Cuba Part 9

But the government was soon to be undeceived. The insurrection became a very serious matter indeed. The insurgents pursued very much the same tactics that they had followed in the Ten Years War, that is, they would seldom risk an open battle, and the Spaniards could gain but little ground against the guerilla methods of their opponents.

The Cubans were very badly equipped; in fact they had scarcely any war material whatever. They began by appropriating indiscriminately any fire arms wherever they could find them, from the repeating rifle to the shot gun with the ramrod. Many of them were armed only with revolvers, and the majority of them had simply the "machete," a knife about nineteen inches in length.

Recruits constantly came to their ranks, however, and it was not long before they numbered over six thousand.

A political crisis now took place in Spain, and the conservative party came into power. Premier Canovas then appointed as governor-general of Cuba, Martinez Campos, who had been so successful, by diplomacy rather than by anything else, in ending the Ten Years War.

He landed at Guantanamo, and before visiting Havana, he issued the most elaborate instructions to every department of the military service, which now had been largely reinforced.

In the early part of the war, a great misfortune befell the Cubans, and that was in the loss of their beloved leader, Jose Marti.

On the 18th of May, a part of the insurgent army camped upon the plains of Dos Rios, where they learned that the enemy was in the neighborhood, in safety, protected by a fort.

The insurgents numbered about seven hundred cavalrymen, under the command of Marti and Gomez.

The next morning they came upon the Spanish outpost. Gomez, who has always shown himself to be a prudent general, thought it would be wiser not to risk a battle, but to continue their route, as the object of the expedition was not skirmis.h.i.+ng, but to attempt to penetrate into the Province of Puerto Principe.

But Jose Marti, in his fiery enthusiasm longed to fall upon the enemy; he declared that not to do so would be dishonor. Gomez yielded.

Marti was mounted upon a very spirited horse. He was told that it was unmanageable, but he would not listen to reason. Crying, "Come on, my children!" and "Viva Cuba Libre," he dashed upon the Spanish, followed by his men.

Before this onslaught, the Spaniards retreated, but in good order. Gomez cried to his troops to rally, but Marti, dragged on by his horse which he was unable to control, disappeared among the ranks of the enemy. He received a bullet above the left eye, another in the throat, and several bayonet thrusts in the body.

Led by Gomez, who was heart broken at the fate of his old companion and friend, the insurgents charged upon the Spaniards, but it was of no avail. The latter retained possession of the corpse of the gallant soldier, whose only fault was a too reckless bravery.

And now it is a pleasure to be able to recount one n.o.ble act on the part of the Spaniards, perhaps the only one in the whole course of the war.

General Campos, who was a just and honorable man, ordered the body of the ill.u.s.trious patriot to receive decent burial, and one of the Spanish officers even p.r.o.nounced a sort of eulogy over the remains.

There was a report that Gomez had also been killed, but this was a mistake. About a mouth afterward he crossed the trocha and entered the province of Puerto Principe, more commonly known as the Camaguey.

The trocha, by the way, was an invention of Campos in the preceding war, and was found to be of great value. It was practically a line of forts extending across the island between the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, and it was intended that the insurgents should not be allowed to cross this line. Other trochas were afterwards erected, but they have not proved of any extraordinary advantage in the present insurrection.

An a.s.sembly, composed of representatives of all the bands that were under arms, met and elected the officers of the revolutionary government.

Salvador Cisneros, otherwise known as the Marquis of Santa Lucia, was elected president, the same office he had filled during the Ten Years War.

The other officers were:

Vice-President, Bartolomeo Maso.

Secretary of State, Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo.

Secretary of War, Carlos Roloff.

Secretary of the Treasury, Severo Pina.

General-in-Chief, Maximo Gomez.

Lieutenant-General, Antonio Maceo.

Afterwards, at another election, as officers, according to the Cuban const.i.tution, only serve two years, there were replaced by the following:

President, Bartolomeo Maso. Vice-President, Mendez Capote.

Secretary of State, Andres Moreno de la Torres.

Secretary of War, Jose B. Alemon.

Secretary of the Treasury, Ernesto Fons Sterling.

Maximo Gomez still remained general-in-chief.

Gomez and Campos were now pitted once more against each other, as they had been in the previous war.

Both men issued orders to their respective commands.

Gomez ordered the Cubans to attack the small Spanish outposts, capture their arms if possible setting at liberty every man who should deliver them up; to cut all railway and telegraph lines; to keep on the defensive and retreat in groups, unless the Cubans were in a position to fight the enemy at great advantage; to destroy Spanish forts and other buildings where any resistance was made by the enemy; to destroy all sugar crops and mills, the owners of which refused to contribute to the Cuban war fund; and, finally to forbid the farmers to send any food to the cities unless upon the payment of certain taxes.

On his part, Campos issued the following commands:

Several regiments to protect the sugar estates; other detachments to be placed along the railroads, and on every train in motion; to attack always, unless the enemy's numbers were three to one; all rebels, except officers, who surrendered, to be allowed to go free and unmolested; convoys of provisions to be sent to such towns as needed them.

Everything was now in readiness for a fierce campaign, and one that threatened to be protracted. It was not long before operations commenced in earnest.

CHAPTER VIII.

CUBAN TACTICS.

There was one incident which occurred in the early part of the disturbances which caused a certain amount of excitement in the United States, as it was thought that it would prove to be a repet.i.tion of the Virginius affair.

On the 8th of March, 1895, the s.h.i.+p Allianca was bound from Colon to New York. She was following the usual track of vessels near the Cuban sh.o.r.e.

But, outside the three mile limit, she was fired upon by a Spanish gunboat. President Cleveland declared this to be an unwarrantable interference by Spain with pa.s.sing American s.h.i.+ps. Protest was promptly made by the United States against this act as not being justified by a state of war; nor permissible in respect of a vessel on the usual paths of commerce, nor tolerable in view of the wanton peril occasioned to innocent life and property. This act was disavowed by Spain, with full expression of regret, and with an a.s.surance that there should not be again such just cause for complaint. The offending officer was deposed from his command. All this was eminently satisfactory, and the United States took no further action in the matter.

The chief battle of the campaign, while Campos still remained governor-general, was that fought at Bayamo, in July, 1895. Campos himself commanded in person, and for the first time the Spaniards, ever vain-glorious and self-confident, became aware of the mettle of the men arrayed against them.

The Spanish forces numbered some five thousand men, while the Cubans had not much more than half that number. It was the Spanish strategy, however, to divide their men into detachments, and the Cubans were quick to take advantage of this. The fight was a long and b.l.o.o.d.y affair, but finally the victory, although not p.r.o.nounced, remained with the Cubans.

The Spanish forces were more or less demoralized, and their loses were heavy. Thirteen Spanish officers were killed, while the Cubans lost two colonels. The Cubans admitted that fifty of their number were killed or disabled, but they claimed that the loss of the Spaniards was over three hundred.

It is impossible to tell much from the Spanish accounts, as they were far from being complete and were highly colored. It has been the same way in the present war, as witness the laughable "one mule" report, with which all are familiar.

In this engagement, General Santocildes was killed. It is said that Santocildes sacrificed his own life to save that of his friend and superior, Campos.

There are two very different stories told of the att.i.tude of Antonio Maceo toward Campos in this battle. One is to the effect that he did not know that Campos was commanding in person, but when he was told of it the following day, he said: