Moral Theology Part 74

(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by wisdom: "A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant, because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels" (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);

(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the good of the whole community.

1643. Utility of Prudence for Society.--Hence, we see that none of the virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws of the State.

1644. Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to other goods that benefit human life.

(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue, but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as are embarra.s.sing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably, etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).

(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii.

42).

(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.

(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises, insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.

1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are practical students and church people who do their own work well and get good results.

1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.--As was explained in 1636, the potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to which they are subordinated. The princ.i.p.al act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633).

Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:

(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for virtuous choice;

(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct.

1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to exist apart?

(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues, they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first cla.s.s are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in dispensing alms).

(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should (e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.

1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.--Political prudence, if understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons, not even in all the good.

(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly, lacks political prudence: "If one knows not how to govern his own house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of G.o.d?" said St.

Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.

(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus, Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy, because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous times.

(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is prepared to learn to rule well.

1649. Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers, although not in the same manner.

(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence in a supreme degree, or statesmans.h.i.+p, so that they may be able to discharge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether as legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as judges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives by maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.

(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted with no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the inst.i.tutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good judgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and ready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal interest.

(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the laws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not unwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and enlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they may coperate for the common good and directing their acts according to law.

1650. The principles just given concerning political prudence will apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.

(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent, rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.

(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent, etc.) to be a.s.sured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.

1651. Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.--In the preceding paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the moral virtues possess prudence?

(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the latter's goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning.

Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection.

Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the means to overcome a.s.saults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin, but whose resolutions never last.

(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination, tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But, morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for example, that men endowed with business ac.u.men or a practical sense of the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good, sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.

(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore, that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.

1652. Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.--(a) Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether the sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had through reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one sole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become prudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards the lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of mortal sin (see 138).

1653. We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of the virtue of prudence:

(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also the habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own efforts;

(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g., those who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of prudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;

(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g., those who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have neither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one mortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit of prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of prudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a judgment agreeable to a good will.

1654. The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of Grace.--(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner--that is, on account of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their want of reason they have not the use of the power.

(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise.

Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well, or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish between good and bad advice.

(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of human life.

1655. Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?--(a) If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to be looked for in the elderly, both because the pa.s.sions that disturb calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to acquire fixed ways of acting: "In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence" (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).

(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary, therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.

1656. Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?--(a) If we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong which are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general are known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but not so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320 sqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is natural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural evidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first principles belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also called synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which is a gift of nature.

(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is presupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment about those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are not variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of attraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate, as is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by nature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form accurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking again, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature disposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.

(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means to fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this kind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied according to the differences of affairs, persons, and circ.u.mstances.

And since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal principles or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the particular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense prudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better fitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also some persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about practical cases and the means conducive to morality.

1657. The Growth and Decay of Prudence.--(a) As repeated acts form a habit of prudence, so do repeated acts strengthen prudence already formed, especially when the chief act of prudence (i.e., the command that things wisely deliberated on be performed) is often brought into play. Even infused prudence is augmented and perfected by use and practice: "Strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil" (Heb., v.

14).

(b) As prudence consists primarily in a dictate which applies the reason's knowledge to the control of will and conduct, this virtue is corrupted chiefly by pa.s.sion. We see that those who are swayed by pleasure or pain lose sight of the true motive of choice and action, and do not issue to themselves the order which prudence and their better judgment inspire. Thus, l.u.s.t deceived even the elders of the people (Dan., xiii. 56), and bribes blind even the prudent (Exod., xxiii. 8). Nature enables a man to judge rightly about the universal principles of right and wrong; but, when judgment is to be given about particular lines of action, "as a man is, so he judges," the licentious man judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty. Hence, the moral virtues must be united with prudence, else it perishes.

(c) As prudence presupposes a fund of general moral principles, forgetfulness is an impediment to this virtue; yet not so that every loss of memory which deprives one of arts and sciences will also take away prudence. For, while art and science consist entirely of knowledge, prudence has also a moral element derived from a right inclination of the will towards goodness, and its chief office is the utilization of principles in practice. The virtuous man will continue to follow prudence, even though he has forgotten its theory or rules, guiding himself by good habits formed or by the counsel of those wiser than himself.