Modern Economic Problems Part 9

[Footnote 12: Payment of interest on credit balances reduces the motive to withdraw for investment elsewhere any such excess, and mingles in the depositor's thought monetary and investment motives.]

[Footnote 13: In the United States in 1914 there were individual deposits reported in banks other than savings banks to the amount of about $13,400,000,000

In national banks .................................. $6,000,000,000

In state banks ..................................... 3,250,000,000

In loan and trust companies .......................... 4,000,000,000

In private banks ..................................... 150,000,000

Nearly all these were doubtless demand deposits (what proportion were time deposits we have no data for determining), and were available as immediate purchasing power for the depositors. The total money (other than bank notes) in the commercial banks of the country was hardly 11 per cent of this amount. In that year the total amount of money of all kinds in circulation (and in banks) in the United States (outside the Treasury), including gold and silver and certificates represented by bullion in the treasury, United States notes of all kinds, and national bank notes, was about one fourth of the amount of these individual deposits in commercial banks. This may suggest the enormous influence that banking has in determining the average efficiency of the circulating medium of the country.]

[Footnote 14: See above, sec. 3.]

CHAPTER 8

BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1914

-- 1. The First and Second Banks of the United States. -- 2. Banking from 1836 to 1863. -- 3. National Banking a.s.sociations, 1863-1913.

-- 4. Defects of our banking organization before 1913. -- 5. Lack of system. -- 6. Inelasticity of credit. -- 7. Periodical local congestion of funds. -- 8. Unequal territorial distribution of banking facilities.

-- 9. Lack of provision for foreign financial operations. -- 10. The "Aldrich plan."

-- 1. #The First and Second banks of the United States.#

A knowledge of the history of banking is helpful to an understanding of the present banking system in our country. The form of our present banking system has been affected by various economic and political events which will be sketched here in broad outline to give a background for our present study.

Alexander Hamilton, the great first Secretary of the Treasury in Was.h.i.+ngton's cabinet, advocated the charter of a central national bank as one portion of his larger plan of national financiering. His purpose was realized in the chartering, in 1791, of the First Bank of the United States, for a period of twenty years. The capital for this inst.i.tution was in small part subscribed by the government, but mostly by private capitalists. The management of the bank was left almost entirely in private hands. The central bank established branches in many parts of the country, issued bank notes which circulated everywhere without depreciation, acted as the governmental depository of funds and as governmental agency in various ways. It seems to have been successful and useful as a banking inst.i.tution until the expiration of its charter in 1811, but it was touched by the contemporary controversies over state rights and was from the first opposed by those who feared the growth of a strong central government.

This opposition prevented the extension of its charter.

In 1816, however, after only a moderate discussion, the Second Bank of the United States was chartered for a period of twenty years. This also, in its purely banking aspects, seems to have been distinctly successful, conducting numerous branches in various parts of the country, maintaining at all times the parity of its notes, facilitating domestic exchange throughout the country, and enjoying unquestioned credit and solvency. However, this bank became, even in a greater degree than did the First Bank, the creature of political rivalries. In the period of rising democratic sentiment typified and led by Andrew Jackson, the bank came to be looked upon as the embodiment, or the stronghold, of plutocratic interests, and Congress permitted its charter to expire by limitation in 1836, near the close of Jackson's administration.

-- 2. #Banking from 1836 to 1863#. The Federal Government, which up to that time had deposited its funds in the central bank and its branches and in local state banks, established the "independent treasury," in 1840 (abolished in 1841 and re-established in 1846). By this plan the government kept its money of all kinds in various depositories (or sub-treasuries) in charge of public officials. While from 1792 to 1836 almost continuously a central banking system was in operation, other banks, organized under state charters, were steadily increasing in number. They received deposits, issued bank notes under state laws, and cared for local commercial needs. The abolition of the central national bank in 1836 left to the various state banks for twenty seven years all the banking functions of the country. The banks of some states (notably those of New England and New York), under careful regulation and held to strict standards by public sentiment, for the most part maintained a high credit; but many banks, under lax laws and regulations, were guilty of great abuses of credit and of downright dishonest practices. The evils were more especially evident in connection with excessive issues of bank notes.

-- 3. #National Banking a.s.sociations, 1863-1913#. The next step in federal legislation was taken in 1863 in the midst of the Civil War by chartering local "national banking a.s.sociations." The purpose was in part to provide banks under national charters for banking purposes (both of deposit and of issue), and in part it was to make a wider market for United States bonds at a time when government credit was at low ebb. The plan adopted followed the experience of New York state (1829 on) with a system of bond-secured bank notes. Congress provided that every bank taking out a national charter must purchase bonds of the United States and deposit them with the treasurer of the United States, in return for which it would receive bank notes to the amount of 90 per cent of the denomination or of the market value of the bonds.[1] Bank notes issued on this plan, being secured by the bonds, rest ultimately on the credit of the government, not on the credit of the bank. They are not promptly sent back for redemption to the banks issuing them, as should be done if they were typical bank notes. They may circulate thousands of miles away from the bank that issued them, and for years after the bank has gone out of business. They are not an "elastic currency," increasing or diminis.h.i.+ng with the needs of business. The changes in their amount depend upon the chance of the banks to make more or less in this way than by any other use of their capital, and this in turn depends largely on the price of bonds and on the rate of interest they bear. From 1864 to 1870, fortunes were made from this source, but thereafter banks could make little more from note issues than they could by investing the same amount in other ways. Many banks for a long period did not avail themselves in the least of their privilege of issue. The notes were subject to a tax.[2]

A national bank (as the law now stands) may be organized, with $25,000 capital in towns not exceeding three thousand population, with $50,000 in towns not exceeding six thousand, with $100,000 in cities not exceeding fifty thousand, and with $200,000 in large cities. Three cities, New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, have long been designated as central reserve cities, and some 47 other cities as reserve cities, in which the reserves of banks were required to bear a considerably larger proportion to their deposits than in other cities.[3] Other banks might count as part of their legal reserves their deposits in reserve city banks, up to a certain proportion. The national banks in the larger cities thus became the great capital reservoirs of cash for the whole country.

National banks have been subject to stricter inspection than have been the banks in most of the states, a fact which has strengthened public confidence in their stability. Except in this and the other respects above mentioned, a national charter offered few, if any, attractions to small banks, a majority of which have found it more advantageous to operate under state charters because of less stringent regulations as to amount of capital, reserves, and supervision.

-- 4. #Defects of our banking organization before 1913#. Taken altogether, the banks in the United States since 1868 have represented great banking power and very efficient service for the community in times of normal business. But in several respects it long ago became evident that our banks were operating less satisfactorily than those of several other countries. American banking organization had failed to keep pace with the increasing magnitude and difficulty of its task. Especially at the recurring periods of financial stress, such as occurred in 1893, 1903, and 1907, our banking machinery showed itself to be wofully unequal to the strain put upon it. Financial panics were more acute here than in any other land, and the evil clearly was traceable in large part to defects in the banking situation. In academic teaching and in public conferences of bankers, business men, publicists, and students, the subject was continually discussed after 1890. At length Congress in 1908 created a "National Monetary Commission" to inquire into and report what changes were necessary and desirable in the monetary system of the United States or in the laws relative to banking and currency. After the most extended inquiry and discussion that the subject had ever received, the commission submitted its report in January, 1912. The defects to be remedied, as enumerated in the report,[4] may be reduced to the following five headings: (a) Lack of system, (b) Inelasticity of credit, (c) Periodic local congestion of funds. (d) Unequal territorial distribution of banking facilities. (e) Lack of provision for foreign banking.

-- 5. #Lack of system#. Only in a loose sense could the banks of the United States be said (before 1914) to const.i.tute a system at all.

Both national and state laws dealt with individual banks only. It was not legal for a bank to establish branches in another city as is done in most countries. The several national banks in one city were legally quite separate. It was only by voluntary agreement that in some of the larger cities they came together into clearing-house a.s.sociations.

They made possible some measure of cooperation which, small as it was, proved at times of stress to be of much service within a limited sphere for the local communities. But even with the aid of these organizations the banks were unable in times of emergency to avoid the suspension of cash payments.

There was no provision whatever for the concentration of bank revenues so that each bank would be supported by the strength of the other banks, if a movement began to withdraw deposits in unusual amounts.

Each bank then was compelled for self-protection to call for any sums it had deposited with other banks,[5] and to keep for its own use all the reserves it might have in excess of its own immediate needs. This threw a great strain upon the banks in the reserve cities, which in normal times had become the depositories of a good part of the reserves of the banks in other places. Thus developed a spirit of panic, like the fright of theater-goers crowding toward the door at the cry of fire.

The maintenance of the government's independent treasury contributed to the difficulties by causing the irregular withdrawal of money from circulation and thus depleting bank reserves in periods of excessive government revenues and by returning these funds into circulation only in periods of deficient revenues. Efforts to modify this system by a partial distribution of the public moneys among national banks had resulted, it was charged, in discrimination and favoritism in the treatment of different banks and of different sections of the country.

-- 6. #Inelasticity of credit#. Our banks, considered both separately and collectively, were unable to increase their loaning powers quickly and easily to respond to business needs. The need of greater elasticity of credit was felt in the more or less regular seasonal variations within the year, and in the more irregular variations in cycles of years from periods of prosperity to those of panic and depression in business. The inelasticity was necessitated by illogical federal and state laws restricting absolutely the further extension of credit when the reserves fell below the percentage of deposits (15 or 25 per cent) fixed by law. Reserves thus could not legally be used to meet demands for cash payments at the very time when most needed.

This feature has been likened to the rule of the liveryman who always refused to allow the last horse to leave his stable so that he would never be without a horse when a customer called for one. The refusal of credit by the banks at such times when they still had large amounts of cash in their vaults increased the need and eagerness of the public to draw from the bank all the cash they could, and often precipitated the insolvency of the banks. Clearly some means were needed to enable the loaning power of the individual banks to be increased at such times, so that no customer with good commercial paper need fear to be refused a loan, even tho the rate of interest might have to be somewhat higher for a few days or weeks than the normal rate.

Our bond-secured bank notes lacked almost entirely the quality of elasticity needed to meet these changing business needs.[6] Their value being dependent primarily upon the amount and price of United States bonds, they might be most numerous just when least needed as a part of our circulating medium.

-- 7. #Periodical local congestion of funds#. In times of general confidence each bank finds it profitable, and is tempted, to extend its credit to the extreme limit permitted by the law governing the proportion of reserves to deposits. Of the 15 per cent reserves required in most banks, three-fifths (9 per cent) might be kept in banks in reserve cities, and of the 25 per cent in reserve city banks, 12-1/2 per cent might be kept in central reserve cities, where it counted as part of the depositing banks' legal reserves, was a fund upon which domestic exchanges could be drawn, and usually earned a small rate of interest (usually 2 per cent). Very large reserves were kept in New York city where they could be loaned "on call," and the largest use for call loans was in stock-exchange speculation. Thus every period of prosperity encouraged an unhealthy distribution of reserves, gave an unhealthy stimulus to rising prices, and "promoted dangerous speculation."

-- 8. #Unequal territorial distribution of banking facilities.# Another aspect of this concentration of surplus money and available funds in the larger cities was the comparatively ample provision of banking facilities in the cities and in the manufacturing sections, and imperfect provision in the agricultural districts. The whole financial system seemed designed to induce the poorer country districts to lend funds at low rates of interest to be used speculatively in cities, instead of enabling the richer districts, the cities, to lend to the rural districts for productive enterprise. The rates of bank discount in different sections of our country have long been most unequal--lowest in the largest cities, and highest in the rural South and West--whereas in all parts of Canada, with a different system of banking, the rates have long been much more approximately uniform.

Indeed, our national banking development has been predominantly urban and commercial to the neglect of rural and agricultural interests.

National banks were (until 1913) forbidden to make loans on real estate, and this greatly "restricted their power to serve farmers and other borrowers in rural communities." There was "no effective agency to meet the ordinary or unusual demands for credit or currency necessary for moving crops or for other legitimate purposes." The lack of uniform standards of regulation, examination, and publication of reports in the different sections prevented the free extension of credit where most needed. Finally, the methods and agencies for making domestic exchange of funds were, compared with other countries, imperfect and uneconomical even in normal times and could not "prevent disastrous disruption of all such exchanges in times of serious trouble."

-- 9. #Lack of provision for foreign financial operations.# Not without its influence on public opinion was the consideration that we had "no American banking inst.i.tutions in foreign countries." Many bankers and business men felt, as did the commission, that the time had come when the organization of such banks was "necessary for the development of our foreign trade." Foreign banks in South America and the Orient, handling American trade, were believed to favor their own countrymen rather than the interests of American merchants. In contrast with the European nations with their centralized control of banking, we had "no instrumentality that" could "deal effectively with the broad questions which, from an international standpoint, affect the credit and status of the United States as one of the great financial powers of the world. In times of threatened trouble or of actual panic these questions, which involve the course of foreign exchange and the international movements of gold, are even more important to us from a national than from an international standpoint."

-- 10. #The "Aldrich plan."# The National Monetary Commission submitted with its report a plan which was known by the name of the commission's chairman, Senator Aldrich. This plan was embodied in a bill for a National Reserve a.s.sociation, a bank for banks which bore some likeness to the great central banks of Europe. In the many details of the plan an effort has been made to remedy every one of the difficulties above described and to supply all the needs indicated.

The plan was favored pretty generally by bankers, but called forth many adverse opinions. In the year of a presidential election, however, Congress took no action in the matter. All parties were pledged to some kind of banking reform, but particular proposals were not discussed in the campaign.

[Footnote 1: Whichever was the smaller. In 1900 this was changed so that notes could be issued to the full amount of the denomination of the bonds.]

[Footnote 2: In recent years this has been one half of 1 per cent when 2 per cent bonds, and 1 per cent when bonds bearing a higher interest, were deposited.]

[Footnote 3: In reserve cities 25 per cent and in other cities 15 per cent. The details of the regulations in the old law (given in part below, sec. 7) were ll altered by the legislation of 1913.]

[Footnote 4: The expressions within quotation marks in the following sections are taken from this report.]

[Footnote 5: See further on this in sec. 7 on periodical congestion of funds.]

[Footnote 6: See above, sec. 3.]

Chapter 9

THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

-- 1. General banking organization. -- 2. The Federal Reserve Board.

-- 3. Federal reserve banks. -- 4. Federal reserve notes. -- 5. Reserves against Federal reserve notes. -- 6. Reserves against Federal reserve bank deposits. -- 7. Reserves in member banks. -- 8. Rediscount by Federal reserve banks. -- 9. Changes in national banks.

-- 10. Operation of the Act.

-- 1. #General banking organization#. President Wilson and the newly elected Congress with its Democratic majority made banking reform one of the main objects on the program for the special session beginning March 5, 1913. The result was the Gla.s.s-Owen bill, which became law as the Federal Reserve Act December 23 of that year. The bill was actively discussed within and without the halls of Congress, and many of its features were attacked by bankers individually and acting through the bankers' a.s.sociations, at various stages of its progress.