The Colored Regulars in the United States Army Part 9

Mr. Bonsal also brings into clear view the part taken in this battle by Lawton's Infantry. He shows by means of a simple map the trail by which Miles' brigade, in which was the Twenty-fifth Infantry, moved in order to flank the Spanish position, while Chaffee's brigade was hurrying forward on the Royal Road to reinforce the line in front. A letter from a soldier of the Twenty-fifth written soon after these events fully confirms Mr. Bonsal in what he says concerning the movement of Miles' brigade. The soldier says: "On the morning of the 24th the Rough Riders, Tenth and First Cavalry were to make an attack on a little place where the Spanish were fortified. The Second Brigade was to come on the right flank of these troops and a little in rear of the fortifications; but by some misunderstanding, the former troops, led by the Rough Riders, made an attack before we got our position, and the result was a great many lives lost in the First Cavalry and Rough Riders--only one in Tenth Cavalry, but many wounded. They captured the fortification." This letter by a humble soldier, written with no thought of its importance, shows how gallantly Lawton had sprung to the rescue of Wheeler's division. According to Bonsal, who says he obtained his information from Spanish officers who were present in this fight, it was the information of the approach of this brigade and of Chaffee's up the main road that caused the Spaniards to withdraw rapidly from the position. The whole force was in imminent danger of being captured. Another soldier of the Twenty-fifth wrote: "The report came that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was to cut off the Spanish retreat from a stronghold, toward Santiago." These glimpses from soldiers' letters ill.u.s.trate how clearly they comprehended the work upon which they were sent, and show also how hearty and cordial was the support which the infantry at that time was hurrying forward to the advancing cavalry.

The official reports show that the strength of the Spanish position was before the right of our line. Mr. Bonsal says: "Directly in front of the Tenth Cavalry rose undoubtedly the strongest point in the Spanish position--two lines of shallow trenches, strengthened by heavy stone parapets." We must remember that so far as we can get the disposition of these troops from official records, Troop A connected the Rough Riders with the First Cavalry, and Troops I and B were on the right of the First Cavalry. Troop A did not fire a shot; the fighting, therefore, was done by Troops I and B on the extreme right of the line, and it was on their front that "undoubtedly the strongest point in the Spanish position" lay--nor should the reader forget that at this very important moment Troop B was commanded by its First Sergeant, Buck, Lieutenant Williard having by his own report been "unfortunate enough to lose the troop." This is said with no disparagement to Lieutenant Williard. It was merely one of the accidents of battle.

Says Mr. Bonsal: "The moment the advance was ordered the black troopers of the Tenth Cavalry forged ahead. They were no braver certainly than any other men in the line, but their better training enabled them to render more valuable services than the other troops engaged. They had with them and ready for action their machine guns, and shoved them right up to the front on the firing line, from where they poured very effective fire into the Spanish trenches, which not only did considerable execution, but was particularly effective in keeping down the return fire of the Spaniards. The machine guns of the Rough Riders were mislaid, or the mules upon which they had been loaded could not be found at this juncture. It was said they had bolted. It is certain, however, that the guns were not brought into action, and consequently the Spaniards suffered less, and the Rough Riders more, in the gallant charge they made up the hill in front of them, after the Tenth Cavalry had advanced and driven the Spaniards from their position on the right."

Corporal W.F. Johnson, B Troop, was the non-commissioned officer in charge of the machine guns during the brief fight at Las Guasimas, and his action was such as to call forth from the troop commander special mention "for his efficiency and perfect coolness under fire." Here I may be pardoned for calling attention to a notion too prevalent concerning the Negro soldier in time of battle. He is too often represented as going into action singing like a zany or yelling like a demon, rather than as a man calculating the chances for life and victory. The official reports from the Black Regulars in Cuba ought to correct this notion. Every troop and company commander, who has reported upon colored soldiers in that war, speaks of the coolness of the men of his command. Captain Beck, of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, in the Guasimas fight, says: "I will add that the enlisted men of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, behaved well, silently and alertly obeying orders, and without becoming excited when the fire of the enemy reached them."

The yell, in the charge of the regulars, is a part of the action, and is no more peculiar to Negro troops than to the whites, only as they may differ in the general timbre of voice. Black American soldiers when not on duty may sing more than white troops, but in quite a long experience among them I have not found the difference so very noticeable. In all garrisons one will find some men more musically inclined than others; some who love to sing and some who do not; some who have voices adapted to the production of musical tones, and some who have not, and it is doubtless owing to these const.i.tutional differences that we find differences in habits and expressions.

Lieutenant Miley, of General Shafter's staff, in his description of the departure of General Shatter from General Garcia's tent, gives us a glimpse of the character of the men that composed the Cuban army in that vicinity.

"While the interview was going on, the troops were being a.s.sembled to do honor to the General on his departure.

Several companies were drawn up in front of the tent to present arms as he came out, and a regiment escorted him to the beach down the winding path, which was now lined on both sides by Cuban soldiers standing about a yard apart and presenting arms. The scene made a strong impression on all in the party, there seemed to be such an earnestness and fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these soldiers to be a power. About fifty per cent. were blacks, and the rest mulattoes, with a small number of whites. They were very poorly clad, many without s.h.i.+rts or shoes, but every man had his gun and a belt full of ammunition."

B.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM A SOLDIER OF THE 10TH CAVALRY, TROOP B, CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF LAS GUASIMAS:

"... The platoon which escaped this ditch got on the right of the 1st Cavalry on the firing line, and pushed steadily forward under First Sergeant Buck, being then in two squads--one under Sergeant Thompson. On account of the nature of the ground and other natural obstacles, there were men not connected with any squads, but who advanced with the line.

Both squads fired by volley and at will, at the command of the sergeants named; and their shots reached the enemy and were effective, as it is generally believed.

Private W.M. Bunn, of Sergeant Thompson's squad, is reported to have shot a sharpshooter from a tree just in front of the enemy's work. Private Wheeler was shot twice in the advance.

Sergeant Thompson's squad was once stopped from firing by General Wheeler's adjutant-general for fear of hitting the Rough Riders.

It seems that two distinct battles were fought that day.

Colonel Wood's command struck the enemy at about the tame time, or probably a Little before, ours did, and all unknown to the men in our ranks; and got themselves into a pretty tight squeeze. About the same time our force engaged the enemy and drew part of the attention they were giving the Rough Riders. This, the latter claimed, enabled them to continue the movement on the enemy's works.

But as our command had an equal number of 1st and 10th Cavalrymen, I am of the opinion that the story of our saving the Rough Riders arose from the fact that as soon as the fight was over, the 1st Regular Cavalry was opening its arms to us, declaring that we, especially B Troop, had saved them; for the 1st Regular Cavalry was first in the attack in General Young's command; and when the enemy began to make it pretty warm, he ordered B and I Troops of the 10th forward on the right. Troop B was in the lead; and the alacrity with which these two troops moved to the front has always been praised by the 1st Cavalry; and they declare that that movement helped them wonderfully. In making this movement my troop had three or four men wounded; and later, when Sergeant Thompson's squad was fighting far to the front, it had in it several members of the 1st Cavalry, who are always glad to praise him.

So, I think that by the Rough Riders first attributing their success, or their rescue from inevitable defeat, to the attack made by our command; and by the 1st Regular Cavalry's very generously, in the heat of success, bestowing upon us the honors of the day, it finally became a settled thing that we saved the whole battle.

That evening, after the battle, I was met by Lieutenant s.h.i.+pp, later killed at San Juan Hill, who, on inquiring and being told that I belonged to Troop B, congratulated me on its conduct, and said it had made a name for the regiment.

Lieutenant s.h.i.+pp was not in that fight, but had come up after it was over and had heard of us through the 1st Cavalry."

C.

Sergeant John Buck was born September 10th, 1861, at Chapel Hill, Texas; enlisted in 10th Cavalry, November 6, 1880, and pa.s.sed over ten years in active Indian service. He is a man of strong character, an experienced horseman and packer, and so commanded a portion of the firing line in the battle of June 24 as to elicit remarks of praise from officers of other troops "for his gallantry, coolness and good judgment under fire." Sergeant Thompson's good conduct in the same battle was noticeable also. Sergeant Buck was made second lieutenant in the 7th U.S. Volunteer Infantry and subsequently captain in the 48th United States Volunteers.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] See Note A at the end of this chapter.

[16] THE TWENTY-FIFTH AT EL-CANEY.

American valor never shone with greater l.u.s.ter than when the Twenty-fifth Infantry swept up the sizzling hill of El-Caney to the rescue of the rough riders. Two other regiments came into view of the rough riders. But the bullets were flying like driving hail; the enemy were in trees and ambushes with smokeless powder, and the rough riders were biting the dust and were threatened with annihilation.

A rough rider described the feelings of his brigade when they saw the other regiments appear and retreat. Finally this rough rider, a Southerner, heard a well-known yell. And out of the distance moved a regiment as if on dress parade, faces set like steel, keeping step like a machine, their comrades falling here, there, everywhere, moving into the storm of invisible death without one faltering step, pa.s.sing the rough riders, conquering up the hill, and never stopping until with the rough riders El-Caney was won. This was the Twenty-fifth Regiment (colored), United States Infantry, now quartered at Fort Logan, Denver. We have asked the chaplain, T.G. Steward, to recite the events at El-Caney. His modesty confines him to the barest recital of "semi-official" records. But the charge of the Twenty-fifth is deserving of comparison with that of "the Light Brigade" in the Crimean War, or of Custer at the ma.s.sacre of the Big Horn.

(Editorial in religious paper.)

[17] See Note C at the end of this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.

The Capture of the Stone Fort by the Twenty-fifth Infantry.

While the battle of Guasimas was going on, in which the Tenth Cavalry took so conspicuous a part, the Twenty-fourth Infantry still remained on board the City of Was.h.i.+ngton awaiting orders to land. During the night of the 24th such orders were received by the authorities of the transport, and they were directed to land their troops, but the General Commanding, Brigadier-General Kent, did not hear of the matter until some time the next morning. He relates the following circ.u.mstances in his official report of the debarkation:

"At 9 a.m. of the 25th Lieutenant Cardin, of the Revenue Marine, came aboard with orders for me to proceed to and disembark at Altares (Siboney). This officer also handed me a letter from the corps commander expressing his astonishment that I had remained away three days."

General Kent also states in his report that his travel rations had been exhausted seven days before and that but one meal of field rations remained, and that the s.h.i.+p's supply both of water and provisions was running low, and that in consequence of these facts as well as for higher considerations he was very anxious to get on sh.o.r.e.

The debarkation followed as rapidly as possible, and that afternoon General Kent reported in person to Major-General Wheeler, the troops bivouacking for the night near the landing. The next day Colonel Pearson, who commanded the Second Brigade of Kent's division, took the Second Infantry and reconnoitred along the railroad toward the Morro, going a distance of about six miles and returning in the evening, having found no enemy in that vicinity, although evidences were found that a force had recently retreated from a blockhouse situated on the railroad about two miles from Aguadores.

On the day following, June 27th, the entire division moved out on the road toward Santiago and encamped on the same ground that Lawton had occupied the night previous. The Second Brigade took its place near Savilla, while the Third Brigade, which included the Twenty-fourth Infantry, went into camp at Las Guasimas, where the affair of the 24th had occurred. The order of march had now partially fallen back to the original plan: Lawton in advance, with whom was the Twenty-Fifth Infantry; Wheeler next, with whom was the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, and Kent in the rear, who had, as we have just related, the Twenty-fourth Infantry in his Third Brigade. In this order the army moved, so far as it moved at all, until the morning of the 30th, when dispositions for the general attack began.

The story of the great battle, or as it turned out, of the two great battles, begins on this day, and the careers of the four colored regiments are to be followed through the divisions of Lawton, Kent and Wheeler. Let us begin, however, with General Shafter's official report and his "Story of Santiago," as told in the "Century" of February, 1899.

From these sources it is learned that on June 30th General Shafter reconnoitered the country about Santiago and determined upon a plan of attack. Ascending a hill from which he could obtain a good view of the city, and could also see San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney, he observed afresh what had impressed itself upon all immediately upon landing, to wit: That in all this country there were no good roads along which to move troops or transport supplies. The General says: "I had never seen a good road in a Spanish country, and Santiago did not disappoint my expectations." The roads as he saw them from the summit of the hill on June 30th were very poor, and indeed, little better than bridle paths, except between El Caney and San Juan River and the city. Within this region, a distance of from four to four and a half miles, the roads were pa.s.sable. El Caney lay about four miles northeast of Santiago, and was strongly fortified, and, as events proved, strongly garrisoned. This position was of great importance to the enemy, because from it a force might come to attack the right flank and rear of the American Army as it should make its attempt on San Juan Hill. El Caney held the road from Guantanamo, at which point an important Spanish force was posted. While General Shafter was surveying the country from the hill at El Pozo and making what special examination he could of the country toward San Juan Hills, Generals Lawton and Chaffee were making a reconnoisance around El Caney. From General Lawton's report it would appear that the work of reconnoitering around El Caney was done chiefly by General Chaffee. He says: "To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and intelligent reconnoissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior to the battle and the submission of a plan of attack which was adopted. I consider General Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers in the army and recommend him for special distinction for successfully charging the stone fort mentioned in this report, the capture of which practically closed the battle."

The general plan of attack as explained by General Shafter himself in his "Century" article was "to put a brigade on the road between Santiago and El Caney, to keep the Spaniards at the latter place from retreating on the city, and then with the rest of Lawton's division and the divisions of Wheeler and Kent, and Bates' brigade to attack the Spanish position in front of Santiago." Before that he had said that he wished to put a division in on the right of El Caney and a.s.sault the town on that road. To Admiral Sampson on June 26th he said: "I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city, making my main attack from the northeast and east." His desire at this time was to "get the enemy in my front and the city at my back." On June 30th he had modified this plan so as to decide to place one brigade on the road between El Caney and Santiago, with a view merely to keeping the El Caney garrison from retreating into Santiago.

As he was explaining his plan to the division officers and others on the afternoon of the 30th at his own headquarters, Lawton and Chaffee were of the opinion that they could dispose of the Spaniards at El Caney in two hours time. "Therefore," says the General, "I modified my plan, a.s.signing Lawton's whole division for the attack of El Caney and directed Bates' independent brigade to his support." This last modification of General Shafter's plan was made in deference to the opinion of subordinates, and was based upon observations made especially by General Chaffee.

The force a.s.signed for the reduction of El Caney was to begin its work early in the morning, and by ten or eleven o'clock at the outside it was expected that the task would be accomplished and Lawton would join Kent and Sumner in the a.s.sault upon San Juan. Early on the morning of July 1st Cap.r.o.n's battery was got into position on a line running directly north from Marianage on a hill about five hundred yards east of Las Guasimas Creek. Lawton's division began its move on the afternoon of the 30th, as did in fact the whole army, and bivouacked that night near El Pozo. The Twenty-fifth Infantry, which belonged to the Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Miles, a former Major of the Twenty-fifth, left El Pozo at daylight by way of the road leading almost due north, and marched about one mile to the little town of Marianage. Here a halt was made for an hour, from 6.30 to 7.30, during which time reconnoitering parties were sent out to examine the ground toward the Ducoureau House, which lay about one mile to the northward of Marianage, and which had been designated by General Lawton as a general rendezvous after the engagement should terminate.

Reconnoissance was made also to the front for the purpose of discovering the enemy, and to ascertain the left of Ludlow's brigade.

This was the first brigade of Lawton's division and consisted of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and the Second Ma.s.sachusetts, the last named regiment being on the right. The Second Brigade was to connect with this on its right and succeeded in finding the position of the Second Ma.s.sachusetts during this halt. At 11.30 Miles' brigade was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's brigade, which it did in the following order: The Fourth Infantry on the left, joining with the Second Ma.s.sachusetts on Ludlow's right; the Twenty-fifth on the right, with its left joining on the Fourth Infantry.

We must now review the progress of the battle so far as it is possible to do so, from the firing of the first shot by Cap.r.o.n's battery up to 11.30, an hour long after the time at which it had been supposed that El Caney would fall. Cap.r.o.n's reports are very brief. He says: "July 1--Fired sh.e.l.l and shrappnel into El Caney (ranged 2,400) 6.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m." In another report he says: "Opened fire July 1, with sh.e.l.l and shrappnel at 6.15 on Caney; range, 2,400 yards; continued until 11.30 a.m." He says that the battery "continued its fire against specified objectives intermittently throughout the day under the personal direction of the division commander." The forces we have so far considered, consisting of Ludlow's and Miles' brigades, and of Cap.r.o.n's battery, lay to the south of Caney, between it and Santiago, Ludlow's brigade having been placed there to "cut off the retreat of the garrison should it attempt to escape." Up to 11.30 there had been no call for employing it for that purpose. The garrison had made no attempt to escape. We must now go around to the east and north of Caney. Here the Third Brigade, consisting of the Seventh, Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry, was posted, and early in the morning joined in the attack, the brigade getting under fire before eight o'clock.

Colonel Carpenter, of the Seventh Regiment, says that one company of his regiment, by General Chaffee's direction, was detached and sent forward to reduce a blockhouse, well up on the hill, which commanded the approach of his regiment to the field of action. After several ineffectual attempts by the company, the Captain (Van Orsdale) was directed to abandon the undertaking and rejoin the regiment, which then took up a position on the crest of a hill running nearly parallel with the Spanish lines. From this position the men crawled forward about fifty yards and opened a deliberate fire upon the enemy, keeping it up for about an hour, but as the losses of the regiment at this time were considerable and the fire seemed to be without material effect, the command was withdrawn to its position on the hill where it found protection in a sunken road. In this condition this regiment lay when Cap.r.o.n's battery made its lull at 11.30. The fearful fire this regiment met can be estimated by the losses it sustained, which during the day were as follows: Killed, 1 officer and 33 enlisted men; wounded, 4 officers and 95 enlisted men; missing, 3 enlisted men. The Seventeenth Regiment went into action on the right of the Seventh, doing but little firing, as their orders were not to open fire unless they could make the fire effective. Companies C and G fired a few volleys; the remainder of the regiment did not fire at all. Four enlisted men were killed and two officers severely wounded, one, Lieutenant d.i.c.kinson, dying from his wounds within a few hours.

Several enlisted men were also wounded. At 11.30 this regiment was lying on the right of the Seventh. The Twelfth Regiment began firing between 6 and 7 in the morning and advanced to take its position on the left of the Seventh Infantry. This regiment early reached a position within 350 yards of the enemy, in which it found shelter in the sunken road, "free from the enemy's fire." The regiment remained in this position until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and, hence, was there at 11.30 a.m. The losses of this regiment during the day were, killed, 7 enlisted men; wounded, 2 officers and 31 enlisted men.

From these brief sketches the reader will now be able to grasp the position of Lawton's entire division. Beginning on the south, from the west, with Ludlow's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second, Eighth and Second Ma.s.sachusetts, the line was continued by Miles' brigade of the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry; then pa.s.sing over a considerable s.p.a.ce, we strike Chaffee's brigade, posted as has just been described.

General Bates' brigade probably arrived upon the field about noon.

This brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and is known as "Bates' Independent Brigade." The brigade is reported as going into action about 1 o'clock and continuing in action until 4 o'clock. It took a position on the right, partially filling up the gap between Miles and Chaffee. The first battalion of the Twentieth Infantry went into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's firing line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the charge by which the stone house was taken. Between 11.30, when Cap.r.o.n's firing stopped, and when Miles' brigade was moved forward to join the right of Ludlow's, and 12.20, when the battery recommenced, the troops, including Bates' brigade, were either in the positions described above or were moving to them. Noon had arrived and El Caney is not taken; the garrison has not attempted to escape, but is sending out upon its a.s.sailants a continuous and deadly fire. "Throughout the heaviest din of our fire," says Colonel Carpenter, "could be heard the peculiar high-keyed ring of the defiant enemy's shots."

Twelve o'clock on July 1st, 1898, was a most anxious hour for our army in Cuba. The battle at El Caney was at a standstill and the divisions of Kent and Sumner were in a most perilous situation. Bonsal's description of the state of the battle at that time is pathetic.

Speaking of the artillery at El Caney--Cap.r.o.n's battery--he says it was now apparent that this artillery, firing from its position of twenty-four hundred yards, could do very little damage to the great stone fort and earthworks north of the village. The shots were too few and the metal used too light to be effectual. Three hours of the morning had worn away and the advance of our men had been slowly made and at great cost; all the approaches were commanded by Spanish entrenchments and the fighting was very unequal. A soldier of the Twenty-fifth says that when he came in sight of the battle at El Caney, "the Americans were gaining no ground, and the flashes of the Spanish mausers told us that the forces engaged were unequally matched, the difference of position favoring the Spaniards." This view was had about noon, or soon after. At that time "a succession of aides and staff officers came galloping from headquarters with messages which plainly showed that confusion, if not disaster, had befallen the two divisions which, by the heavy firing, we had learned to our great surprise, had become warmly engaged in the centre. The orders to General Lawton from headquarters were at first peremptory in character--he was to pull out of his fight and to move his division to the support of the centre" (Bonsal). This call for Lawton arose from the fact that about noon General Shafter received several dispatches from Sumner, of the Cavalry Division, requiring a.s.sistance. General Sumner felt the need of the a.s.sistance of every available man in the centre of the line where he was carrying on his fight with the Spaniards on Blue House Hill. This situation so impressed the General, Shafter, that he finally wrote to Lawton, "You must proceed with the remainder of your force and join on immediately upon Sumner's right.

If you do not the battle is lost." Shafter's idea then was to fall back to his original plan of just leaving enough troops at El Caney to prevent the garrison from going to the a.s.sistance of any other part of the line. Shafter himself says: "As the fight progressed I was impressed with the fact that we were meeting with a very stubborn resistance at El Caney and I began to fear that I had made a mistake in making two fights in one day, and sent Major n.o.ble with orders to Lawton to hasten with his troops along the Caney road, placing himself on the right of Wheeler" (Sumner). Lawton now made a general advance, and it is important to see just what troops did advance. The Seventh Infantry did not move, for Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter says that after withdrawing "to the partial cover furnished by the road, the regiment occupied this position from 8 o'clock a.m. until about 4.30 p.m." The Seventeenth did not move, for Captain O'Brien, commanding, says the regiment took a position joining "its left with the right of the Seventh Infantry" and that the regiment "remained in this position until the battle was over." The Twelfth Infantry remained in its shelter within 350 yards of the stone fort until about 4 p.m. Then we have Chaffee's brigade on the north of the fort remaining stationary and by their own reports doing but little firing. The Seventeenth fired "for about fifty minutes" about noon, with remarkable precision, but "it seemingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire delivered in our (their) front." The Seventh did not fire to any extent. The Twelfth Infantry lay in its refuge "free from the enemy's fire" and may have kept up an irregular fire.

About this time Bates' brigade entered the field and one battalion of the Twentieth Infantry is reported to have joined the left of the firing line of the Twenty-fifth. General Ludlow says there was a lull from 12 to 1 p.m., "when the action again became violent, and at 3 p.m. the Third Brigade captured the stone fort with a rush and hoisted the American flag." From Ludlow's brigade, Captain Van Horne, commanding the Twenty-second Infantry, after the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, says that the First Battalion of his regiment took a position about 800 yards from the town and kept up firing until the place surrendered. He does not say positively that the firing was upon the town, but he had said just before that the Second Battalion slowly moved forward, firing into the town from the left, so that we may readily conclude from the context as well as from the position that the First Battalion fired into the town also. Hence it seems fair to exclude from the fort all of Ludlow's brigade, and it is observable that Ludlow himself claims no part in the capture of that stronghold.