A History of Rome to 565 A. D Part 8

*Peace: 201 B. C.* For Carthage all hope of resistance was over and she had to accept the Roman terms. These were: the surrender of all territory except the city of Carthage and the surrounding country in Africa, an indemnity of 10,000 talents ($12,000,000), the surrender of all vessels of war except ten triremes, and of all war elephants, and the obligation to refrain from carrying on war outside of Africa, or even in Africa unless with Rome's consent. The Numidians were united in a strong state on the Carthaginian borders, under the Roman ally Masinissa. Scipio returned to Rome to triumph "over the Carthaginians and Hannibal," and to receive, from the scene of his victory, the name of Africa.n.u.s.

V. THE EFFECT OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR UPON ITALY

The destruction of the Carthaginian empire left Rome mistress of the western Mediterranean and by far the greatest power of the time. But this victory had only been attained after a tremendous struggle, the greatest probably that the ancient world ever witnessed, a struggle which called forth in Rome the patriotic virtues of courage, devotion, and self-sacrifice to a degree that aroused the admiration of subsequent generations, which drained her resources of men and treasure and which left ineffaceable scars upon the soil of Italy.

One of the main factors in deciding the issue was the Roman command of the sea which Carthage never felt able to challenge seriously. Another was the larger citizen body of Rome, and the friendly relations between herself and her federate allies. This, with the system of universal military service, gave her a citizen soldiery which in morale and numbers was superior to the armies of Carthage. As long as Hannibal was in Italy Rome kept from year to year upwards of 100,000 men in the field. Once only, after the battle of Cannae, was she unable to replace her losses by the regular system of recruiting and had to arm 8000 slaves who were promised freedom as a reward for faithful service. On the other hand, Carthage had to raise her forces from mercenaries or from subject allies. As her resources dwindled the former became ever more difficult to obtain, while the demands made upon the latter caused revolts that cost much effort to subdue. It required the personality of a Hannibal to develop an _esprit de corps_ and discipline such as characterized his army in Italy. A third factor was the absence in the Roman commanders of the personal rivalries and lack of cooperation which so greatly hampered the Carthaginians in Spain and in Sicily. Still one must not be led into the error of supposing that the Carthaginians did not display tenacity and patriotism to a very high degree. The senatorial cla.s.s especially distinguished itself by courage and ability, and there are no evidences of factional strife hampering the conduct of the war. The Romans overcame the disadvantage of the annual change of commanders-in-chief by the use of the proconsuls.h.i.+p and pro-praetors.h.i.+p often long prorogued, whereby officers of ability retained year after year the command of the same armies. This system enabled them to develop such able generals as Metellus and the Scipios.

The cost of maintaining her fleet and her armies taxed the financial resources of Rome to the utmost. The government had to make use of a reserve fund which had been acc.u.mulating in the treasury for thirty years from the returns of the 5% tax on the value of manumitted slaves, and the armies in Spain could only be kept in the field by the generosity and patriotism of several companies of contractors who furnished supplies at their own expense until the end of the war. An additional burden was the increased cost of the necessities of life and the danger of a grain famine, caused by the disturbed conditions in Italy and Sicily and the withdrawal of so many men from agricultural occupations. In 210 the situation was only relieved by an urgent appeal to Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt, from whom grain had to be purchased at three times the usual price.

However, this crisis pa.s.sed with the pacification of Sicily in the next year.

Furthermore, a heavy tribute had been levied upon the man power of the Roman state. The census list of citizens eligible for military service fell from about 280,000 at the beginning of the war to 237,000 in 209; and the federate allies must have suffered at least as heavily. The greatest losses fell upon the southern part of the peninsula. There, year after year, the fields had been laid waste and the villages devastated by the opposing armies, until the rural population had almost entirely disappeared, the land had become a wilderness, and the more prosperous cities had fallen into decay. From the effects of these ravages southern Italy never recovered.

CHAPTER IX

ROMAN DOMINATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE SECOND PHASE: ROME AND THE GREEK EAST, 200167 B. C.

I. THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR: 200196 B. C.

*The eastern crisis: 202 B. C.* The Roman senate had been eager to conclude a satisfactory peace with Carthage as soon as possible in order to devote its undivided attention to a crisis which had arisen in the eastern Mediterranean. There Ptolemy IV of Egypt had died in 203 B. C., leaving the kingdom to an infant son who was in the hands of corrupt and dissolute advisors. Egypt had lost her command of the eastern Mediterranean at the time of Rome's First Carthaginian War, and later (217 B. C.) had only saved herself in a war against Syria by calling to arms a portion of the native population. This step had led to internal racial difficulties which weakened the position of the dynasty. At this juncture Philip V of Macedon, who had emerged with credit from his recent struggle with Rome and his foes in Greece, and Antiochus III of Syria, who had just returned from a series of successful campaigns (212204 B. C.) which had recovered for his kingdom its eastern provinces as far as the Indus and had won for him the surname of "the Great," judged the moment favorable for the realization of long-cherished ambitions at the expense of their rival, Egypt. They formed an alliance for the conquest of the outlying possessions of the Ptolemies, whereby Philip was to occupy those in the Aegean, while Antiochus was to seize Phoenicia and Palestine. In 202 B. C.

they opened hostilities.

*The appeal for Roman intervention: 201 B. C.* But the operations of the forces of Philip in the Aegean brought him into war with Rhodes and with Attalus, King of Pergamon, while in Greece a quarrel, which developed between some of his allies and the Athenians, involved him in hostilities with the latter. From these three states and from Egypt, which, having been unable to prevent Antiochus from occupying her Syrian possessions, was now threatened with invasion, envoys were sent to Rome, to request Roman intervention on their behalf, on the ground that they were friends (_amici_) of Rome.

*The status of amicitia.* The Romans had adopted the idea of international friends.h.i.+p (_amicitia_, _philia_) from the Greeks in the course of the third century. Previously, their only conception of friendly relations between states was that of alliance (_societas_) based upon a perpetual treaty (_foedus_), which bound each party to render military a.s.sistance to the other and which neither could terminate at discretion. However, under the influence of ideas current among the h.e.l.lenic states they began to form friends.h.i.+ps, i. e. to open up diplomatic relations with states and rulers. These _amici_ (friends) could remain neutral in case Rome engaged in war, or they could render Rome support, which was, however, voluntary and not obligatory. And Rome enjoyed a similar freedom of action with regard to them.

*Rome intervenes: 200 B. C.* The Roman Senate, influenced by mixed motives-sympathy for the h.e.l.lenes and their culture, ambition to appear as arbiters of the fate of the Greek world, a desire for revenge upon Philip for his partial successes in the late war, and fear of seeing him develop into a more powerful enemy-was anxious to intervene. But, although the Roman fetials, the members of the priestly college which was the guardian of the Roman traditions in international relations, decided that Attalus and the other Roman _amici_ might be regarded as allies (_socii_) and so be defended legitimately, the Roman people as a whole shrank from embarking upon another war. The Comitia once voted against the proposal, and at a second meeting was only induced to sanction it, when it was represented to them that they would have to face another invasion of Italy if they did not antic.i.p.ate Philip's action.

*The Roman ultimatum.* The Senate next sent amba.s.sadors to the East to present an ultimatum to Philip, and at the same time to negotiate with Antiochus for the cessation of his attacks upon Egypt, for the Romans did not wish to have his forces added to those of the Macedonian king. When Philip was engaged in the siege of Abydos on the h.e.l.lespont he received the Roman terms, which were that he should abstain from attacking any cities of the Greeks or the possessions of Ptolemy, and should submit to arbitration his disputes with Attalus and the Rhodians. Upon his rejection of these proposals the war opened.

*The Romans cross the Adriatic.* Late in 200 B. C. a Roman army under the consul Sulpicius crossed into Illyric.u.m and endeavored to penetrate into Macedonia. However, both in this and in the succeeding year, the Romans, although aided by the forces of the Aetolian Confederacy, Pergamon, Rhodes and Athens, were unable to inflict any decisive defeat upon Philip or to invade his kingdom.

However, with the arrival of the consul of 198, t.i.tus Flamininus, the situation speedily changed. The Achaean Confederacy was won over to the side of Rome, and Flamininus succeeded in forcing Philip to evacuate his position in Epirus and to withdraw into Thessaly. In the following winter negotiations for peace were opened, but these led to nothing, for the Romans demanded the evacuation of Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias, three fortresses known as "the fetters of Greece," and Philip refused to make this concession.

*Cynoscephalae: 197 B. C.* The next year military operations were resumed with both armies in Thessaly. Early in the summer a battle was fought on a ridge of hills called Cynoscephalae (the Dog's Heads) where the Romans won a complete victory. Although the Aetolians tendered valuable a.s.sistance in this engagement, the Macedonian defeat was due to the superior flexibility of the Roman legionary formation over the phalanx. Philip fled to Macedonia and sued for peace. The Aetolians and his enemies in Greece sought his utter destruction, but Flamininus realized the importance of Macedonia to the Greek world as a bulwark against the Celtic peoples of the lower Danube and would not support their demands. The terms fixed by the Roman Senate were: the autonomy of the h.e.l.lenes, the evacuation of the Macedonian possessions in Greece, in the Aegean, and in Illyric.u.m, and an indemnity of 1000 talents ($1,200,000). The conditions Philip was obliged to accept (196 B. C.).

*The proclamation of Flamininus: 196 B. C.* At the Isthmian games of the same year Flamininus proclaimed the complete autonomy of the peoples who had been subject to Macedonia. The announcement provoked a tremendous outburst of enthusiasm. After spending some time in carrying this proclamation into effect and in settling the claims of various states, Flamininus returned to Italy in 194, leaving the Greeks to make what use they could of their freedom.

II. THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AND THE AETOLIANS: 192189 B. C.

*Antiochus in Asia Minor and Thrace.* Even before Flamininus and his army had withdrawn from Greece the activities of Antiochus had awakened the mistrust of the Roman Senate and threatened to lead to hostilities. The Syrian king had completed the conquest of Lower Syria in 198, and then, profiting by the difficulties in which Philip of Macedon was involved, he turned his attention towards Asia Minor and Thrace with the hope of recovering the possessions once held by his ancestor, Seleucus I, in these quarters. The Romans were at the time too much occupied to oppose him, and, outwardly, he professed to be the friend of Rome and to be limiting his activities to the reestablis.h.i.+ng of his empire to its former extent.

Eventually, in 195 B. C., he crossed over into Europe and proceeded to establish himself in Thrace. Negotiations with the Roman Senate seemed likely to lead to an agreement that the king should limit his expansion to Asia and recognize a sort of Roman suzerainty in Europe, when the action of the Aetolians precipitated a conflict.

*The Aetolians and Rome.* The Aetolians, who had been Rome's allies in the war just concluded and who greatly exaggerated the importance of their services, were disgruntled because the kingdom of Macedonia had not been entirely dismembered and they had been restrained from enlarging the territory of the Confederacy at the expense of their neighbors. In short, they wished to take the place formerly held by Macedonia among the Greek states. Accustomed to regard war as a legitimate source of revenue, they did not easily reconcile themselves to Rome's preservation of peace in h.e.l.las. Ever since the battle of Cynoscephalae they had striven to undermine Roman influence among the Greeks, and now they sought to draw Antiochus into conflict with Rome.

*Antiochus invades Greece: 192 B. C.* In 192 B. C. they elected Antiochus as commander-in-chief of the forces of their confederacy and seized the fortress of Chalcis. This they offered to the king, to whom they also made an unauthorized promise of aid from Macedonia. Thereupon, trusting in the support promised by the Aetolians, Antiochus sailed to Greece with a small force of 10,000 men. It so happened that Hannibal, who in 196 B. C. had been forced to flee his native city owing to the machinations of his enemies and the Romans, was then at the court of Antiochus, where he had taken refuge. He advised his protector to invade the Italian peninsula, but Antiochus rejected the advice, probably with wisdom, for such a course would have required him to win the control of the sea, which was a task beyond his resources. But when, throughout his whole campaign, he neglected to make use of the services of the greatest commander of the age, he committed a most serious blunder. Had Hannibal led the forces of Antiochus the task of the Romans would not have been so simple.

*Antiochus driven from Greece: 191 B. C.* In 191 a Roman army under the consul Acilius Glabrio appeared in Greece and attacked and defeated the forces of Antiochus at Thermopylae. The king fled to Asia. Contrary to his hopes he had found but little support in Greece. Philip of Macedon and the Achaean Confederacy adhered to the Romans, and the Aetolians were rendered helpless by an invasion of their own country. Furthermore, the Rhodians and Eumenes, the new King of Pergamon, joined their navies to the Roman fleet.

*The Romans cross over to Asia Minor: 190 B. C.* As Antiochus would not hearken to the terms of peace laid down by the Romans, the latter resolved upon the invasion of Asia Minor. Two naval battles, won by the aid of Rhodes and Pergamon, secured the control of the Aegean and in 190 B. C. a Roman force crossed the h.e.l.lespont. For its commander the Senate had wished to designate Scipio Africa.n.u.s, the greatest of the Roman generals.

However, as he had recently been consul he was now ineligible for that office. The obstacle of the law was accordingly circ.u.mvented by the election of his brother Lucius to the consulate and his a.s.signment to this command, and by the appointment of Publius to accompany him as extraordinary proconsul, with power equal to his own.

*Magnesia: 190 B. C.* One decisive victory over Antiochus at Magnesia in the autumn of 190 B. C. brought him to terms. He agreed to surrender all territory to the north of the Taurus mountains and west of Pamphylia, to give up his war elephants, to surrender all but ten of his s.h.i.+ps of war, to pay an indemnity of 15,000 talents ($18,000,000) in twelve annual instalments, and to abstain from attacking the allies of Rome. Still, unlike Carthage, he was at liberty to defend himself if attacked. The Romans then proceeded to establish order in Asia Minor. The territories of their friends, Rhodes and Pergamon, were materially increased, while the enemies of the latter, the Celts of Galatia were defeated and forced to pay a heavy indemnity. Rome retained no territory in Asia, but left the country divided among a number of small states whose mutual jealousies rendered impossible the rise of a strong power which could venture to set aside the Roman arrangements.

*The subjugation of the Aetolians: 189 B. C.* The Roman campaign of 191 against the Aetolians had caused the latter, who were also attacked by Philip of Macedon, to seek terms. However, as the Romans demanded an unconditional surrender, the Aetolians decided to continue the struggle.

In the next year no energetic measures were taken against them, but in 189 the consul Fulvius n.o.bilior pressed the war vigorously and besieged their chief city, Ambracia. But since the obstinate resistance of its defenders defied all his efforts, and since the Athenians were trying to act as mediators in bringing the war to a close, the Romans abandoned their demand for an unconditional surrender and peace was made on the following conditions. The Aetolian Confederacy gave up all territory captured by its enemies during the war and entered into a permanent alliance with Rome, whereby it was bound to send contingents to the Roman armies. Ambracia was surrendered and destroyed, and the Romans occupied the pirate nest of Cephallenia.

III. THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR: 171167 B. C.

*Rome and the Greek states.* Although by her alliance with the Aetolians Rome had planted herself permanently on Greek soil, and in the war with Antiochus had claimed to exercise a sort of protectorate over the Greek world, still the Senate as yet gave no indication of reversing the policy of Flamininus, and the Greek states remained as the friends of Rome in the enjoyment of political independence. However, it was not long before these friendly relations became seriously strained and Rome was induced to embark upon a policy of interference in Greek affairs which ultimately put an end to the apparent freedom of h.e.l.las. The fundamental cause of this change was that while Rome interpreted Greek freedom to mean liberty of action provided that the wishes and arrangements of Rome were respected, the Greeks understood it to mean the perfect freedom of sovereign communities, and resented bitterly any infringement of their rights.

Keeping in mind these conflicting points of view, it is easy to see how difficulties were bound to arise which would inevitably be settled according to the wishes of the stronger power.

*Rome and the Achaeans.* The chief specific causes for the change in the Roman policy are to be found in the troubles of the Achaean Confederacy and the reviving ambitions of Macedonia. The Confederacy included many city-states which had been compelled to join it and which sought to regain their independence. This the Confederacy was determined to prevent. One such community was Sparta, and the policy of the Achaeans towards it in the matter of the restoration of Spartan exiles led to the Spartans appealing to Rome. The Roman decision wounded the susceptibilities of the Confederacy without settling the problem, and the tendency of the Achaeans to stand upon their rights provoked the anger of the Romans. Within the Confederacy there developed a pro-Roman party ready to submit to Roman dictators.h.i.+p, and a national party determined to a.s.sert their right to freedom of action. From 180 B. C. the Romans deliberately fostered the aristocratic factions throughout the cities of Greece, feeling that they were the more stable element and more in harmony with the policy of the Senate. As a consequence the democratic factions began to look for outside support and cast their eyes towards Macedonia.

*Rome and Macedonia.* Philip V of Macedon considered that the a.s.sistance which he had furnished to Rome in the Syrian War was proof of his loyalty and warranted the annexation of the territory he had overrun in that conflict. But the Senate was not inclined to allow the power of Macedonia to attain dangerous proportions, and he was forced to forego his claims.

Henceforth he was the bitter foe of the Romans. He devoted himself to the development of the military resources of his kingdom with the ultimate view of again challenging Rome's authority in Greece. At his death in 179 B. C. he left an army of from 30,000 to 40,000 men and a treasure of 6,000 talents ($7,200,000). His son and successor Perseus inherited his father's anti-Roman policy and entered into relations with the foes of Rome everywhere in Greece.

*The Third Macedonian War: 171167 B. C.* But the Senate was kept well aware of his schemes by his enemies in Greece, especially Eumenes of Pergamon. Therefore they determined to forestall the completion of his plans and force him into war. In 172, a Roman commission visited Perseus and required of him concessions which meant the extinction of his independence. Upon his refusal to comply with the demands they returned home and Rome declared war. Now, when success depended upon energetic action, Perseus sought to avoid the issue and tried to placate the Romans, but in vain. In 171 a Roman force landed in Greece and made its way to Thessaly. But in the campaigns of this and the following year the Roman commanders were too incapable and their troops too undisciplined to make any headway. Nor did Perseus show ability to take advantage of his opportunities. Furthermore, by his parsimony he lost the chance to win valuable aid from the Dardanians, Gesatae, and Celts on his borders.

Finally, in 168, the Romans found an able general in the consul Aemilius Paulus, who restored the morale of the Roman soldiers and won a complete victory over Perseus in the battle of Pydna. The Macedonian kingdom was at an end; its territory was divided into four autonomous republics, which were forbidden mutual privileges of _commercium_ and _connubium_; a yearly tribute of fifty talents was imposed upon them; and the royal mines and domains became the property of the Roman state.

*The aftermath of the war.* Having disposed of Macedon the Romans turned their attention to the other Greek states with the intention of rewarding their friends and punis.h.i.+ng their enemies. Everywhere death or exile awaited the leaders of the anti-Roman party, many of whose names became known from the seizure of the papers of Perseus. Although the Achaeans had given no positive proof of disloyalty 1000 of their leading men, among them the historian Polybius, were carried off to Italy nominally to be given the chance of clearing themselves before the Senate but really to be kept as hostages in Italy for the future conduct of the Confederacy.

The Rhodians, because they had endeavored to secure a peaceful settlement between Rome and Perseus, were forced to surrender their possessions in Asia Minor, and a ruinous blow was dealt to their commercial prosperity by the establishment of a free port at the island of Delos. Eumenes of Pergamon, whose actions had aroused suspicions, had to recognize the independence of the Galatians whom he had subdued. Far worse was the fate of Epirus. There seventy towns were sacked and their inhabitants to the number of 150,000 carried off into slavery.

Henceforth it was clear that Rome was the real sovereign in the eastern Mediterranean and that her friends and allies only enjoyed local autonomy, while they were expected to be obedient to the orders of Rome. This is well ill.u.s.trated by the anecdote of the circle of Popilius. During the Third Macedonian War, Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, King of Syria, had invaded Egypt. After the battle of Pydna a Roman amba.s.sador, Popilius by name, was sent to make him withdraw. Popilius met Antiochus before Alexandria and delivered the Senate's message. The king asked for time for consideration, but the Roman, drawing a circle around him in the sand, bade him answer before he left the spot. Antiochus yielded and evacuated Egypt.

The spoils of this war with Macedonia brought an enormous booty into the Roman treasury, and from this time the war tax on property-the _tributum civium Romanorum_-ceased to be levied. The income of the empire enabled the government to relieve Roman citizens of all direct taxation.

IV. CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY AND SPAIN