced him to support McClellan, while the Radicals'

tendency to accept negro suffrage weakened his liking for the Republican party. However, no unkind words followed his action.