Democritus Platonissans Part 1

Democritus Platonissans.

by Henry More.

INTRODUCTION

Henry More (1614-1687), the most interesting member of that group traditionally known as the Cambridge Platonists, lived conscientiously and well. Having early set out on one course, he never thought to change it; he devoted his whole life to the joy of celebrating, again and again, "a firm and unshaken Belief of the Existence of G.o.d . . . , a G.o.d infinitely Good, as well as infinitely Great . . . ."[1] Such faith was for More the starting point of his rational understanding: "with the most fervent Prayers" he beseeched G.o.d, in his autobiographical "Praefatio Generalissima," "to set me free from the dark Chains, and this so sordid Captivity of my own Will." More offered to faith all which his reason could know, and so it happened that he "was got into a most Joyous and Lucid State of Mind," something quite ineffable; to preserve these "Sensations and Experiences of my own Soul," he wrote "a pretty full Poem call'd _Psychozoia_" (or _A Christiano-Platonicall display of Life_), an exercise begun about 1640 and designed for no audience but himself. There were times, More continued in his autobiographical remarks, when he thought of destroying _Psychozoia_ because its style is rough and its language filled with archaisms. His princ.i.p.al purpose in that poem was to demonstrate in detail the spiritual foundation of all existence; Psyche, his heroine, is the daughter of the Absolute, the general Soul who holds together the metaphysical universe, against whom he sees reflected his own soul's mystical progress. More must, nevertheless, have been pleased with his labor, for he next wrote _Psychathanasia Platonica: or Platonicall Poem of the Immortality of Souls, especially Mans Soul_, in which he attempts to demonstrate the immortality of the soul as a corrective to his age.

Then, he joined to that _Antipsychopannychia, or A Confutation of the sleep of the Soul after death_, and _Antimonopsychia, or That all Souls are not one_; at the urging of friends, he published the poems in 1642--his first literary work--as _Psychodia Platonica_.

In his argument for the soul's immortality toward the end of _Psychathanasia_ (III.4), More had urged that there was no need to plead for any extension of the infinite ("a contradiction," and also, it would seem, a fruitless inquiry); but he soon changed his mind. The preface to _Democritus Platonissans_ reproduces those stanzas of the earlier poem which deny infinity (34 to the end of the canto) with a new (formerly concluding) stanza 39 and three further stanzas "for a more easie and naturall leading to the present Canto," _i.e._, _Democritus Platonissans_, which More clearly intended to be an addition, a fifth canto to _Psychathanasia_ (Book III); and although _Democritus Platonissans_ first appeared separately, More appended it to _Psychathanasia_ in the second edition of his collected poems, this time with English t.i.tles, the whole being called _A Platonick Song of the Soul_ (1647).

There is little relations.h.i.+p between _Democritus Platonissans_ and the rest of More's poetry; even the main work to which it supposedly forms a final and conclusive canto provides only the slightest excuse for such a continuation. Certainly, in _Psychathanasia_, More is excited by the new astronomy; he praises the Copernican system throughout Book III, giving an account of it according to the lessons of his study of Galileo's _Dialogo_, which he may have been reading even as he wrote.[2] Indeed, More tries to harmonize the two poems--his habit was always to look for unity. But even though _Democritus Platonissans_ explores an astronomical subject, just as the third part of _Psychathanasia_ also does, its att.i.tude and theme are quite different; for More had meanwhile been reading Descartes.

More's theory of the infinity of worlds and G.o.d's plenitude evidently owed a great deal to Descartes' recent example; More responds exuberantly to him, especially to his _Principes de la Philosophie_ (1644); for in him he fancied having found a true ally. Steeped in Platonic and neo-Platonic thought, and determined to reconcile Spirit with the rational mind of man, More thought he had discovered in Cartesian 'intuition' what was not necessarily there. Descartes had enjoyed an ecstatic illumination, and so had Plotinus; but this was not enough, as More may have wanted to imagine, to make Descartes a neo-Platonist.[3] But the Platonic element implicit in Descartes, his theory of innate ideas, and his proof of the existence of G.o.d from the idea of G.o.d, all helped to make More so receptive to him. Nevertheless, More did not really need Descartes, nor, as he himself was later to discover, had he even understood him properly, for More had looked at him only to find his own reflection.

But there was nothing really new about the idea of infinite worlds which More described in _Democritus Platonissans_; it surely was not a conception unique to Descartes. The theory was a common one in Greek and Renaissance thought. Democritus and the Epicureans, of course, advocated the theme of infinite worlds in an infinite universe which More accepted; but at the same time, he rejected their view of a mechanistic and fortuitous creation. Although Plato specifically rejects the idea of infinite worlds (in _Timaeus_), More imagines, as the t.i.tle of his poem implies, a Platonic universe, by which he really means neo-Platonic, combined with a Democritean plurality of worlds. More filled s.p.a.ce, not with the infinite void of the Atomists, but with the Divine, ever active immanence. More, in fact, in an early philosophic work, _An Antidote against Atheisme_ (1652), and again in _Divine Dialogues_ (1668), refutes Lucretius by a.s.serting the usefulness of all created things in G.o.d's Providence and the essential design in Nature. His reference in _Democritus Platonissans_ (st. 20) is typical: "though I detest the sect/ of Epicurus for their manners vile,/ Yet what is true I may not well reject." In bringing together Democritus' theories and neo-Platonic thought, More obviously has attempted reconciliation of two exclusive world views, but with dubious success.

While More stands firmly before a familiar tradition, his belief in an infinity of worlds evidently has little immediate connection with any predecessors. Even Bruno's work, or Thomas Digges,' which could have occupied an important place, seems to have had little, if any, direct influence on More. It was Descartes who stimulated his thought at the most receptive moment: in 1642 to have denied a theory which in 1646 he proclaimed with such force evidently argues in favor of a most powerful attachment. More responded enthusiastically to what he deemed a congenial metaphysical system; as a champion of Descartes, he was first to make him known in England and first in England to praise the infinity of worlds, yet Descartes' system could give to him little real solace.

More embraces G.o.d's plenitude and infinity of worlds, he rejoices in the variety and grandeur of the universe, and he wors.h.i.+ps it as he might G.o.d Himself; but Descartes was fundamentally uninterested in such enthusiasms and found them even repellant--as well as unnecessary--to his thought. For More the doctrine of infinity was a proper corollary of Copernican astronomy and neo-Platonism (as well as Cabbalistic mysticism) and therefore a necessity to his whole elaborate and eclectic view of the world.

In introducing Cartesian thought into England, More emphasized particular physical doctrines mainly described in _The Principles of Philosophy_; he shows little interest in the _Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason_ (1637), or in the _Meditations_ (1641), both of which were also available to him when he wrote _Democritus Platonissans_. In the preface to his poem, he refers to Descartes whom he seems to have read hopefully: surely "infinitude" is the same as the Cartesian "indefinite." "_For what is his =mundus indefinite extensus=, but =extensus infinite=? Else it sounds onely =infinitus quoad nos=, but =simpliciter finitus=_," for there can be no s.p.a.ce "_unstuffd with Atoms_." More thinks that Descartes seems "to mince it," that difficulty lies in the interpretation of a word, not in an essential idea. He is referring to Part II, xxi, of _The Principles_, but he quotes, with tacit approval, from Part III, i and ii, in the motto to the poem. More undoubtedly knows the specific discussion of 'infinity' in Part I, xxvi-xxviii, where he must first have felt uneasy delight on reading "that it is not needful to enter into disputes regarding the infinite, but merely to hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefinite, such as the extension of the world . . . ."[4] More asked Descartes to clarify his language in their correspondence of 1648-49, the last year of Descartes' life.

_Democritus Platonissans_ is More's earliest statement about absolute s.p.a.ce and time; by introducing these themes into English philosophy, he contributed significantly to the intellectual history of the seventeenth century. Newton, indeed, was able to make use of More's forging efforts; but of relative time or s.p.a.ce and their measurement, which so much concerned Newton, More had little to say. He was preoccupied with the development of a theory which would show that immaterial substance, with s.p.a.ce and time as attributes, is as real and as absolute as the Cartesian geometrical and spatial account of matter which he felt was true but much in need of amplification.

In his first letter to Descartes, of 11 December 1648, More wrote: ". . . this indefinite extension is either _simpliciter_ infinite, or only in respect to us. If you understand extension to be infinite _simpliciter_, why do you obscure your thought by too low and too modest words? If it is infinite only in respect to us, extension, in reality, will be finite; for our mind is the measure neither of the things nor of truth. . . ." Unsatisfied by his first answer from Descartes (5 February 1649), he urges his point again (5 March): if extension can describe matter, the same quality must apply to the immaterial and yet be only one of many attributes of Spirit. In his second letter to More (15 April), Descartes answers firmly: "It is repugnant to my concept to attribute any limit to the world, and I have no other measure than my perception for what I have to a.s.sert or to deny. I say, therefore, that the world is indeterminate or indefinite, because I do not recognize in it any limits. But I dare not call it infinite as I perceive that G.o.d is greater than the world, not in respect to His extension, because, as I have already said, I do not acknowledge in G.o.d any proper [extension], but in respect to His perfection . . . . It is repugnant to my mind . . . it implies a contradiction, that the world be finite or limited, because I cannot but conceive a s.p.a.ce outside the boundaries of the world wherever I presuppose them." More plainly fails to understand the basic dualism inherent in Cartesian philosophy and to sense the irrelevance of his questions. While Descartes is really disposing of the spiritual world in order to get on with his a.n.a.lysis of finite experience, More is keenly attempting to reconcile neo-Platonism with the lively claims of matter. His effort can be read as the brave attempt to harmonize an older mode of thought with the urgency of the 'new philosophy' which called the rest in doubt. More saw this conflict and the implications of it with a kind of clarity that other men of his age hardly possessed. But the way of Descartes, which at first seemed to him so promising, certainly did not lead to the kind of harmony which he sought.

More's original enthusiasm for Descartes declined as he understood better that the Cartesian world in practice excluded spirits and souls.

Because Descartes could find no necessary place even for G.o.d Himself, More styled him, in _Enchiridion Metaphysic.u.m_ (1671), the "Prince of the Nullibists"; these men "readily acknowledge there are such things as _Incorporeal Beings_ or _Spirits_, yet do very peremptorily contend, that they are _no where_ in the whole World [;] . . . because they so boldly affirm that a Spirit is _Nullibi_, that is to say, _no where_,"

they deserve to be called _Nullibists_.[5] In contrast to these false teachers, More describes absolute s.p.a.ce by listing twenty epithets which can be applied either to G.o.d or to pure extension, such as "Unum, Simplex, Immobile . . . Incomprehensible "[6] There is, however, a great difficulty here; for while s.p.a.ce and Spirit are eternal and uncreated, they yet contain material substance which has been created by G.o.d. If the material world possesses infinite extension, as More generally believes, that would preclude any need of its having a creator. In order to avoid this dilemma, which _Democritus Platonissans_ ignores, More must at last separate matter and s.p.a.ce, seeing the latter as an attribute of G.o.d through which He is able to contain a finite world limited in s.p.a.ce as well as in time. In writing that "this infinite s.p.a.ce because of its infinity is distinct from matter,"[7] More reveals the direction of his conclusion; the dichotomy it embodies is Cartesianism in reverse.

While More always labored to describe the ineffable, his earliest work, the poetry, may have succeeded in this wish most of all. Although he felt that his poetry was aiming toward truths which his "_later and better concocted Prose_"[8] reached, the effort cost him the suggestiveness of figurative speech. In urging himself on toward an ever more consistent statement of belief, he lost much of his beginning exuberance (best expressed in the brief "Philosopher's Devotion") and the joy of intellectual discovery. In the search "_to find out Words which will prove faithful witnesses of the peculiarities of my Thoughts_," he staggers under the unsupportable burden of too many words. In trying so desperately to clarify his thought, he rejected poetic discourse as "slight"; only a language free of metaphor and symbol could, he supposed, lead toward correctness. Indeed, More soon renounced poetry; he apparently wrote no more after collecting it in _Philosophical Poems_ (1647), when he gave up poetry for "more seeming Substantial performances in solid _Prose_."[9] "Cupids Conflict," which is "annexed" to _Democritus Platonissans_, is an interesting revelation of the failure of poetry, as More felt it: he justifies his "rude rugged uncouth style" by suggesting that sweet verses avoid telling important truths; harshness and obscurity may at least remind one that there is a significance beyond mere words. His lament is characteristic: "How ill alas! with wisdome it accords/ To sell my living sense for liveless words."

In spite of these downcast complaints, More was quite capable of lively and meaningful poetic ideas. One is the striking image of the cone which occurs in _Democritus Platonissans_ (especially in stanzas 7-8, 66-67, and 88) and becomes the most essential symbol to More's expression of infinitude and extension. The figure first appears in _Antipsychopannychia_ (II.9) where his purpose is to reconcile the world Soul with Christian eschatology. In _Democritus Platonissans_, the cone enables More to adapt the familiar Hermetic paradox:

A Circle whose circ.u.mference no where Is circ.u.mscrib'd, whose Centre's each where set, But the low Cusp's a figure circular, Whose compa.s.se is ybound, but centre's every where. (st. 8)

Every point on the circ.u.mference, or base of the cone, relates to the single point at the top. The world, More wants to say, has no limits, no center, yet there are bounds in its not having any. More recognizes the contradiction when he fancies "some strong arm'd Archer" at the wide world's edge (st. 37). Where shall he send his shafts? Into "mere vacuity"? But More hardly seems aware of the inappropriateness of the cone: he uses a geometrical figure to locate s.p.a.ce, time, and numberless worlds within the universal sight of G.o.d, but matter is infinite, "distinct/ And yet proceeding from the Deitie" (st. 68). Obviously, the archer must forever be sending his arrows through an infinitely expanding surface. Nevertheless, the cone has great value as a metaphor, as a richly suggestive and fascinating conception. More, however, does not want to speak metaphorically; he is attempting to disclose truths, literal and plain, where pretty words and metaphors have no place. Even as he is writing his most effective poetry, we are aware that More is denying his poetic office; for he is pleading a reasoned case where the words crack and strain, where poetic meaning gathers, only to be denied.

But these objections momentarily disappear when More forgets himself enough to let us feel his imagination and does not worry that we might miss the proofs of his philosophy. _Democritus Platonissans_ concludes with an apocalyptic vision wherein the poet imagines the reconciliation of infinite worlds and time within G.o.d's immensity. He is also attempting to harmonize _Psychathanasia_, where he rejected infinitude, with its sequel, _Democritus Platonissans_, where he has everywhere been declaring it; thus we should think of endless worlds as we should think of Nature and the Phoenix, dying yet ever regenerative, sustained by a "centrall power/ Of hid spermatick life" which sucks "sweet heavenly juice" from above (st. 101). More closes his poem on a vision of harmony and ceaseless energy, a most fit ending for one who dared to believe that the new philosophy sustained the old, that all coherence had not gone out of the world, but was always there, only waiting to be discovered afresh in this latter age.

The University of British Columbia

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

[Footnote 1: The quotations from More's Latin autobiography occur in the _Opera Omnia_ (London, 1675-79), portions of which Richard Ward translated in _The Life of . . . Henry More_ (London, 1710). Cf. the modern edition of this work, ed. M. F. Howard (London, 1911), pp. 61, 67-68, the text followed here. There is a recent reprint of the _Opera Omnia_ in 3 volumes (Hildesheim, 1966) with an introduction by Serge Hutin. The "Praefatio Generalissima" begins vol. II. 1. One pa.s.sage in it which Ward did not translate describes the genesis of _Democritus Platonissans_. More writes that after finis.h.i.+ng _Psychathanasia_, he felt a change of heart: "Postea vero mutata sententia furore nescio quo Poetico incitatus supra dictum Poema scripsi, ea potissimum innixus ratione quod liquido constaret extensionem s.p.a.cii dari infinitam, nec majores absurditates pluresve contingere posse in Materia infinita, infinitaque; Mundi duratione, quam in infinita Extensione s.p.a.cii"

(p. ix).]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Lee Haring's unpub. diss., "Henry More's _Psychathanasia_ and _Democritus Platonissans_: A Critical Edition,"

(Columbia Univ., 1961), pp. 33-57.]

[Footnote 3: Marjorie Hope Nicolson's various articles and books which in part deal with More are important to the discussion that follows, and especially "The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England," SP, XXVI (1929), 356-379; _Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory_ (Ithaca, 1959), pp.

113-143, and _The Breaking of the Circle_ (New York, 1960), pp.

158-165.]

[Footnote 4: Cf. _The Meditations and Selections from the Principles of Rene Descartes_, trans. John Veitch (Chicago, 1908), p. 143. The quotations from the letters which follow occur in Alexandre Koyre's very helpful book, _From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe_ (Baltimore, 1957), pp. 114, 122-123, but the complete and original texts can be consulted in Descartes, _Correspondance avec Arnaud et Morus_, ed. G. Lewis (Paris, 1953).]

[Footnote 5: This pa.s.sage occurs at the beginning of "The Easie, True, and Genuine Notion, And consistent Explication Of the Nature of a Spirit," a free translation of _Enchiridion Metaphysic.u.m_, I. 27-28, by John Collins which he included in Joseph Glanvil's _Saducismus Triumphatus_ (London, 1681). I quote from the text as given in _Philosophical Writings of Henry More_, ed. F. I. MacKinnon (New York, 1925), p. 183.]

[Footnote 6: Cf. _Enchiridion Metaphysic.u.m_, VIII. 8, trans. Mary Whiton Calkins and included in John Tull Baker, _An Historical and Critical Examination of English s.p.a.ce and Time Theories_ . . . (Bronxville, N.Y., 1930), p. 12. For the original, cf. _Opera Omnia_, II. 1, p. 167.]

[Footnote 7: "_Infinitum_ igitur hoc _Extensum_ a Materia distinctum,"

_Enchiridion Metaphysic.u.m_, VIII. 9, in _Opera Omnia, loc. cit._ Quoted by MacKinnon, p. 262.]

[Footnote 8: This and the following reference appear in _An Explanation of the grand Mystery of G.o.dliness_ (London, 1660), "To the Reader," pp.

vi and v.]

[Footnote 9: _Ibid._, II. xi. 5 (p. 52).]

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The text of this edition is reproduced from a copy in the Henry E.

Huntington Library.

Democritus Platonissans,

Or,

_AN ESSAY_

Upon The

INFINITY OF WORLDS

Out Of

PLATONICK PRINCIPLES.

Hereunto is annexed