The Teaching of Epictetus Part 17

He acknowledged that it was.

Therefore, that which maketh a dog beautiful maketh a horse ill-favored; and that which maketh a horse beautiful, a dog ill-favored; if, indeed, their natures are different?

--"So it seems."

And that which maketh a beautiful Pancratiast,[1] the same maketh a wrestler not good, and a runner utterly laughable? And he who is beautiful for the Pentathlon is very bad for wrestling?

--"It is so," he said.

What is it, then, that makes a man beautiful? Is it not that which, in its kind, makes also a dog or a horse beautiful?

--"It is that," he answered.

What, then, makes a dog beautiful? The presence of the virtue of a dog.

And a horse? The presence of the virtue of a horse. And what, then, a man? Is it not also the presence of the virtue of a man? And, O youth, if thou wouldst be beautiful, do thou labor to perfect this, the virtue of a human being. But what is it? Look whom you praise when you praise any without affection-is it the righteous or the unrighteous?

--"The righteous."

Is it the temperate or the profligate?

--"The temperate."

Is it the continent or the incontinent?

--"The continent."

Then making yourself such a one as you praise, you will know that you are making yourself beautiful; but so long as you neglect these things, though you sought out every device to appear beautiful, you must of necessity be ugly.

2. For thou art not flesh and hair, but a Will: if thou keep this beautiful, then wilt thou be beautiful. But so far I dare not tell thee that thou art ugly, for I think thou wilt more easily bear to hear anything else than this. But see what Socrates saith to Alcibiades, the most beautiful and blooming of men: _Endeavor, then, to be beautiful_; and what saith he? _Curl thy locks, and pluck out the hairs of thy legs?_ G.o.d forbid. But _Set thy Will in order, cast out evil doctrines_.

--"And how then shall we deal with the body?"

As nature made it. Another hath cared for this; commit it to Him.

--"But what? Shall the body then be uncleansed?"

G.o.d forbid. But that which thou art and wast made by Nature, cleanse this; let a man be clean as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child.

3. For we ought not even by the aspect of the body to scare away the mult.i.tude from philosophy; but by his body, as in all other things, a philosopher should show himself cheerful, and free from troubles.

_Behold, friends, how I have nothing and need nothing; behold how I am homeless and landless, and an exile_, if so it chance, _and hearthless, and yet I live more free from troubles than all the lordly and the rich.

But look on my body, too; ye see that it is not the worse for my hard life._ But if one saith this to me, having the countenance and garb of a condemned criminal, what G.o.d shall persuade me to approach to philosophy which makes such men as this? G.o.d forbid! I would not, were it even to become a sage.

4. I, indeed, by the G.o.ds, had rather a young man in his first movement towards philosophy came to me with his hair curled than disheveled and foul. For a certain impression of the beautiful is to be seen in him, and an aim at what is becoming; and to the thing wherein it seemeth to him to lie, there he applies his art. Thenceforth it only needs to show him its true place, and to say, _Young man, thou seekest the beautiful, and thou dost well. Know, then, that it flourishes there where thy Reason is; there seek it where are thy likes and dislikes, thy pursuits and avoidances, for this is what thou hast in thyself of choice and precious, but the body is by nature mud. Why dost thou spend thy labor upon it in vain? for that the body is naught, Time shall certainly teach thee, though it teach thee nothing else._ But if one come to me foul and filthy, and a mustache down to the knees, what have I to say to him?

with what image or likeness can I draw him on? For with what that is like unto Beauty hath he ever busied himself, so as I may set him on another course, and say, _Not here is Beauty, but there_? Will you have me tell him, _Beauty consists not in being befouled, but in the Reason_?

For doth he even seek Beauty? hath he any impression of it in his mind?

Go, and reason with a hog, that he shall not roll himself in the mud.

5. Behold a youth worthy of love-behold an old man worthy to love, and to be loved in return; to whom one may commit his sons, his daughters, to be taught; to whom young men may come, if it please you-that he may deliver lectures to them on a dunghill! G.o.d forbid. Every extravagance arises from something in human nature, but this is near to being one that is not human.

CHAPTER XIII.

WHY WE SHOULD BEAR WITH WRONG.

When some one may do you an injury, or speak ill of you, remember that he either does it or speaks it believing that it is right and meet for him to do so. It is not possible, then, that he can follow the thing that appears to you, but the thing that appears to him. Wherefore, if it appear evil to him, it is he that is injured, being deceived. For also if any one should take a true consequence to be false, it is not the consequence that is injured, but he which is deceived. Setting out, then, from these opinions, you will bear a gentle mind towards any man who may revile you. For, say on each occasion, _So it appeared to him_.

CHAPTER XIV.

THAT EVERYTHING HATH TWO HANDLES.

Every matter hath two handles-by the one it may be carried; by the other, not. If thy brother do thee wrong, take not this thing by the handle, _He wrongs me_; for that is the handle whereby it may not be carried. But take it rather by the handle, _He is my brother, nourished with me_; and thou wilt take it by a handle whereby it may be carried.

CHAPTER XV.

ON CERTAIN FALSE CONCLUSIONS.

There is no true conclusion in these reasonings: _I am richer than thou, therefore I am better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore I am better_. But the conclusions are rather these: _I am richer than thou, therefore my wealth is better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore my speech is better_. But thou art not wealth, and thou art not speech.

CHAPTER XVI.

PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT.

1. Doth a man bathe himself quickly? Then, say not, _Wrongly_, but _Quickly_. Doth he drink much wine? Then say not, _Wrongly_, but _Much_.

For whence do you know if it were ill done till you have understood his opinion?

2. Thus it shall not befall you to a.s.sent to any other things than those whereof you are truly and directly sensible.[1]

3. What is the cause of a.s.senting to anything? The appearance that it is so. But if it appear to be not so, it is impossible to a.s.sent to it.

Wherefore? For that this is the nature of the mind, to receive the true with favor, the false with disfavor, and the uncertain with indifference. The proof of this? Be sure, if you can, at this moment, that it is night. You cannot. Cease to be sure that it is day. You cannot. Be sure that the stars are odd in number, or that they are even.

You cannot. When, therefore, any man shall a.s.sent to what is false, know that he had no will to consent to falsehood; for, as saith Plato, no soul is willingly deprived of the truth, but the false appeared to it to be true. Come, then, what have we in actions corresponding to this true and false? The seemly and the unseemly, the profitable and the unprofitable, that which concerns me and that which doth not concern me, and such like. Can any man think that a certain thing is for his profit, and not elect to do it? He cannot. How, then, is it with her who saith-

"And will I know the evils I shall do, But wrath is lord of all my purposes?"

_Medea_, 1079.