Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez Volume I Part 38

At break of day I found myself attacked by four of the enemy's squadron,--three s.h.i.+ps and a frigate,--which had pursued the same course. Though totally disabled, and the crew fatigued, having had no rest for three days, we returned their fire with courage: the frigate attacked us first, but a few shots well directed from our stern-guns made her abandon her object. The s.h.i.+p which followed, approached us, and kept up a brisk fire. We manoeuvred to get into a better position; I ran close to her until we were yard-arm and yard-arm, and maintained a terrible and well-supported fire: after being engaged an hour and a half, she was completely dismasted, making water in every part. The frigate which had attacked me astern, came immediately to her a.s.sistance; the other two vessels finding it necessary to sheer off after receiving some broadsides, not without damage, joined the frigate, and hoisted out all their boats to save the crew of the other vessel, and to take her in tow. They resigned to me the field of battle, and retired.

I expected, however, another combat. We were determined to make the most vigorous defence; but, as the enemy retired, and as I found myself in such a situation as to be unable to pursue them, I resolved to proceed to Cadiz, where I arrived at two in the afternoon.

I shall not attempt to give you any account of particular instances of bravery. The two staffs, the crew, and the troops who were pa.s.sengers, vied with each other,--covering themselves with glory; for, besides the n.o.ble combat of the 6th, this proves that the valour which animated the brave men I have the honour to command, was carried to a degree which it is difficult to describe. Government will, no doubt, take the earliest opportunity of rewarding so much courage, and so great a devotion to restore the glory of the French navy. It would be just, also, to indemnify them for the losses they have sustained; their effects having been cut to pieces and absolutely destroyed.

I have now, Citizen General, to communicate to you a very fatal relation.--In the battle of this night, two of the s.h.i.+ps which fired upon me, took fire and blew up. I supposed them to be English, presuming that the fire had been occasioned by the furnaces they had on board for heating their shot; but, on entering the harbour of Cadiz, I was a.s.sured they were Spanish.

The darkness had led them into a mistake, which I had justly dreaded. They fired on each other, and on my vessel, at the moment when I formed the prudent resolution of avoiding a combat in which I could not distinguish the enemy. The names of these two vessels are the San Carlos and the Hermenegildo.

In the combat so severe as that of this morning, and against so unequal a force, I am happy in having to regret only twenty men killed, or severely wounded.

Accept, Citizen General, a.s.surances of my zeal and most respectful devotion.

TROUDE.

Letter from Rear-admiral Linois to the Minister of the Marine, giving an account of the action:

CITIZEN MINISTER,

On the 9th of July a Spanish division, consisting of six sail of the line and three frigates, arrived at Algeziras from Cadiz, under command of his Excellency Lieutenant-general Moreno, in order to raise the blockade of four sail of the line and one frigate, which were under my orders, and to favour their escape to Cadiz. That officer accordingly gave me every a.s.sistance in his power in order to put my s.h.i.+ps in a condition to put to sea, and to tow them out, in order to enable them to set sail. Our labour was continued day and night. General Moreno made his squadron anchor in a line N.E. and S.W. On the 12th, there was a tolerable fresh east wind, and it was determined to set sail at one o'clock in the afternoon, on account of the tide. The signal being given at that hour, the fleet set sail, the Spanish squadron being to windward of ours. The frigate L'Indienne towed the Hannibal, which we were sorry to perceive made very little way.

The calm which we experienced under Gibraltar necessarily deranged the regularity of our order; while the enemy, having a brisk gale at east, sailed from Gibraltar with five sail of the line, a frigate, a brig, and a Portuguese frigate, and formed the order of battle. As soon as the English Admiral had pa.s.sed Europa Point, he made a signal, and immediately we saw to windward six sail, of which two had three masts. I was then with M. de Moreno on board the Sabina frigate. At sunset, the two last s.h.i.+ps of our line doubled the Cape Carnero. Three only remained, with the Hannibal, which was under jury-masts, and which consequently could not carry much sail.

Night was coming on, and it was necessary to return to our anchorage, which afforded the enemy an opportunity of attacking us before we took a position. At all events every delay was dangerous, for the reinforcements which the enemy expected might arrive every moment. The breeze from the east becoming stronger, we were a.s.sured of the wind during the night. We determined to send the Hannibal back to Algeziras, and to pa.s.s the Strait with the combined squadron. We then manoeuvred so as to facilitate the rallying of two of our vessels, which had fallen into the rear in consequence of the calm. The three French vessels, which sailed better than could have been expected, were in the van; and in that order it was proposed to pa.s.s the Strait.

At eight, the enemy showed a disposition to attack us. At nine we heard the reports of three cannon, and at the same time we saw fires at a considerable distance behind us. We presumed it might be some of the enemy's vessels making signals of their arrival. We congratulated ourselves upon seeing our squadrons so well collected together, and sailing so well, which made us confident that the plan of the enemy would not succeed.

At half-past eleven the wind was considerably increased. The night was very dark, and we heard a smart cannonade in the E.N.E.; and, soon after, we saw a conflagration, which made us apprehend that some of our vessels, in firing their stern guns, had taken fire, in consequence of the force of the wind. We thought also that they might be fire-s.h.i.+ps of the enemy. We put about for a moment; but the vessel on fire approaching us, we continued our way, having constantly a light at our main-top-mast head, as a signal for rallying.

It could no longer be doubted that the enemy had pa.s.sed the Strait, and had got into our wake. The cannonade became pretty general, but the wind was too strong to continue the action. We received several shots on board the frigate, which killed one man and wounded five. Several b.a.l.l.s pa.s.sed through our sails. We took down the signal we had at our mast-head, for fear the enemy would fall upon us. It was afterwards hoisted, in order to collect our s.h.i.+ps. We made sail, directing our course to the W.N.W., not choosing to go more before the wind, lest the wind, which was very strong, would carry away our masts. We pa.s.sed the night in the greatest disquietude, not knowing whether the vessels which were in sight were not enemies. At length the day dissipated part of our fears, and we found ourselves in the midst of our fleet, with the exception of the two s.h.i.+ps of three decks, viz. the Hermenegildo and Real Carlos, and the Formidable and the St. Antoine. The wind having fallen calm, it became impossible to go in search of the vessels which had separated.

We were then six leagues west of Cadiz.

At half-past four the Dessaix made a signal that she had sprung a leak, and that the water gained upon her thirty inches an hour. She demanded a.s.sistance, which was granted. At five o'clock we heard an action in the east, and perceived a smoke.

The wind being then from the S.E., we made the signal for the line of battle to be formed as quickly as possible, without regard to places, in order to a.s.sist the vessel that was engaged. At half-past six the action ceased, and a most perfect calm succeeded. At eleven, the wind rising again, we perceived four vessels at a considerable distance from one another. We flattered ourselves at first that they were our s.h.i.+ps, but we soon found by their manoeuvres that they were enemies. We also distinguished the Formidable close under the land, making the best of her way to Cadiz. We stood for the port, from which a felucca brought me a letter from the captain of the Formidable, which had been anch.o.r.ed in the Road of Cadiz, stating that in the morning he had engaged two s.h.i.+ps of the line and a frigate, and that one of the s.h.i.+ps of the line had been completely dismasted, and had been towed away by a frigate. We then anch.o.r.ed in Cadiz.

I must acknowledge the consummate experience and talents of General Moreno, as well as the zeal and care which he displayed for the success of his mission. If separations have taken place, they must be attributed to the darkness of the night, and the necessity which there was of getting away from the vessels that were on fire. That officer, on hearing at Cadiz of the destruction of two s.h.i.+ps of his squadron, Hermenegildo and Real-Carlos, was justly struck with grief on the occasion. He had, by his wise instructions, provided against almost every possible case. I have since been informed that the two Spanish vessels which were destroyed, cannonaded and run foul of one another, each supposing the other to be an enemy. We are uncertain about the fate of the St. Antoine. The violence of the wind made it extremely dangerous to fire to windward.

Rear-admiral LINOIS.

Dated in Cadiz Harbour, 15th July 1801, on board the Formidable.

Admiral Moreno's orders to his fleet on the 11th July 1801:

Orders of sailing to be observed by the s.h.i.+ps in my charge on their pa.s.sage through the Straits of Gibraltar.

The three s.h.i.+ps under the command of Rear-admiral Linois will form the vanguard, with the line abreast; the six s.h.i.+ps under my charge will form astern of these, likewise formed in a line abreast, endeavouring, as much as possible, to keep opposite to the intervals of the French s.h.i.+ps, so as not to impede their fire, according to the following disposition:

Hannibal.

Indomptable. Formidable. Dessaix.

Augus- Ar- R. Herme- St. St. Fer- tin. ganauta. Carlos. negildo. Antonio. nando.

In case the enemy should attempt to follow and attack the combined squadron in the rear, besides the continual fire which we ought to make from the stern chasers, chiefly with a view to destroy the enemy's rigging, the squadron will form the line ahead, either with their heads to the Spanish coast, or to that of Africa, as will be determined by signal from the Admiral; and, in order that this might be more simple, in that case, he will only show the signal for the course, at the entire lowering of which the movements must be made. As their situation, from their local position, cannot be of long duration, consequently either by hailing (if near enough) or by signal to preserve the course, the squadron will proceed again to form the line abreast as formerly. It is of the utmost importance that the fire from none of the s.h.i.+ps should interfere, or be embarra.s.sed with that of others in this squadron, nor leave the three French s.h.i.+ps in the rear.

As soon as the French s.h.i.+ps get under sail, all those in my charge will do the same, following the track of each other, always observing to keep at a short distance from the French, till we weather the Point of Carnero, in order that if the enemy should get under sail, and find themselves in a situation to offer battle to our squadron before it is formed in the Straits with the line abreast as above directed, we may engage them with advantage; consequently, the least inattention or delay may produce the most unfortunate consequences.

I think the captains of the s.h.i.+ps I have the honour to command are fully persuaded of this truth, and therefore I depend upon its efficacy; and I flatter myself that they are convinced everything will be performed on my part which can be inspired by my wish to add to the glory of his Majesty's arms, that of our corps in particular, and the nation in general.

Line of battle in natural order.

_2nd Squadron._ _1st Squadron._ _3rd Squadron._ St. Ferdinand, Formidable, Argonauta, St. Antonio, R. Carlos, Dessaix, Hermenegildo. Indomptable. St. Augustin.

Fr. frigate Sabina, Vautour.

A red pendant, under any other signal, signifies it is directed to the French s.h.i.+ps only.

To those conversant in naval affairs, it must appear manifest that the disposition made by Admirals Moreno and Linois was one of the worst that could be devised. It was scarcely possible that nine s.h.i.+ps, which had never sailed in company with each other, could maintain, for any length of time, a line abreast before the wind so exactly as to be able to form in a line ahead when required, especially in a dark night with a strong breeze; and it must be evident that any s.h.i.+p which advanced at all ahead of the others could never get into the line of battle when the signal was made to form it on either tack. Moreno seems to have been fully aware of the probability of the s.h.i.+ps firing into each other, yet he made arrangements of all others the least likely to prevent it. Had he formed into two lines ahead, with the disabled s.h.i.+ps in advance, he would have obviated the risk of firing into each other, while the one division, by shortening sail, might have given timely a.s.sistance to the other which had been attacked.

Nothing can equal the scene of horror which the sudden conflagration produced in these two s.h.i.+ps. The collision in which the fore-top-mast of the Hermenegildo fell on board of the Real Carlos, added to the general dismay; and the agonising screams of the unhappy crews, deserted by their countrymen and allies in that dreadful hour, could not fail to pierce the hearts of the brave conquerors; but to render them any a.s.sistance while the hostile flag was flying was impossible. The duty of the Admiral was to "sink, burn, and destroy." Seven sail of the enemy's line were still flying from half their force, and he was obliged to leave the burning s.h.i.+ps to their fate, and pursue his enemy until his destruction was complete.

The capture of the Hannibal, in which the Spaniards had so distinguished a share, induced a number of the young men of family to embark in the two Spanish three-deckers, in order to convey their trophy to Cadiz, never supposing that the half-demolished British squadron would dare to approach so formidable and so superior a force. This fatal event, while it plunged into distress the whole city of Cadiz, could not fail to create a sensation strongly unfavourable to their new republican allies as the originators of their misery.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.