Government and Administration of the United States Part 10

Each candidate, a short time after his nomination, is expected to publish a letter of acceptance, in which he expresses his full confidence and belief in the platform which his party has adopted, discloses his views, and outlines what his future policy will be if he is elected.

To recapitulate, then, in a few words, let us see how a President is nominated and elected.

In nominating the President each voter in caucus or primary meeting shares in choosing delegates to the ward convention, which chooses delegates to the city or county convention, which in turn sends delegates to the district conventions. In these, delegates are chosen for the State conventions, where Presidential electors are appointed, and also the delegates sent to the National Convention.

In the National Convention, composed of delegates sent from the State conventions and Territories, the Presidential candidate is nominated.

The electors are elected by the people, who in turn elect the nominees of their National Convention. If State officers, as Governor, Attorney-General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, etc., are to be elected, they are nominated in the State conventions and elected by the people.

Besides counties, towns.h.i.+ps, and cities, States have other subdivisions for political purposes. Thus the whole State is divided into senatorial districts, each one of which sends one Senator to the State legislature, and also into smaller districts, each one of which sends one member to the lower house of the State legislature. Usually a senatorial district is one or more counties, except in the case of large cities, which may in itself contain two or more senatorial districts.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Introduction to the Study of the History of Political Parties in the United States.

A knowledge of the nature of our federal government, and its relations to the State Governments, of which it is composed, is a prerequisite to an understanding of the history of our political parties.

The government of the United States is a federal republic, first formed by the voluntary union of thirteen commonwealths. At present it is composed of forty-four united States. It is a government of enumerated powers, and in this respect differs radically from the governments of the individual States. As all agree, the Federal Government possesses only those powers specifically granted to it by the const.i.tution. The States possess all powers except those granted to the National Government, and those not prohibited to them by the terms of the const.i.tution. When the government of the United States desires to exercise a power, it must be proven that it was the intention of the framers of the const.i.tution, and so expressed in that instrument, that it should possess such a power. The States in the exercise of their powers need only show that they have not resigned that power. If there be any dispute as to the const.i.tutionality of an act of either Congress or a State legislature, the point is decided in the final instance by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the political history of our country since the adoption of the const.i.tution, there have been ever present two great const.i.tutional questions, in the conflicting answers to which we must seek the origin and creeds of our great political parties. If we can gain a proper conception of the character of these two questions, we shall have taken a long step towards the understanding of the reasons for the conduct of the various opposing parties, and the basis of the disputes arising between them. These have been the two questions. First, What is the extent of the powers granted by the const.i.tution to the National Government? Second, What is the real nature of our Union; and, arising under this problem, What is the extent to which the States are justified in opposing what they believe to be unconst.i.tutional acts on the part of the National Government; and, Can a State or States, as a last resort, withdraw from the Union? The remainder of this chapter will be mainly devoted to a more particular examination of these questions.

What are the legitimate powers of the United States Government?

The United States government was the result of the union of thirteen independent colonies--a union voluntary on the part of the colonies, yet forced upon them by the evident need of some central power strong enough to enforce obedience at home and demand respect abroad. The determination of what and how many the national powers should be, was the work of the Const.i.tutional Convention. Of the difficulties of this task we have already spoken.

In forming a scheme for a central government, there was the double necessity of creating a government strong enough to perform the duties for which it was established, and yet not so strong as to endanger the free self-government of the States. The delicate point to be adjusted was to give to the Federal Government only such powers as were necessary for the establishment of an effective National Government, and, as far as possible, to retain in the States their full governmental powers; in other words, to harmonize federal strength with State sovereignty.

The fear exhibited by the States in the debates preceding the adoption and ratification of the const.i.tution of 1787, that the National Government might become too strong at the expense of their own powers of government, was not set at rest by the compromises obtained in the convention, nor by the eleven amendments adopted soon after the inauguration of the new government. The reason for the continuance of this fear is that the const.i.tution is so worded that the powers of the general government are not precisely fixed.

The statement sometimes loosely made that a description of our government is contained in the const.i.tution, is apt to be misleading.

The const.i.tution has served rather as a foundation upon which to build the government, than as an entire framework. As a distinguished writer has termed it, "The const.i.tution was meant only as a scheme in outline, to be filled up afterwards, and from time to time, by legislation."

A description of our present form of government is far from being contained in the instrument adopted in 1788. For example, the const.i.tution makes no mention of how business shall be transacted by the legislature. Committee Government in Congress owes its existence to no provision of the const.i.tution. The only mention made in the const.i.tution of the Speaker of the House, to-day the most powerful officer in the legislature, is where it is provided that "The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers." All executive departments--the State, War, Navy, Treasury, Post Office, Interior, Justice, Agriculture, and Labor--have been created from time to time by act of Congress. Regarding the structure and number of federal courts, the const.i.tution merely provides that "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Our elaborate system of district, circuit, and territorial courts, rests solely upon congressional enactments. So, too, the const.i.tution gives to Congress the control of territories, but does not provide how that control shall be exercised.

The framers of our const.i.tution were wise in not attempting to specify more particularly than they did, the manner in which the several powers granted to the Federal Government should be exercised. They realized that they were forming a scheme that was to endure for many years, and that if it was to be capable of meeting the needs of a changing and rapidly growing country, it would have to be elastic, and contain within itself the power of adapting itself to new needs and conditions. To secure the beneficial execution of the powers granted, Congress was given the power of selecting appropriate means. To have refused the grant of this power, would have been to attempt to provide by unchangeable rule for emergencies that could by no possibilities be foreseen. Or, as Chief Justice Marshall has put it, "It would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circ.u.mstances."

After enumerating the various particular powers given to the Federal Legislature, the const.i.tution further says (Art. I, Sec. 8) "and [shall have power] to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this const.i.tution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." This is the clause under whose authorization all those powers have been a.s.sumed, and functions exercised, that have made the United States government of to-day so different from that of 1789.

The general rule is, as has been said, that the United States government possesses only those powers granted to it by the const.i.tution. But here, in this clause just quoted, is a general grant of all powers necessary or proper for carrying into effect any of the powers particularly granted. Who or what is to decide just what powers are necessary and proper for the accomplishment of this object? Naturally people have not been able to agree upon the question of just what powers are const.i.tutional or expedient as "implied" under this t.i.tle of "necessary and proper" and this question has been largely instrumental in dividing the people in opposing political parties. There has always been a party, the members of which, favoring great powers for the States rather than for the Federal Government, have been "strict constructionists," and have advocated a close and narrow interpretation of this clause of "implied powers." From their desire to retain in the State governments as many powers as possible, they have been known as the "States' Rights Party." Opposing them has been the party of "loose constructionists,"

the members of which have held to a free, liberal interpretation of the const.i.tution, and have endeavored to increase the power of the Federal Government. There have never been political parties styling themselves "Strict Constructionists" and "Loose Constructionists," for these are terms that have been used not as t.i.tles, but as definitions of different principles of const.i.tutional interpretation. But by whatever name they may have been known, there have been, during the greater part of our history, these two political parties, the one holding to the principle of strict construction and States' Rights, and the other to that of loose construction and federal power.

The second fundamental question spoken of in the beginning of this chapter as underlying national politics, is concerning the nature of our union and the rights of state nullification and secession.

A final answer to these questions cannot of course be here attempted, but that which can be done, is to state in a few words just what their meaning is, and the points upon which they have turned. When we come to the consideration of the course of politics in the United States we shall see the answers that history has given to them.

The government of the United States is the judge of its own powers, for it is in its own supreme judicial tribunal that the const.i.tutionality of both State and Federal laws is finally determined. More than once has a practical answer been demanded to the question What is to be done by a State or States when, in their estimation, the National Government has transcended its powers and legislated in an unconst.i.tutional manner?

Obedience, nullification, or, in the last resort, secession from the Union, have been the various alternatives that have offered themselves to the States. Different views of the nature of our Union have sustained the propriety of the selection of different ones of these alternatives.

According to the nullification theory, the const.i.tution is held to be of the nature of a compact between the States as one party and the Federal Government as the other; and that, as in all contracts, if the agreements contained therein are broken by the one party, the other party has the right to refuse its a.s.sent thereto. Therefore, if the United States government attempts the exercise of powers not granted in the compact, the States have the right to interpose the "rightful remedy" of "nullification." That is to say, that each State has the right to determine for itself when an unwarranted power has been a.s.sumed by the general government, and in such a case to declare the obnoxious law null and of no force within her own boundaries.

In considering the question of nullification, it is necessary to distinguish between the theory or rather method of nullification propounded by Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, from that of Calhoun brought forward at the time of South Carolina's resistance to, and attempted nullification of, the Tariff laws of 1828, and 1832. In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions the Alien and Sedition Acts were solemnly declared to be unconst.i.tutional, that the Union was a compact, and the States had the right to interpose the remedy of nullification; but open resistance was not proposed. By the Jeffersonian theory, it was proposed to obtain the opinion of three-fourths of the States that the acts were unconst.i.tutional, and thus to "nullify" them after the manner of a const.i.tutional amendment.

Until such nullification, the laws were to be obeyed.

The Calhoun doctrine was something entirely different from this.

According to his doctrine, any single State might order at once a suspension of the law within her borders, and not until three-fourths of the States in national convention had overruled the nullification could the State be forced to obey the obnoxious law. To use Calhoun's own words, his theory was, that "it belongs to the State, as a member of the Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitely, as far as her citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she has _contracted_; and if, in her opinion, the act exercising the power in dispute be unconst.i.tutional, to declare it null and void, which declaration would be obligatory on her citizens." The sum and substance of this was, as Von Holst has pointed out,[1] to give to one-fourth of the States the power if they saw fit to deprive the Federal Government of every power entrusted to it, that is, to alter the const.i.tution at will.

[Footnote 1: _Const.i.tutional History of the United States_, Vol. I, p.

474, note.]

The right of secession follows as a logical outcome of the theory of nullification rigidly carried out. Federal laws are general in their nature, and if binding anywhere, must be binding everywhere. If then, a minority of States insist on their right of nullification, the federal government will be obliged either to admit that every act of Congress is without any force in a State until it has obtained the tacit approval of the people of that State, or else it will be driven to the necessity of obtaining the enforcement of the law by arms. Such employment of force would of course be but the prelude to secession. Indeed, South Carolina, in her Ordinance of Nullification, declared that she would secede, if the United States did not repeal the obnoxious laws, or if she should attempt to enforce the collections of the tariff duties provided for by the acts in dispute. According to the Unionist view, it is held that in no case has the individual State the right to resist the operation of a federal law, much less does it possess the actual power to pa.s.s a law affecting its relation to, or continuance in, the Union. This view is supported by an interpretation of the const.i.tution that denies to that instrument the character of a compact between the States and the National Government. The const.i.tutional theory of this school is that the National Government was formed _by the people_ as a whole, and not by the States. That the States accepted this government, but were in no sense parties to an agreement between them and the Nation. According to this view, the Union began with the first acts of resistance taken in common by the colonies, and is thus, in a sense, older than the state governments, which were not formed until after the Declaration of Independence. Also, that when the States gave in 1788 their consent to the const.i.tution, their consent was irrevocable. Two quotations from decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States will make clear the arguments and theory of the Unionists.

Said Chief Justice Marshall:[1] "The convention which promulgated the const.i.tution was indeed elected by the state legislatures, but the instrument when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligations or pretentious to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request that it might 'be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under recommendation of its legislature for their a.s.sent and ratification.' This mode of proceeding was adopted, and by the conventions, by Congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only way in which they can act safely, effectually, and wisely on such a subject, by a.s.senting in convention. It is true they a.s.sembled in their several States, an where could they have a.s.sembled? From these conventions the const.i.tution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people. The a.s.sent of the States in their sovereign capacity is implied in calling the convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it, and their decision was final. It required not the affirmance of, and could not be negatived by, the state governments. The const.i.tution when adopted was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties. The government of the Union then, is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."

[Footnote 1: _McCulloch_ v. _Md._, 4 Dall., 316.]

Said Chief Justice Chase:[1] "The union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the articles of Confederation. By these the union was solemnly declared to 'be perpetual.' And when the articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the const.i.tution was ordained 'to form a more perfect union.' It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be more indissoluble if a perpetual union made more perfect, is not? But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States.... Without the States in Union, there could be no such political body as the United States. Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the const.i.tution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care of the const.i.tution, as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Government. The const.i.tution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States."

[Footnote 1: _Texas_ v. _White_, 7 Wall., 750.]

A civil war of four years' duration has decided the Unionist theory of our government to be the one under which the Nation is to be governed.

Whether or not, in point of fact, the Nation was older than the States, and the const.i.tution not a compact, but an indissoluble Union, will always remain a question to be discussed. The dispute turns upon a point that does not admit of final determination. We can only theorize. To maintain the view that the Union is older than the States it is necessary to show that the Continental Congress was of such a character, and its powers of such a nature, that a true national government may be said to have existed before July 4, 1776, and therefore, that the Declaration of Independence and the consequent transformation of the colonies into States were not the result of the individual action of separate colonies, but of the whole people united in a nation. And, following from this, that the States were never out of the union, but that the individual colonies became States, only as belonging to the United States. Consequently that the theory of a 'compact' between the States and the United States is untenable, for at the time the United States was born, the States did not exist.[1]

[Footnote 1: As Lincoln expressed it in his message of July 4, 1861: "The States have their _status_ in the Union, and they have no other legal status.... The Union is older than any of the States, and in fact, it created them as States."]

To maintain the "Compact Theory" it is necessary to show that the "Continental Congress" had no properly delegated national powers, and to it the character of a national government could not fitly be applied, and that the colonies when they separated from England remained independent of each other, because as colonies they had been independent. Therefore, that the initial clause of the Preamble to the Const.i.tution "We the people of the United States" referred not to all the people of the United States in their collective capacity, but to the people of the several States.

In fine, admitting, as all do, the Continental Congress to have been a revolutionary body, exercising undelegated powers, the question is, Was it, or was it not, a _de jure_, as well as _de facto_ national government, and this is a question that cannot be answered absolutely.

These opposing views of the character of our const.i.tution have been stated not with the idea of proving either of them to be the correct one, but solely to indicate the lines along which political parties have fought their battles. Thus, it is hoped, the student will be prepared for an intelligent consideration of the various political parties that have existed in the course of his country's history.

To complete the statement of the underlying causes and fundamental principles that have directed the course of our national politics, it is necessary to give at least some short account of the natural causes that have operated irresistibly to divide the North and the South in their political thoughts and actions.

Why is it that slavery flourished in the South, but languished and was gradually abolished in the North? Why is it that the stronghold of the States' Rights doctrine of nullification and of secession was in the South, and the citadel of the Unionists in the North? Why is it that to-day the debate between high and low customs duties, is, to a very considerable extent, a discussion between the New England and Middle States and the Southern States?

To all these questions a very satisfactory answer can be found in the different physical characteristics of the North and South. The nature of the soil and climate, as well as the character of the settlers, predetermined for the Southern colonies an agricultural character, and for the colonies of the North a commercial and industrial character; and, already by the end of the eighteenth century we find in them a marked difference of political and social life.

From the very start, the South, favored by a mild climate, rich soil, and broad, low-lying valleys, developed an agricultural life. Slavery was introduced at an early date, and flourished, the warm climate being congenial to the negro, and the rude manual labor of the field suited to his meagre capabilities. The result of these influences was to develop in the South a system of large ill-worked manors or estates. The predominance of slave labor, discouraged the immigration of free labor, and the South remained comparatively thinly settled. The moral effect of slavery upon the white population was bad. Habits of thriftlessness and laziness were engendered among the free population, and their social relations corrupted.

In the North, an indented coast with many good harbors, a rugged soil, and a wintry climate, encouraged the development of a commercial and manufacturing life. Slave labor here proved itself scarcely profitable, neither the climate nor the nature of the work required, being suited to the frames and abilities of the African. As compared with the South, the North soon became thickly settled, and largely as a result of this, adopted the small area of the town or towns.h.i.+p as its most important unit of local government, instead of the larger area, the county, used in the South. This essential difference in the system of local government in the North, from that of the South, has remained unchanged to this day, and has exercised great influence upon the political habits of the peoples of these two sections.

At the time of the adoption of the const.i.tution, these differences between the northern and southern colonies were not so great as they were soon to become. As contrasted with the North, the agricultural character of the South was already marked, but the designation of these two sections as "free" and "slave" states had not yet come into use. It was the remarkable development of the cultivation of cotton consequent upon the invention of Whitney's cotton gin in 1793, that gave the tremendous impetus to the increase of slavery in the South. While prior to the introduction of this machine, scarcely a single pound of cotton could be separated from the seed by a man in a day, Whitney's gin made it possible to prepare for market three hundred and fifty pounds per day. The nature of the cotton plant rendered it peculiarly fitted to the climate and soil of the South, and the ease with which it could be cultivated and prepared for market, made the application of slave labor extremely profitable. In 1789 many of the southern states exhibited evidences of a desire and intention to ultimately abolish slavery, but from this time we hear nothing more of this. After 1800 the number of slaves increased rapidly. The census of 1790 showed in the southern colonies 650,000, while that of 1820 showed the number to be over 1,580,000. From 1800 to 1865 the political life of the South is largely explainable by the interest of its people in, and devotion to, the inst.i.tution of slavery.

The promptness with which, irrespective of party affiliations, the people of the North a.s.sumed the anti-slavery att.i.tude and those of the South placed themselves under the pro-slavery banner, at the time of the Missouri contest in 1820, shows the extent to which these two sections of the United States were already divided upon this great question. The South, r.e.t.a.r.ded in its growth by the employment of slave labor, as compared with the North already exhibited an example of arrested development, and her politicians saw that if the balance of power between the slave-holding and the non-slave-holding States was to be maintained, a wider field for the extension of their favorite inst.i.tution would have to be provided. It is in the light of this motive that the desire of the South for the annexation of Cuba and of Texas, even at the expense of a war with Mexico, is to be interpreted. The compromise of 1820 satisfied the demands of the slavocracy for a time, but only for a time. In 1850 the South again demanded, and obtained concessions. It required a civil war to demonstrate to us the futility of endeavoring to avert by compromise the conflict that was irrepressible between the North and South so long as slavery existed in the one, and was reprobated in the other.

The different att.i.tudes a.s.sumed at the present day by the North and South in regard to the Tariff question, is explainable by the difference in the industrial life of these two sections. The North is essentially a manufacturing centre, and, as such, demands high import duties as a protection to her manufacturers and merchants. The South is, as a whole, agricultural, and favors low duties with the idea of thus extending foreign trade, and affording a larger market for the sale of her raw products. A striking proof of the influence of the industrial life of a section in determining its att.i.tude towards the tariff, is seen in the change of front of Ma.s.sachusetts after 1824 from free-trade to protection, this change being wholly due to the predominating influence acquired by her manufactures over her commerce and agriculture.