Moral Theology Part 46

(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity.

There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the sinner leading up to charity--faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.--are for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may be virtually included in charity.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a higher love that is disinterested: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart" (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in G.o.d as a friend, and hence presupposes charity.

(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect love, which desires G.o.d for the sake of the one who loves, while charity is perfect love and desires G.o.d for His sake.

1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such as look for all beat.i.tude in something different from G.o.d (e.g., in secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope which puts self above G.o.d or delight above virtue).

1082. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be distinguished:

(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beat.i.tude is hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is beat.i.tude (i.e., G.o.d the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which places subjective beat.i.tude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which beat.i.tude is attained) above objective beat.i.tude (i.e., G.o.d as the object in which beat.i.tude consists). Just as the intellect is in error when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is nothing inordinate in a man's hoping for food on account of eating and in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely inordinate to hope for G.o.d on account of the beatific vision or on account of self, since G.o.d is the End of all, and the beatific vision is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely the subject to whom G.o.d and the beatific vision are to be given for its perfection through them.

(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other elements that pertain to subjective beat.i.tude. The subjective happiness of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly human--namely, in the act of the intellect seeing G.o.d intuitively; hence, pleasure--even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed as something secondary and consequent.

(c) Utilitarian hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if the latter were merely a means, as when one says: "If there were no heaven, I would practise no virtue." There are three kinds of good: (i) useful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of that vision, not its end.

1033. Hope, therefore, must seek G.o.d as the chief good; it must not prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks G.o.d as its own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order to be a true virtue.

(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in the impossible hypothesis that G.o.d were unwilling to reward virtue, the reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider chimerical cases.

(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity (i.e., that one always direct one's desire of salvation to the end that G.o.d may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.

(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity (i.e., that one hope for salvation as one's own good, only when a previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love towards G.o.d), for to desire that which G.o.d wishes one to desire is in itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify it.

1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great Saints, and at such times, when pure love of G.o.d seems almost impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi.

19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, x.x.x.

15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).

1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to ask this from G.o.d: "Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity" (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to G.o.d in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience (Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).

1036. The Subject of Hope.--By the subject of hope we mean the power of the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final reward or punishment.

1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They cannot hope for the princ.i.p.al object of bliss, since they already enjoy it: "Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed there is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other than G.o.d does not const.i.tute the theological virtue of hope, which tends directly to G.o.d.

1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish between those in h.e.l.l and those in purgatory.

(a) Those who are in h.e.l.l, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt., xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on the gates of h.e.l.l it is written: "Hope abandon ye that enter here."

Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has resulted from no personal fault of their own.

(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Ma.s.s the Church prays for the departed "who sleep the sleep of peace"--that is, who are secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before their introduction into heaven: "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth .... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country" ( Heb., xi. 13, 16).

1039. As to those who have not yet pa.s.sed from this mortal life, some have hope, others have it not.

(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is "the substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for" (Heb., xi. 1).

Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, "I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come," one's hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers who despair of salvation, or who do not look to G.o.d for it, have not the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or its motive is not relied on.

(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but they can expect through the grace of G.o.d to be freed from sin and to merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that G.o.d wishes their salvation and to hope for it.

1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear; on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.

(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., G.o.d's power and mercy), he has the a.s.surance of faith that G.o.d can and will help him to attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken hope: "I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day" (II Tim., i. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. x.x.x. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)

(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will coperate with G.o.d and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1 sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere (Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: "He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall" (I Cor., x. 12); "With fear and trembling, work out your salvation" (Phil., ii. 12).

1041. The Gift of Fear of the Lord.--The Gift of the Holy Ghost that perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a) hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope joins the affections to G.o.d, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus tending towards its beat.i.tude--we fear to lose what we hope for; (b) fear a.s.sists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beat.i.tude or of divine help, but the lack of coperation on our own part with the a.s.sistance given by G.o.d.

1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of the Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical and moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion treated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion, bashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like the other pa.s.sions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b) Fear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to G.o.d or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.

1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good; for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of G.o.d.

(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than G.o.d, because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of eternity. Thus, St. Peter's denial of Christ was prompted by fear of the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men, it is called human respect.

(b) Fear of G.o.d is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures, because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter's death for Christ proceeded from his fear of G.o.d.

1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend, or be willing to offend, G.o.d for the sake of escaping some temporal evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: "Fear ye not them that kill the body and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy both body and soul in h.e.l.l" (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: "In his days he feared not the prince" (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however, the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or virtual fear, on the other hand.

(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act--that is, the condition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred self to G.o.d as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able to seek certain particular or natural goods.

(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear of some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil, virtual fear executes it. Examples: Semp.r.o.nius internally resolves to be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of G.o.d against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself, adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear (virtual fear).

1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:

(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to offend G.o.d seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: t.i.tus, in order to escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape reproof for this misdemeanor. t.i.tus' fear is a grave sin, that of Balbus a venial sin.

(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft.

To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circ.u.mstance that appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.

1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the sin to which it leads.

(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is prepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason of this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed--one against charity, because a temporal good was preferred to G.o.d, and the other against religion, because G.o.d was called on to witness to falsehood.

(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin, and this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins are committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not able to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he steals money and offers it to Semp.r.o.nius as an inducement to calumniate Caius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.

1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and sinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he represents the authority of G.o.d is a duty: "Render to all men their dues . . . fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor" (Rom., xiii. 7). (b) To fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty, property) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord bids us pray for deliverance from evil.

1048. Fear of G.o.d is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as the object one dreads is offense of G.o.d or punishments from G.o.d. (a) Servile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin because of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to G.o.d that is contained in it.

1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as to its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is derived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty which it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its circ.u.mstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the fear, the manner in which he fears, etc.

1050. Servile fear in itself is good and supernatural.

(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord recommends this fear when he says: "I will show you whom ye shall fear.

Fear ye Him who after He hath killed, hath power to cast into h.e.l.l.

Yea, I say to you, fear Him" (Luke, xii. 5). the object of this fear is penalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be dreaded.

(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its acts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may prepare himself for grace; it is "the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. cx.

10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as a rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the justice of G.o.d which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far superior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.