The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science Science and Method Part 48

These are generalities applicable in sum to all the sciences; and for example the mechanism of mathematical invention does not differ sensibly from the mechanism of invention in general. Later I attack questions relating more particularly to certain special sciences and first to pure mathematics.

In the chapters devoted to these, I have to treat subjects a little more abstract. I have first to speak of the notion of s.p.a.ce; every one knows s.p.a.ce is relative, or rather every one says so, but many think still as if they believed it absolute; it suffices to reflect a little however to perceive to what contradictions they are exposed.

The questions of teaching have their importance, first in themselves, then because reflecting on the best way to make new ideas penetrate virgin minds is at the same time reflecting on how these notions were acquired by our ancestors, and consequently on their true origin, that is to say, in reality on their true nature. Why do children usually understand nothing of the definitions which satisfy scientists? Why is it necessary to give them others? This is the question I set myself in the succeeding chapter and whose solution should, I think, suggest useful reflections to the philosophers occupied with the logic of the sciences.

On the other hand, many geometers believe we can reduce mathematics to the rules of formal logic. Unheard-of efforts have been made to do this; to accomplish it, some have not hesitated, for example, to reverse the historic order of the genesis of our conceptions and to try to explain the finite by the infinite. I believe I have succeeded in showing, for all those who attack the problem unprejudiced, that here there is a fallacious illusion. I hope the reader will understand the importance of the question and pardon me the aridity of the pages devoted to it.

The concluding chapters relative to mechanics and astronomy will be easier to read.

Mechanics seems on the point of undergoing a complete revolution. Ideas which appeared best established are a.s.sailed by bold innovators.

Certainly it would be premature to decide in their favor at once simply because they are innovators.

But it is of interest to make known their doctrines, and this is what I have tried to do. As far as possible I have followed the historic order; for the new ideas would seem too astonis.h.i.+ng unless we saw how they arose.

Astronomy offers us majestic spectacles and raises gigantic problems. We can not dream of applying to them directly the experimental method; our laboratories are too small. But a.n.a.logy with phenomena these laboratories permit us to attain may nevertheless guide the astronomer.

The Milky Way, for example, is an a.s.semblage of suns whose movements seem at first capricious. But may not this a.s.semblage be compared to that of the molecules of a gas, whose properties the kinetic theory of gases has made known to us? It is thus by a roundabout way that the method of the physicist may come to the aid of the astronomer.

Finally I have endeavored to give in a few lines the history of the development of French geodesy; I have shown through what persevering efforts, and often what dangers, the geodesists have procured for us the knowledge we have of the figure of the earth. Is this then a question of method? Yes, without doubt, this history teaches us in fact by what precautions it is necessary to surround a serious scientific operation and how much time and pains it costs to conquer one new decimal.

BOOK I

SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIST

CHAPTER I

THE CHOICE OF FACTS

Tolstoi somewhere explains why 'science for its own sake' is in his eyes an absurd conception. We can not know _all_ facts, since their number is practically infinite. It is necessary to choose; then we may let this choice depend on the pure caprice of our curiosity; would it not be better to let ourselves be guided by utility, by our practical and above all by our moral needs; have we nothing better to do than to count the number of lady-bugs on our planet?

It is clear the word utility has not for him the sense men of affairs give it, and following them most of our contemporaries. Little cares he for industrial applications, for the marvels of electricity or of automobilism, which he regards rather as obstacles to moral progress; utility for him is solely what can make man better.

For my part, it need scarce be said, I could never be content with either the one or the other ideal; I want neither that plutocracy grasping and mean, nor that democracy goody and mediocre, occupied solely in turning the other cheek, where would dwell sages without curiosity, who, shunning excess, would not die of disease, but would surely die of ennui. But that is a matter of taste and is not what I wish to discuss.

The question nevertheless remains and should fix our attention; if our choice can only be determined by caprice or by immediate utility, there can be no science for its own sake, and consequently no science. But is that true? That a choice must be made is incontestable; whatever be our activity, facts go quicker than we, and we can not catch them; while the scientist discovers one fact, there happen milliards of milliards in a cubic millimeter of his body. To wish to comprise nature in science would be to want to put the whole into the part.

But scientists believe there is a hierarchy of facts and that among them may be made a judicious choice. They are right, since otherwise there would be no science, yet science exists. One need only open the eyes to see that the conquests of industry which have enriched so many practical men would never have seen the light, if these practical men alone had existed and if they had not been preceded by unselfish devotees who died poor, who never thought of utility, and yet had a guide far other than caprice.

As Mach says, these devotees have spared their successors the trouble of thinking. Those who might have worked solely in view of an immediate application would have left nothing behind them, and, in face of a new need, all must have been begun over again. Now most men do not love to think, and this is perhaps fortunate when instinct guides them, for most often, when they pursue an aim which is immediate and ever the same, instinct guides them better than reason would guide a pure intelligence.

But instinct is routine, and if thought did not fecundate it, it would no more progress in man than in the bee or ant. It is needful then to think for those who love not thinking, and, as they are numerous, it is needful that each of our thoughts be as often useful as possible, and this is why a law will be the more precious the more general it is.

This shows us how we should choose: the most interesting facts are those which may serve many times; these are the facts which have a chance of coming up again. We have been so fortunate as to be born in a world where there are such. Suppose that instead of 60 chemical elements there were 60 milliards of them, that they were not some common, the others rare, but that they were uniformly distributed. Then, every time we picked up a new pebble there would be great probability of its being formed of some unknown substance; all that we knew of other pebbles would be worthless for it; before each new object we should be as the new-born babe; like it we could only obey our caprices or our needs.

Biologists would be just as much at a loss if there were only individuals and no species and if heredity did not make sons like their fathers.

In such a world there would be no science; perhaps thought and even life would be impossible, since evolution could not there develop the preservational instincts. Happily it is not so; like all good fortune to which we are accustomed, this is not appreciated at its true worth.

Which then are the facts likely to reappear? They are first the simple facts. It is clear that in a complex fact a thousand circ.u.mstances are united by chance, and that only a chance still much less probable could reunite them anew. But are there any simple facts? And if there are, how recognize them? What a.s.surance is there that a thing we think simple does not hide a dreadful complexity? All we can say is that we ought to prefer the facts which _seem_ simple to those where our crude eye discerns unlike elements. And then one of two things: either this simplicity is real, or else the elements are so intimately mingled as not to be distinguishable. In the first case there is chance of our meeting anew this same simple fact, either in all its purity or entering itself as element in a complex manifold. In the second case this intimate mixture has likewise more chances of recurring than a heterogeneous a.s.semblage; chance knows how to mix, it knows not how to disentangle, and to make with multiple elements a well-ordered edifice in which something is distinguishable, it must be made expressly. The facts which appear simple, even if they are not so, will therefore be more easily revived by chance. This it is which justifies the method instinctively adopted by the scientist, and what justifies it still better, perhaps, is that oft-recurring facts appear to us simple, precisely because we are used to them.

But where is the simple fact? Scientists have been seeking it in the two extremes, in the infinitely great and in the infinitely small. The astronomer has found it because the distances of the stars are immense, so great that each of them appears but as a point, so great that the qualitative differences are effaced, and because a point is simpler than a body which has form and qualities. The physicist on the other hand has sought the elementary phenomenon in fictively cutting up bodies into infinitesimal cubes, because the conditions of the problem, which undergo slow and continuous variation in pa.s.sing from one point of the body to another, may be regarded as constant in the interior of each of these little cubes. In the same way the biologist has been instinctively led to regard the cell as more interesting than the whole animal, and the outcome has shown his wisdom, since cells belonging to organisms the most different are more alike, for the one who can recognize their resemblances, than are these organisms themselves. The sociologist is more embarra.s.sed; the elements, which for him are men, are too unlike, too variable, too capricious, in a word, too complex; besides, history never begins over again. How then choose the interesting fact, which is that which begins again? Method is precisely the choice of facts; it is needful then to be occupied first with creating a method, and many have been imagined, since none imposes itself, so that sociology is the science which has the most methods and the fewest results.

Therefore it is by the regular facts that it is proper to begin; but after the rule is well established, after it is beyond all doubt, the facts in full conformity with it are erelong without interest since they no longer teach us anything new. It is then the exception which becomes important. We cease to seek resemblances; we devote ourselves above all to the differences, and among the differences are chosen first the most accentuated, not only because they are the most striking, but because they will be the most instructive. A simple example will make my thought plainer: Suppose one wishes to determine a curve by observing some of its points. The practician who concerns himself only with immediate utility would observe only the points he might need for some special object. These points would be badly distributed on the curve; they would be crowded in certain regions, rare in others, so that it would be impossible to join them by a continuous line, and they would be unavailable for other applications. The scientist will proceed differently; as he wishes to study the curve for itself, he will distribute regularly the points to be observed, and when enough are known he will join them by a regular line and then he will have the entire curve. But for that how does he proceed? If he has determined an extreme point of the curve, he does not stay near this extremity, but goes first to the other end; after the two extremities the most instructive point will be the mid-point, and so on.

So when a rule is established we should first seek the cases where this rule has the greatest chance of failing. Thence, among other reasons, come the interest of astronomic facts, and the interest of the geologic past; by going very far away in s.p.a.ce or very far away in time, we may find our usual rules entirely overturned, and these grand overturnings aid us the better to see or the better to understand the little changes which may happen nearer to us, in the little corner of the world where we are called to live and act. We shall better know this corner for having traveled in distant countries with which we have nothing to do.

But what we ought to aim at is less the ascertainment of resemblances and differences than the recognition of likenesses hidden under apparent divergences. Particular rules seem at first discordant, but looking more closely we see in general that they resemble each other; different as to matter, they are alike as to form, as to the order of their parts. When we look at them with this bias, we shall see them enlarge and tend to embrace everything. And this it is which makes the value of certain facts which come to complete an a.s.semblage and to show that it is the faithful image of other known a.s.semblages.

I will not further insist, but these few words suffice to show that the scientist does not choose at random the facts he observes. He does not, as Tolstoi says, count the lady-bugs, because, however interesting lady-bugs may be, their number is subject to capricious variations. He seeks to condense much experience and much thought into a slender volume; and that is why a little book on physics contains so many past experiences and a thousand times as many possible experiences whose result is known beforehand.

But we have as yet looked at only one side of the question. The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is beautiful. If nature were not beautiful, it would not be worth knowing, and if nature were not worth knowing, life would not be worth living. Of course I do not here speak of that beauty which strikes the senses, the beauty of qualities and of appearances; not that I undervalue such beauty, far from it, but it has nothing to do with science; I mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious order of the parts and which a pure intelligence can grasp. This it is which gives body, a structure so to speak, to the iridescent appearances which flatter our senses, and without this support the beauty of these fugitive dreams would be only imperfect, because it would be vague and always fleeting.

On the contrary, intellectual beauty is sufficient unto itself, and it is for its sake, more perhaps than for the future good of humanity, that the scientist devotes himself to long and difficult labors.

It is, therefore, the quest of this especial beauty, the sense of the harmony of the cosmos, which makes us choose the facts most fitting to contribute to this harmony, just as the artist chooses from among the features of his model those which perfect the picture and give it character and life. And we need not fear that this instinctive and unavowed prepossession will turn the scientist aside from the search for the true. One may dream a harmonious world, but how far the real world will leave it behind! The greatest artists that ever lived, the Greeks, made their heavens; how shabby it is beside the true heavens, ours!

And it is because simplicity, because grandeur, is beautiful, that we preferably seek simple facts, sublime facts, that we delight now to follow the majestic course of the stars, now to examine with the microscope that prodigious littleness which is also a grandeur, now to seek in geologic time the traces of a past which attracts because it is far away.

We see too that the longing for the beautiful leads us to the same choice as the longing for the useful. And so it is that this economy of thought, this economy of effort, which is, according to Mach, the constant tendency of science, is at the same time a source of beauty and a practical advantage. The edifices that we admire are those where the architect has known how to proportion the means to the end, where the columns seem to carry gaily, without effort, the weight placed upon them, like the gracious caryatids of the Erechtheum.

Whence comes this concordance? Is it simply that the things which seem to us beautiful are those which best adapt themselves to our intelligence, and that consequently they are at the same time the implement this intelligence knows best how to use? Or is there here a play of evolution and natural selection? Have the peoples whose ideal most conformed to their highest interest exterminated the others and taken their place? All pursued their ideals without reference to consequences, but while this quest led some to destruction, to others it gave empire. One is tempted to believe it. If the Greeks triumphed over the barbarians and if Europe, heir of Greek thought, dominates the world, it is because the savages loved loud colors and the clamorous tones of the drum which occupied only their senses, while the Greeks loved the intellectual beauty which hides beneath sensuous beauty, and this intellectual beauty it is which makes intelligence sure and strong.

Doubtless such a triumph would horrify Tolstoi, and he would not like to acknowledge that it might be truly useful. But this disinterested quest of the true for its own beauty is sane also and able to make man better.

I well know that there are mistakes, that the thinker does not always draw thence the serenity he should find therein, and even that there are scientists of bad character. Must we, therefore, abandon science and study only morals? What! Do you think the moralists themselves are irreproachable when they come down from their pedestal?

CHAPTER II

THE FUTURE OF MATHEMATICS

To foresee the future of mathematics, the true method is to study its history and its present state.

Is this not for us mathematicians in a way a professional procedure? We are accustomed to _extrapolate_, which is a means of deducing the future from the past and present, and as we well know what this amounts to, we run no risk of deceiving ourselves about the range of the results it gives us.

We have had hitherto prophets of evil. They blithely reiterate that all problems capable of solution have already been solved, and that nothing is left but gleaning. Happily the case of the past rea.s.sures us. Often it was thought all problems were solved or at least an inventory was made of all admitting solution. And then the sense of the word solution enlarged, the insoluble problems became the most interesting of all, and others unforeseen presented themselves. For the Greeks a good solution was one employing only ruler and compa.s.ses; then it became one obtained by the extraction of roots, then one using only algebraic or logarithmic functions. The pessimists thus found themselves always outflanked, always forced to retreat, so that at present I think there are no more.

My intention, therefore, is not to combat them, as they are dead; we well know that mathematics will continue to develop, but the question is how, in what direction? You will answer, 'in every direction,' and that is partly true; but if it were wholly true it would be a little appalling. Our riches would soon become enc.u.mbering and their acc.u.mulation would produce a medley as impenetrable as the unknown true was for the ignorant.

The historian, the physicist, even, must make a choice among facts; the head of the scientist, which is only a corner of the universe, could never contain the universe entire; so that among the innumerable facts nature offers, some will be pa.s.sed by, others retained.

Just so, _a fortiori_, in mathematics; no more can the geometer hold fast pell-mell all the facts presenting themselves to him; all the more because he it is, almost I had said his caprice, that creates these facts. He constructs a wholly new combination by putting together its elements; nature does not in general give it to him ready made.