The Relations of the Federal Government to Slavery Part 4

The organization headed by Bell and Everett seems to have no distinctive principle, except fidelity to the Union. It is a party of vague outlines, and without tangible substance.

Each of the three distinct parties (as do also the Bell and Everett party) a.s.sume to stand upon the common ground of the const.i.tution and to justify their principles and measures by that sacred instrument, "the palladium of American liberty."

1st. The Breckinridge or Southern sectional theory, claiming the Dred Scott decision as its justification, is, that slavery is a benign national inst.i.tution, to be fostered and protected by the Federal government "wherever its const.i.tutional authority extends;" and the logical sequence from the Dred Scott decision, as construed in the South, is, that this national inst.i.tution involves an inviolable right of property, and is carried by force of the const.i.tution into _all the States and Territories_, and is there to be protected by the Federal government, and this idea is entirely consistent with the Breckinridge platform adopted at Baltimore on the 28th June last. A necessary result of the establishment of this theory will be the reopening of the African slave trade.

2d. The Lincoln and Seward or Northern sectional theory, is, that slavery is a relic of barbarism, antagonistic to the principles and policy of the nation, and is to be annoyed, a.s.sailed, and ultimately annihilated by the Federal government wherever its const.i.tutional authority extends.

To sum up the two theories in a few words:

Slavery, according to Breckinridge and his school, is a _national good_, to be encouraged and protected by the national strong arm.

Slavery, according to Lincoln and Seward, is a _national evil_, gigantic and portentous, to be combatted and slain by the same strong arm.

That the South will permit slavery to be abolished in all the States by violence or starvation; or that the North will permit slavery to be established in all the States by judicial decision or otherwise, no man in his senses believes--hence looking to the legitimate results _of their doctrines_, both the Breckinridge and Lincoln parties _are essentially disunion parties_. Constant conflict and ultimate disunion are the natural sequents of their antagonism. As neither can hope to conquer the other, the Union, the common bond and roof tree of both, must be divided and fall.

3d. The Douglas or truly conservative theory, resting upon the limited powers of the Federal const.i.tution, as a compact of confederation, among sovereign and independent States, a.s.sumes that so far as the United States, _as a Nation_, are concerned, domestic slavery is neither a national good to be protected, nor a national evil to be crushed out; it is a local domestic inst.i.tution, existing at the formation of the confederacy, in all the States, "under the laws thereof," and its good or evil, concerns only the local sovereignties or people with whom it exists or may exist. The Federal government not having been ordained or established to form or control the domestic inst.i.tutions of the people of the confederated States, is equally powerless to destroy or to extend slavery. Its destruction or extension must be the work of local law, not of the Federal const.i.tution, nor of Federal law made under it.

Let us re-state the points:

The Breckinridge or slavery extension party would _nationalize_ slavery, by making its existence commensurate with the obligations of the Federal const.i.tution.

The Lincoln or abolition party would _denationalize_ it, by destroying it by prohibition where it is not, and by starvation where it is.

The Douglas or non-intervention party would denationalize it, by leaving the people in the respective localities, be they States or territories, to deal with it as they see fit.

Therefore, Breckinridge would use the national government to force slavery on an unwilling people.

Lincoln and Seward would use the same power to prevent a people who may desire domestic slavery from having it.

Douglas would not use the same power, either to permit or destroy, but recognizing the right and capacity of the people to govern themselves, would leave them to decide _for themselves_ as to what domestic inst.i.tutions they would or would not have.

There can be no mistaking as to which of the three parties occupies the true democratic ground on this subject. To rightly decide that question, we have only to reach the central and fundamental idea of the nature of the Federal Const.i.tution, upon which each party bases itself.

The political history of the United States, since the Confederation, shows that as well in the formation, as in the interpretation and administration of the Federal Const.i.tution, two parties have existed, representing two different political ideas--the one, State Sovereignty--the other, National Sovereignty, or, Confederation against Consolidation; or, democratic government in _the States_ against an Imperial government in _the Nation_.

The advocates of a consolidated National government, the leading mind among whom was Alexander Hamilton, were, until after the publication of the Federalist, known as the National party. After that publication, and about 1790, they took the name of Federalists. Their opponents, who favored a Federal Union of limited and clearly defined powers, in preference to a strong National Government, were at first called Federalists, but afterwards took the name of Republicans, or, Democrats.

The master spirit of this party was Thomas Jefferson. Principles adverse to those of Hamilton prevailed in the Const.i.tutional Convention of 1787.

Hamilton's plan of government was not adopted, and by express vote of the Convention the term, "United States Government," was adopted in lieu of "National Government," as originally proposed, to distinguish the system to be formed.

The men of the Convention were men of great intellectual power and lofty patriotism, but also men of concession and compromise, and it is not therefore surprising that their different views should be so far reflected in the Const.i.tution, their common work, as to lead to occasional difficulty in its interpretation. The Const.i.tution is not so clearly expressed, that he who runs may read its meaning. The wisest and best men of the nation have differed as to its true construction, and their differing interpretations are mainly the result of adherence to one or the other of the adverse principles already stated--the one aiming to amplify the jurisdiction of the Federal government by liberal or lat.i.tudinarian construction--the other aiming to limit it by strict construction.

The National, or Hamilton, school of politicians hold that the Const.i.tution is not a compact between the States, but a system of National Government ordained and established by the People of the United States--and Mr. H. a.s.serted "that it belongs to the discretion of the national legislature to p.r.o.nounce upon the subjects which concern the GENERAL WELFARE." John Adams, an ultra Federalist, in his letters to Roger Sherman in 1789, attempted to show that the Federal government is "a monarchial republic," or, "limited monarchy," and contended that the President should have been an integral part of the national legislature by being invested with an absolute veto power.

The Democratic, or Jefferson school of politicians, on the contrary, hold that the Const.i.tution is a compact between sovereign and independent States, and the government formed by it one of strictly limited and defined powers, delegated by the States.

Among the eminent men who have adopted _the national_ theory of the const.i.tution, were Mr. Hamilton, Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Story and Mr. Webster, and to their great abilities and powers of argument, may in part be attributed the fact that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on const.i.tutional questions of a political character, have favored the national or anti democratic theory of interpretation. These great men were federalists, and no one can doubt that their general political views have given shape and color to their legal arguments and opinions.

The people, to whose welfare democratic principles are vital, have not always yielded to the opinions and reasoning of the Supreme Court, or of the Federal school of statesmen and jurists; but have gradually from time to time by their clearly expressed will in the popular elections, imposed just restraints upon the action of the Federal government. They have thus repeatedly voted down a National Bank, a high protective tariff, a national system of internal improvements, and other kindred measures, based, like the attempt to abolish slavery, upon the same const.i.tutional theory, that the Federal government is one of general or discretionary powers; or as Mr. Hamilton expressed it, "that it belongs to the discretion of the national Legislature to p.r.o.nounce upon the subjects which concern the general welfare."

The Democratic principle of limited and specific power in the Union, for Federal purposes, and general sovereignty in the people of the States, for all local and domestic purposes, has taken deep root in the minds of the people, and has received their frequent endors.e.m.e.nt.

The Democratic party have recognized this principle in their platforms, and in the platform of 1852 at Baltimore, and in that of 1856 at Cincinnati, and in that of 1860 at Charleston, they incorporated as one of the main foundations of their political creed, the const.i.tutional doctrines of Jefferson and Madison as expressed in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1797 and 1798 and Mr. Madison's report of 1799-1800, which are expressly opposed to the Hamilton theory of a consolidation of the States into one sovereignty, "_the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be_," as Mr. Madison says, "_to transform the republican system of the United States into a monarchy_."

It is beyond doubt, this democratic doctrine of the sovereignty of the people of the States which has, more than any other, given to the Democratic party its strength with the people, and enabled the States themselves to grow and prosper, while the nation, as the symbol of their united sovereignty, has made the name of "The United States," known, and honored, and feared in every land.

Accordingly, then, as theories or principles of national politics favor or oppose the consolidation of power in the Federal government, upon matters of domestic concern or internal policy, to the denial or exclusion of the power of the people of the States or territories over the same matters, so are those theories or principles, and the measures based upon them, practically favorable or opposed to true democratic principles of government.

Apply, then, this test to the Breckinridge and Lincoln doctrines, and we need not be at a loss to determine to what cla.s.s of political theories they belong.

The Breckinridge and Lincoln platforms both rest upon the same idea, viz: That there is a power in the Federal government or const.i.tution, derived from implication, not from express language, in reference to the subject matter of domestic slavery, _above the power of the people of the States or territories to control_--or, to state the point a little differently: On this one subject of purely domestic concern the Federal government is stronger than the people.

The Federal government, virtually say the Breckinridge party, must every where protect, but can no where prohibit slavery: The same government, in effect say the Lincoln party, must prohibit slavery, but can no where establish or legalize it:

True it is, that the Breckinridge party in the 3d article of their platform say: "That when the settlers of a territory having an adequate population, _form a State const.i.tution_," the State "ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its const.i.tution prohibits or recognizes the inst.i.tution of slavery;" but at the same time they so construe the Dred Scott decision as to affirm that the right of property in slaves is guaranteed by the Federal const.i.tution, and therefore protected every where, where that const.i.tution is the supreme law. If so, of what avail is it for a State const.i.tution or State law to prohibit slavery? The prohibition would be a nullity under the Federal const.i.tution.

True it is also, that the Lincoln party affirm in the 4th article of the Chicago platform, the necessity of maintaining "the right of each State to order and control its own domestic inst.i.tutions, according to its own judgment exclusively;" but in the 8th article of the same platform, they affirm the right and duty of Congress, _by legislation_, to maintain the territories in their normal condition of freedom, and they deny "_the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individual, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States_."

The pretense then of conceding sovereignty to the people of the States "to order and control" the domestic inst.i.tution of slavery, when that sovereignty is denied to the same people while in a territory, is a piece of transparent hypocrisy. Does not any sensible man know that prohibition of domestic slavery in a territory, is essentially prohibition of it in a State to be formed of that territory? As the twig is bent by Congress in the territory, so will the tree be inclined in the State. If slavery does not exist in a State at its organization, it will never exist there, unless forced there by the Federal government under the Breckinridge construction of the const.i.tution.

But again: If Congress, as the Chicago platform affirms, because of the provision of the Federal const.i.tution (5th amendment) that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," cannot legalize slavery in a territory, where as the Republican platform of 1856 a.s.serts, Congress has "sovereign power," how can a State legislature, in the face of the same const.i.tutional prohibition or principle, (as old as _magna charta_) legalize slavery in any State where such legislature has equally sovereign power? It may be answered to this question, that the Supreme Court of the United States have decided that the amendment to the const.i.tution containing the clause above quoted, does not apply to the State governments; but this answer does not cover the whole ground, for we may ask again: how can Congress, if it has no power to legalize slavery in a territory, const.i.tutionally admit to the Union a new State formed from such Territory with a const.i.tution legalizing slavery? Suppose, for example, such a const.i.tution provides. "The right of the people to hold slaves is hereby declared, and such right shall never be defeated or impaired." The State const.i.tution has no vitality, as such, until the State is admitted to the Union--the act of admission makes the const.i.tution a law, and a law for slavery. Congress therefore in accepting such a const.i.tution from a new State, where slavery had not before existed, as effectually legislates slavery into such State as if a special Congressional act were pa.s.sed for that purpose. Consistency then, with the Chicago platform would seem to require, that Congress should refuse, for want of const.i.tutional power, to admit any State with a slavery const.i.tution. I here incidentally ask another question: if the const.i.tution, as is a.s.serted, gives Congress _sovereign power_ over the territories, where is the obligation on Congress ever to permit a territory to rise above its territorial condition, and become a State, except on such terms as Congress may impose? What is const.i.tutionally to prevent Congress from erecting and continuing territorial governments until the territories _under the sovereign power of Congress_, outnumber and overshadow the States, and the national government becomes an Imperial power, like the Roman or British Empires, with hundreds of tributary States or provinces?

I ask again: If the normal condition of all the territories of the United States is that of freedom, and if Congress cannot legalize slavery in any territory, can the Federal government bring slaves under the power of Congress by acquiring territory governed by foreign slave laws, as were the territories of Florida and Louisiana? Does the foreign slave code continue to exist _proprio vigore_ in the absence of express recognition by the Federal government; or does the force of the const.i.tution itself annul upon the acquisition of the territory, the local law of slavery, and abrogate all treaty or legislative provisions, if any, for its continuance? In other words can the Federal government, by simple act of acquisition, or expressly by treaty, legislative act, or judicial decision, enact or continue in force a foreign slave code over territory acquired by the United States, "the normal condition of which is that of freedom?" I would be glad to know what the Chicago platform means by that expression. Does it mean that slavery cannot exist in any territory of the United States over which the const.i.tution extends? or if it does exist there by virtue of a foreign local law at the time of acquisition, does it mean that Congress can abrogate the right of property under that law and make the territory free?

If the Republican platform really means that the Federal government cannot legalize slavery by acquiring slave territory; and cannot legalize slavery in any territory already acquired; and cannot admit a State with a slavery const.i.tution, does not the same platform drive the Republican party to the doctrine that domestic slavery _has not_, and _cannot have_ any legal existence in any State or territory where it did not exist by local law when the Federal const.i.tution became operative?

What then becomes of the a.s.serted "right of each State to order and control its own domestic inst.i.tutions according to its own judgment exclusively?"

I put all these questions by way of suggestions, not a.s.sertions, and leave the respective advocates of the Lincoln and Breckinridge platforms to answer them consistently with the Union and the Const.i.tution.

Examine them in any light to which they may be presented, the Breckinridge and Lincoln doctrines equally lead to the same anti-Democratic result:--Sovereign power in the Federal const.i.tution and government, superior to the power of the people of the States and territories, over the domestic inst.i.tution of slavery. Directly opposed to this position is the one held by Mr. Douglas; absence of power in Congress, and full power in the people of the States and territories to deal with all their domestic inst.i.tutions and local affairs. Which is the Democratic position?

J. K. E.