Essays on the Constitution of the United States Part 3

In some former publications, I have confined myself chiefly to pointing out the views of the opposers to the plan of federal government; the reason why I did not enter particularly into the merits of the new const.i.tution is, that I conceived if it was candidly read, and properly attended to, that alone would be sufficient to recommend it to the acceptance of every rational and thinking mind that was interested in the happiness of the United States of America. Some babblers of the opposition junto have, however, complained that nothing has been said, except in general terms, in favour of the federal const.i.tution; in consequence of this, incompetent as I am to the undertaking, I have been induced to lay the following remarks before the publick.

Sect. first, of the new const.i.tution, says,

"All legislative powers Herein Granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States."

I beg the reader to pay particular attention to the words herein granted, as perhaps there may be occasion for me to recur to them more than once in the course of my observations.

The second section of the federal const.i.tution says, that the members of the house of representatives shall be chosen every second year, and the electors shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Some have made objections to the time for which the representatives are to be chosen; but it is to be considered, that the convention, in this particular, meant to accommodate the time for which the representatives should stand elected, to the const.i.tutions of the different states. If it had been provided, that the time should have been of shorter duration, would not a citizen of Maryland or South-Carolina had reason to murmur?

The weakness the anti-federalists discover in insinuating that the federal government will have it in their power to establish a despotick government, must be obvious to every one; for the time for which they are elected is so short, as almost to preclude the possibility of their effecting plans for enslaving so vast an empire as the United States of America, even if they were so base as to hope for anything of the kind.

The representatives of the people would also be conscious, that their good conduct alone, would be the only thing which could influence a free people to continue to bestow on them their suffrages: the representatives of the people would not, moreover, dare to act contrary to the instructions of their const.i.tuents; and if any one can suppose that they would, I would ask them, why such clamour is made about a bill of rights, for securing the liberties of the subject? for if the delegates dared to act contrary to their instructions, would they be afraid to encroach upon a bill of rights? If they determined among themselves to use their efforts to effect the establishment of an aristocratical or despotick government, would a bill of rights be any obstacle to their proceedings? If they were guilty of a breach of trust in one instance, they would be so in another.

The second section also says, no person shall be elected a representative who shall not have been seven years an inhabitant of the United States.

This clause effectually confounds all the a.s.sertions of the anti-federalists, respecting the representatives not being sufficiently acquainted with the different local interests of their const.i.tuents; for a representative, qualified as the const.i.tution directs, must be a greater numbskull than a Vox Populi or an Agrippa,(12) not to have a knowledge of the different concerns of the Confederation.

The objection that the representation will not be sufficient, is weak in the highest degree. It is supposed, that there are sufficient inhabitants in the state of Ma.s.sachusetts to warrant the sending of six delegates, at least, to the new Congress-To suppose that three gentlemen, of the first characters and abilities, were inadequate to represent the concerns of this state in a just manner, would be absurd in the highest degree, and contradictory to reason and common sense. The weakness of the anti-federalists, in regard to the point just mentioned, sufficiently shews their delinquency with respect to rational argument. They have done nothing more than barely to a.s.sert, that the representation would not be sufficient: it is a true saying, that a.s.sertions are often the very reverse of facts.

Sect. third, of the new const.i.tution, says, each state shall choose two senators, &c. The liberalty of this clause is sufficient, any reasonable person would suppose, to damp all opposition.

Can any thing be more consistent with the strictest principles of republicanism?

Each state is here upon an equal footing; for the house of representatives can of themselves do nothing without the concurrence of the senate.

The third section further provides, that the senate shall choose their own officers. This is so congenial with the const.i.tution of our own state, that I need not advance any argument to induce the free citizens of Ma.s.sachusetts to approbate it. And those who oppose this part of the federal plan, act in direct opposition to what the anti-federalists often profess, for the excellency of our const.i.tution has been their favourite theme.

The third section also provides, that the senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. This clause seems to be peculiarly obnoxious to anti-federal sycophants.

They have declared it to be arbitrary and tyrannical in the highest degree. But, fellow-citizens, your own good sense will lead you to see the folly and weakness contained in such a.s.sertions. You have experienced the tyranny of such a government; that under which you now live is an exact model of it. In Ma.s.sachusetts, the house of representatives impeach, and the senate try, the offender.

That part of the proposed form of government, which is to be styled the senate, will not have it in their power to try any person, without the consent of two-thirds of the members.

In this respect, therefore, the new const.i.tution is not more arbitrary than the const.i.tution of this state. This clause does not, therefore, savour in the least of any thing more arbitrary than what has already been experienced: so that the horrours the anti-federal junto pretend to antic.i.p.ate on that head, must sink into nothing. Besides, when the house of representatives have impeached, and the senate tried any one, and found him guilty of the offence for which he is impeached, they can only disqualify him from holding any office of power and trust in the United States: and after that he comes within the jurisdiction of the law of the land.

How such a proceeding can be called arbitrary, or thought improper, I cannot conceive. I leave it to the gentlemen in opposition to point out the tyranny of such conduct, and explain the horrid tendency it will have, for the government of the United States to determine whether any one or more of their own body are worthy to continue in the station to which they were elected.

Another clause, which the anti-federal junto labour to prove to be arbitrary and tyrannical, is contained in the fourth section, which provides, that the time and place for electing senators and representatives shall be appointed by the different state legislatures, except Congress shall at any time make a law to alter such regulation in regard to the place of choosing representatives. The former part of this clause, gives not the least opportunity for a display of anti-federal scandal, and the latter, only by misrepresentation, and false construction, is by them made a handle of. What is intended, by saying that Congress shall have power to appoint the place for electing representatives, is, only to have a check upon the legislature of any state, if they should happen to be composed of villains and knaves, as is the case in a sister state;(13) and should take upon themselves to appoint a place for choosing delegates to send to Congress; which place might be the most inconvenient in the whole state; and for that reason be appointed by the legislature, in order to create a disgust in the minds of the people against the federal government, if they themselves should dislike it. The weakness of their arguments on this head, must therefore be obvious to every attentive mind.

There is one thing, however, which I might mention, as a reason why the opposition junto dread the clause aforementioned-they may suppose, that Congress, when the people are a.s.sembled for the choice of their rulers, in the place they have appointed, will send their terrible standing army (which I shall speak of in its place) and, Cesar Borgia like, ma.s.sacre the whole, in order to render themselves absolute. This is so similar to many of the apprehensions they have expressed, that I could not pa.s.s it by unnoticed. Indeed the chief of their productions abound with improbabilities and absurdities of the like kind; for having nothing reasonable to alledge against a government founded on the principles of staunch republicanism, and which, if well supported, will establish the glory and happiness of our country. They resort to things the most strange and fallacious, in order to blind the eyes of the unsuspecting and misinformed.

Ca.s.sIUS.

(_To be continued._)

Ca.s.sius, IX.

The Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette, (Number 392)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1787.

For the Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE.

(_Continued from our last._)

Section 5, of the new const.i.tution, says, Each house shall be a judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members-a majority shall const.i.tute a quorum, and be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the law may provide. Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings-punish its members for disorderly behaviour-and with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. No one, who professes to be governed by reason, will dispute the propriety of any a.s.sembly's being the judge of the qualifications requisite to const.i.tute a member of their own body. That part of the fifth section which says a majority shall const.i.tute a quorum, has been an object against which many anti-federal shafts have been levelled. It has been a.s.serted by some, that this clause empowers a majority of members present, to transact any business relating to the affairs of the United States, and that eight or ten members of the house of representatives, and an equal number of the senate, might pa.s.s a law which would benefit themselves, and injure the community at large. The fallacy of such a.s.sertions is sufficiently conspicuous to render them ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of every unprejudiced mind-for the section further expresses, That a smaller number than a quorum may adjourn from day to day, and be authorised to compel attendance of absent members.

This is all the power that is vested in a smaller number than the majority. It is therefore evident, that when it says a majority shall const.i.tute a quorum to do business, it means a majority of the whole number of members that belong to either house.

Sect. 5, further provides, That each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. This clause is so openly marked with every feature of republicanism, and expressed in such liberal and comprehensive terms, that it needs no comment to render it acceptable to the enlightened citizens of Ma.s.sachusetts.

Sect. 6, provides, That the senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law-they shall, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their session.-The necessity of such regulations must appear plain to every one; the inhabitants of Ma.s.sachusetts, fully convinced of the justness of such provision, made it in the const.i.tution of this state.

The 6th section further says, No member shall be called to account for sentiments delivered in either house, at any other place. In this clause, the freedom of debate, so essential to the preservation of liberty and the support of a republican form of government, is amply provided for. Impeded by no obstacle whatever, the patriot may here proclaim every sentiment that glows within his breast. How far despotism can encroach upon such a government I leave the antifederal junto to declare.

The 6th section further provides, that no senator or representative shall, during the time he is in office, be elected or appointed to any office under the United States-nor shall any person, holding any office under the government, be elected a member of either house during his continuance in that station.

This clause at once confutes every a.s.sertion of the antifederalists respecting the new congress being able to secure to themselves all offices of power, profit and trust. This section is even more rigidly republican than the const.i.tution of this commonwealth; for in the general a.s.sembly of Ma.s.sachusetts, a civil officer is not excluded a seat; whereas the new const.i.tution expressly a.s.serts that no person in civil office under the United States shall be eligible to a seat in either house.

Sect. 7 provides that all bills for raising revenues shall originate in the house of representatives. Here again must the anti-federalists appear weak and contemptible in their a.s.sertions that the senate will have it in their power to establish themselves a complete aristocratick body; for this clause fully evinces that if their inclinations were ever so great to effect such an establishment, it would answer no end, for being unable to levy taxes, or collect a revenue, is a sufficient check upon every attempt of such a nature.

The 7th section further provides, That every bill which pa.s.ses the house of representatives and the senate, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the president of the United States; if he objects to it the sense of both houses will be again taken on the subject, and if two-thirds of the members are in favour of the bill, it pa.s.ses into a law.

Much clamour has been made about the power of the president; it has been a.s.serted that his influence would be such as to enable him to continue in office during life.

Such insinuations are founded on a very slender basis. If the president opposes the sense of both houses, without sufficient reasons for his conduct, he will soon become obnoxious, and his influence vanish like the fleeting smoke; and his objection to anything which the house and senate may think calculated for the promotion of the publick good, will be of no effect.

Sect. 8 provides, That Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises, &c.-to pay debts, to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States-that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the Union-they shall have power to coin money, and to fix the value thereof, &c.-The impotency of the present Congress sufficiently indicates the necessity of granting greater powers to a federal head; and it is highly requisite such a head should be enabled to establish a fund adequate to the exigencies of the Union.

The propriety of all duties and imposts being uniform throughout the states, cannot be disputed. It is also highly requisite that Congress should be enabled to establish a coin which shall circulate the same throughout all the states. The necessity of such arrangements is certainly very obvious. For other particulars contained in the 8th section, I must refer my readers to the Const.i.tution, and am confident they will find it replete with nothing more than what is absolutely necessary should be vested in the guardians of a free country.

Can, then, those murmuring sycophants, who oppose the plan of federal government, wish for anything more liberal than what is contained in the aforementioned section? If the powers of a federal head were to be established on as weak a frame as that on which the present confederation is founded, what effect would any const.i.tution have in giving energy to measures designed to promote the glory of the Union, and for establis.h.i.+ng its honour and credit? One great object of the federal Convention was, to give more power to future a.s.semblies of the States. In this they have done liberally, without partiallity to the interests of the states individually; and their intentions were known before the honourable body was dissolved. And now that a form of government, every way adequate to the purposes of the Union, has been proposed by them, in which proper powers are to be vested in the supreme head, a hue and cry is raised by the sons of sedition and dishonesty, as though an army of uncirc.u.mcised Philistines were upon us!

They are bellowing about, that tyranny will inevitably follow the adoption of the proposed const.i.tution. It is, however, an old saying, that the greatest rogue is apt to cry rogue first. This we may rely upon, that if we follow perfidious counsels, as those are, I dare affirm, of the anti-federalists, every evil which that sapp brood antic.i.p.ates, will befall us. Besides, foreign creditors will not be cheated out of their property; nor will the creditors of our own country be tame spectators of the sacrifice of their interest at the shrine of villainy.

Section 9th says, The writ of habeus corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion, or the invasion of the publick safety may require it. It has been a.s.serted by some, that a person accused of a crime, would be obliged to ruin himself, in order to prove his innocence; as he would be obliged to repair to the seat of federal government, in order to have his cause tried before a federal court, and be liable to pay all expenses which might be incurred in the undertaking. But the section beforementioned proves that a.s.sertion to be futile and false, as it expressly provides for securing the right of the subjects, in regard to his being tried in his own state.

The 9th section further provides, that a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all publick monies, shall be published from time to time. Thus the people will have it in their power to examine the appropriations made of the revenues and taxes collected by Congress; and if they are not satisfied in regard to the conduct of their rulers in this respect, they will be able to effect a change agreeable to their wishes.

The last section of this article provides, that no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, &c., coin money, emit bills of credit, make any other but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts-all laws respecting imposts, duties, and excises, shall be subject to the revision and controul of Congress.

The absolute necessity of powers of this nature being vested in a federal head is indisputable.

For want of such a power, what vile proceedings have of late disgraced almost every legislative measure of Rhode Island! For want of such a power, some honest creditors in Ma.s.sachusetts have been paid in old horses and enormous rocks, in return for money loaned upon interest. With respect to the controul of Congress over laws of the afore-mentioned description, it is highly requisite that it should take place: nor have the people any thing to fear from such a proceeding; for their controul cannot be extended farther than the powers granted in the new const.i.tution; the words of which are, "all powers Herein Granted." If any act originates contrary to this, it will be of no effect, and a mere nullity.

Section one, of article second, provides that the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States. The necessity of such a provision must appear reasonable to any one; and further remarks, therefore, on this head will be needless.