Manual of Military Training Part 68

Now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages and disadvantages of each.

You must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before you can decide intelligently what you're going to do.

In making your plan always bear in mind not only your own MISSION, but also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and this is what nine men out of ten forget to do.

=951. The Decision.= It is important that you should come to a clear and correct decision--that you do so promptly and then execute it vigorously.

The new j.a.panese Field Service Regulations tell us that there are two things above all that should be avoided--inaction and hesitation. "To act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain inactive and irresolute"--that is to say do something.

You are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how you're going to do it. Frederick the Great, expressed the same idea in fewer words: "Don't haggle."

Having settled on a plan, push it through--don't vacillate, don't waver. Make your plan simple. No other has much show. Complicated plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. They require several people to do the right thing at the right time and this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a result, they generally fail.

=952. The Order.= Having completed your estimate of the situation and formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to carry it out.

You must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their mission.

The better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can play his part. Unexpected things are always happening in war--a subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands what his superior wants to do.

Always make your instructions definite and positive--vague instructions are sometimes worse than none.

Your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and definite--everyone should know just exactly what he is to do.

A Few General Principles

=953.= The man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting bigger game--he's hunting for human beings--but you want to remember that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning"

for you. So, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. Remember what Frederick the Great said: "It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by surprise."

Do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken yourself--you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"--that is, of one part being defeated after another. Remember the old saying: "In union there is strength." Undue extension of your line (a mistake, by the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally as bad.

While too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. Good sense alone can determine. A certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated, as where it puts an impa.s.sable obstacle directly in your rear. And don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would do in case of defeat.

What is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or only squads engaged? It's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. Now, what is this loss that he will not stand? What is the loss that will cause him to break? Well, it varies; it is subject to many conditions--different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have different breaking points. However, whatever it may be in any particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate it.

There are many causes tending to drag down our score on the battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's fire. It is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in vision and hence of shooting. It is well established that the effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the effectiveness of that of the other.

Bear in mind then these two points--we must get the enemy's breaking point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the less effective will be his.

Expressed in another way--to win you must gain and keep a fire superiority.

This generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective than a smaller volume better handled.

The firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their rifles.

This has been found to be about one man to the yard. In this way you get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that their commanders lose their power to direct and control.

If it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave gaps in the line. The men are so much better controlled, the fire better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the cross fire of parties adjacent.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] In the preparation of the first part of this chapter, extracts of words and of ideas, were made from a paper on Applied Minor Tactics read before the St. Louis convention of the National Guard of the United States in 1910, by Major J. F. Morrison, General Staff, U. S.

Army.

[12] The word "_mission_" is used a great deal in this text. By your "_mission_" is meant your business, what you have been told to do, what you are trying to accomplish.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PLAN OF INSTRUCTION IN MAP PROBLEMS FOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES--INSTRUCTION IN DELIVERING MESSAGES

=(The large wall map to be used for this instruction can be obtained from the George Banta Publis.h.i.+ng Co., Menasha, Wis., at a cost of $1.50.)=

[Ill.u.s.tration: Elementary Map]

=954.= The noncommissioned officers and the privates of the squad, section, platoon or company are seated in front of the instructor, who, with pointer in hand, is standing near the map on the wall.

The instructor a.s.sumes certain situations and designates various noncommissioned officers to take charge of squads for the purpose of accomplis.h.i.+ng certain missions; he places them in different situations, and then asks them what they would do. He, or the noncommissioned officer designated to perform certain missions, designates certain privates to carry messages, watch for signals, take the place of wounded noncommissioned officers, etc. For example, the instructor says: "The battalion is marching to Watertown (see Elementary Map in pocket at back of book) along this road (indicating road): our company forms the advance guard; we are now at this point (indicating point). Corporal Smith, take your squad and reconnoiter the woods on the right to see if you can find any trace of the enemy there, and rejoin the company as soon as you can. Corporal Jones, be on the lookout for any signals that Corporal Smith may make."

Corporal Smith then gives the command, "=1. Forward, 2. March=," and such other commands as may be necessary.

=Instructor:= Now, when you reach this point (indicating point), what do you see?

(Corporal Smith holds his rifle horizontally above his head.)

=Corporal Jones:= Captain, Corporal Smith signals that he sees a small body of the enemy.

=Corporal Smith:= =Lie down. Range, 700. 1. Ready; 2. AIM; 3. Squad; 4. FIRE. 1. Forward; Double time; 2. MARCH=, etc.

The noncommissioned officers and the privates who are thus designated to do certain things must use their imagination as much as possible.

They must look at the map and imagine that they are right on the ground, in the hostile territory; they must imagine that they see the streams, hills, woods, roads, etc., represented on the map, and they must not do anything that they could not do if in the hostile territory, with the a.s.sumed conditions actually existing.

=955.= The general idea of this system of instruction is to make the noncommissioned officers and the privates think, to make them use common sense and initiative in handling men in various situations, in getting out of difficulties. By thus putting men on their mettle in the presence of their comrades and making them bring into play their common sense and their powers of resourcefulness, it is comparatively easy to hold the attention of a whole squad, section, platoon or company, for those who are not actually taking part in the solution of a particular problem are curious to see how those who are taking part will answer different questions and do different things--how they will "pan out."

=956.= Everything that is said, everything that is done, should, as far as practicable, be said and done just as it would be said and done in the field. The commands should be actually given, the messages actually delivered, the reports actually made, the orders and instructions actually given, the signals actually made, etc., just the same as they would be if the operations were real. Of course, sometimes it is not practicable to do this, and again at other times it would be advisable not to do so. If, for instance, in the solution of a problem there were a great many opportunities to give commands to fire, to make signals, to deliver messages, etc., and if these things were actually done every time, it would not only become tiresome but it would also delay the real work and instruction. Common sense must be used. Just bear this in mind: In the solution of map problems the noncommissioned officers and the privates are to be given proper and sufficient instruction in giving commands, making signals, sending and delivering messages, making reports, etc., the instructor using his common sense in deciding what is proper and sufficient instruction. In carrying out this feature of the instruction it would be done thus, for instance:

Instead of a platoon leader saying, "I would give the order for the platoon (two, three or four squads) to fire on them," he would say, for instance, "I would then give the command, '=AT LINE OF MEN. RANGE, 600. FIRE AT WILL=,' and would continue the firing as long as necessary." Should the instructor then say, for instance, "Very well; the enemy's fire has slackened; what will you do now?" The platoon leader would answer, for instance, "I would signal: =1. By squads from the right; 2. RUSH.="

Instead of saying, for instance, "I would advance my squad to the top of this hill at double time," the squad leader should say, "I would give the command: '=1. Forward, double time; 2. MARCH=,' and upon reaching the top of this hill, I would command, '=1. Squad; 2. HALT=,'

cautioning the men to take advantage of cover."

Instead of saying, "I would signal back that we see the enemy in force," the squad leader should take a rifle and make the signal, and if a man has been designated to watch for signals, the man would say to the captain (or other person for whom he was watching for signals): "Captain, Corporal Smith has signaled that he sees the enemy in force."

Instead of saying, "I would send a message back that there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house; they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders," say, "Smith, go back and tell the captain (or other person) there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders." Private Smith would then say to the captain (or other person), "Captain, Corporal Harris sends word there are about twenty men just in the rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horse holders."