The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 25

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss the conditions which arose in Mindanao under Insurgent rule, he attempts to show that no political importance attaches to them. In the pa.s.sage above quoted he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Palawan (Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to justify his action by making the following statements:--

"The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141 islands to eleven, the last three [323] of the nine contained in the above table may also be eliminated as follows: [324]--

"Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzon, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, is thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large part of its area, has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious), is also very spa.r.s.ely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure politically as a disturbing factor." [325]

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved in the government of the important islands which Blount would thus leave out of consideration, is not solved by ignoring it, certain of his further statements cannot be allowed to go uncorrected.

The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure politically as a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the Spanish days its forests furnished a safe refuge for evildoers who were from time to time driven out of Cavite and Batangas. A large proportion of its Filipino inhabitants were criminals who not infrequently organized regular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate, Romblon and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and Calamianes groups lived in constant terror of the Mindoro pirates, and _tulisanes_, [326]

who paid them frequent visits. I myself have been at Calapan, the capital of the province, when the Spanish officials did not dare to go without armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear of being captured and held for ransom. During considerable periods they did not really pretend to exercise control over the criminal Filipinos inhabiting the west coast of the island. Conditions as to public order were worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the archipelago north of Mindanao and Jolo.

No less absurd are Blount's suggestions as to the general worthlessness of the island. There are high mountains in its interior, and there are great stretches of the most fertile land in the world along its coast. Its northern and eastern portions have a very heavy and evenly distributed rainfall, and are admirably suited to the growing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similar tropical products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully without irrigation. There was a time in the past when Mindoro was known as "the granary of the Philippines." Later its population was decimated by constant Moro attacks, and cattle disease destroyed its draft animals, with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, from which, however, it is easy to redeem them. The west coast has strongly marked wet and dry seasons similar to those at Manila. There is abundant water available for irrigation, furnished by streams which never run dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of sugar in large quant.i.ty. The forests, which now cover extensive areas, abound in fine woods, and produce rubber and other valuable gums. There are outcroppings of lignite at numerous points on the island, and in the vicinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet discovered in this part of the world. Gold is also present in some quant.i.ty at various places. In short, Mindoro is naturally one of the richest islands in the Archipelago. If its tillable lands were under high cultivation, it would support half the population of the Philippines.

_Palawan_

In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without political importance Blount has followed precisely the procedure which he adopted in the case of Mindoro. First, he gives the area and the population of the island, when he should concern himself with the province. The area of the island is 4027 square miles; that of the province, 5238 square miles. According to the 1903 census, the population of the island was 10,918, while that of the province, which contains such thickly settled and fertile islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39,582. Of course, if one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, it is more convenient to take the figures for the island.

Blount says:--

"Paragua, [327] the long narrow island seen at the extreme lower left of any map of the archipelago, extending northeast-southwest at an angle of about 45, is practically worthless, being fit for nothing much except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in fact now used." [328]

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even if we limit our consideration to the island of Palawan. Only 159 of its 4027 square miles are utilized for a penal colony. Its natural wealth is simply enormous. It is covered throughout the greater part of its extent with virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the best timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abundant in its mountains. Much of the so-called "Singapore cane," so highly prized by makers of rattan and wicker furniture, comes from its west coast. It is a well-watered island, and its level plains, which receive the wash from its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpa.s.sed fertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five years or even less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island lies south of the typhoon belt. Malampaya Sound, situated near its northwestern extremity, is one of the world's great harbors. But should we wish to rid ourselves of this wonderful island, I may say, without violating any official confidences, that there was a time when Germany would have been more than pleased to take it off our hands; and indeed our British friends, who were sufficiently interested in it to survey it some decades ago, might possibly be prevailed upon to accept it!

There are good reasons why Blount thought it convenient to make it appear that Palawan was politically unimportant. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with Spain the Filipino garrison at Puerto Princesa mutinied, and the things which they did were not nice. Among others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being at the time a penal colony, and the latter, together with some of the soldiers, started up the east coast of the island, leaving a trail of devastation in their wake. The prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them that it has never since been reoccupied except by a few stragglers. Other towns, including Tay-Tay, were raided.

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo's representative in this province wrote him that the inhabitants were preparing to kill all the Tagalogs and revolt against Insurgent rule. [329] Later when some of the latter were anxious to get the people of one of the northern settlements to take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans consented to give them a lift only on condition that they first allow themselves to be bound, and then took them out to sea and threw them overboard.

Another thing which Blount would have found it inconvenient to discuss is the conduct of the people of Cuyo, at one time the capital of the province. On this island, which contains but twenty-one square miles, there were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated and feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers to Iloilo, after the Americans had occupied that place, to beg for a garrison of American troops, and to say that if furnished with an American flag they themselves would defend it. For some reason they were not given the flag, and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having grown weary of waiting, they made an American flag of their own, hoisted it, and when the Insurgents from Mindoro came intrenched themselves and defended it. They were actually being besieged when the American garrison finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with the theory that the Filipino people were a unit at Aguinaldo's back, and of course the easiest way to get around such an occurrence is to forget to mention it!

_Mindanao_

And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, which all but equals Luzon in size, having an area of 36,292 square miles as against the 40,969 of Luzon. Blount's first mention of it is peculiar.

In connection with the words "the other six islands that really matter," in the pa.s.sage above cited on page 116 of his book, he has inserted a foot-note reading as follows:--

"The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealt with in this book as a separate and distinct problem." [330]

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this great island, which is a little continent by itself, quite so cavalierly and I will quote the more important of his further and later statements regarding it:--

"While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its 36,000 square miles of area, requires that the Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more than one thousand miles from north to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains about 500,000 people all told, half of them semi-civilized, the governmental problem it presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether, if ever, we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of the other islands, than the questions that have to be pa.s.sed on by our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff. Mindanao's 36,000 square miles const.i.tute nearly a third of the total area of the Philippine archipelago, and more than that fraction of the 97,500 square miles of territory to a consideration of which our attention is reduced by the process of elimination above indicated. Turning over Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized Moros would indeed be 'like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief,' as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo. Furthermore, the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be ent.i.tled to recognition as subjects of, some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have no moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, the latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed principles has not a leg to stand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it, we have a distinct separate problem, which cannot be solved in the lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not in the least delay the advent of independence for the other fourteen fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago--all Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is true that there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our government would of course protect them from the Moros. If they did not like our government, they could move to such parts of the islands as we might permit to be incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao and the adjacent islets called Jolo (the 'Sulu archipelago,'

so called, 'reigned over' by the sultan of comic opera fame) originally presented, as they will always present, a distinct and separate problem, and never did have anything more to do with the Philippine insurrection against us than their cousins and co-religionists over in near-by Borneo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant practically the subjugation of one big island, Luzon, containing half the population and one third of the total area of the archipelago, and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan Islands." [331]

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means Mohammedan. The Mohammedan Malays, called Moros, are found here and there along the western coast of the Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coast of the island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the Cotabato River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that is all. The interior of the island is for the most part occupied by the members of a number of non-Christian, non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northern and eastern coasts are inhabited by Visayan Filipinos, of whom there are many in Zamboanga itself.

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the insurrection against the United States, the Visayans of Mindanao did, and we had some lively tussles with them in Misamis and in Surigao.

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao over to the Moros. Abandonment of it by us would in the end result in this, as they would take possession of the entire island in the course of time. Neither the other wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand against them. I heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retain this island for many years before we can settle the problems which it presents. It is further true that we might retain it and still grant independence to the remainder of the Philippine Archipelago, but if we are to eliminate Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos have no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in reality only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand [332] on the island, and could not if they would, what about Luzon, where there are in reality no less than four hundred and sixty thousand non-Christians, [333] many of whom, like the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas and wild Tingians, are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by Filipinos, while most of them welcome American rule?

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control them than they have to control the Moros? Could they control them if they would? And has the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed principle "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it in the other?

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that Filipinos could not satisfactorily govern Moros and have even alleged that they did so govern them during the period now under discussion. Let us examine the facts.

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with the Sultan of Jolo, addressing him as his "great and powerful brother," [334] but this brother does not seem to have received his advances with enthusiasm, and the other brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at the first opportunity.

Jose Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of conditions in the province of Misamis says: [335]--

"Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 28th of last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the interior, our mortal enemies since times immemorial on account of their religious fanaticism which they carry to extremes, as do their co-religionists in Europe and Asia, and on account of their objection to leading a civilized life, began to harry the town of Iligan which is the nearest town to the lake around which is the densest Moro population. Due to the prestige of the local president of that town, Senor Carloto Sariol, and the energy that he showed, after some days of constant firing against groups who descended upon the suburbs of the town, he was successful in having them abandon their hostile att.i.tude and promise to live in peace and harmony with said towns, this verbal agreement being partic.i.p.ated in by the Dattos of some settlements who did not wish to treat with the Spanish Government.

"Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know by experience that the more friendly they appear, the more we must watch against them, because as soon as they find a good opportunity they do not fail to take advantage of it to enter the towns for the purpose of sacking them and kidnapping as many of their inhabitants as possible in order to reduce them to slavery."

Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards the Filipino residents set up a government there. A few days later the Moro datos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers, cut off the head of the Filipino _presidente_, served a few other leading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded to set up a government of their own which was the only government that the place had prior to the arrival of the American troops.

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place to be stripped and compelled to march before him on the public plaza in a state of nudity.

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time after the Spaniards left had they desired to do so. On the arrival of the Americans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn it over to them, but his proposition was declined.

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions under Insurgent rule. It reads as follows:--

"We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during the revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when for seven or eight months there was in existence the so-called Filipino Republic. During that time there was much robbing and killing; the life of a man was worth no more than that of a chicken; men killed one another for personal gain; enemies fought one another with the bolo instead of settling their differences before the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror. There was no justice. Because of this the Moros were opposed to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better cla.s.s of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control of the local government." [336]

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who did not promptly make their escape were murdered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual.

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinos to govern Moros did not result in complete success.

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communication with the Sultan of Jolo, authorizing him to establish in all the _rancherias_ of Mindanao and Jolo a government in accordance with a decree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms, and was advised that, "if in this war, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence and with the opposition of our brothers in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country will always render a tribute of homage and grat.i.tude to your memory." [337]

Curiously, the Sultan seems to have remained unmoved by the appeal.

_Masbate_

This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayan population of 29,451. Its people are all Filipinos, and are on the whole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set. There is no reason why it should have been excluded in considering "the human problem in its broader governmental aspect," whatever that may be, nor can I understand why Blount should have desired to exclude it except that he seems to have been endeavouring to exclude everything possible outside of Luzon, in order to increase the apparent importance of the Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be taken into account in connection with the Visayan Islands, of which it is one.

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as "The Visayas"

from the ancient tribal name of the civilized Filipino people who inhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor and numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although their inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak a number of more or less distinct dialects. Only Panay, Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan have non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last named their number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panay and Negros, however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers, as are the representatives of a tribe sometimes called _Monteses_ [338]

and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thought it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao.

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldo was established at various places and different times, without consulting or considering the will of the people. The men who went as his delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authority was not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings which might easily have grown into a war cry.

The att.i.tude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in the following extract from a letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabini discussed the advisability of putting the const.i.tution in force:--

"And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and Iloilo will form a federal Republic and not one in conformity with the centralized Republic provided for by the Const.i.tution." [339]

The action later taken by Negros shows that there was abundant reason for this fear.

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was still ignorant as to the real conditions in Negros and Mindanao. [340]

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, we learn that Aguinaldo and his followers were even then still uninformed as to events in the Visayan Islands. [341] In view of these facts, how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that the Malolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And what shall we say of the following statement, remembering that the Treaty of Paris was signed December 10, 1899?

"When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thousand men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all of the rest of the archipelago with between 35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the army of their country." [342]