Moral Theology Part 49

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between G.o.d and creatures as the object of one's happiness. This moment occurs for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in this connection the words of Christ: "Seek ye first the kingdom of G.o.d and His justice" (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning from creatures towards G.o.d: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day" (Ecclus, v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the act of hope: "The grace of G.o.d our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and G.o.dly in this world, looking for the blessed hope" (t.i.tus, ii. 11, 12), "Serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope" (Rom., xii. 11, 12); "He that plougheth, should plough in hope" (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more perfect must have on "the helmet of hope" (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi).

But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Ma.s.s and the reception of the Sacraments.

1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made explicitly, when one expresses one's confident expectation, the objects expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: "O my G.o.d, relying on Thy all-powerful a.s.sistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life everlasting." This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is made implicitly, when one offers pet.i.tions to G.o.d as one ought; for the confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of hope of G.o.d and of hope in G.o.d. Thus, the words, "Thy Kingdom come,"

utter the soul's expectation of bliss and its reliance on G.o.d. The implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another virtue will be lost or endangered without the a.s.sistance of hope, one is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: t.i.tus is so discouraged by the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being contained in another virtue. Example: Semp.r.o.nius is in the state of sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Semp.r.o.nius must not only grieve over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope (I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that G.o.d be the chief object of our desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019, 1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of inordinate love of creatures.

(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as G.o.d will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.

1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he hopes in G.o.d's mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven by his works and must pray to G.o.d in his necessities--things that are impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific vision.

1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues.

For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same time not love G.o.d for His own sake, or not regulate one's conduct conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to believe and yet not practise one's belief (see 1016, 1030).

(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: t.i.tus does not believe in a future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Semp.r.o.nius, who is a.s.sociated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and rest.i.tution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Semp.r.o.nius is presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.--(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: "I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender" (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments"

(Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in h.e.l.l" (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of G.o.d), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. "What doth the Lord thy G.o.d require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy G.o.d, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy G.o.d?" (Deut., x. 12).

1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.

Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

1105. Definition.--The word "charity" (_carum_, what is held dear, highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of a kindly nature towards others, whether or not G.o.d be concerned in them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes applied to friends.h.i.+p: "It is better to be invited to herbs with charity than to a fatted calf with hatred" (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to the love of G.o.d for man or the love of man for G.o.d. Here we are considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves G.o.d for His own sake, and others on account of G.o.d.

1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or what is considered as one's good. It is the root of all appet.i.tes of the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of the giver of money; but in the last a.n.a.lysis it will be found that the desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A because he hates A's enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or destroy what one loves.

(c) Every satisfaction is due to the possession or presence of something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the love one has of being entertained.

1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) separation from other things, for the lover's thoughts are on the object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it from him.

1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own existence;

(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. s.e.x-attraction is a species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (_dilectio_) arises from the reflection of the mind, and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the worth of the beloved object.

1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor concupiscenti_), which is affection for an object which one desires for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else (thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence (_amor benevolenti_), which is had for an object to which one wishes good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when one wishes to give him food or money).

1110. The love of benevolence is called friends.h.i.+p when the following conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who is loved does not reciprocate the other party's affection, they are not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity which is a bond of union, for friends.h.i.+p supposes that the parties have common interests and that they delight in each other's company, which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus, there is friends.h.i.+p of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who are alike, but friends.h.i.+p is impossible when the parties have nothing special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friends.h.i.+p must be distinguished. (a) The friends.h.i.+p of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one's friend, not for the friend's sake, but for one's own advantage or gratification. Hence, friends.h.i.+ps of this kind contain some love of benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friends.h.i.+p in the truest sense. Examples: t.i.tus cultivates the friends.h.i.+p of Balbus, because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, on his part, returns the friends.h.i.+p of t.i.tus, because he finds his prices cheaper (a friends.h.i.+p of convenience or utility). Caius and Claudius a.s.sociate together much and help each other gladly, but the only thing that draws them together is the amus.e.m.e.nt they get out of each other's companions.h.i.+p (a friends.h.i.+p of pleasure).

(b) The friends.h.i.+p of virtue is that by which one desires good for another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the friends. This is true friends.h.i.+p, because it is unselfish and has the highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).

Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the other's virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friends.h.i.+p between G.o.d and His intellectual creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of G.o.d (John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cx.x.xviii. 17), and the conditions of true friends.h.i.+p are affirmed about their relation to G.o.d. (a) There is a mutual love of benevolence between G.o.d and the just: "I love them that love Me" (Prov., viii. 20); "He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him" (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a common bond; for, while according to nature G.o.d and man are infinitely distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of G.o.d and the heir to glory in which he will share happiness with G.o.d.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated charity is G.o.d Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: "G.o.d is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in G.o.d" (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as "Fount of life, fire, charity, and spiritual anointing." (b) Created charity is a supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of love of G.o.d and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: "The charity of G.o.d is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us" (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: "A supernatural virtue infused by G.o.d, through which we love with friends.h.i.+p G.o.d, the author of our beat.i.tude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of G.o.d." Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. The Excellence of Charity.--Human friends.h.i.+p of the lower kind is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friends.h.i.+p, however, const.i.tutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: "These three: faith, hope and charity" (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as G.o.d among the objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e., the goodness of G.o.d), and it is based on but one fellows.h.i.+p (i.e., the beatific vision to be bestowed by G.o.d).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which G.o.d is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is G.o.d Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it tends to G.o.d in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to G.o.d as He is the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: "The greatest of these is charity" (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.