The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 13

"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the accusations made against them it was for fear of greater punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard took the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared to express himself so.

"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation for a country that wished to be free and that they, the Americans, do not arrest any one without just cause. [171]

"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter in question and other abuses in order that the measures you may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of ours and judge us secretly now in order to do so later in public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future injury to us, because many will desire to place themselves under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights.

"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like him." [172]

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce the desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about them. [173]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--these are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He did not dare discipline General Pio del Pilar, nor remove him from the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American troops could pa.s.s or approach their lines had greatly displeased General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel's troops from Manila. [174]

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already made up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the following significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our rights." [175]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were the words:--

"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows: ..."

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special importance. It reads as follows:--

"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Was.h.i.+ngton, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him _in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government_. [176]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--

"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject." [177]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--

"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression 'forces of the Government' to mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation." [178]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt's intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that in my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharp practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any "condition," in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and a.s.sisted him in starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations took place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarra.s.sing situation would have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable course left open to him would have been to advise Was.h.i.+ngton of his improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protest General Merritt says:--

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future." [179]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his a.s.sociates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business, over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:

"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity.

"_Otis_."

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicial statement of the conditions which existed:--

"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your s.h.i.+pping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, rest.i.tution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents the United States authority over Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot escape the obligations which it has a.s.sumed.

"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition--a joint occupation--upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the a.s.sistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hards.h.i.+ps, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have a.s.serted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hards.h.i.+ps endured and a.s.sistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

"The first is: Protection to your s.h.i.+pping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not a.s.sailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater lat.i.tude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

"The second concession named by you is rest.i.tution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

"Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your proceedings.

"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short s.p.a.ce of time should you decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action."

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:--

"On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated--something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters--he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--

"'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_

"'_Philippine Islands_,

"'_Manila_, P. I., September 13, 1898.