The United States Since the Civil War Part 24

Party lines are so drawn in the United States that it is difficult for like-minded men of different parties to cooperate in furthering a program. The three pioneers were men whose capacities and personal qualities differed greatly, but in their economic and political philosophy they were nearer to one another than to the rank and file of their own parties. Bryan in 1902 refused to take part in the Democratic campaign in Wisconsin because he favored La Follette's program, and in 1905 he even aided the latter in his fight for railroad regulation; in 1912 Bryan found Roosevelt leading a revolt in the Republican party on a program to much of which he could give unqualified a.s.sent; and of La Follette, Roosevelt said in the same year: "Thanks to the movement for genuinely democratic popular government which Senator La Follette led to overwhelming victory in Wisconsin, that state has become literally a laboratory for wise experimental legislation aiming to secure the social and political betterment of the people as a whole."

Roosevelt's own share in the history of the early twentieth century was of such magnitude as to require a more extended account.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The literature is voluminous and not easy to evaluate. On population changes and immigration, the best source is the _Abstract of the Thirteenth (1910) Census_ (1913), with the _Atlas_ accompanying it (1914); _Reports of the Immigration Commission, appointed under the Congressional Act of Feb. 20, 1907_ (42 vols., 1911), is exhaustive; F.

A. Ogg, _National Progress_ (1918), has a good chapter; consult Joseph Schafer, _A History of the Pacific Northwest_ (rev. ed., 1918), for Was.h.i.+ngton and Oregon.

The consolidation in industry, railroads and finance may be followed in: A.D. Noyes, _Forty Years of American Finance_ (1909); John Moody, _The Truth about the Trusts_ (1904); _Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Steel Industry_ (3 parts, 1911), on the United States Steel Corporation; Anna P. Youngman, _Economic Causes of Great Fortunes_ (1909); C.R. Van Hise, _Concentration and Control a Solution of the Trust Problem in the United States_ (rev. ed., 1914); E.R.

Johnson and T.W. Van Metre, _Principles of Railroad Transportation_ (1916); John Moody, _The Railroad Builders_ (1919); John Moody, _The Masters of Capital_ (1919); and _Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit_, (Pujo Committee) 1913.

There is no satisfactory study of the social and political effects of the great increase in the circulation of newspapers and periodicals.

Suggestive articles are: _World's Work_ (Oct., 1916), "Stalking for Nine Million Votes"; _Arena_ (July, 1909), "The Making of Public Opinion"; _Atlantic Monthly_ (Mar., 1910), "Suppression of Important News." Less superficial articles are those of Walter Lippmann in the _Atlantic Monthly_ (Nov., Dec., 1919). The statistics are available in N.W. Ayer, _American Newspaper Annual and Directory_.

The emergence of the theory of public interest is best seen in the _Autobiography_ of R.M. La Follette (4th ed., 1920); consult also Theodore Roosevelt, _Autobiography_, and C.G. Washburn, _Theodore Roosevelt; the Logic of his Career_ (1916). A profound article is W.J.

Tucker, "The Progress of the Social Conscience," in _Atlantic Monthly_ (Sept., 1915).

On the Fourteenth Amendment, consult the volumes already mentioned under Chap. IV.

There are no thorough estimates of Bryan and La Follette. On the former: _Atlantic Monthly_ (Sept., 1912), and _Nineteenth Century_ (July, 1915); H. Croly, _Promise of American Life_ (1914), is critical.

W.J. Bryan, _First Battle_ (1897), is essential. On La Follette, his own narrative as given in the _Autobiography_ is best, but should be read with care as it was written in the heat of partisan controversy.

See also F.C. Howe, _Wisconsin an Experiment in Democracy_ (1912), friendly to La Follette.

Frank Norris, _The Octopus, and The Pit_; Winston Churchill, _Coniston_ and _Mr. Crewe's Career_; and Upton Sinclair, _The Jungle_, are ill.u.s.trative fiction.

[1] The shrinkage of the value of these securities caused the "rich men's panic" of 1903. Consult Noyes, _Forty Years_, 308-311.

[2] The word originated in 1906 with President Roosevelt, who likened certain sensational journalists to the man with the Muck-Rake in Bunyan's _Pilgrim's Progress. Annual Register_, 1906, 442.

[3] Cf. pp. 94-96 above.

[4] I have drawn largely at this point upon Dr. W.J. Tucker's article "The Progress of the Social Conscience" in the _Atlantic Monthly_, Sept., 1915, 289-303. The clearest idea of the transition from _laissez faire_ to public interest is gained by reading the biography of M.A.

Hanna by Croly, and La Follette's and Roosevelt's autobiographies.

[5] Usually cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment have also involved other parts of the Const.i.tution. The main reliance, however, in such cases has been the Amendment mentioned.

CHAPTER XX

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Seldom, in times of peace, is the personality of a single individual so important as that of Theodore Roosevelt during the early years of the twentieth century. At the time of his accession to the presidency, he lacked a month of being forty-three years old, but the range of his experience in politics had been far beyond his age. In his early twenties, soon after leaving Harvard, he had entered the a.s.sembly of the state of New York. President Harrison had made him Civil Service Commissioner in 1889, and he had been successively President of the Board of Police Commissioners of New York City, a.s.sistant Secretary of the Navy, an important figure in the war with Spain, and Governor of New York. He had been known as a young man of promise--energetic, independent and progressive--and in addition to his political activities he had found time to write books on historical subjects, see something of life on a western ranch and develop a somewhat defective physique into an engine of physical power.

Br.i.m.m.i.n.g with energy, nimble of mind, impetuous, sure of himself, quick to strike, a fearless foe, frank, resourceful, audacious, honest, versatile--Roosevelt possessed the qualities which would challenge the admiration of the typical American. One who frequently saw him at work described thus the way in which he prepared a message to be sent to the Senate:

He storms up and down the room, dictating in a loud and oratorical tone, often stopping, recasting a sentence, striking out and filling in, hospitable to every suggestion, not in the least disturbed by interruption, holding on stoutly to his purpose, and producing finally, out of these most unpromising conditions, a clear and logical statement, which he could not improve with solitude and leisure at his command.

The breadth of his interests, the democratic character of his friends.h.i.+ps--for he was equally at home with blue-stocking, politician, cowboy and artisan--his complete loyalty to his friends and his disregard of conventionalities gave him a grip upon popular favor that had not been duplicated since the days of Andrew Jackson, unless by Lincoln. The effectiveness of so compelling a personality was in no way diminished by Roosevelt's possession of what a journalist would call "news sense." He was made for publicity; he had an instinct for the dramatic. His speeches were removed from mediocrity by his evident sincerity, his abounding interest in every occasion at which he was called upon to talk and the phrases that were half victories which he coined almost at will. "Mollycoddle," "muckraking," "the square deal,"

"the big stick" became familiar idioms in the vernacular of politics and the street. The political leaders.h.i.+p of Roosevelt rested mainly upon his personal prestige and upon his attributes as a reformer. With unerring prescience he chose those political issues which would make a wide appeal and which could be pressed quickly to a successful conclusion. His complete integrity saved him from mere opportunism; his ruggedly practical commonsense saved him from that combination of high purpose and slight accomplishment which has characterized many other reformers.

No estimate of the deficiencies in Roosevelt's personality and leaders.h.i.+p would be agreed upon at the present time. In some cases--as in the realm of international relations--only the future can decide whether he was a prophet or a chauvinist; in all cases, opinions have differed widely, for Roosevelt could scarcely explore a river, describe a natural phenomenon or urge a political innovation without thereby arousing a controversy in which his friends and his opponents would partic.i.p.ate with equal intensity. His identification of himself with his purposes was as complete as that of Andrew Jackson; opposition to his proposals was reckoned as opposition to him as an individual. Like many leaders of the fighting type, he was frequently weak when judging the motives of those who disagreed with him. One of his admirers declared that his greatest political defect was an impatience of any interval between an expressed desire for an act and the accomplishment of the deed itself--an inability to stand through years of defeat for the future success of an ideal. A keener and equally sympathetic critic dubbed him the "sportsman" in politics--honest, hard-hitting, but playing the issue which had an immediate political effect.

At the outset of his administration Roosevelt was apparently an adherent of the prevailing Republican creed--protective tariff, gold standard, imperialism, _laissez faire_ and the rest. His first official utterance after becoming President was an indication that he would continue unbroken the policies of his predecessor, and to this end he insisted that the cabinet should remain intact.[1] His foreign policy was aggressive; his interest in the military and naval establishments real and constant. Roosevelt was more venturesome than McKinley, and more ready to experiment with new ideas. He took up the duties of his position with an unaffected zest and enthusiasm; he looked upon the presidential office as an exhilarating adventure in national and even international affairs. As time went on, therefore, it became more and more evident that he was prepared to play a big role on a great stage.

Moreover, few doubts concerning the const.i.tutional powers of the executive position seem ever to have a.s.sailed him. Whatever may have been his theory at the outset of his presidency, he came eventually to believe that the executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Const.i.tution, or imposed by Congress in laws which it had const.i.tutional authority to pa.s.s. The scope which this theory presented for the exercise of his energetic originality is evident when contrasted with the theory of his predecessors, who had, in times of peace, held to the belief that the executive possessed only the powers specifically designated by the Const.i.tution.

Not until some future time, when the events of the early twentieth century are better understood, will it be possible to judge accurately the value of President Roosevelt's regime in its relation to the control of railroads and corporations. There can be no doubt, however, that one of the most serious problems that faced the American people during that time was the position which the government ought to occupy toward the business interests of the nation. Not only were the railroads and the great corporations the center of the economic life of the people, but their social and political effects were momentous.

Neither the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 nor the Sherman Anti-trust law of 1890, it will be remembered, had accomplished what had been expected of them. The Interstate Commerce law had met with grave obstacles in the courts; the Sherman act had been seldom invoked by the federal executive, and in the most prominent case, United States _v._ E.C. Knight Co., the government had failed to obtain the decision it desired. Government regulation seemed like a broken reed.[2] A few cases, however, had indicated the possibility that strength might be discovered in the law. In United States _v._ the Trans-Missouri Freight a.s.sociation, the Supreme Court had declared that the Anti-trust act applied to railroads and that it forbade agreements among them to maintain rates; two years later, in 1899, the Court p.r.o.nounced illegal a combination of pipe manufacturers in the Middle West, on the ground that its result was to restrain interstate commerce.

Roosevelt, like Bryan and La Follette, had been groping his way to an understanding of the importance of the new problem. During his term as Governor of New York he had clashed with the older political leaders when he supported an act looking to the heavier taxation of railway franchises. The first recommendations in his message to Congress on December 3, 1901, concerned the subject of the relation of government and industry. The acc.u.mulation of wealth in recent years in the United States, he a.s.serted, had been due to natural causes, and much of the antagonism aroused thereby was without warrant. Nevertheless grave evils had attended the process: overcapitalization was one; untruthful representations concerning the value of the properties in which business asked the public to invest was another. Such evils should be attacked; with extreme care, to be sure, but also with resolution.

Combination and concentration, he thought, should be supervised and, within reasonable limits, controlled. The remedies which the President suggested were simple: in the interest of the public the government should have the right to inspect the workings of organizations engaged in interstate commerce; because of the lack of uniformity in corporation legislation within the states, the federal government should so extend its power as to include supervision of corporations; a Department of Commerce and Industries should be established, whose head should be a cabinet officer; the Interstate Commerce law should be amended; railway rates should be just, and should be the same to all s.h.i.+ppers alike, and the government should be the agent to provide a remedy to this end.

The enthusiastic reception accorded the message by the press indicated that one or another of its numerous recommendations met with approval.

The effect on Congress, however, of the portion dealing with interstate commerce was represented by a cartoon in the New York _World_. Uncle Sam was there portrayed stowing away for later attention a bundle of ma.n.u.script labelled "President's Message 1901. 30,000 words," while he smilingly remarked "When I git time!" But Roosevelt was not content to let the matter drop, and in the following summer he took the unusual step of carrying his message directly to the people. In the New England states first, and later in the West, he declared his creed on the federal regulation of industry. The effectiveness of the campaign was increased by the moderation of the President, by his increasing popularity and by the many telling phrases, with which he enforced his main thesis. The Sherman act looked less like a broken reed when the chief executive of the nation declared: "As far as the anti-trust laws go they will be enforced ... and when (a) suit is undertaken it will not be compromised except upon the basis that the Government wins." Here and there objection was raised that the program was not sufficiently definite; now and then a critic hazarded a conjecture that Roosevelt had not consulted the leaders of his party; but in the main he succeeded in obtaining a sympathetic hearing. At this juncture the coal strike of 1902 gave him one of those fortunate opportunities which were commonly referred to as a part of "Roosevelt's luck." With no uncertain hand he seized the opportunity which chance presented.

Before 1899, there had been no organization of the anthracite miners with sufficient strength to force any changes in the conditions under which the men performed their work. During that year the United Mine Workers of America began to send organizers into the Pennsylvania region. In 1900 the men struck, but an agreement was reached with the operators and work was resumed. The settlement, however, was not satisfactory to either side, and in 1902 the workers asked for a conference. The presidents of the coal companies and the coal-carrying railroads replied that they were always ready to meet their own employees but would have no dealings with a general labor organization.

Smaller causes of unrest were the demand for more pay, shorter hours, and payment for coal by weight instead of by the car, but the fundamental issue was the recognition of the union--the workmen insisting on collective bargaining, the operators refusing it. The men were helpless except as a union; the roads were sure of keeping the upper hand if they dealt with the men individually or in small groups.

When attempts at conference failed, the miners struck and from May 12 until October 23 nearly 147,000 of them remained idle. The total loss to miners and operators was nearly $100,000,000.

Since the Pennsylvania fields were almost the sole source of supply for anthracite coal, discomfort was soon felt in the North and West, and as the cooler weather came on, suffering became acute and public feeling bordered on panic. A winter without hard coal could hardly be contemplated without grave misgivings. Popular opinion, meanwhile, went increasingly to the side of the miners. The refusal of the operators to confer, and the propriety of the conduct of the workmen made a wide impression that was favorable to the union. Moreover, George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Company, spoke of himself and his a.s.sociates in a letter to a correspondent as those "Christian men to whom G.o.d in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country." The remark was widely quoted and generally looked upon as evidence of a selfish and uncompromising individualism.[3] The strike having now become a matter of national importance, President Roosevelt requested the operators and representatives of the miners to meet him in Was.h.i.+ngton, October 3. At this conference the spokesman of the railroads refused mediation, while the leader of the United Mine Workers, John Mitch.e.l.l, proposed arbitration and pledged the workers to accept it.

After the refusal of the operators to accept the President's conciliatory offer, he decided to apply pressure. He obtained the consent of Grover Cleveland to act as chairman of a commission of investigation and determined to seize the mines by military force, if necessary, operate them as a receiver and await the report of his commission. In some way, which can not now be indicated with certainty, the operators were influenced to accept mediation, and the President appointed a commission with Judge George Gray as chairman.[4] The miners immediately returned to work, coal began again to flow to the North, and public rejoicing was extreme. The President's Commission at once repaired to Pennsylvania, heard 558 witnesses, visited the mines, and inspected machinery and the homes of the miners. It concluded that neither side was completely in the right, and therefore made an award that satisfied some of the complaints of both parties. In the history of the relation between the federal government and the business interests of the nation, the anthracite strike of 1902 is of marked significance. The operators had given evidence of a failure to understand that their business so concerned the nation that the interest of the public in it must be heeded. The successful outcome enhanced the prestige of the government and of the President, and an example of the need of greater control over corporations received wide publicity at the precise moment when the general subject was uppermost in the popular mind.

The first legislative evidence of the result of the agitation for the more effective regulation of industry was an act approved on February 11, 1903, by which any suit brought in a Circuit Court by the United States government under the Sherman Anti-trust act or the Interstate Commerce law, could be given precedence over other cases at the desire of the Attorney-General. Three days later a law was pa.s.sed which established a Department of Commerce and Labor, whose chief was to be a cabinet officer. Included in the Department was a Bureau of Corporations headed by a Commissioner, who was authorized to investigate the organization and conduct of the business of corporations. Within another five days the Elkins Act had been pa.s.sed--a law designed to eliminate rebating. Despite the Interstate Commerce act, the practice of rebating had continued. Agreement was general that railroad men who, in other respects, were perfectly scrupulous, commonly violated the law in order to get business in compet.i.tion with their rivals. Among the railroad men who had violated the law but who deprecated the necessity of so doing, was Paul Morton, president of the Santa Fe system. Morton volunteered to a.s.sist Roosevelt in stamping out the evil, and the Elkins law was designed to aid in this process. It forbade any variation from published rates, made both a corporation and its agents punishable for offenses against the law, prohibited the receiving of rebates as well as giving them, and made the penalty for failure to observe the provisions of the Act a fine of one thousand to twenty thousand dollars. Furthermore, during February, 1903, Congress appropriated $500,000 to be expended under the direction of the Attorney-General for the better enforcement of the anti-trust and interstate commerce laws.

In 1903, likewise, was initiated an important judicial proceeding in the direction of the enforcement of the Sherman law. The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company operated parallel competing lines of road extending from the region of Lake Superior to the Pacific Coast. An attempted consolidation of the two had been declared illegal under the statutes of the state of Minnesota. On November 13, 1901, under the leaders.h.i.+p of two of the foremost railway magnates of the nation, J.J. Hill and J.P. Morgan, there had been organized the Northern Securities Company, to purchase and control at least a majority of the shares of the capital stock of the two lines of railway. In this way the two roads would be operated as one, their earnings pooled, compet.i.tion between the two eliminated and a virtual consolidation effected. On the advice of the Attorney-General, Philander C. Knox, President Roosevelt directed that proceedings be inst.i.tuted against the holding company--an act that seemed almost useless in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Knight Case. But the decision in the Northern Securities Case, handed down in 1904, was a surprise. By a vote of five to four the Court declared the company a combination in restraint of trade, and therefore illegal under the Sherman act, and enjoined any attempt on its part to control the affairs of either of the two railways.

Nineteen hundred and four, the year of the presidential election, found Roosevelt in a strong position. His success in handling the coal strike and his energetic preparations for the crusade against trust evils had struck a responsive chord in the popular mind. Late in 1903 he had announced to Congress that frauds had been discovered in the post office and land office, and urged the appropriation of funds for the prosecution of the offenders. The result was a house-cleaning which involved the conviction of many officials, including two United States senators. Roosevelt's popularity became greater than ever.

It was to be expected, however, that some opposition would appear to the nomination of Roosevelt for a continuation of his term of office, and it was around the forceful Mark Hanna that the opposition began gradually to center. Hanna had attained remarkable influence as a senator, was highly trusted by the business interests and was popular among southern Republicans. But his death in February, 1904, effectively ended any opposition to Roosevelt, since it was then too late to focus attention upon any other compet.i.tor. The Republican nominating convention, therefore, which met in Chicago on June 21, lacked any semblance of a contest, and the President was renominated without opposition. The platform was of the traditional sort. The history of the party was approved; its achievements in giving prosperity to the country and peaceful government to the island possessions were recounted; the protective tariff, the gold standard, an isthmian ca.n.a.l, the improvement of the army and navy, the continuation of civil service reform and a vigorous foreign policy,--on all these the party utterance was that of other days. Surprisingly little was said upon the subject of the regulation of corporations. The few steps already taken were approved, but as to the future, the platform was almost colorless:

Combinations of capital and of labor are the results of the economic movement of the age, but neither must be permitted to infringe upon the rights and interests of the people. Such combinations, when lawfully formed for lawful purposes, are alike ent.i.tled to the protection of the laws, but both are subject to the laws, and neither can be permitted to break them.

The Democratic convention met in St. Louis on July 6, and the excitement which marked its proceedings compensated for the lack of interest at the Republican meeting. As drawn up by a sub-committee of the Committee on Resolutions, the platform was, in many of its planks, a distinct return to the programs of the days before 1896. It urged a reduction of the tariff, generous pensions and civil service reform, together with the enforcement of the anti-trust laws and the popular election of senators. In the main, it was devoted to a condemnation of the existing Republican administration, which it denounced as "spasmodic, erratic, sensational, spectacular and arbitrary." It also contained a paragraph declaring that the question of the money standard had ceased to be an issue, on the ground that recent discoveries of gold had enormously increased the supply of currency in the country.

Bryan did not approve. With characteristic energy he threw himself into an all-night fight in the Committee in behalf of a silver plank. His defeat indicated that the convention was in the hands of his opponents and the platform as adopted contained no reference to the currency.

The delegates had, in fact, come to the meeting with the distinct purpose of returning to the "safe and sane" democracy of Grover Cleveland. To that end, the platform was to drop the silver issue and Bryan was to be replaced by a more conservative leader. The radical forces centered their strength upon William R. Hearst, but they were in a distinct minority, and in the end, the Cleveland wing succeeded in nominating Judge Alton B. Parker of New York. As soon as he was notified of his nomination, Judge Parker telegraphed to the convention that he regarded the gold standard as irrevocably established and that he must decline to be the party candidate if his att.i.tude on the currency was unsatisfactory to the delegates. Thereupon the convention replied that the platform was silent on the question of a monetary standard because it was not regarded as a campaign issue. Parker was satisfied with the reply, and the last word was written upon a question that had disturbed politics for many years.

The succeeding campaign was unusually listless. Parker did not inspire enthusiasm, although a man of undoubted integrity and ability, and the personality of Roosevelt was the controlling force. Only at the close of the canva.s.s did a pa.s.sing interest appear in some charges made by Parker. He called attention to the fact that Secretary Cortelyou of the Department of Commerce and Labor had been charged with the duty of examining the acts of corporations and had then resigned to become chairman of the National Republican Committee. Parker insinuated that Cortelyou was using information about corporate misdoing, which he had discovered, in order to force large contributions from the business interests. He also declared that the Republican campaign was being financed by the corporations. Roosevelt did not answer the charges until three days before the election, and then he a.s.serted that the statements made by Parker were "unqualifiedly and atrociously false."

Later investigations have shown that in general Parker was correct in his complaint as to the activities of the corporations, although he would have found difficulty in proving his charges in detail. The same investigations, however, indicated that some of the Democratic campaign fund had come from similar sources.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Election of 1904 by Counties]