The Plattsburg Manual Part 20

PLATE SHOWING THE MAIN IDEAS INVOLVED IN SECURITY

Danger zone Cavalry

Danger zone ---- Danger zone --- --- Cavalry -- __ -- Cavalry -- -- -- -- / -- -- / / ___ + / ---- ---- + ^ + / + / ^ + +-----------+ + / | MAIN BODY | ^ / +-----------+ Line of observation. Line of reserves - Occupied by small to move forward to groups. Drive back help line of supports.

enemy patrols. Line of supports on line of resistance.

Rallying point for small groups in front.

Note that distances from the line of observation to the main body increase as the groups increase in size. The reserves are the largest groups. The groups on the Line of observation are the smallest.

It is most important to note that the groups are placed according to the conditions and circ.u.mstances of the particular case. Don't follow any blind rules. Your judgment must tell you when to place this group here and not to place that group there. Have as few men on such duty as practicable.

If a swamp, or a large body of water here, very small groups will afford the necessary security.

If a forest, or steep hills here, very small parties will afford the necessary security.

a.s.sume that we want to afford security for our main body from any especially dangerous sector such as ABC. Our cavalry is in front of our first line and in touch with the enemy. The danger zone represents the direction from which the enemy is expected.]

This plan must be modified according to the particular case. Let us suppose that we are camping by a large body of water, or that we are surrounded by mountains. We can easily imagine where we could change the above general plan so as to give adequate protection and at the same time lessen the number of men detailed for security. We must never forget that men are generally tired when they arrive in camp, and that we should make their work as light as circ.u.mstances permit. It requires a nice judgment to choose the correct number for security.

We should know the names of these groups. Farthest away is the line that sees, and reports what it sees, but can offer only a limited resistance.

This is called the "line of observation" or the "line of outguards." In rear of the line of outguards we have larger groups placed at greater distances. These are called "supports." This is the line that fights.

This is the line that makes extensive preparations for fighting (or resisting). It is called the "line of supports" or the "line of resistance."[2] We have one farther and last line of groups which is still larger and occupies still greater distances than the two we have just discussed. This is the safety valve and is called the "reserve," or the "line of reserves." This is the line that gives a sound factor of safety. It will only be called upon in cases of emergency and may therefore generally enjoy a considerable degree of repose. But it and the line of supports combined must have sufficient strength to delay the enemy, in case of a general attack, long enough for our main body to form for battle.

Let us look at the line of outguards for further important considerations and distinctions. The enemy's movements and operations should ordinarily be expected where there are for him least difficulties. Large (dangerous) bodies of troops find trouble in marshes, thick forests, steep mountainous country. They avoid these obstacles as much as possible, selecting open country, solid soil, strong bridges, and good roads. Here is where large and strong groups in opposition are necessary. Small and unimportant groups (or no groups at all) should be placed where the enemy's advance is exceptionally difficult. Finally, there will be places between these last two extremes that require just an average amount of attention, that is to say, require groups of medium strength.

The groups that are largest and are used at the important places where danger is most expected, are called "Pickets." (These consist of from two squads of eight men each to eight squads.) The least important groups are called "Cossack Posts." (These consist of four men, usually a noncommissioned officer and three privates.) The groups of average importance are called "Sentry Squads." (These consist of eight men, a corporal and seven privates.)

Having discussed in broad terms the security of troops in camp, we are prepared to consider their security while either advancing upon or retreating from the enemy. In either case groups are placed between our main body and the actual or supposed position of the hostile troops.

When we are advancing upon an enemy our advanced groups const.i.tute what we term the "advance guard." If we are retreating from the enemy, our rear groups compose the "rear guard." The main general ideas of an advance guard are ill.u.s.trated by the husband who takes his wife and family to his house after an evening's absence. The house is dark and without occupants. The wife and children are apprehensive of danger. The husband goes first, turns on the light, and searches for any indications of an enemy. He looks, if desirable, in the closets and under the beds.

If there is any one that may harm his family it is his duty to find out and dispose of him.

In the advance guard we have exactly the same general scheme as with outposts. Far advanced to the front (and often to the sides or flanks) we have small groups (called, when considered collectively, the "advance party") whose business it is to inform us of the presence of the enemy.

Next we have a large group ("support") to a.s.sist these small and rather helpless ones in advance in case of difficulty. And last we have a still larger group ("reserve") that may be called upon in great emergencies.

We should fully understand that all these groups are out to accomplish several ends, but their one great and ultimate object should be to push on ahead of the main body so that it may be secure and its march uninterrupted. To accomplish this it is desirable to get all possible information about the enemy; it is also desirable to keep him from getting any information about your own troops.

The ideas are nearly the same with rear guards. Note this important difference: if, in an advance upon the enemy, your advance guard should suddenly be fired upon, your main body would (temporarily) halt. If, in a retreat, your rear guard is halted by the enemy's fire, your main body would normally be marching farther from it. In the first case a.s.sistance is near at hand. In the second it is withdrawing. The rear guard in a retreat should therefore be a little larger than in an advance. It must be able to extricate itself from any situation however difficult or it loses its usefulness. Its commander should have a cool, level head. To delay the enemy and thus a.s.sist the main body to escape is his mission.

For him to remain too long in a good position might endanger not only his safety but that of the main body as well.

CHAPTER VIII

ATTACK AND DEFENSE

The European War has demonstrated more clearly than ever before two points in attack and defense. First, no people, or group of people, can claim a monopoly on bravery. They all move forward and give up their lives with the same utter abandon. Courage being equal, the advantage goes to him in the attack who possesses superior leaders, greater training, and better equipment. Second, a man's training and courage, his clear eye and steady nerve, his soul's blood and iron, const.i.tute a better defense than steel and concrete.

A soldier has little business attacking or defending anything in this day unless he is an athlete, unless he is skilled in the technique of manuver, unless he is a good shot, unless he knows the value of many features of the terrain (which means the nature of the country--its hills, rivers, mountains, depressions, etc.--considered from a military point of view), unless he is disciplined to a splendid degree, and unless his training has imbued him with an irresistible desire to push forward, to get at his opponent. a.s.suming, at least, as much as this, we are prepared to consider the subject of the attack (the offensive).

To have your troops superior in number, condition, training, equipment, and morale to that of your enemy; to be at the right place, at the right time, and there to deliver a smas.h.i.+ng, terrific blow--this is the greatest principle of the attack. And history shows that victory goes more often to him who attacks.

Initiative in war is no less valuable than in business life. Become at once imbued with the desire to put "the other fellow" on the defensive.

That makes him somewhat dependent upon your own actions. That gives you opportunities to fool him that he does not so fully enjoy. Your commander can elect to attack any point of the defensive line. Your dead and wounded--always a demoralizing element--are left behind. Your target is stationary. Your side is closing in. The enemy is straining every nerve to fire faster and more effectively, and still your side is closing in. There is the thrill of motion.

To attack, you will usually require a greater number of troops than the defense. Why so? Because you will be more exposed. You will have to move forward, however dangerous the ground. Your enemy, for his protection, will be certain to utilize and improve every advantage of cover. Your losses will be greater. You should have a greater number of reserves to fill the depleted ranks. If the defensive can maintain a better (superior) fire, that is to say, a fire that kills and wounds a greater number than the opposing fire (this we call fire superiority), he will stop the advance of the attacking force unless that force is so superior in numbers that it can send forward reinforcements after reinforcements as an ocean sends sh.o.r.eward its series of waves.

Suppose that you were in command of a group of men and that you were ordered to attack. Just what princ.i.p.al points should you weigh? First, you should avail yourself of every opportunity to obtain all information of military value, such as the enemy's strength, his position, and intentions. For this you would have to send out groups of reconnoitering patrols exceptionally skilled in woodcraft, or trained to gather information. As soon as such information as is available is reported to you, you should at once begin the consideration of all the important elements that affect your problem. You must not lose sight of what you were sent out to do (your mission). Consider how this and that fact bear upon your course of action (estimate the situation). For instance: the enemy's force is reported to be greatly inferior to your own. He is out of supplies. He is greatly fatigued with forced marches. His morale is shattered on account of recent and frequent reverses. His camp is disorganized. It is poorly guarded. Certain roads are in fine condition.

Others are very poor. Your troops are in splendid shape and excellent spirits. They believe that they can crush the enemy and want to attack.

As you easily see, all such points have great significance in sizing up the case (estimating the situation).

Having estimated the situation, you should investigate and consider all possible courses of attack that are open to you. Don't ask any advice from any one. Select the course that appears to offer the greatest chance of success. Make up your mind what you are going to do (come to a decision).

Having come to a decision, stick to it, right or wrong. Your next and final thing to do is to put your decision into action. To do that, give your subordinates the information they should possess; tell them what you are going to do and how you are going to do it; i.e., issue your orders.

A study of the orders of successful generals in history teaches us that we will be greatly aided in issuing them, if we will observe a system.

We understand an order more easily and quickly if it conforms to some plan with which we are familiar.

In order to give your group an opportunity to act with a greater degree of teamwork, and intelligence in case of an emergency, it is necessary to give it data (information) concerning the enemy. Your men should know where there are friendly troops. Now tell them what you are going to do (your plan), whether it be to attack, retire, or a.s.sume the defensive.

And then order the execution of that plan by a.s.signing to each group its task. Next tell (direct) what is to be done with the wagons (trains), and last, state where you may be found at any time in case of need or where messages may be sent to you.

Having issued the order, let us now observe the progress of the attack.

You are probably three or four thousand yards from the enemy. His position is invisible. His artillery has opened fire. Your artillery is replying. The troops must advance cautiously over exposed ground. They are not firing. They are not deployed for action (in battle line). They are waiting to get within as short a distance of the enemy's line as possible, for their ammunition is limited; and after troops are actually launched in the attack, control over them, for ordinary purposes, is practically lost. The farther from the enemy the attack is launched, the longer the exposure to their fire and the greater the number of casualties, so the leaders of the different groups are taking advantage of all the accidents of the ground, of all cover in advancing. They are using one formation here, another there, with a view to minimizing the losses and reaching an advantageous position as soon as possible where they can open an effective fire on the enemy.

Now the enemy's fire is severe. Casualties are becoming heavy. The men are growing restless. It is necessary to return the fire. Fire superiority should be gained at once. Don't move forward until you gain it. If difficult to gain, use every means at your disposal. When you have it, keep it. Part of your men can advance when your side has fire superiority. The remainder of the firing line should fire faster to maintain that superiority. If you lose fire superiority, regain it. If necessary, troops from the rear will generally be sent forward.

Now you are approaching the point where the charge is to be made.

Bayonets are fixed; not all at one time, for that would affect the advantage that you possess with your fire. Groups that have been held back in support are advanced. These are to be used at decisive moments.

They are held well in hand. The firing line is lost in noise and confusion. Not so the supports; control is exercised over them. If they are not used in the attack they can be used to great advantage to complete the discomfort of the enemy after the clash (shock).

There is at last, if the enemy remains in his position, the clash.

Bayonet against bayonet, man against man, nerve against nerve. Apply the great principle of attack and decide for yourself who the victor will be. If successful, then organize your men and prepare for the pursuit or for the return (counter attack) of the enemy.

Now you are to handle groups on the defense. You must bear in mind that there are two kinds of defense: first, where you do nothing but defend (pa.s.sive defense); second, where you defend, but temporarily, with the idea of attacking the enemy as soon as a favorable opportunity arises (active defense). Let us a.s.sume that you have been ordered by superior authority to locate and prepare a definite position to check the advance of an enemy. Just what main points should you bear in mind? Suppose you have found an ideal position; what conditions should it fulfil? You should be able to see the enemy long before he arrives at your position.

Intervening objects and trees would make that impossible. You should be hidden from his view. The ends of your lines (your flanks) should rest, if possible, on ground easy to defend; for instance, a high mountain, a large body of water, or an impa.s.sable swamp. A few acres of ground will not hold tens of thousands of men. Therefore the extent of the ground must be suitable for the size of your group (force or command). It would be of great advantage to have such cover that one group (for instance, a support) could move from this position to that without danger of being fired upon or observed. A wise general has plans for any contingency. He is either going to win or he is not going to win. If he loses, he should have a means of escape (retreat). In selecting his position he should place it where the enemy must attack or give up his mission. Verdun had to be attacked before the advance on Paris from the east was practicable.

In defense there is a generous allowance of advantages. Usually you have time to select and prepare your position. By preparing a position we mean, you can dig trenches, destroy intervening objects that obstruct the view of what you should see, construct obstacles that will embarra.s.s the enemy in his advance, estimate (or determine) distances to important places. You have opportunities for collecting ammunition, arranging wires for communication, establis.h.i.+ng stations for the wounded. Troops in motion are easier to see. You are not called upon for as much physical strain as the attacking troops. You are less fatigued. Your machine guns are better concealed and the gunners know the ranges better than those of the attack.

But it is most distressing to a man on the defense to see the enemy, regardless of everything he can do, advance step by step. He begins to question within himself the efficacy of his fire, which is to doubt his own ability. The more he questions and worries, the less effective his aim becomes. His comrades are dead and wounded about him. Their cries of distress are heard above the noise and confusion of battle. He becomes less methodical and deliberate in his actions. His shooting becomes high and wild. This becomes generally true. The attacking force gains fire superiority.

Suppose that it is actually your business to construct a defensive position. Just how will you a.s.sign the tasks? What are the important things to be done at first, and what, if time is pressing, may with least hards.h.i.+p be omitted? You would first cut down trees, blow up buildings, destroy crops that prevented you from seeing in any direction of danger. Next you should provide protection (concealment and cover), so that there will be as few casualties as possible. Then do what is in your power to make it most difficult for the enemy to arrive at your position; i.e., construct some barbwire fences (entanglements) that he will be unable to cross. Have your expert range finders determine and make notes of the distances to important points from which the enemy must advance. Next, dig ditches (trenches) so that your groups (supports or reserves) may pa.s.s from one point to another without danger. Now take steps to protect your most vital and vulnerable points, your flanks. Have them so strong, if practicable, that the enemy will leave them alone. a.s.sign to each group of men a section of the ground to defend. Having done these important things, then go about those things that will make you more comfortable in the trenches.

CHAPTER IX