Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy Part 31

Introduction.

The last major thinker of the pre-Qin period is the social and political theorist Han Feizi (c. 280233 B.C.E.). Han Fei was a member of the ruling house of the state of Han ; a small but influential state, strategically located in the southern portion of China's central plain. The book that bears his name is a collection of essays on the arts of government and rhetoric, criticisms of historical episodes and existing philosophical doctrines, commentaries on earlier philosophical works, and collections of historical and semihistorical anecdotes to be used in the persuasion of rulers. Most of these works (including all the selections translated here) were written by Han Fei himself, but some of them appear to be the work of later authors and were probably added to the text by compilers during the Western Han dynasty.

According to the historian Sima Qian, Han Fei was "a stutterer who could not speak his own counsel, but who was skilled at composing written works,"1 and this may partly explain why, up until the end of his life, there is no record of Han Fei ever holding an important position in the government of his home state. Sima Qian also states that at some point early in his career Han Fei studied under the great Confucian philosopher Xunzi, and was a schoolmate of the infamous statesman Li Si -who went on to become prime minister of the state of Qin-and was largely responsible for Qin's conquest of the Chinese cultural sphere in the year 221 B.C.E. Although Han Fei's ideas seem to have fallen on deaf ears in the state of Han, his writings eventually brought him to the attention of the reigning king of Qin (i.e., the future first emperor of China), and as a result, Han Fei was dispatched as an emissary to the state of Qin in either 234 or 233 B.C.E. Unfortunately, Han Fei's former schoolmate Li Si believed that Han Fei posed a threat to his own power, and so he, together with his compatriot Yao Jia , slandered Han Fei before the king of Qin, and convinced the king to have him imprisoned. While Han Fei was in prison, Li Si sent someone to offer him poison, and Han Fei, facing the prospect of a cruel execution and unable to defend himself before the king of Qin, accepted the poison and took his own life.

During Han Fei's lifetime, the state of Han was plagued by internal disorder and was in constant danger of being swallowed up by the ever-expanding state of Qin to the west. The fact that Han Fei was operating under these precarious conditions may help to explain why he came to advocate such a pragmatic and largely amoral view of politics. Han Fei does not seem to have been the least bit interested in determining what form of government was most ethically justified. His goal was simply to determine which measures were most effective in ensuring the continued survival of the state and furthering the public interests of the ruler and his people. Han Fei rejected the Confucian and Mohist claim that a ruler should model his government on the values and inst.i.tutions of the ancient sage-kings. He maintained that each stage in the development of human civilization comes with its own unique set of problems, and so the rulers of each age must be able to come up with new measures for dealing with these obstacles. A truly effective government must be based on a firm grasp of the existing sociopolitical conditions, and not on some ahistorical and overly idealized vision of human social life. Han Fei was also opposed to the traditional model of government because he believed it relied too heavily on the moral character of political agents. He did not deny that it was better to have a good ruler in power than a bad one, but he did not believe that moral goodness by itself was sufficient to guarantee peace and prosperity. Furthermore, Han Fei recognized that while there may be some rulers who are either exceptionally good or exceptionally bad, most fall somewhere in between. If a system of government is to be sustainable over time, it must be stable enough to withstand the occasional bad ruler, and self-supporting enough to be maintained by the numerous mediocre ones. Han Fei was also deeply concerned about the proliferation of what he regarded as politically dangerous or socially useless groups of people. Among the groups singled out for criticism by Han Fei, the most noteworthy are: cla.s.sical scholars (i.e., Confucians), wandering orators, private swordsmen, draft dodgers, and merchants. In his view, these five groups were nothing more than "vermin" who fed off the resources of the state without contributing anything substantial in return. If these groups were not wiped out or suppressed, Han Fei argued, they would eventually weaken the political structure of society and bring about the downfall of the state.

Han Fei's own political philosophy represents the culmination of a long movement toward inst.i.tutionalism in early Chinese political theory. Some aspects of this inst.i.tutionalist view can be seen in Xunzi's emphasis on the political significance of li, "public ritual," and socially defined standards of yi, "rightness," but the true proponents of this model of government were the so-called Legalist statesmen like Guan Zhong, Gongsun Yang, Shen Buhai, and Shen Dao.2 Han Fei s role within the Legalist tradition is that of both synthesizer and critic. His major achievement was to show how the individual doctrines developed by the earlier Legalists could be combined into a single theory of government, while at the same time correcting and refining many of the central ideas contained in each of them.

In addition to being a brilliant political theorist, Han Fei was also a great rhetoritician, and the style of his writings has often been praised by later writers. Han Fei not only invented a new genre of writing (nan , "philosophical critique"), he also developed a new style of writing that later became known as the lian zhu , "linked pearl," style. But perhaps Han Fei's greatest contribution in the field of rhetoric lies in his observation that an effective persuasion depends as much on one's knowledge of the person being persuaded as it does on the quality of one's argument, or the style of one's presentation. This observation had important ramifications within the political culture of Warring States China. For the minister, it meant that if you wanted your proposal to be approved, you had to determine what sort of desires and aversions might be "in the mind" of the ruler you were persuading, so that you could adjust the way you presented your ideas to match what the ruler was already thinking. For the ruler, it meant that if you wanted to know the truth behind your ministers' proposals and avoid being misled by their rhetoric, you had to work hard to conceal your own desires and aversions, so that your ministers could not change their words simply to please you.

Han Fei's philosophy had a tremendous influence on later political theory and practice in China. There is no way to determine what role his ideas may have played in shaping the government of the Qin dynasty, but we do know that his theories were often debated and discussed in the succeeding Han dynasty, especially during the height of the so-called Huang-Lao movement. After the Han it is difficult to find any thinker who refers to themselves as a Legalist, but by that point, many of the basic tenets of Legalism had already been incorporated into the ideology of imperial Confucianism, where they continued to be used right down into the modern era.

Chapter Five: The Way of the Ruler3.

The Way is the beginning of the ten thousand things and the guiding thread of truth and falsity. For this reason, an enlightened ruler holds to the beginning so that he may know the source of the ten thousand things, and regulates the guiding thread so that he may understand the starting points of excellence and failure. Thus, empty and still he waits, allowing names to define themselves and affairs to determine themselves. Being empty, he grasps the essence of phenomena; being still, he understands the correctness of movements. When a proposal is made, it itself serves to name the objectives. When an affair is carried out, it itself serves to form the results. When form and name are matched and found to be identical, there is nothing for the ruler to do, and everything returns to what is essential. Thus it is said, "A ruler should never reveal what he desires. For if he reveals what he desires, the ministers will cut and polish themselves accordingly. A ruler should never reveal what he intends. For if he reveals what he intends, the ministers will try to make themselves look distinctive." Thus it is also said, "Get rid of likes and dislikes and the true character of your ministers will be plain. Dispense with experience and wisdom and your ministers will be forced to take precautions."

Thus, an enlightened ruler has wisdom, but he does not use it to make plans. He allows the ten thousand things to know their place. He has worthiness, but he does not use it to conduct his own affairs. He observes what his ministers and subordinates base their actions on. He has courage, but he does not use it to express anger. He allows the a.s.sembled ministers to fully extend their martial feelings. Thus, by getting rid of wisdom he achieves clarity; by getting rid of worthiness he enjoys achievement; by getting rid of courage he possesses strength. When the a.s.sembled ministers keep to their duties, the hundred offices follow a uniform standard, and the ruler employs them based on their abilities, this is called "exercising the constant." Thus it is said, "Tranquil, he has no position to occupy. Isolated, no one knows his place." When an enlightened ruler practices nonaction above, the a.s.sembled ministers will be anxious and fearful below.

This is the way of an enlightened ruler: he makes it so that the wise fully exert themselves in making plans, while he used their wisdom to manage his affairs. Thus, he is never lacking in wisdom. He makes it so that the worthy refine their natural talents, while he makes use of those talents and employs them. Thus, he is never lacking in ability. He makes it so that when there are achievements he gets the credit for their worthiness, and when there are errors the ministers take the blame. Thus, he is never lacking in reputation. Thus, though he himself is not worthy, he is taught by those who are worthy; though he himself is not wise, he is corrected by those who are wise. The ministers perform the work, and the ruler enjoys the final achievement. This is what is called the guiding principle of a worthy ruler.

The Way lies in not being seen, its use lies in not being known. Remain empty, still, and without concern, so that you may secretly observe the defects of others. See others but do not allow yourself to be seen; hear others but do not allow yourself to be heard; know others but do not allow yourself to be known. Once you understand someone's words, do not alter or change them, but check them using the comparison of form and name. If you put one person in every office, and do not allow them to speak with one another, then the ten thousand things will all be completed. Cover your tracks, conceal your starting points, and your subordinates will not be able to see where you are coming from. Get rid of wisdom, dispense with ability, and your subordinates will not be able to guess your intentions. Hold on to what people have said before, and look to see if they match it with results. Carefully take hold of the handles of punishment and reward and maintain firm control of them. Cut off all hope of using them, smash all intentions to take them, and do not allow people to covet them.

If you do not watch your door and strengthen your gate, tigers will live in your state; if you do not take care with your affairs and conceal your true character, thieves will be born in your country. Some people kill their rulers and take their places, making it so that no one dares not to join them. Hence, they are called tigers. Some people sit by their ruler's side and listen to his secrets for the sake of corrupt ministers. Hence, they are called thieves. If you break up their factions, arrest their benefactors, close their gates, and take away their support, the state will have no tigers. If your greatness cannot be measured and your depth cannot be gauged, if you match up form and name and examine laws and models, making sure that those who usurp powers that do not belong to them are executed, the state will have no thieves.

Thus a ruler of men can be blocked in five ways: when a minister shuts off his ruler from others, this is the first kind of block. When a minister controls the wealth and benefits of the state, this is the second kind of block. When a minister usurps the power to issue commands, this is the third kind of block. When a minister is able to carry out righteousness, this is the fourth kind of block. When a minister can plant his own men in positions of power, this is the fifth kind of block. When a minister shuts off his ruler from others, the ruler loses his position. When a minister controls the wealth and benefits of the state, the ruler loses the power to grant favors. When a minister usurps the power to issue orders, the ruler loses control. When a minister is able to carry out righteousness, the ruler loses his clarity. When a minister can plant his own men in positions of power, the ruler loses his supporters. These are all things that only a ruler of men should control. They are not things that his ministers should be able to manipulate.

The Way of a ruler of men takes stillness and retreat as its treasures. A good ruler does not personally manage his affairs, but he knows the difference between clumsiness and skill. He does not personally calculate or make plans, but he knows the difference between good fortune and bad. Thus, even though he himself does not propose anything, he is good at responding to the proposals of others; even though he himself does not perform any tasks, he is good at increasing his own resources. When a ruler has responded to a minister's proposal by a.s.signing him a task, it is as if he holds the creditor's portion of the qi tally.4 When the task has generated some increase, it is as if he wields the commander's portion of the fu tally.5 It is from the matching of the qi and fu tallies that rewards and penalties are born. Thus, when the a.s.sembled ministers lay out their proposals, the ruler a.s.signs them tasks based on their proposals, and then uses the tasks to hold them accountable for their achievements. If the achievements accord with the task and the task accords with the proposal, then the minister is rewarded. If the achievements do not accord with the task or the task does not accord with the proposal, then the minister is punished. The Way of an enlightened ruler is to make it so that no minister may make a proposal and then fail to match it with actions and results.

For this reason, when an enlightened ruler hands out rewards it is generous, like the fall of timely rain, and the hundred surnames all benefit from his bounty. When he hands out penalties, it is terrifying, like thunder and lightning, and even spirits and sages cannot undo his work. Thus, an enlightened ruler does not skimp on rewards or forgive penalties. If he skimped on rewards the successful ministers would become lazy in their work, and if he forgave penalties the corrupt minister would find it easy to do wrong. For this reason, those who make genuine achievements must always be rewarded, even if they are distant and lowly, while those who make genuine errors must always be punished, even if they are close and cherished. If those who are distant and lowly are always rewarded for their achievements, and those who are close and cherished are always punished for their crimes, then those who are distant and lowly will not become resentful, and those who are close and cherished will not become haughty.

Chapter Six: On the Importance of Having Standards (A Memorial) No state is forever strong, no state is forever weak. If those who uphold the law are strong the state will be strong. If they are weak the state will be weak. . . .

Thus, under King Zhuang of Chu and Duke Huan of Qi, the states of Chu and Qi enjoyed hegemony,6 while under King Zhaoxiang of Yan and King Anxi of Wei, the states of Yan and Wei became strong.7 Now, however, these states have all deteriorated because their a.s.sembled ministers and government officials pursue that which brings about disorder instead of that which brings about order. Since these states are already weak and disorderly, if their ministers and officials abandon the laws of the state and make private arrangements with foreign powers, this will be like carrying wood to put out a fire-the weakness and disorder will only grow worse.

Thus, at the present time, if a ruler can get rid of private crookedness and promote the public law, his people will become secure and his state will become well ordered. If he can expel private conduct and enforce the public law, his troops will grow strong while his enemies grow weak. Therefore, if when examining gains and losses there is a system of laws and standards that can be applied to the claims and actions of the a.s.sembled ministers, the ruler will not be deceived by trickery and falsehood. If when examining gains and losses there is a scale of weights and balances that can be used to measure the importance of distant affairs, the ruler will not be deceived by the heaviness or lightness of the parties of the world.

Now if you rely on reputation to advance the capable, the ministers will separate themselves from those above and spend their time colluding with those below. If you rely on political factions to promote men to office, the people will work to develop instrumental relations.h.i.+ps and will not seek to be useful with regard to the law. Thus, a ruler who mistakes reputation for ability when a.s.signing offices will see his state fall into disorder.

If a ruler distributes rewards based on reputation, and hands out penalties based on slander, those people who covet rewards and hate penalties will abandon the public law and carry out their private schemes, colluding with one another in order to advance their mutual interests. If ministers forget their ruler and establish relations.h.i.+ps with foreign powers in order to advance the interests of their confederates, there will be scant reason for subordinates to obey their superiors. When relations.h.i.+ps are profuse and confederates are numerous, so that cliques and factions flourish both inside and outside the state, then even if a minister commits a great transgression, he will have ample means to cover it up. Thus, the loyal ministers will be in danger of being killed even though they have not committed a crime, and the corrupt and wicked ministers will enjoy security and profits even though they have not produced any achievements. When loyal ministers are in danger of being killed even though they have not committed a crime, good ministers will go into hiding. When corrupt and wicked ministers enjoy security and profit even though they have not produced any accomplishments, corrupt ministers will advance in the government. Herein lies the origin of the downfall of the state.

In a situation like this, the a.s.sembled ministers will violate the law, strengthen their private influence, and make light of the public legal standards. They will travel repeatedly to the gates of "capable men," but never once go to the court of their ruler. They will deliberate a hundred times about the welfare of their private households, but never once make plans for their ruler's state. So even though the number of ministers may be great, they will be of no use in bringing respect to the ruler; and even though the hundred offices may be filled, they will be of no use in administrating the country. In such a situation, the ruler will have the name of a ruler, but the actual power of the ruler will be shared among the houses of his a.s.sembled ministers.

Therefore your servant says, "There are no people in the court of a deteriorated state." The reason why there are no people in the court of a deteriorated state is not because of the degeneration of the court. Rather, it is because the n.o.ble houses work to make each other flourish and do not strive to enrich the state; the great ministers work to make each other respected and do not strive to bring respect to their ruler; and the minor ministers look for promotions and stipends by cultivating advantageous relations.h.i.+ps and do not attend to the duties of their office. The reason why things are like this is that the ruler has not set the standard from above through laws, and instead relies on his subordinates to take care of things. Thus, an enlightened ruler uses the law to select men and does not try to promote them himself; he uses the law to evaluate accomplishments and does not try to measure them himself. When ability cannot be hidden and errors cannot be covered up, when those who only have a good reputation cannot advance, and denunciations cannot make good men retire, then the relations.h.i.+p between ruler and minister will be clearly defined and the state will be easy to govern. Thus, if Your Majesty would only attend to the law everything would be fine.

When worthy men serve as ministers, they face north,8 presenting their tokens of allegiance, and are never of two minds about whom they should serve. At court they never presume to excuse themselves from lowly positions, and in the military they never venture to remove themselves from danger. They always follow the directions of their superiors and obey the laws of their ruler. With empty minds they wait for orders and have no predetermined views about what is right and wrong. Thus, although they have mouths they do not use them to speak for their private interests; although they have eyes they do not use them to look for private gain. In all matters they are directed by those above them. Those who serve as ministers can be compared to hands; reaching up they take care of the head, reaching down they take care of the feet. In times of coolness and warmth, hot and cold, they cannot help but aid the body by rubbing or fanning it, and when a sharp sword like Moye9 threatens to strike the body, they dare not fail to bat it away. There are no "private" ministers who are worthy and intelligent, no "private" officers who are useful and capable. Thus, when the people do not establish private relations.h.i.+ps outside their own villages, and have no relatives by marriage more than a hundred li away, when the n.o.ble and the base do not encroach on each other, and the stupid and the wise lift up the balance of the law and stand in their proper places-this is the pinnacle of good order.

Now, if someone thinks little of t.i.tles and stipends, and readily leaves a state in order to choose himself a new ruler, your servant would not call him steadfast. If someone uses deceitful rhetoric to go against the law and opposes his ruler with forceful remonstrances, your servant would not call him loyal. If someone doles out favors and distributes benefits, gathering the support of those below him in order to make a name for himself, your servant would not call him benevolent. If someone takes leave of society and goes into seclusion, using his actions to criticize his superiors, your servant would not call him righteous. If someone serves as an emissary to the other feudal rulers outside the state and squanders resources within it, if he takes control of the narrow and dangerous pa.s.ses and frightens his ruler by saying, "Without me your relations.h.i.+ps with friendly states will not be close and the anger of enemy states will not be abated," and the ruler believes him and uses the resources of the state to follow his counsel, if he degrades the name of the ruler while glorifying his own person, and destroys the wealth of the state while benefiting his own household, your servant would not call him wise. These several things are the doctrines of a dangerous age and that which the laws of the former kings sought to minimize. The laws of the former kings say, "A minister should never work to create his own authority or benefit; he should follow the directions of the king. He should never work to create trouble; he should follow the king's road."10 The people in the well-ordered ages of the past upheld the public law and abandoned private strategies; they focused their intentions and unified their conduct. Everything they did was for the sake of being employed by the ruler.

Now if a ruler of men tries to personally examine each of the hundred offices, he will find that his days are too short and his strength is insufficient. Moreover, if a superior uses his eyes to investigate things, his subordinates will dress up what he sees. If he uses his ears to investigate things, his subordinates will dress up what he hears. If he uses his reasoning to investigate things his subordinates will make their words complex and difficult to understand. The former kings knew that these three things were insufficient to be used in governing, so they put aside their own abilities, based their government on law and method, and carefully exercised the power of reward and punishment. The former kings held on to what was essential, so their laws were simple but inviolable. They alone controlled the land within the four seas, so the intelligent and wise were not able to use their trickery, the flatterers and deceivers were allowed no opening through which they could curry favor, and the corrupt and wicked had nothing to rely upon. Those who lived a thousand li away did not dare to change their words, and those who occupied positions of power among the officers of the court did not dare to hide goodness or disguise wrongs. The various subordinates of the court kept to their places and remained una.s.suming, not daring to overstep the boundaries of their offices or infringe upon each other's duties. Thus, the affairs of government were not enough to exhaust the strength of the former kings, and they had more than enough time to get things done. It was the way these superiors used the power of their position that made it thus.

When a minister encroaches upon the power of his ruler, it is as if the two of them were in some unfamiliar terrain and the minister, by gradually leading them forward, causes the ruler of men to lose his sense of direction so that he turns from east to west without even knowing it. This is why the former kings set up southward-pointing markers in order to fix the directions of morning and evening.11 Therefore, an enlightened ruler makes sure that his a.s.sembled ministers do not let their intentions wander into areas outside the scope of the law, and does not grant favors in those areas within the scope of the law, so that no action negates the law. Stern laws are what one uses to prohibit transgressions and cast out selfishness; harsh punishments are what one uses to enforce commands and chastise subordinates. The power of the ruler cannot be bestowed on others; control of the state cannot be shared among the gates of several houses. If power and control are shared then a myriad of vices will flourish; if the law cannot be trusted then the status of the ruler will be in danger; but if punishments are not curtailed then wickedness will not prevail. Thus it is said, "The estimate of a skillful carpenter is as accurate as an ink-line, but a good carpenter will always begin by using the compa.s.s and square as his standard. The recommendations of the wisest men always strike at the heart of the matter, but a truly wise man will always use the laws of the former kings as a way of checking his conclusions." Thus, when the ink-line is pulled straight, bent wood can be cut true; when the level is even, high sections can be planed down; when the weights and balances have been properly hung, heavy will be shown to be greater than light; and when the size of bushels and piculs has been properly established, more will be shown to be greater than less.

Thus, using law to govern the state involves nothing more than promoting that which accords with the law and abandoning that which does not. The law does not make exceptions for those who are n.o.ble, just as the ink-line does not bend around that which is crooked. The wise cannot excuse themselves from what the law commands, and the brave do not dare oppose it. The punishment of transgressions does not bypa.s.s the great ministers, and the rewarding of goodness does not neglect the common folk. Thus, when it comes to straightening out the mistakes of superiors and punis.h.i.+ng the wickedness of inferiors, ordering the disorderly and untangling the tangled, reducing covetousness, supressing disobedience, and unifying the course of the people, nothing is better than the law. For strictly regulating the offices and overawing the people, thwarting licentiousness and idleness, and stopping trickery and falsehood, nothing is better than punishments. If punishments are heavy then the n.o.ble and the base will not presume to change places. If laws are well defined then those above will be respected and their power will not be encroached upon. When superiors are respected and their power is not encroached upon, then the ruler will be strong and have a hold on what is essential. Therefore, the former kings valued the law and pa.s.sed it down to their successors. If a ruler abandons the law and relies on private judgments, the positions of superior and inferior will not be properly distinguished.

Chapter Seven: The Two Handles.

The way an enlightened ruler controls his ministers is through the use of two handles, and nothing more. These two handles are punishment and favor. What is meant by punishment and favor? To kill or execute-this is what is meant by "punishment." To venerate or reward-this is what is meant by "favor." Those who serve as ministers are fearful of execution and penalities and regard being venerated or rewarded as something beneficial. So if the ruler of men personally exercises his power to punish and grant favors, then the a.s.sembled ministers will all fear his might and turn to the benefits he offers them.

With the corrupt ministers of the age, however, this is not the case. When they hate someone, they are able to obtain the power to punish from their ruler and accuse him, and when they love someone, they are able to obtain the power to grant favors from their ruler and reward him. Now if the ruler of men does not make it so that the might and benefits that derive from rewards and penalities come only from him, and instead listens to his ministers when carrying out rewards and penalties, then the people of the state will all fear their ministers while dismissing their ruler, and turn to their ministers while departing from their ruler. This is the misfortune that comes when the ruler of men loses the power to punish and grant favors. The reason why the tiger can subdue the dog is because he has claws and fangs. But if the tiger loses his claws and fangs and allows the dog to use them, then the tiger will instead be subdued by the dog. A ruler of men is someone who uses punishments and favor to control his ministers. Now if the ruler of men loses his power to punish and grant favors and allows his ministers to use them, then the ruler will instead be controlled by his ministers.

Thus, Tian Chang requested the power to grant t.i.tles and stipends and exercised it over the a.s.sembled ministers above, while at the same time increasing the size of the bushel and picul measures and distributing grain among the hundred surnames below. In this case, Duke Jian lost his power to grant favors and allowed Tian Chang to use it. As a result, Duke Jian was eventually a.s.sa.s.sinated. Zi Han said to the Lord of Song, "Veneration, rewards, boons, and gifts-these are things that the people all enjoy. Let you, my Lord, take care of these things yourself. Death, mutilation, punishments, and penalties-these are things that the people all hate. Let me, your servant, take care of these." Thereupon, the Lord of Song lost the power to punish and allowed Zi Han to use it. As a result, the Lord of Song was robbed of his authority. Tian Chang gained exclusive use of favor and Duke Jian was a.s.sa.s.sinated. Zi Han gained exclusive use of punishment and the Lord of Song was robbed of his authority.12 So if those who serve as ministers in the current age have taken control of both punishments and favor, then the danger facing the rulers of the current age is far greater than that faced by Duke Jian and the Lord of Song. Thus, whenever a ruler is robbed, killed, imprisoned, or overshadowed, it is invariably because he has endangered himself and his state by giving up control of punishments and favors and allowing his ministers to use them.

If a ruler of men wants to put an end to vice, he must examine the correspondence between form and name, and look to see how what is said differs from what is done. When those who serve as ministers lay out proposals, the ruler a.s.signs them tasks based on their proposals, and then uses their tasks to hold them accountable for their achievements. If the achievements accord with the task and the task accords with the proposal, then the minister is rewarded. If the achievements do not accord with the task or the task does not accord with the proposal, then the minister is penalized. Thus, if someone among the a.s.sembled ministers proposes something great but the actual achievement is small, he should be penalized. In this case, one is not penalizing them because the achievement is small, but rather because the achievement does not match their named objectives. If someone among the a.s.sembled ministers proposes something small but the actual achievement is great, he should also be penalized. In this case, it is not that one is not pleased by the great achievement, but rather that one feels that the harm that comes from achievements not according with named objectives is even greater than the benefit of the great achievement, so he must be penalized.

Marquis Zhao of Han13 once became drunk and fell asleep. The Steward of Caps, seeing that his ruler was cold, placed the Marquis' cloak over him. When Marquis Zhao awoke he was pleased by this, and asked his attendants, "Who covered me with my cloak?" His attendants replied, "It was the Steward of Caps." Consequently, the ruler punished both the Steward of Caps and the Steward of Cloaks. He punished the Steward of Cloaks because he felt the man had failed to fulfill his appointed task, and he punished the Steward of Caps because he felt the man had overstepped the bounds of his position. It was not that the Marquis did not dislike the cold, but rather that he felt that the harm that comes from ministers encroaching on each other's office is even greater than the harm that comes from being cold. Thus, when an enlightened ruler controls his ministers, he makes it so that ministers cannot get credit for achievements gained by overstepping the bounds of their offices, or make proposals and then fail to match them with actual achievements. If someone oversteps the boundaries of his office, he should die. If someone's proposals are not matched by actual achievements, he should be faulted. If ministers are forced to be virtuous in guarding the duties of their offices and completing the tasks they have proposed for themselves, then the a.s.sembled ministers will not be able to form cliques and factions to a.s.sist each other.

A ruler of men faces two possible misfortunes: if he employs the worthy, the ministers will use worthiness as a pretext to rob their ruler of his power; but if he promotes men recklessly, his affairs will be neglected and he will not prevail. Thus, if the ruler of men is fond of worthiness, the a.s.sembled ministers will dress up their behavior in order to satisfy their ruler's desires and the true character of the a.s.sembled ministers will not be apparent. And when the true character of the a.s.sembled ministers is not apparent, the ruler of men will have no way of differentiating between good and bad ministers. Thus, the King of Yue was fond of bravery, so his people often looked lightly upon their own deaths.14 King Ling of Chu was fond of narrow waists, so there were many starving people in his state. Duke Huan of Qi was jealous and fond of women, so Shu Diao castrated himself in order to take control of the Duke's harem. Duke Huan also liked exotic flavors, so Yi Ya steamed his first-born son and presented it to him.15 King Kuai of Yan was fond of worthiness, so Zi Zhi made a great show of refusing to accept control of the state.16 Thus, if the ruler reveals what he dislikes, the a.s.sembled ministers will conceal the origins of their actions; if the ruler reveals what he likes, the a.s.sembled ministers will feign abilities they do not have. In short, if a ruler reveals his desires, the true character and ambitions of his a.s.sembled ministers will be given the resources they need in order to succeed.

Thus, Zi Zhi relied on worthiness to ensnare his ruler, while Shu Diao and Yi Ya used their ruler's desires to encroach upon his power. In the end King Kuai was killed in the chaos following his abdication,17 and Duke Huan remained unburied until the insects devouring his corpse flowed out from under his door.18 What is the reason for all this? It is because these rulers of men allowed their natural dispositions to support the misfortunes brought about by their ministers. The character of ministers is not always such that they can love their ruler. Some become ministers only to increase their personal benefit. Now if a ruler of men does not cover up his true character and conceal the origins of his actions, and instead allows his ministers to have the means to encroach upon their ruler, then the a.s.sembled ministers will not find it difficult to become a Zi Zhi or a Tian Chang. Thus it is said, "Get rid of likes and dislikes and the true character of the a.s.sembled ministers will be plain. And when the true character of the a.s.sembled ministers is plain, the ruler of men cannot be deceived."

Chapter Eight: A Critique of the Doctrine of the Power of Position Shenzi says, "The flying dragon rides upon the clouds; the soaring serpent roams upon the mist. But when the clouds disperse and the mist clears, the dragon and the serpent are no different from the earthworm and the ant because they have lost the things on which they travel. If a worthy man bows before an unworthy man, it must be because his authority is light and his position is lowly. If an unworthy man can make a worthy man submit to him, it must be because his authority is heavy and his position is respected. When Yao was a commoner he could not bring order to three people, but Jie, acting as the Son of Heaven, was able to throw the whole world into disorder. By this I know that the power of status and position are sufficient to be relied on, while worthiness and wisdom are not worth admiring.

"If the crossbow is weak but the arrow flies high, it must be because it has been hastened by the wind. If one's character is unworthy but one's commands are carried out, it must be because one has received help from the mult.i.tude. When Yao taught among the lower cla.s.ses the people would not listen to him, but once he faced south and became king of the world his commands were carried out and his prohibitions stopped what they were intended to prohibit. Looking at it from this perspective, one can see that worthiness and wisdom are never enough to subdue the mult.i.tude, while the power of status and position are sufficient to make even the worthy bend."

In response to Shenzi some critic says, "As for the flying dragon riding upon the clouds and the soaring serpent roaming upon the mist, I do not deny that the dragon and the serpent depend on the power of the clouds and mist. Nevertheless, if one abandons worthiness and relies solely on power of position, will this be enough to bring about order? I, for one, have never seen this. When there are conditions of clouds and mist, the reason why the dragon and the serpent can ride or roam upon them is that the natural abilities of dragons and serpents are excellent. The clouds may be plentiful, but the earthworm cannot ride on them. The mist may be thick, but the ant cannot roam upon it. When there are conditions of plentiful clouds and thick mist, the reason why the earthworm and the ant cannot ride or roam upon them is that the natural abilities of earthworms and ants are meager. Now, when Jie and Zhou faced south and became kings of the world, using the prestige of the Son of Heaven as their clouds and mist, the reason why the world could not escape falling into great disorder is that the natural abilities of Jie and Zhou were meager.

"Moreover, Shenzi maintains that it was the power of Yao's position that brought order to the world. But how was the power of his position any different from the power of Jie's position that threw the world into disorder? The power of position is not something that can be restricted so that the worthy use it and the unworthy do not. If the worthy use it, the world will be well-ordered; if the unworthy use it, then the world will be disordered. The dispositions and natures of human beings are such that those who are worthy are few, while those who are unworthy are many. So if one uses the benefits of prestige and the power of position to try to save the unworthy men of a disordered age, then those who use the power of position to bring disorder to the world will be many, while those who use the power of position to bring order to the world will be few.

"The power of position is something that can either facilitate order or benefit disorder. Thus, the Doc.u.ments of Zhou19 say, "Do not add wings to a tiger, or it will fly into the cities, s.n.a.t.c.hing up people and devouring them." To allow unworthy men to ride on the power of position is to add wings to a tiger. Jie and Zhou exhausted the strength of the people by building lofty pavilions and deep pools; they injured the lives of the people by creating the punishment of the roasting pillar.20 That Jie and Zhou were able to complete these unconscionable actions is due to the fact that they had the prestige of facing south to act as their wings. If Jie and Zhou had been commoners, they would have been punished or executed before they began to carry out even one of them. The power of position is that which nourishes the hearts of tigers and wolves and brings violent and disordering affairs to completion. It is a great danger to the world. The power of position surely has no fixed position in relation to order and chaos. So if the main point of Shenzi's doctrine is that the power of position is sufficient to bring order to the world, then the depth of his wisdom is very shallow indeed!

"If one has fine horses and a st.u.r.dy chariot, and one allows a common servant to drive them, people will just laugh at him. If the great charioteer w.a.n.g Liang21 drives them, however, they will speed across a thousand li in a single day. The chariot and the horses are no different, but one person travels a thousand li and the other is laughed at by people. This is because the distance between skillfulness and clumsiness is vast. Now, suppose one takes the state to be the chariot, the power of position to be the horses, orders and commands to be the reins and bridle, and punishments and fines to be the whip and crop. If a Yao or Shun drives them, the world will be well ordered, but if a Jie or Zhou drives them, the world will be disordered. This is because the distance between worthiness and unworthiness is vast. To understand that one should employ w.a.n.g Liang if one wants to travel swiftly over great distances, but not understand that one should employ the worthy and the capable if one wants to promote what is beneficial and get rid of what is harmful-this is the kind of misfortune that comes from not understanding things of the same category. Yao and Shun are the w.a.n.g Liangs of governing the people."

In response to the previous critic I say, "Shenzi maintains that the power of position is sufficient to be relied on when governing the offices of the state, but [the previous critic] says one must wait for worthy men before there will be order. This is not the case. The 'power of position' is a single term, but it allows for endless variations in interpretation. If 'power of position' must always refer to naturally occurring differences in power and status, then there really is nothing that can be said about it. What I refer to when I talk about 'the power of position' are the differences in power and status set up by human beings.

"Now if one says that when Yao and Shun obtained the power of position there was order, and when Jie and Zhou obtained the power of position there was disorder, I would not deny that this was indeed the case with Yao, Shun, Jie, and Zhou. Nevertheless, differences in power and status are not something that can be set up by a single person. If a Yao or Shun is born into a superior position, then even if there are ten Jies or ten Zhous they cannot cause disorder, because the differences in power and status are well ordered. On the other hand, if a Jie or Zhou is born into a superior position, then even if there are ten Yaos or ten Shuns they cannot bring about good order, because the differences in power and status are disordered. Thus it is said, 'If the differences in power and status are well ordered there cannot be disorder, but if the differences in power and status are disordered there cannot be order.' But this refers only to naturally occuring differences in power and status, and not to the differences in power and status that can be set up by human beings.

"What I am talking about is simply the differences in power and status that can be set up by human beings, and what does worthiness have to do with these? How can I show that this is the case? A guest once told me the following story: There once was a man who dealt in spears and s.h.i.+elds. First he would praise his s.h.i.+elds saying, 'My s.h.i.+elds are so strong that nothing can penetrate them.' Then a moment later, he would praise his spears saying, 'My spears are so sharp that there is nothing they cannot penetrate.' A person in the crowd asked the man, 'If one were to use one of your spears to try to pierce one of your s.h.i.+elds, what would happen?' The man could not answer him, because 'impenetrable s.h.i.+elds' and 'all-penetrating spears' are two claims that cannot stand together. Worthiness is something that cannot be forbidden by the power of position, but when the power of position is used as a Way of governing, there is nothing that it cannot forbid. So if one says that achieving good order requires both worthiness, which cannot be forbidden, and the power of position, which has nothing it cannot forbid, this is just like saying one has both all-penetrating spears and impenetrable s.h.i.+elds. Hence, the fact that worthiness and the power of position are incompatible should be abundantly clear.

"Furthermore, even if a Yao, Shun, Jie, or Zhou only emerged once in every thousand generations, it would still seem like they were born b.u.mping shoulders and treading on each other's heels. But those who actually govern each age are typically somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. The reason why I discuss the power of position is for the sake of these mediocre rulers. These mediocre rulers, at best they do not reach the level of a Yao or Shun, and at worst they do not behave like a Jie or Zhou. If they hold to the law and depend on the power of their position, there will be order; but if they abandon the power of their position and turn their backs on the law, there will be disorder. Now if one abandons the power of position, turns one's back on the law, and waits for a Yao or Shun, then when a Yao or Shun arrives there will indeed be order, but it will only be one generation of order in a thousand generations of disorder. On the other hand, if one holds to the law, relies on the power of position, and waits for a Jie or Zhou, then when a Jie or Zhou comes there will indeed be disorder, but it will only be one generation of disorder in a thousand generations of order. Having a thousand generations of order with one generation of disorder and having one generation of order in a thousand generations of disorder is like getting on two fast horses and riding them in opposite directions-the distance between the two will certainly be great.

"If Xi Zhong22 had abandoned the models for bending and straightening, or dispensed with the methods of measuring and weighing when he was inventing the chariot, he would not have been able to make even a single wheel. If Yao and Shun had relinquished the power of their positions as rulers and abandoned the law, and instead went from door to door persuading and debating with people, without any power to encourage them with veneration and rewards or coerce them with punishments and penalties, they would not have been able to bring order to even a few households. So the fact that the power of position is sufficient to be used in governing should be clear. Furthermore, if starving people do not eat for a hundred days because they are holding out for fine grain and meat, they will not live. Now if one says that we must wait for the worthiness of a Yao or Shun to bring order to the people of the current age, this is like saying that one should hold out for fine grain and meat in order to save oneself from starvation.

"The critic says that if one has fine horses and a st.u.r.dy chariot, and one allows a common servant to drive them, people will just laugh at him, but if w.a.n.g Liang drives them they will cover a thousand li in a single day. I do not believe this is the case. If one waits for the skilled ocean swimmers of the coastal state of Yue to rescue the drowning people in the states of the central plain, then even though the people of Yue swim very well, those drowning in the central states will still not be saved. To say that we must wait for an ancient hero like w.a.n.g Liang to drive the horses of today is just like saying that we should wait for the people of Yue to save the drowning people of the central states. Clearly this will not do.

"If one has fine horses and st.u.r.dy chariots, and one places a fresh team every fifty li along the road, then even if one allows a mediocre charioteer to drive them, he can still use them to travel swiftly over great distances, and a thousand li can easily be traversed a single day. What need is there to wait for an ancient hero like w.a.n.g Liang? Moreover, in the case of driving, the critic makes it sound like if one does not employ a w.a.n.g Liang, one must employ a common servant who will ruin things; and in the case of governing, he makes it sound like if one does not use a Yao or Shun, one must use a Jie or Zhou who will throw things into disorder. But this is like saying that if something does not taste as sweet as syrup or honey, it must taste as acrid as bitter herbs or mustard greens. The previous criticism is nothing more than a collection of empty rhetoric and meaningless phrases. It presents an argument based on two extreme positions that is entirely opposed to reason and bereft of any method. How can it be used to criticize or find fault with the reasonable teachings of Shenzi! The critic's argument has not reached the same level as his doctrine."

Chapter Twelve: The Difficulties of Persuasion.

As for the true difficulty of persuasion, it is not the difficulty of finding something in my knowledge that can be used to persuade the listener, nor is it the difficulty of being able to express myself in a way that elucidates my meaning, nor is it even the difficulty of daring to speak without hesitation so that I can finish everything I have to say. No, the true difficulty of persuasion lies in knowing what is in the heart of the person being persuaded, so that I can use my persuasion to match it.

If the one you are persuading is interested in elevating his reputation, but you try to persuade him using the idea of increasing his profits, you will be regarded as a person of inferior character who deals with things lowly and base, so he will surely reject what you have to say and keep you at a distance. If the person you are persuading is interested in increasing his profits, but you try to persuade him using the idea of elevating his reputation, you will be regarded as impractical and removed from the essence of affairs, so the person surely will refuse to accept your advice. If the person you are persuading is secretly interested in increasing his profits, but on the surface he wants to appear to be interested in elevating his reputation, and you try to persuade him using the idea of elevating his reputation, then in the light of day he will welcome you, but in reality he will ignore what you have to say. If you try to persuade such a person using the idea of increasing his profits, then he will secretly use your words while outwardly rejecting you for the sake of appearances. This is something one cannot fail to examine.

Affairs succeed when they are kept secret but fail when they are exposed. The persuader may not be the person who has leaked the information, but if his words touch upon some hidden affair of the ruler, his person will be in danger. If a ruler has some widely known affair he is carrying out, but he is doing it in order to achieve some ulterior objective, and the persuader not only understands what the ruler is doing, but also why he is doing it, his person will be in danger. If a persuader comes up with some special project and the ruler agrees with it, and then some clever person outside the project figures it out and leaks it to the outside world, the ruler is sure to think that it is the persuader who did it, and his person will be in danger. If a persuader does not yet enjoy the full confidence and favor of the ruler, but his words are extremely intelligent, then when his persuasions are carried out and there is some achievement he will be overlooked by the ruler's favor, and when his persuasions are not carried out and there is some failure he will be looked upon with suspicion, and his person will be in danger. If an important person commits some small error, and the persuader ostentatiously discourses on ritual and righteousness in order to challenge his wrongdoing, his person will be in danger. If an important person obtains a plan from someone else and hopes to pa.s.s it off as his own achievement, but the persuader also knows where he got it from, his person will be in danger. If a persuader forcefully urges a ruler to do that which he is incapable of doing, or stop that which he is incapable of stopping, his person will be in danger.

Thus, if you talk to a ruler about great men he will think you are implying a difference between him and them, but if you talk to him about little men he will think you are selling your influence. If you talk about what he loves he will think you are trying to borrow resources from him, but if you talk about what he hates he will think you are trying to test the limits of his anger. If you speak too plainly and oversimplify your persuasion he will think that you are unwise and your words are clumsy, but if you speak in too much detail and are too eloquent he will think that you are verbose and your words are confusing. If you make too little of your project and only outline your ideas, he will say you are cowardly and do not dare to say everything that you have to say, but if you make too much of your project and go on and on about it, he will say that you are unmannered and arrogant. These are the difficulties of persuasion. One cannot fail to understand them.

The real work of persuasion is knowing how to highlight those qualities of which the person being persuaded is proud, while eliminating those of which they are ashamed. If a ruler has some private concern, the persuader must use the public standards of righteousness to explain and strengthen it. If a ruler has an intention to do something stupid, and he cannot be prevented from doing it, the persuader should highlight the good points of the plan and scold the ruler for not carrying it out. If a ruler has some lofty ambition in his heart, but in reality he is not up to the task, the persuader should point out the problems with the plan, expose its bad points, and praise the ruler for not doing it. If a ruler wants to be proud of his wisdom and ability, the persuader should bring up several different examples in the same category and give him plenty of room to think, so that he will attribute the final plan of action to himself, and increase his own wisdom without even knowing it.

If you want to make a proposal for peaceful coexistence with other parties within the state, you must use beautiful words to explain the proposal, and subtly make the ruler see how this is in accord with his private interests. If you want to tell a ruler about some dangerous or harmful situation, you must make the potential for destruction or defamation clear, and subtly show the ruler how this may be a personal misfortune for him. Praise other people who have acted in the same way as the ruler you are speaking with, and give examples of other affairs where plans like those of the ruler you are talking to have been used. If there is someone who shares the same vices as he does, you must use their greatness to make it seem as if there is no real harm in it. If there is someone who has suffered the same failures he has, you must use his eminence to make it seem as if there is no real loss. If a ruler believes he has much strength, do not use his past difficulties to correct him. If he believes he is courageous in his military decisions, do not use his past mistakes to anger him. If he believes he is wise in his planning, do not use his past failures to distress him. First make sure that there is nothing in the overall meaning of your proposal that will offend the ruler you are persuading, and nothing in your phrasing or language that will aggravate him, then you can use the full extent of your wisdom and eloquence on him. This is the way to become intimate and close to a ruler without becoming an object of suspicion, so that you will be able to fully express your position.

Yi Yin served as a cook while Boli Xi23 became a servant. In both cases, this is how they were able to influence their superiors. These two men were both sages, yet even they could not advance without subjugating their persons and demeaning themselves like this. Now if by becoming a cook or a servant you can gain the ear of a ruler and save the world, then this is not something that a capable officer should be ashamed to do. When you have served a ruler for a long time and enjoy his full confidence and favor, so that you are able to plan important matters for him without arousing his suspicion and have disagreements with him without being accused of being disloyal, you should clearly distinguish the beneficial from the harmful in order to promote his accomplishments, and straightforwardly point out the difference between right and wrong in order to glorify his person. When ruler and minister use their relations.h.i.+p to support each other, this is the fulfillment of the ends of persuasion. . . .

The dragon is a creature that can be tamed and trained so that one can ride upon its back. But on the underside of its throat it has inverted scales one foot in diameter, and if any person brushes against them, the dragon will surely kill them. A ruler of men also has his "inverted scales," so if a persuader hopes to succeed, he must be careful to avoid brus.h.i.+ng up against them.

Chapter Forty-Three: Deciding Between Two Models of Government A questioner asks, "Shen Buhai and Gongsun Yang, which of these two men's teachings are most vital to the success of the state?"

In response I say, "This cannot be determined. If people do not eat, then in ten days they will die. But in the depth of the winter, if they do not clothe themselves, they will also die. So if you ask which is more vital to the success of human beings, food or clothing, it is clear that people cannot do without either one of them; both are tools necessary for sustaining life.

Now Shen Buhai discussed the use of administrative methods while Gongsun Yang advocated governing through laws. Using administrative methods means to a.s.sign offices based on a person's qualifications, to heed the objectives named in a minister's proposal and then hold them accountable for the actual results, to manipulate the handles of life and death, and to test the abilities of the a.s.sembled ministers.24 This is what the ruler controls. Government through law exists when the ruler's edicts and decrees are promulgated among the various departments and bureaus, when the cert.i.tude of punishments and penalties is understood in the hearts of the people, when rewards are given to those who respect the law, and when penalties are imposed on those who violate the ruler's decrees. This is what instructs the ministers. If the ruler has no method, he will be obscured above; if the ministers have no laws, there will be disorder below. A state cannot do without either one of these things; both are the tools of emperors and kings."

The questioner asks, "Why is it that one cannot employ administrative methods without government through law, or practice government through law without using administrative methods?"

I respond, "Shen Buhai was counselor to Marquis Zhao of Han,25 and the state of Han is one of the states formed from the division of the state of Jin.26 During Shen Buhai's term of office the old laws of Jin had not yet disappeared, but the new laws of Han had already been created; the decrees of the former rulers of Jin had not yet been revoked, but the decrees of the succeeding rulers of Han had already been handed down. Because Shen Buhai did not take control of the state of Han's laws or unify its edicts and decrees, there was a good deal of corruption. Thus, if there was something beneficial in the old laws and the former decrees the ministers would follow these, but if there was something beneficial in the new laws and the later decrees they would follow those. Since the old and the new laws were mutually contradicting, and the former and the later decrees were mutually conflicting, even though Shen Buhai ten times instructed Marquis Zhao in the use of method, the corrupt ministers still had the means to deceive him with their words. Thus, in the seventy years since Shen Buhai's death, none of the rulers of the powerful state of Han, which can field ten-thousand war chariots, has ever reached the level of a lord protector or a king; and the reason for this misfortune is that even though Shen Buhai's methods have been employed by the rulers of Han above, the law has not been properly administered within the offices of the state below.

When Gongsun Yang controlled the state of Qin, he set up a system in which people were expected to inform on their a.s.sociates but were held accountable for the truth of their accusations. He linked the population together into groups of five and ten households and made all the members of each group collectively responsible for crimes committed by any of them. He ensured that rewards were substantial and reliable and that punishments were heavy and certain. Because of this, the people of Qin were industrious and did not rest even when they were tired; they pursued their enemies and did not turn away even when it was dangerous. Thus, their state became rich and their army grew strong. Nevertheless, because the rulers of Qin did not have any method to recognize corruption, the wealth and strength that was generated by this system only increased the holdings of important ministers.

After the death of Duke Xiao and Gongsun Yang, King Hui a.s.sumed the position of ruler.27 At that point the law of Qin had not yet been defeated, but Zhang Yi used the power of Qin to extort profits from the states of Han and Wei.28 When King Hui died, King Wu a.s.sumed the position of ruler, and Gan Mao used the power of Qin to extort profits from the Zhou royal house.29 When King Wu died, King Zhao a.s.sumed the position of ruler, and the Marquis of Rang crossed over the states of Han and Wei to attack the state of Qi in the east. After five years, the state of Qin had not increas