Heroes of the Great Conflict; Life and Services of William Farrar Part 2

I say murderous, because we were recklessly ordered to a.s.sault the enemy's entrenchments knowing neither their strength nor position. * * * I am very sorry to add that I have seen but little generals.h.i.+p during the campaign. Some of our corps commanders are not fit to be corporals. Lazy and indifferent they will not even ride along their lines, yet without hesitancy they will order us to attack the enemy, no matter what their position or numbers."

As the a.s.sault on Cold Harbor was a general one, it follows of course that it must have been ordered by someone higher in authority than either Smith of the Eighteenth or Upton of the Sixth Corps.

It was doubtless in allusion to this and to similar instances that the veracious and outspoken Humphreys, at that time Meade's Chief of Staff, and afterwards the peerless commander of the Second Army Corps, wrote:

"The incessant movements day and night for so long a period, the constant close contact with the enemy during all that time, the almost daily a.s.saults upon intrenchments having entanglements in front and defended by artillery and musketry in front and flank, exhausted both officers and men."

Although all the orders which brought about this unfortunate condition of affairs must have pa.s.sed through Humphreys himself, it is obvious that they could not have originated with him, but must have come from higher authority.

If the imperturbable and painstaking Smith, fresh from the triumphs and confidences of Chattanooga, should have lost his patience under these distressing circ.u.mstances, and declared to General Grant, frankly and fearlessly as he did as was clearly his duty, that "there had been a fearful slaughter at Cold Harbor," surely it should not have been brought up against him later as one of the reasons for relieving him from the command of the troops of the Department of the James, to which he had been a.s.signed after this criticism had been made. If in the same interview Grant acknowledged, as it is credibly stated he did, "that there had been a butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he had said nothing about it, because it could do no good," his remembrance of the circ.u.mstance to the prejudice of Smith, must be regarded as an afterthought which had its origin in some cause not yet fully explained.

It is altogether likely that Smith's criticism was repeated to others less ent.i.tled to speak than himself and that it was exaggerated into a direct attack upon both Meade and Grant, which could not be pa.s.sed over lightly. Be this as it may, it must be apparent that it was fully justified as a mere matter of military criticism and quite independent of both Smith and Upton, it was generally approved both by the army and the country at large.

It was shortly after the a.s.sault in question, while I was commanding a division of cavalry, that I visited Grant's headquarters. During the conversation which followed the Lieutenant General asked me: "What is the matter with this army?" To which I replied:

"It will take too long to explain, but I can tell you how to cure it. Give Parker [the Indian Chief] a tomahawk, a supply of commissary whiskey and a scalping knife and send him out with orders to bring in the scalps of general officers."

During this same visit and frequently afterwards Rawlins, in a white rage, inveighed against the desperate practice of blindly a.s.saulting fortified lines, and denounced in unmeasured terms all who favored them or failed to make adequate preparation for success, where any just excuse could be found for resorting to them. It is worthy of remark, without reference to the origin of the practice, or to the persons who were responsible for it, that General Grant alone had the power to stop it, and that later there was a noticeable change in the Army of the Potomac in regard to that practice, although it should be noted that Sherman followed it as an example in his desperate, but unsuccessful a.s.sault of the enemy's impregnable fortifications on Kenesaw Mountain, for the purpose, as he frankly explained, of showing that his army could also a.s.sault strongly fortified lines.

That such a costly practice could spring up and obtain imitation in our army is a striking commentary upon the lack of intelligent supervision over the essential details of its daily operations. It affords ample justification for again calling attention to the fact that in this respect the Confederate Army was much better off and more fortunate than the Union Army. Its generals, although not without fault, were much more careful in the management of their military details than ours were. Jefferson Davis was himself an educated soldier of great capacity, and selected none but educated and experienced military men for high command. While Lee's staff was far from faultless in organization, he had supreme authority in the field, with no army or independent corps commanders between him and the troops. His army corps were led by generals of the first rank, who took their orders directly from him, and no unnecessary time was lost in their transmission or execution, nor was there any uncertainty as to whose duty it was to work out and superintend the details of attack and defence. But whatever may be said in further elucidation of this important subject, I cannot help expressing regret that General Smith, who had shown such rare talents in another field, for planning and executing the most complicated movements, should not have had in this an opportunity to add to his fame, instead of being sent out as a subordinate to a general who, however great his talents as a lawyer and a militiaman, had developed no special apt.i.tude as an army commander. In this connection the important fact should he recalled that Generals Barnard and Meigs, officers of the highest training and distinction, at the request of General Grant, shortly after the fiasco of Bermuda Hundred, had been sent by the Was.h.i.+ngton authorities to make an investigation of General Butler's fitness for command in the field, and had with due deliberation reported that while "General Butler was a man of rare and great ability, he had not had either the training or experience to enable him to direct and control movements in battle." It was doubtless the verification of this report to Grant's satisfaction that caused him finally to relieve that General from duty in the field, and in doing so to incur both his active and his covert hostility.

Meanwhile however valid and important, in either a military or a political sense, the considerations may have been which sent Butler out in command of an army with such men as Smith and Gilmore, both professional soldiers of the highest standing, as his subordinates, the arrangement was unfortunate from beginning to end, and from its very nature it was foredoomed to failure. It is to be observed that while these admirable soldiers were constantly with their troops moving against or confronting the enemy, Butler was generally at Fortress Monroe, or at a more central point some distance in the rear, and when his orders were not ill-timed or inapplicable to the case in hand, they were not infrequently deemed impracticable, or at cross purposes with the convictions of the generals whose duty it was to carry them into effect. The simple and incontrovertible fact is that General Butler's presence with that army was from the start embarra.s.sing if not absolutely unnecessary. It interposed an intermediate commander between the generalissimo and two entire army corps, and however good the intentions of that commander or great his abilities, his princ.i.p.al influence was necessarily to derange and delay the orderly conduct and development of the campaign. It was productive of no good whatever, and was besides in direct violation of the rule of experience which teaches that better results are to be expected with one poor commander in full authority than with two or more good ones liable to pull against each other.

The chief conclusion to be reached from these considerations, and from a study of the records, in connection with the writings and unpublished memoirs of General Smith, is that his conduct during the continuance, of the arrangement was not only natural and blameless, but that the failure of Butler's army to play an important and decisive part, was due primarily, if not entirely, to Butler's own misunderstanding or mismanagement of what was entrusted to him, or the inherent defects in the organization and staff arrangements of the Union forces operating in Virginia. Under the conditions as they actually existed, effective co-operation and control, it has been shown, could not have been reasonably expected, and for this the verdict of the military critic and historian must be that the Lieutenant General who had ample power, if he chose to exercise it, was primarily responsible. Under the incontrovertible facts of the case it is difficult to see how this conclusion can be avoided.

It will he recalled by those who have read "Butler's Book," that in addition to a number of trivial derelictions of duty, General Smith was charged with the more serious one of having failed through negligence and an untimely cessation of operations, to capture Petersburg, when it was claimed that all the conditions were favorable to success. It should also be recalled that several weeks after this failure had taken place and all the necessary explanations had been made and considered, the President had, on Grant's recommendation, relieved Butler from further service in the field and had a.s.signed General Smith to the command of the Eighteenth Corps which was composed of the troops from Butler's department, serving with the Army of the Potomac. It should be remembered at the same time that before General Smith received this order he had applied for and been granted leave of absence on account of illness, or as he explained, "because of his old trouble with his head," and that while he was absent, the Lieutenant General was by some means never fully or satisfactorily explained, induced to restore Butler to his former command and to dispense entirely with the services of General Smith. In reply to a letter from Smith, he authorized Colonel Comstock of his staff to inform him that he had been relieved "because of the impossibility of his getting along with General Butler," who was his senior in rank. But General Grant a.s.sured me about this time that it was with great regret that he had taken this action; that he had tried in vain to utilize Smith's great talents; that he had been too free in his criticisms, and that Smith himself had made it necessary that either he should be relieved or that Meade, Burnside and Butler should he deprived of command and sent out of the army. Some conversation followed, in which it was suggested that he should have given the preference to the alternative as a means of simplifying the organization and increasing the efficiency of the army, and it is a singular coincidence at least, that this suggestion was partly carried into effect, with most excellent results, by the relief of both Butler and Burnside, shortly afterwards, from the command of troops in that theatre of operations. It has besides long been a question among military men whether still better results would not have been obtained if Grant had at the same time relieved Meade, who was certainly a most competent and loyal general, from the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac and placed him instead at the head of an army corps.

It may not be out of place here to call attention to the fact that while no specific limitations were ever put upon the responsibilities of Meade as an army commander, Grant thenceforth took upon himself a closer supervision of the details of the campaign, while upon many occasions during the final operations, he gave his orders directly to the corps commanders, instead of sending them through the regular official channels. The result of this practice after it became confirmed, was in every case beneficial, though it should he observed that it was far from increasing the cordial relations between Grant and Meade or between their respective headquarters.

But to return to the breach between Grant and Smith, to the exact state of facts which led up to it, and to the immediate pressure which finally brought about Smith's relief from further command in the field.

Much that is as well forgotten, has been written about this unfortunate episode. Smith felt to the day of his death that he had been misrepresented to Grant and unjustly injured by his action. He always contended that the whole truth had not been told, and it must be confessed that no consecutive and exhaustive a.n.a.lysis of the case has ever been made. Perhaps none can be made. But from such information as I have been able to gather, I have always supposed that Grant's action was based upon Smith's criticisms, exaggerated reports of which were made by certain officers of Butler's staff with whom Smith dined and spent the night at Fortress Monroe on his way home, that Butler presented these reports in person to General Grant, without the knowledge or concurrence of Meade or Burnside, and made them the basis of a demand for Smith's immediate relief. Exactly what took place at the interview must for reasons which will appear hereafter, always remain a matter of conjecture. It however seems to be probable that had General Smith deferred his leave of absence till he had seated himself firmly in his new command, or had he been sent for and allowed to make his own explanation, he would have been spared the humiliation, which ended his military career, while the country would have continued to receive the a.s.sistance of one of its greatest military minds.

General Smith, by his military writings, has not only refuted the unjust criticisms of General Butler's Book, but he has modestly and conclusively set forth his own military services during the various campaigns in which he took part. He points out with pardonable pride the friends.h.i.+p which sprang up during the Chattanooga campaign, between himself and General Grant. He makes it clear that his failure to capture Petersburg was due to a number of causes more or less potential and altogether beyond his control. First among them was the physical exhaustion of himself and his troops; second, an order which was sent to him through the signal corps from General Butler, who was all day June 15 at Point Lookout Signal Station, to stay his advance; and, third, the failure of General Hanc.o.c.k, who was with the Second Corps within supporting distance, to take up the movement and give the finis.h.i.+ng stroke to the day's work. To these should be added the defective staff arrangements by which the various forces in the field of operations were controlled, the inadequate strength of Smith's command, which was inexcusable where such a vast force was within call, the lack of engineer officers and of exact information as to the character of the ground over which the troops were compelled to operate, and the total absence of proper support and co-operation on the part of the Army of the Potomac. Above all, it should be kept in mind that the enemy held the defensive and had interior lines upon which he could throw his troops from point to point on his threatened front, with greater celerity than the attacking force could be concentrated by outside lines and across wide rivers against him.

When Smith began his movement against Petersburg, which was to be in the nature of a surprise, the greater part of Grant's army was still north of the James River, and both Meade and Hanc.o.c.k allege that they were not notified that a new effort was to be made to capture Petersburg by Smith alone, after Butler had tried and failed with his whole army to isolate and cut it off from Richmond by the movement to Bermuda Hundred. Both of these able officers declare that if they had known in time that Petersburg was to have been captured, Petersburg would have been captured. This simple statement, without reference to its truth, which has never been questioned, is conclusive evidence that the staff arrangements and the organization of the machinery of command were fatally defective, for had it been otherwise, every officer who could have been called upon to take part in the movement, or could have been expected to co-operate with it, would have been so clearly instructed as to make his duty entirely plain.

General Smith, in explanation of why he was relieved from command in the field, not only reflects strongly upon the conduct of General Butler, but endeavors to show that General Grant "was forced" by Butler to restore him to full command, in order to prevent the exposure of his own conduct, yet even if this were true it necessarily leaves both the question of fact and the question of motives in the dark. Certain letters which pa.s.sed between Smith, Grant, Rawlins and Butler have been quoted, for the purpose of ill.u.s.trating the character of the persons concerned. They will he found in the Records and they throw much light upon the subject, but they still leave the reason of Smith's removal in obscurity.

It cannot be denied that Smith was a man of great talents and conspicuous services, with unusual powers of caustic Criticism, who had been badly injured by the way in which his connection with the Army of the James had been severed. His views and conduct had been impugned, not only then, but afterwards, in both the newspapers and the personal statements of the day, and hence it was but natural that he should retort with an appeal to the facts of a private nature more or less commented upon at the time, to expose the reasons for official action and to vindicate his own conduct. He strenuously contended that he was under no obligation to conceal any important facts of the case connected either personally or officially with those who were using him unkindly to the prejudice of the public welfare, especially where those facts were believed to be a potential factor in influencing their official acts and in shaping history.

It must he confessed that Grant's explanations of his later att.i.tude towards Smith, and of the reasons for relieving him and restoring Butler to command, were neither full nor always stated in the same terms. He ignores the subject entirely in his memoirs, but it so happens that Mr. Dana, then a.s.sistant Secretary of War, was sitting with General Grant when Butler, clad in full uniform, called at headquarters and was admitted. Dana describes Butler as entering the General's presence with a flushed face and a haughty air, holding out the order, relieving him from command in the field, and asking: "General Grant, did you issue this order?" To which Grant in a hesitating manner replied: "No, not in that form." Dana, perceiving at this point that the subject under discussion was an embarra.s.sing one, and that the interview was likely to be unpleasant, if not stormy, at once took his leave, but the impression made upon his mind by what he saw while present was that Butler had in some measure "cowed" his commanding officer. What further took place neither General Grant nor Mr. Dana has ever said. Butler's Book, however, contains what purports to be a full account of the interview, but it is to be observed that it signally fails to recite any circ.u.mstance of an overbearing nature. It is abundantly evident, however, from the history of the times and from contemporaneous doc.u.ments published in the Records, that neither the working arrangements by which Butler commanded an army from his headquarters at Fortress Monroe or in the field while the major part of it, under the command of Smith, was co-operating with the Army of the Potomac, nor his relations with either his superiors or subordinates, were at all satisfactory. In the nature of the case, they could not be.

Butler was a lawyer and politician accustomed to browbeat where he could not persuade. He and Smith while starting out as friends, early came to distrust each other. Smith, who was as before stated on intimate terms at general headquarters, made his views fully known from time to time, and especially in a frank and manly letter of July 2, 1884, to both Rawlins and Grant, and from the correspondence of the latter with Halleck, it is certain that both sympathized with Smith at first. It was evidently at Grant's request to Halleck, then acting as chief of staff and military adviser at Was.h.i.+ngton, that Smith was a.s.signed to the Eighteenth Corps, and at Grant's request that he was relieved from it, without explanation. The undisputed fact is that the countermanding order was issued after a personal interview between Grant and Butler, the details of which are only partly known, and that no further explanation consistent with the continuance of friendly relations between Grant and Smith has ever been given.

The inference to be drawn from the records, the correspondence, the conversations and the writings of all the parties thereto, is that the representations of Butler, and especially his comments upon Smith's criticism of the battles and management of the campaign, were the princ.i.p.al factors in convincing Grant that the best way out of the complications was to relieve Smith and restore Butler to full command.

This way had been foreseen and suggested by Smith himself for he had asked more than once to be relieved from further service in the field on account of ill health, which made it impossible for him to undergo exposure to the hot sun, but his request had been denied, doubtless from a sincere desire on Grant's part to have the advantages of his services in the solution of the complicated problem which yet confronted the army. Had this request been granted when made, or had it been granted afterwards, and placed on the ground of a personal favor for the benefit of his health, which might well have been done, General Smith has frankly admitted that he would have had no shadow of excuse for anything but thanks. But when he was relieved without notice or any a.s.signment of cause, as he was starting on sick leave, and the order was concealed from him till he had returned, a suspicion at once arose in his mind as to the motives which inspired it, and the suspicion was claimed by him as a sufficient justification for telling the world all he knew in regard to those who were responsible for the action of which he complains. His military criticism, however indiscreet, had always been direct and manly. Its soundness had been approved by some of the best officers ill the service, including Grant himself, but it must be observed that the latter in his final report of the campaign, takes pains to make the point, evidently to forestall criticism, that he held himself responsible for only the general plans of the campaigns and operations, and that in accordance with an invariable habit, he left the details and the actual conduct of the battles to his subordinate commanders. The wisdom of this arrangement is not here in question, though much might be said against it. Its effect, if admitted, as a sound rule of action, must be to transfer the responsibility for a b.l.o.o.d.y and costly campaign to the shoulders of Meade, Humphreys, Burnside, Butler, Sheridan, Hunter, and in a number of cases even to those of corps and division commanders, instead of leaving it where it more justly belongs, on the shoulders of those who were responsible for the working organization of the army, and for the details of its staff arrangements.

General Smith's true place in history does not depend solely on these considerations, nor on his contributions to the history or criticism of the war. Fortunately for him the military committee of the House of Representatives of the Fiftieth Congress on its own motion, long after all these incidents had been closed, investigated his military career, for the purpose of deciding upon his fitness for the retired list, and on April 20, 1888, it submitted to the House of Representatives a highly favorable report, from which the following extract is taken:

"On October, 1863, he [General Smith] was transferred to the West, where he in turn became Chief Engineer of the Department of the c.u.mberland, on the staff of General George H. Thomas, and of the Military Division of the Mississippi, on the staff of General Grant. As such he devised the plan of operations by which the Army of the c.u.mberland was saved from starvation and capture at Chattanooga, and was duly credited with the same by General Thomas. He also devised the plan of operations by which Bragg's army was overthrown and driven back from Missionary Ridge, for which services he was again appointed and this time confirmed as Major General of Volunteers, also as Brevet Brigadier General, United States Army."

After referring to other incidents of his life, which have been considered more fully in this account of his public services and need not he repeated here, this report added, although General Smith had resigned from the army many years before, that he was

"fully ent.i.tled at the hands of the government to be retired for a lifetime of hard and conspicuous service, in which he has displayed the most incorruptible honesty, the most outspoken patriotism and devotion and the highest ability. It has been the good fortune of but few men in any age or in any country to save an army and to direct it to victory, from a subordinate position. Such service in Europe would secure honor and riches. In ours it should certainly result in an a.s.signment to a place on the retired list of the army, with the rank of Major General, and the appropriate pay for the remaining years of his life. The committee therefore unanimously recommend the pa.s.sage of the bill."

The final action taken in this case, while highly creditable to General Smith, was not as liberal as the House Committee thought it ought to be. The Senate Committee, while concurring in the commendation of the General, in conformity to its own practice cut his rank on the retired list down to that of Major, which was the actual grade he held in the regular army at the date of his resignation. It was a piece of ungracious and n.i.g.g.ardly economy, for the services which ent.i.tled him to retirement were those of a general officer, and as he was actually promoted from Brigadier General to Major General in recognition thereof, the House of Representatives was clearly right in recommending his retirement with the higher grade. General Smith, who had not in any way asked for this recognition, was strongly inclined to decline it, but on the solicitation of his friends he finally accepted it.

At the end of the war General Smith, notwithstanding the differences which had arisen between him and his official superiors, received the brevet of Major General for "gallant and meritorious services in the field during the rebellion."

After his relief from further service in the field, General Smith remained at New York, awaiting orders, till November 24th, 1864, at which time he was a.s.signed to special duty under the orders of the Secretary of War. This detail was voluntarily tendered and took him to New Orleans, where he was engaged in looking into the military administration of the department, under Butler and his successors, and in reference to which he made several confidential reports which have never been given to the public. Perceiving that his military career was practically at an end, and that he was not likely to receive satisfactory recognition on the reorganization of the army, he resigned his volunteer commission on the 4th of November, 1865, and took a leave of absence as a Major of Engineers, from December 15th, 1865, to March 7th, 1867, on which later date his resignation from the army was accepted. He had meanwhile taken employment as President of the International Ocean Telegraph Company, and had visited Florida, Cuba and Spain for the purpose of obtaining an exclusive concession for a term of years, for laying, maintaining and operating an ocean telegraph cable from Jacksonville to Havana. He was most successful in his negotiations, and in the construction and management of his lines, till 1873, when he and his a.s.sociates sold out under advantageous terms to the Western Union Telegraph Company. For the next two years he resided abroad, mostly in England, with his family. During this time he visited nearly all the countries of western Europe, where he met and made the acquaintance of many leading men in the highest walks of life.

In May, 1873, General Smith was appointed one of the police commissioners for New York City, which place he filled till December 31st of that year, when he was appointed president of the board. He held this office till March 11th, 1881, during which time he took an important part in elevating and perfecting the police service. He was, however, too honest and independent to get on harmoniously with the politicians, and after an open breach with a number of them, including the Mayor, he resigned his position and retired to private life.

While engaged in this service he took an active interest in the presidential campaign. It will be remembered that the closeness of the vote between Mr. Tilden and General Hayes, and the high degree of tension between the opposing parties and their managers, filled the country with alarm, in the midst of which General Smith was consulted by the friends of Mr. Tilden, with the view of devising measures against the possibility of a subversion of the government by military or arbitrary power, but fortunately the device and action of the Electoral Commission averted all danger of that sort. The timid and vacillating behavior of Mr. Tilden during the emergency and afterwards was, however, a powerful factor in the estrangement of his supporters, and did much to bring about the nomination of General Hanc.o.c.k by the next Democratic National Convention. General Smith and his friend General Franklin took an active interest in the canva.s.s and convention, and although they were soldiers without political experience, it is believed that their endors.e.m.e.nt of Hanc.o.c.k and their work in his behalf was one of the most powerful influences in securing his nomination.

They had been his life-long friends and his comrade during the great conflict, and hence felt justified in giving him their most earnest support.

At the close of the presidential campaign, the result of which was necessarily disappointing to General Smith, he was compelled, by unfortunate investments, to look about for an occupation. His friend, General John Newton was then Chief of Engineers and the system of Internal Improvements, which had long been favored by the Republican party, was being carried forward by bountiful appropriations from Congress. Many officers and civil engineers were required for the supervision of the various river and harbor works, and General Smith, having had wide experience, was, by the act of his friend, appointed Government Agent, and placed in charge of the works on the Peninsula between the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, with his headquarters at Wilmington, Delaware. On March 1st, 1889, he was, in compliance with a special Act of Congress, put upon the retired list of the army, with the rank of Major. This at once raised the question whether he could draw the pay appropriate to his retired rank, and at the same time receive pay as a Government Agent. After argument by his friend, the Honorable Anthony Higgins, the United States Senator from Delaware, the case was decided in his favor on the theory that an "agent" was not an officer, within the meaning of the law. The decision in this case was similar to that made in the case of Quartermaster General Meigs, who was employed to supervise the construction of the Pension Office in Was.h.i.+ngton, after he had been placed on the retired list. Under the decision General Smith continued to perform the duties and draw the pay of Agent, till 1901, when he voluntarily gave up the appointment and definitively retired from business of every kind. For the last ten years or more he resided in Philadelphia, where he enjoyed the acquaintance and society of his chosen friends to within a few weeks of his death, which occurred on the 28th day of February, 1903, four years subsequent to the death of his wife.

He retained his wonderful intellectual powers, absolutely unimpaired, to the date of his final illness. With keen wit, sparkling repartee and a mind always on the alert for fresh information and the beauties of literature, he remained a delightful and instructive companion to the end. Firm in the Christian faith and fully satisfied that life had nothing further in store for him worth waiting for, he took his departure in to the Silent Land composed and free from regret, like a strong man going to sleep. He left a son and daughter with many friends and hosts of companions scattered throughout the country to mourn his loss. His native State had filled his heart with pride and satisfaction by giving on the walls of its capital to a bronze effigy and tablet with a laudatory inscription celebrating his virtues and his most distinguished services, and handing down his memory to future generations as one in every way worthy of their respect and admiration.

[Ill.u.s.tration:

This tablet is presented to Vermont by soldiers from other states who admire so much her great soldier son

Brevet Major General William Farrar Smith, U.S. Army.

The extracts here quoted from the letter of the a.s.sistant secretary of war C.A. Dana, to General Grant, dated December 21, 1863, show that at a crisis in the Nation's life he was in the thoughts of Lincoln, Stanton and Grant, as the general best qualified for the most important command.

"The surest means of getting the rebels altogether out of East Tennessee is to be found in the Army of the Potomac.

This naturally led to your second proposition, namely that either Sherman or W.F. Smith should be put in command of that army. Both the Secretary of War and Gen. Halleck said 'Gen.

W.F. Smith would be the best person to try'. The President, the Secretary of War and Gen Halleck agree with you in thinking that it would be on the whole much better to select him."

Series I Vol. x.x.xI Page 457 Official Records Union and Confederate Armies. (War of the Rebellion)]

I cannot close this sketch without repeating in part my personal testimony to the strength and elevation of General Smith's character.

He was blessed by a singularly clear, orderly and comprehensive mind, and was most industrious and persistent in its use. Somewhat phlegmatic and deliberate in temperament and manner, he gave the impression occasionally that he was lacking in push and energy, but such was not the case in fact. During his services on the Rio Grande he suffered, as previously related, a malarial attack from which it is now evident he never entirely recovered. Under exposure to the summer sun, he was for the rest of his life liable to a recurrence of the symptoms especially those pertaining to the head, and this may have made him more or less irascible at times. Military habits are at best not calculated to develop a mild and patient behavior, nor to beget a spirit of resignation to unjust or arbitrary treatment, especially if it comes from higher authority, and is not merited.

General Smith was the last man to lay claim to a saint-like character, but according to those who knew him best he possessed a just and even a charitable disposition, which made him fair towards his equals and most considerate towards his subordinates. He was, however, above all things, logical, and as a close student of his profession, he invariably followed the established principles of the military art to their legitimate conclusions. In the presence of great military problems and responsibilities such as those with which he had to deal at Chattanooga, he became absorbed and reticent if not austere and had but little to say except to those with whom it was his duty to talk.

There the solution was so clearly his own that no one thought of disputing it with him till years afterwards. But in the conduct of operations against Lee, there were so many roads open, so many commanders in the field, and so many plans of operations suggested, so many considerations to be observed that no one man except Grant who was clad with special powers for the emergency, could hope for the honor of directing all movements. That became his exclusive function as soon as he was made Lieutenant General, but unfortunately, as has been shown, he and Smith began drifting apart from the day of their arrival in the East, and long before the great task before them was accomplished they had by their own peculiarities, looking at the problem from different points of view, and aided doubtless by the misrepresentations and selfish purposes of others, become hopelessly out of harmony with each other.

This is not the place to p.r.o.nounce final judgment between them. They knew each other well, and although Grant had said towards the close of their friends.h.i.+p, "General Smith, while a very able officer, is obstinate, and is likely to condemn whatever is not suggested by himself," he had shown an earnest desire that his great talents should be utilized. On the other hand Smith, who was intimately acquainted with both the strength and the weaknesses of Grant's character, had full confidence in the soundness of his judgment, when left free from prejudice and misrepresentation, to act upon a full statement of the facts. Neither had hitherto shown himself to be particularly sensitive to criticism from the other, and both were in the highest degree patriotic and loyal to the cause. They had worked harmoniously and with marked success together in the West. Not a shadow had come between them. The case must therefore have been a most complicated one which made it impossible for them to work together in the same manner and to the same end in the East. The severance of their relations.h.i.+p, to whatever influence it may be attributed, is profoundly to be regretted, not only because it prematurely ended the military career of General Smith, but because it must have injuriously affected the fortunes of General Grant as well as of the country and the army, at a time when both sorely needed the help of every capable soldier. These results are all the more to be deplored because no one can study the circ.u.mstances connected therewith, without reaching the conclusion that they were brought about by methods which were themselves not above criticism, and which finally resulted in the downfall of their author.