Cottage Economy Part 11

25. Let us now hear the reasons which he gives for this which he pretends to be law. His first reason is, that there would be no security for property, if it were laid open to the necessities of the indigent, of which necessities _no man but the takers themselves could be the judge_.

He talks of a "strange insecurity;" but, upon my word, no insecurity could be half so strange as this a.s.sertion of his own. BLACKSTONE has just the same argument. "n.o.body," says he, "would be a judge of the wants of the taker, but the taker himself;" and BLACKSTONE, copying the very words of HALE, talks of the "strange insecurity" arising from this cause. Now, then, suppose a man to come into my house, and to take away a bit of bacon. Suppose me to pursue him and seize him. He would tell me that he was starving for want of food. I hope that the bare statement would induce me, or any man in the world that I do call or ever have called my friend, to let him go without further inquiry; but, if I chose to push the matter further, there would be _the magistrate_. If he chose to commit the man, would there not be a _jury_ and a _judge_ to receive evidence and to ascertain _whether the extreme necessity existed or not_?

26. Aye, says Judge HALE; but I have another reason, a devilish deal better than this, "and that is, the act of the 43d year of the reign of QUEEN ELIZABETH!" Aye, my old boy, that is a thumping reason! "_Sufficient provision_ is made for the supply of such necessities by _collections for the poor_, and by the _power of the civil magistrate_." Aye, aye! that is the reason; and, Mr. SIR MATTHEW HALE, there is _no other reason_, say what you will about the matter. There stand the overseer and the civil magistrate to take care that such necessities be provided for; and if they did not stand there for that purpose, the law of nature would be revived in behalf of the suffering creature.

27. HALE, not content however with this act of QUEEN ELIZABETH, and still hankering after this hard doctrine, furbishes up a bit of Scripture, and calls Solomon the _wisest of kings_ on account of these two verses which he has taken. HALE observes, indeed, that the Jews did not put thieves to _death_; but, to restore seven-fold was the _ordinary punishment_, inflicted by their law, for theft; and here, says he, we see, that the extreme necessity _gave no exemption_. This was a piece of such flagrant sophistry on the part of HALE, that he could not find in his heart to send it forth to the world without a qualifying observation; but even this qualifying observation left the sophistry still so shameful, that his editor, Mr. EMLYN, who published the work under authority of the House of Commons, did not think it consistent with his reputation to suffer this pa.s.sage to go forth unaccompanied with the following remark: "But their (the Jews') ordinary punishment being entirely _pecuniary_, could affect him _only when he was found in a condition to answer it_; and therefore the same reasons which could justify that, can, by no means, be extended to a _corporal_, much less to a _capital_ punishment." Certainly: and this is the fair interpretation of these two verses of the Proverbs.

PUFFENDORF, one of the greatest authorities that the world knows anything of, observes, upon the argument built upon this text of Scripture, "It may be objected, that, in Proverbs, chap. vi. verses 30, 31, he is called a _thief_, and p.r.o.nounced obnoxious to the penalty of theft, who steals to satisfy his hunger; but whoever closely views and considers that text will find that the thief there censured is neither in such _extreme necessity_ as we are now supposing, nor seems to have fallen into his needy condition merely by ill fortune, without his own idleness or default: for the context implies, that he had _a house and goods sufficient_ to make seven-fold rest.i.tution; which he might have either sold or p.a.w.ned; a chapman or creditor being easily to be met with in times of plenty and peace; for we have no grounds to think that the fact there mentioned is supposed to be committed, either in time of war, or upon account of the extraordinary price of provisions."

28. Besides this, I think it is clear that these two verses of the Proverbs do not apply to _one and the same person_; for in the first verse it is said, that men _do not despise_ a thief if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry. How, then, are we to reconcile this with _morality_? Are we not to despise a _thief_? It is clear that the word _thief_ does not apply to the first case; but to the second case only; and that the distinction was here made for the express purpose of preventing the man who took food to relieve his hunger _from being confounded with the thief_. Upon any other interpretation, it makes the pa.s.sage contain nonsense and immorality; and, indeed, GROTIUS says that the latter text does not apply to the person mentioned in the former. The latter text could not mean a man taking food from necessity. It is _impossible_ that it can mean that; because the man who was starving for want of food _could not have_ seven-fold; _could not have_ any substance in his house. But what are we to think of JUDGE BLACKSTONE, who, in his Book IV., chap. 2, really _garbles_ these texts of Scripture. He clearly saw the effect of the expression, "MEN DO NOT DESPISE;" he saw what an awkward figure these words made, coming before the words "A THIEF;" he saw that, with these words in the text, he could never succeed in making his readers believe that a man ought to be _hanged_ for taking food to save his life. He clearly saw that he could not make men believe that _G.o.d had said this_, unless he could, somehow or other, get rid of those words about NOT DESPISING the thief that took victuals when he was hungry. Being, therefore, very much pestered and annoyed by these words about NOT DESPISING, what does he do but fairly _leave them out_! And not only leave them out, but leave out a part of both the verses, keeping in that part of each that suited him, and no more; nay, further, leaving out one word, and putting in another, giving a sense to the whole which he knew well never was intended. He states the pa.s.sage to be this: "If a thief steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, _he_ shall restore seven-fold, _and_ shall give all the substance of his house." No broomstick that ever was handled would have been too heavy or too rough for the shoulders of this dirty-souled man. HALE, with all his desire to make out a case in favour of severity, has given us the words fairly: but this shuffling fellow; this smooth-spoken and mean wretch, who is himself _thief_ enough, G.o.d knows, if stealing other men's thoughts and words const.i.tute theft; this intolerably mean reptile has, in the first place, left out the words "_men do not despise_:" then he has left out the words at the beginning of the next text, "_but if he be found_." Then in place of the "_he_," which comes before the words "_shall give_" he puts the word "_and_;" and thus he makes the whole apply to the poor creature that takes to satisfy his soul when he is hungry! He leaves out every mitigating word of the Scripture; and, in his reference, he represents the pa.s.sage to be in _one_ verse! Perhaps, even in the history of the conduct of crown-lawyers, there is not to be found mention of an act so coolly b.l.o.o.d.y-minded as this. It has often been said of this BLACKSTONE, that he not only _lied_ himself, but _made others lie_; he has here made, as far as he was able, a liar of King Solomon himself: he has wilfully garbled the Holy Scripture; and that, too, for the manifest purpose of justifying cruelty in courts and judges; for the manifest purpose of justifying the most savage oppression of the poor.

29. After all, HALE has not the courage to send forth this doctrine of his, without allowing that the case of extreme necessity does, "in _some measure_," and "in _particular cases_," and, "by the _tacit_ or _silent_ consent of nations," _hold good_! What a crowd of qualifications is here!

With what reluctance he confesses that which all the world knows to be true, that the disciples of JESUS CHRIST pulled off, without leave, the ears of standing corn, and ate them "_being an hungered_." And here are two things to observe upon. In the first place this _corn_ was not what _we call corn_ here in England, or else it would have been very droll sort of stuff to crop off and eat. It was what the Americans call _Indian corn_, what the French call _Turkish corn_; and what is called _corn_ (as being far surpa.s.sing all other in excellence) in the Eastern countries where the Scriptures were written. About four or five ears of this corn, of which you strip all the husk off in a minute, are enough for a man's breakfast or dinner; and by about the middle of August this corn is just as wholesome and as efficient as bread. So that, this was _something_ to take and eat without the owner's leave; it was something of value; and observe, that the Pharisees, though so strongly disposed to find fault with everything that was done by Jesus Christ and his disciples, did not find fault of their _taking_ the corn to eat; did not call them _thieves_; did not propose to punish them for _theft_; but found fault of them only for having _plucked the corn on the Sabbath-day_! To pluck the corn was _to do work_, and these severe critics found fault of this working on the Sabbath-day. Then, out comes another fact, which HALE might have noticed if he had chosen it; namely, that our Saviour reminds the Pharisees that "DAVID and his companions, _being an hungered_, entered into the House of G.o.d, and did eat the show-bread, to eat which was unlawful in any-body but the priests." Thus, that which would have been _sacrilege_ under any other circ.u.mstances; that which would have been one of the most _horrible of crimes against the law of G.o.d_, became no crime at all when committed by a person _pressed by hunger_.

30. Nor has JUDGE HALE fairly interpreted the two verses of DEUTERONOMY.

He represents the matter thus: that, if you be _pa.s.sing through_ a vineyard or an olive-yard you may gather and eat, without being deemed a thief. This interpretation would make an Englishman believe that the Scripture allowed of this taking and eating, only where there was a _lawful foot-way_ through the vineyard. This is a very gross misrepresentation of the matter; for if you look at the two texts, you will find, that they say that, "when thou _comest into_;" that is to say, when thou _enterest_ or _goest into_, "thy neighbour's vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy fill at thine own pleasure, but thou shalt not put any in thy vessel;" that is to say, that you should not go and make wine in his vineyard and carry it away. Then in case of the corn, precisely the same law is laid down. You may pluck with your _hand_; but not use the _hook_ or a _sickle_. Nothing can be plainer than this: no distinction can be wiser, nor more just. HALE saw the force of it; and therefore, as these texts made very strongly against him, he does not give them at full length, but gives us a misrepresenting abbreviation.

31. He had, however, too much regard for his reputation to conclude without acknowledging the right of seizing on the provisions of others _at sea_. He allows that private chests may be _broken open_ to prevent men from dying with hunger at sea. He does not stop to tell us why men's lives are _more precious_ on sea than on land. He does not attempt to reconcile these liberties given by the Scripture, and by the maritime laws, with his own hard doctrine. In short, he brings us to this at last: that he will _not acknowledge_, that it is _not theft_ to take another man's goods, without his consent, under any circ.u.mstances; but, while he will not acknowledge this, he plainly leaves us to conclude, that no English judge and no English king will _ever punish_ a poor creature that takes victuals to save himself from peris.h.i.+ng; and he plainly leaves us to conclude, that it is the _poor-laws_ of England; that it is their existence and _their due execution_, which deprive everybody in England of the right to take food and raiment in case of extreme necessity.

32. Here I agree with him most cordially; and it is because I agree with him in this, that I deprecate the abominable projects of those who would annihilate the poor-laws, seeing that it is those very poor-laws which give, under all circ.u.mstances, really legal security _to property_.

Without them, cases must frequently arise, which would, according to the law of nature, according to the law of G.o.d, and as we shall see before we have done, according to the law of England, bring us into a state, or, at least, bring particular persons into a state, which as far as related to them, would cause the law of nature to _revive_, and to make _all things to be owned in common_. To adhere, then, to these poor-laws; to cause them to be duly executed, to prevent every encroachment upon them, to preserve them as the apple of our eye, are the duty of every Englishman, as far as he has capacity so to do.

33. I have, my friends, cited, as yet, authorities only _on one side_ of this great subject, which it was my wish to discuss in this one Number. I find that to be impossible without leaving undone much more than half my work. I am extremely anxious to cause this matter to be well understood, not only by the working cla.s.ses, but by the owners of the land and the magistrates. I deem it to be of the greatest possible importance; and, while writing on it, I address myself to you, because I most sincerely declare that I have a greater respect for you than for any other body of persons that I know any thing of. The next Number will conclude the discussion of the subject. The whole will lie in a very small compa.s.s.

_Sixpence_ only will be the cost of it. It will creep about, by degrees, over the whole of this kingdom. All the authorities, all the arguments, will be brought into this small compa.s.s; and I do flatter myself that many months will not pa.s.s over our heads, before all but misers and madmen will be ashamed to talk of abolis.h.i.+ng the poor-rates and of supporting the needy by grants and subscriptions.

I am, Your faithful friend and Most obedient servant, WM. COBBETT.

NUMBER II.

_Bollitree Castle, Herefords.h.i.+re, 22d Sept. 1826._

MY EXCELLENT FRIENDS,

34. In the last Number, paragraph 33, I told you, that I would, in the present Number, conclude the discussion of the great question of _theft, or no theft_, in a case of taking another's goods without his consent, or against his will, the taker being pressed by extreme necessity. I laid before you; in the last Number, JUDGE HALE'S doctrine upon the subject; and I there mentioned the foul conduct of BLACKSTONE, the author of the "Commentaries on the Laws of England." I will not treat this unprincipled lawyer, this shocking court sycophant; I will not treat him as he has treated King Solomon and the Holy Scriptures; I will not garble, misquote, and belie him, as he garbled, misquoted, and belied them; I will give the whole of the pa.s.sage to which I allude, and which my readers may find in the Fourth Book of his Commentaries. I request you to read it with great attention; and to compare it, very carefully, with the pa.s.sage that I have quoted from SIR MATTHEW HALE, which you will find in paragraphs from 19 to 21 inclusive. The pa.s.sage from BLACKSTONE is as follows:

35. "There is yet another case of necessity, which has occasioned great speculation among the writers upon general law; viz., whether a man in extreme want of food or clothing may justify stealing either, to relieve his present necessities. And this both GROTIUS and PUFFENDORF, together with _many other_ of the foreign jurists, hold in the affirmative; maintaining by many ingenious, humane, and plausible reasons, that in such cases the community of goods by a kind of tacit concession of society is revived. And some even of our own lawyers have held the same; though it seems to be an unwarranted doctrine, borrowed from the notions of some civilians: at least it is now antiquated, the law of England admitting no such excuse at present. And this its doctrine is agreeable not only to the sentiments of many of the wisest ancients, particularly CICERO, who holds that 'suum cuique incommodum ferendum est, potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum;' but also to the Jewish law, as certified by King Solomon himself: 'If a thief steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, he shall restore seven-fold, and shall give all the substance of his house:' which was the ordinary punishment for theft in that kingdom. And this is founded upon the highest reason: for men's properties would be under a strange insecurity, if liable to be invaded according to the wants of others; of which wants no man can possibly be an adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads them. In this country especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in admitting so dubious an excuse; for by our laws such a sufficient provision is made for the poor by the power of the civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the most needy stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to support nature.

This case of a stranger is, by the way, the strongest instance put by Baron PUFFENDORF, and whereon he builds his princ.i.p.al arguments; which, however they may hold upon the continent, where the parsimonious industry of the natives orders every one to work or starve, yet must lose all their weight and efficacy in England, where _charity is reduced to a system, and interwoven in our very const.i.tution_. Therefore, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being _unmerciful_, for denying this privilege to the necessitous; especially when we consider, that the king, on the representation of his ministers of justice, hath a power to soften the law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hards.h.i.+p. An advantage which is wanting in many states, particularly those which are democratical: and these have in its stead introduced and adopted, in the body of the law itself, a mult.i.tude of circ.u.mstances tending to alleviate its rigour. But the founders of our const.i.tution thought it better to vest in the crown the power of pardoning peculiar objects of compa.s.sion, than to countenance and establish theft by one general undistinguis.h.i.+ng law."

36. First of all, I beg you to observe, that this pa.s.sage is merely _a flagrant act of theft_, committed upon JUDGE HALE; next, you perceive, that which I noticed in paragraph 28, a most base and impudent garbling of the Scriptures. Next, you see, that BLACKSTONE, like HALE, comes, at last, to the _poor-laws_; and tells us that to take other men's goods without leave, is theft, _because_ "charity is here reduced to a system, and interwoven in our very const.i.tution." That is to say, to relieve the necessitous; to prevent their suffering from want; completely to render starvation impossible, makes a part of our very const.i.tution. "THEREFORE, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being _unmerciful_ for denying this privilege to the necessitous." Pray mark the word _therefore_. You see, our laws, he says, are not to be taxed with being unmerciful in deeming the necessitous taker _a thief_. And _why_ are they not to be deemed unmerciful? BECAUSE the laws provide effectual relief for the necessitous. It follows, then, of course, even according to BLACKSTONE himself, that if the Const.i.tution _had not_ provided this effectual relief for the necessitous, then the laws _would have been unmerciful_ in deeming the necessitous taker a thief.

37. But now let us hear what that GROTIUS and that PUFFENDORF say; let us hear what these great writers on the law of nature and of nations say upon this subject. BLACKSTONE has mentioned the names of them both; but he has not thought proper to notice their arguments, much less has he attempted to answer them. They are two of the most celebrated men that ever wrote; and their writings are referred to as high authority, with regard to all the subjects of which they have treated. The following is a pa.s.sage from GROTIUS, on War and Peace, Book II., chap. 2.

38. "Let us see, further, what common right there appertains to men in those things which have already become the property of individuals. Some persons, perchance, may consider it strange to question this, as proprietors.h.i.+p seems to have absorbed all that right which arose out of a state of things in common. But it is not so. For, it is to be considered, _what was the intention of those who first introduced private property_, which we may suppose to have been such, as to deviate as little as possible from _natural equity_. For if even _written laws_ are to be construed in that sense, as far as it is practicable, much more so are _customs_, which are not fettered by the chains of writers.--Hence it follows, first, that, in case of _extreme necessity_, the _pristine right of using things revives_, as much as if they had remained in common; because, in all human laws, as well as in the law of private property, _this case of extreme necessity appears to have been excepted_.--So, if the means of sustenance, as in case of a sea-voyage, should chance to fail, that which any individual may have, should be shared in common. And thus, a fire having broken out, I am justified in destroying the house of my neighbour, in order to preserve my own house; and I may cut in two the ropes or cords amongst which any s.h.i.+p is driven, if it cannot be otherwise disentangled. All which exceptions are not made in the written law, but are presumed.--For the opinion has been acknowledged amongst Divines, that, if any one, in such case of necessity, take from another person what is requisite for the preservation of his life, _he does not commit a theft_. The meaning of which definition is not, as many contend, that the proprietor of the thing be bound to give to the needy upon the principle of _charity_; but, that all things distinctly vested in proprietors ought to be regarded as such _with a certain benign acknowledgment of the primitive right_. For if the original distributors of things were questioned, as to what they thought about this matter, they would reply what I have said. _Necessity_, says Father SENECA, _the great excuse for human weakness, breaks every law_; that is to say, _human law_, or law made after the manner of man."

39. "But cautions ought to be had, for fear this license should be abused: of which the princ.i.p.al is, to try, in every way, whether the necessity can be avoided by any other means; for instance, by making application to the magistrate, or even by trying whether the use of the thing can, by entreaties, be obtained from the proprietor. PLATO permits water to be fetched from the well of a neighbour upon this condition alone, that the person asking for such permission shall dig in his own well in search of water as far as the chalk: and SOLON, that he shall dig in his own well as far as forty cubits. Upon which PLUTARCH adds, _that he judged that necessity was to be relieved, not laziness to be encouraged_."

40. Such is the doctrine of this celebrated civilian. Let us now hear PUFFENDORF; and you will please to bear in mind, that both these writers are of the greatest authority upon all subjects connected with the laws of nature and of nations. We read in their works the result of an age of study: they have been two of the great guides of mankind ever since they wrote: and, we are not to throw them aside, in order to listen exclusively to Parson HAY, to HULTON OF HULTON, or to NICHOLAS GRIMSHAW. They tell us what they, and what other wise men, deemed to be right; and, as we shall by and by see, the laws of England, so justly boasted of by our ancestors, hold precisely the same language with these celebrated men. After the following pa.s.sage from PUFFENDORF, I shall show you what our own lawyers say upon the subject; but I request you to read the following pa.s.sage with the greatest attention.

41. "Let us inquire, in the next place, whether the necessity of preserving our life can give us any right over other men's goods, so as to make it allowable for us to seize on them for our relief, either secretly, or by open force, against the owner's consent. For the more clear and solid determination of which point, we think it necessary to hint in short on the causes upon which distinct _properties_ were first introduced in the world; designing to examine them more at large in their proper place.

Now the main reasons on which _properties_ are founded, we take to be these two; that the feuds and quarrels might be appeased which arose in the _primitive communion_ of things, and that men might be put under a kind of necessity of being industrious, every one being to get his maintenance by his own application and labour. This division, therefore, of goods, was not made, that every person should sit idly brooding over the share of wealth he had got, without a.s.sisting or serving his fellows; but that any one might dispose of his things how he pleased; and if he thought fit to communicate them to others, he might, at least, be thus furnished with an opportunity of laying obligations on the rest of mankind. Hence, when properties were once established, men obtained a power, not only of exercising commerce to their mutual advantage and gain, but likewise of dispensing more largely in the works of humanity and beneficence; whence their diligence had procured them a greater share of goods than others: whereas before, when all things lay in common, men could lend one another no a.s.sistance but what was supplied by their corporeal ability, and could be charitable of nothing but of their _strength_. Further, such is the force of _property_, that the _proprietor_ hath a right of delivering his goods with his own hands; even such as he is obliged to give to others. Whence it follows, that when one man has anything owing from another, he is not presently to seize on it at a venture, but ought to apply himself to the owner, desiring to receive it from his disposal. Yet in case the other party refuse thus to make good his obligation, the power and privilege of _property_ doth not reach so far as that the things may not be taken away without the owner's consent, either by the authority of the magistrate in _civil communities_, or in a _state of nature_, by violence and hostile force. And though in regard to bare Natural Right, for a man to relieve another in extremity with his goods, for which he himself hath not so much occasion, be a duty obliging only _imperfectly_, and not in the manner of a _debt_, since it arises wholly from the virtue of _humanity_; yet there seems to be no reason why, by the additional force of a civil ordinance, it may not be turned into a strict and perfect obligation. And this _Seldon_ observes to have been done among the _Jews_; who, upon a man's refusing to give such alms as were proper for him, _could force him to it by an action at law_. It is no wonder, therefore, that they should forbid _their poor_, on any account, to seize on the goods of others, enjoining them to take only what private persons, or the public officers, or stewards of alms, should give them on their pet.i.tion. Whence the stealing of what was another's, though upon extreme necessity, pa.s.sed in that state for theft or rapine. But now supposing _under another government the like good provision is not made for persons in want_, supposing likewise that the covetous temper of men of substance cannot be prevailed on to give relief, and that the needy creature is not able, either by his work or service, or by making sale of anything that he possesses, to a.s.sist his present necessity, _must_ he, _therefore, perish with famine_? Or _can any human inst.i.tution bind me_ with such a force that, in case another man neglects his duty towards me, _I must rather die, than recede a little from the ordinary and regular way of acting_? We conceive, therefore, that such a person doth _not contract the guilt of theft_, who happening, not through his own fault, to be in extreme want, either of necessary food, or of clothes to preserve him from the violence of the weather, and cannot obtain them from the voluntary gift of the rich, either by urgent entreaties, or by offering somewhat equivalent in price, or by engaging _to work it out, shall either forcibly or privily relieve himself out of their abundance_; especially if he do it with full intention to pay the value of them whenever his better fortune gives him ability. Some men deny that such a case of _necessity_, as we speak of, can possibly happen. But what if a man should wander in a foreign land, unknown, friendless, and in want, spoiled of all he had by s.h.i.+pwreck, or by robbers, or having lost by some casualty whatever he was worth in his own country; should none be found willing either to relieve his distress, or to hire his service, or should they rather (as it commonly happens,) seeing him in a good garb, suspect him to beg without reason, must the poor creature starve in this miserable condition?"

42. Many other great foreign authorities might be referred to, and I cannot help mentioning COVARRUVIUS, who is spoken of by JUDGE HALE, and who expresses himself upon the subject in these words: "The reason why a man in extreme necessity may, _without incurring the guilt of theft or rapine_, forcibly take the goods of others for his present relief, is because his condition _renders all things common_. For it is the ordinance and inst.i.tution of nature itself, that inferior things should be designed and directed to serve the necessities of men. Wherefore the division of goods afterwards introduced into the world doth not derogate from that precept of natural reason, which Suggests, that the _extreme wants of mankind may be in any manner removed by the use of temporal possessions_."

PUFFENDORF tells us, that PERESIUS maintains, that, in case of extreme necessity, a man is compelled to the action, by a force which he cannot resist; and then, that the owner's consent may be presumed on, because humanity obliges him to succour those who are in distress. The same writer cites a pa.s.sage from St. AMBROSE, one of the FATHERS of the church, which alleges that (in case of refusing to give to persons in extreme necessity) it is the person who retains the goods who is guilty of the act of wrong doing, for St. AMBROSE says; "it is the _bread of the hungry_ which you detain; it is the _raiment of the naked_ which you lock up."

43. Before I come to the English authorities on the same side, let me again notice the foul dealing of Blackstone; let me point out another instance or two of the insincerity of this English court-sycophant, who was, let it be noted, Solicitor-general to the queen of the "good old King." You have seen, in paragraph 28, a most flagrant instance of his perversion of the Scriptures. He garbles the word of G.o.d, and prefaces the garbling by calling it a thing "_certified_ by King Solomon himself;" and this word _certified_ he makes use of just when he is about to begin the scandalous falsification of the text which he is referring to. Never was anything more base. But, the whole extent of the baseness we have not yet seen; for, BLACKSTONE had read HALE, who had quoted the two verses fairly; but besides this, he had read PUFFENDORF, who had noticed very fully this text of Scripture, and who had shown very clearly that it did not at all make in favour of the doctrine of Blackstone. Blackstone ought to have given the argument of PUFFENDORF; he ought to have given the whole of his argument; but particularly he ought to have given this explanation of the pa.s.sage in the PROVERBS, which explanation I have inserted in paragraph 27. It was also the height of insincerity in BLACKSTONE, to pretend that the pa.s.sage from CICERO had anything at all to do with the matter. He knew well that it had not; he knew that CICERO contemplated no case of extreme necessity for want of food or clothing; but, he had read PUFFENDORF, and PUFFENDORF had told him, that CICERO'S was a question of the mere _conveniences_ and _inconveniences_ of life in general; and not a question of pinching hunger or s.h.i.+vering nakedness. BLACKSTONE had seen his fallacy exposed by PUFFENDORF; he had seen the misapplication of this pa.s.sage of CICERO fully exposed by PUFFENDORF; and yet the base court-sycophant trumped it up again, without mentioning PUFFENDORF'S exposure of the fallacy! In short this BLACKSTONE, upon this occasion, as upon almost all others, has gone all lengths; has set detection and reproof at defiance, for the sake of making his court to the government by inculcating harshness in the application of the law, and by giving to the law such an interpretation as would naturally tend to justify that harshness.

44. Let us now cast away from us this insincere sycophant, and turn to other law authorities of our own country. The _Mirrour of Justices_, (quoted by me in paragraph 14,) Chap. 4, Section 16, on the subject of arrest of judgment of death, has this pa.s.sage. Judgment is to be staid in seven cases here specified: and the seventh is this: "in POVERTY, in which case you are to distinguish of the poverty of the offender, or of things; for if poor people, _to avoid famine, take victuals to sustain their lives, or clothes that they die not of cold_, (so that they perish if they keep not themselves from cold,) _they are not to be adjudged to death, if it were not in their power to have bought their victuals or clothes_; for as much as _they are warranted so to do by the law of nature_." Now, my friends, you will observe, that I take this from a book which may almost be called the BIBLE of the law. There is no lawyer who will deny the goodness of this authority; or who will attempt to say that this was not always the law of England.

45. Our next authority is one quite as authentic, and almost as ancient.

The book goes by the name of BRITTON, which was the name of a Bishop of Hereford, who edited it, in the famous reign of EDWARD THE FIRST. The book does, in fact, contain the laws of the kingdom as they existed at that time. It may be called the record of the laws of Edward the First. It begins thus, "Edward by the grace of G.o.d, King of England and Lord of Ireland, to all his liege subjects, peace, and grace of salvation." The preamble goes on to state, that people cannot be happy without good laws; that even good laws are of no use unless they be known and understood; and that, therefore, the king has ordered the laws of England thus to be written and recorded. This book is very well known to be of the greatest authority, amongst lawyers, and in Chap. 10 of this book, in which the law describes what const.i.tutes a BURGLAR, or house-breaker, and the punishment that he shall suffer (which is that of death,) there is this pa.s.sage: "Those are to be deemed burglars who feloniously, in time of peace, break into churches or houses, or through walls or doors of our cities, or our boroughs; with _exception_ of children under age, and of _poor people who for hunger, enter to take any sort of victuals of less value than twelve pence_; and except idiots and mad people, and others that cannot commit felony." Thus, you see, this agrees with the MIRROUR OF JUSTICES, and with all that we have read before from these numerous high authorities. But this, taken in its full lat.i.tude, goes a great length indeed; for a burglar is a _breaker-in by night_. So that this is not only _a taking_; but a breaking into a house in order to take! And observe, it is taking to the value of _twelve pence_; and twelve pence then was the price of _a couple of sheep_, and of fine fat sheep too; nay, twelve pence was the price of _an ox_, in this very reign of Edward the First. So that, a hungry man might have a pretty good belly-full in those days without running the risk of punishment. Observe, by-the-by, how time has hardened the law. We are told of the _dark ages_, of the _barbarous customs_, of our forefathers: and we have a SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH to receive and to present pet.i.tions innumerable, from the most tender hearted creatures in the world, about "_softening the criminal code_;" but, not a word do they ever say about a softening of _this law_, which now hangs a man for stealing the value of a RABBIT, and which formerly did not hang him till he stole the value of an OX! Curious enough, but still more scandalous, that we should have the impudence to talk of our _humanity_, and our _civilization_, and of the barbarousness of our forefathers. But, if a _part_ of the ancient law remain, shall not the _whole_ of it remain? If we hang the thief, still hang the thief for stealing to the value of _twelve pence_; though the twelve pence now represents a rabbit instead of an ox; if we still do this, would BLACKSTONE take away the benefit of the ancient law from the starving man? The pa.s.sage that I have quoted is of such great importance as to this question, that I think it necessary to add, here, a copy of the original, which is in the old _Norman-French_, of which I give the translation above. "Sunt tenus burgessours trestous ceux, que felonis.e.m.e.nt en temps de pees debrusent esglises ou auter mesons, ou murs, ou portes de nos cytes, ou de nos burghes; hors pris enfauntz dedans age, et poures, que, pur feyn, entret pur ascun vitaille de meindre value q'de xii deners, et hors pris fous nastres, et gens arrages, et autres que seuent nule felonie faire."

46. After this, _lawyers_, at any rate, will not attempt to gainsay. If there should, however, remain any one to affect to doubt of the soundness of this doctrine, let them take the following from him who is always called the "_pride of philosophy_," the "_pride of English learning_," and whom the poet POPE calls "_greatest_ and _wisest_ of mankind." It is LORD BACON of whom I am speaking. He was Lord High Chancellor in the reign of James the First; and, let it be observed, that he wrote those "_law tracts_," from which I am about to quote, long after the present poor-laws had been established. He says (Law Tracts, page 55,) "The law chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsory and not voluntary, and where there is not consent and election; and, therefore, if either there be an impossibility for a man to do otherwise, or so great a perturbation of the judgment and reason, as in presumption of law a man's nature cannot overcome, such necessity carrieth a privilege in itself.--Necessity is of three sorts: necessity of conservation of life; necessity of obedience; and necessity of the act of G.o.d or of a stranger.--First, of conservation of life; _if a man steal viands (victuals) to satisfy his present hunger_, this is _no felony_ nor _larceny_."

47. If any man want more authority, his heart must be hard indeed; he must have an uncommonly anxious desire to take away by the halter the life that sought to preserve itself against hunger. But, after all, what need had we of any _authorities_? What need had we even of _reason_ upon the subject?

Who is there upon the face of the earth, except the monsters that come from across the channel of St. George; who is there upon the face of the earth, except those monsters, that have the bra.s.s, the hard hearts and the brazen faces, which enable them coolly to talk of the "MERIT" of the degraded creatures, who, amidst an abundance of food, amidst a "_superabundance of food_," lie quietly down and receive the extreme unction, and expire with hunger? Who, upon the face of the whole earth, except these monsters, these ruffians by way of excellence; who, except these, the most insolent and hard-hearted ruffians that ever lived, will contend, or will dare to think, that there ought to be any force under heaven to compel a man to lie down at the door of a baker's and butcher's shop, and expire with hunger! The very nature of man makes him shudder at the thought. There want no authorities; no appeal to law books; no arguments; no questions of right or wrong: that same human nature that tells me that I am not to cut my neighbour's throat, and drink his blood, tells me that I am not to make him die at my feet by keeping from him food or raiment of which I have more than I want for my own preservation.

48. Talk of barbarians, indeed; Talk of "_the dark_ and _barbarous ages_."

Why, even in the days of the DRUIDS, such barbarity as that of putting men to death, or of punis.h.i.+ng them for taking to relieve their hunger, was never thought of. In the year 1811, the REV. PETER ROBERTS, A. M.

published a book, ent.i.tled COLLECTANEA CAMBRICA. In the first volume of that book, there is an account of the laws of the ANCIENT BRITONS. Hume, and other Scotchmen, would make us believe, that the ancient inhabitants of this country were a set of savages, clothed in skins and the like. The laws of this people were collected and put into writing, in the year 694 _before Christ_. The following extract from these laws shows, that the moment civil society began to exist, that moment the law _took care that people should not be starved to death_. That moment it took care, that provision should be made for the dest.i.tute, or that, in cases of extreme necessity, men were to preserve themselves from death by taking from those who had to spare. The words of these laws (as applicable to our case) given by Mr. ROBERTS, are as follows:--"There are three distinct kinds of personal individual property, which cannot be shared with another, or surrendered in payment of fine; viz., a wife, a child, and argyfrew. By the word _argyfrew_ is meant, clothes, arms, or the implements of a lawful calling. For without these a man has not the means of support, and it would be _unjust_ in the law to _unman_ a man, or to _uncall_ a man as to his calling." TRIAD 53d.--"Three kinds of THIEVES are not to be punished with DEATH. 1. A wife, who joins with her husband in theft. 2. A youth under age. And 3. One who, after he has _asked, in vain_, for support, in _three towns_, and at _nine houses_ in each town." TRIAD 137.

49. There were, then, _houses_ and _towns_, it seems; and the towns were pretty thickly spread too; and, as to "_civilization_" and "_refinement_,"

let this law relative to a _youth under age_, be compared with the new _orchard and garden law_, and with the tread-mill affair, and new trespa.s.s law!

50. We have a law, called the VAGRANT ACT, to _punish men for begging_. We have a law to punish men for _not working to keep their families_. Now, with what show of justice can these laws be maintained? They are founded upon this; the first, that begging is disgraceful to the country; that it is degrading to the character of man, and, of course, to the character of an Englishman; and, that there is no necessity for begging, _because the law has made ample provision for every person in distress_. The law for punis.h.i.+ng men for not working to maintain their families is founded on this, that they are _doing wrong to their neighbours_; their neighbours, that is to say, the parish, being _bound to keep the family_, if they be not kept by the man's labour; and, therefore, his not labouring is _a wrong done to the parish_. The same may be said with regard to the punishment for not maintaining b.a.s.t.a.r.d children. There is some reason for these laws, as long as the poor-laws are duly executed; as long as the poor are duly relieved, according to law; but, unless the poor-laws exist; unless they be in full force; unless they be duly executed; unless efficient and prompt relief be given to necessitous persons, these acts, and many others approaching to a similar description, are acts of barefaced and most abominable tyranny. I should say that they _would be_ acts of such tyranny; for generally speaking, the poor-laws are, as yet, fairly executed, and efficient as to their object.

51. The law of this country is, that every man, able to carry arms, is liable to be called on, to serve in the militia, or to serve as a soldier in some way or other, _in order to defend the country_. What, then, the man has _no land_; he has _no property_ beyond his mere body, and clothes, and tools; he has nothing that an enemy can take away from him. What _justice_ is there, then, in calling upon this man to take up arms and _risk his life_ in the _defence of the land_: what is the land to him? I _say_, that it is something to him; I _say_, that he ought to be called forth to a.s.sist to defend the land; because, however poor he may be, _he has a share in the land_, through the poor-rates; and if he be liable to be called forth to defend the land, _the land is always liable to be taxed for his support_. This is what _I say_: my opinions are consistent with reason, with justice, and with the law of the land; but, how can MALTHUS and his silly and _nasty_ disciples; how can those who want to abolish the poor-rates or to prevent the poor from marrying; how can this at once stupid and conceited tribe look the labouring man in the face, while they call upon him to take up arms, to risk his life, in defence of the land?

Grant that the poor-laws are just; grant that every necessitous creature has a right to demand relief from some parish or other; grant that the law has most effectually provided that every man shall be protected against the effects of hunger and of cold; grant these, and then the law which compels the man without house or land to take up arms and risk his life in defence of the country, is a perfectly just law; but, deny to the necessitous that legal and certain relief of which I have been speaking; abolish the poor laws; and then this military-service law becomes an act of a character such as I defy any pen or tongue to describe.

52. To say another word upon the subject is certainly unnecessary; but we live in days when "_stern necessity_" has so often been pleaded for most flagrant departures from the law of the land, that one cannot help asking, whether there were any greater necessity to justify ADDINGTON for his deeds of 1817 than there would be to justify a starving man in taking a loaf? ADDINGTON pleaded _necessity_, and he got a Bill of _Indemnity_.

And, shall a starving man be hanged, then, if he take a loaf to save himself from dying? When SIX ACTS were before the Parliament, the proposers and supporters of them never pretended that they did not embrace a most dreadful departure from the ancient laws of the land. In answer to LORD HOLLAND, who had dwelt forcibly on this departure from the ancient law, the Lord Chancellor, unable to contradict LORD HOLLAND, exclaimed, "_Salus populi suprema lex_," that is to say "_The salvation of the people is the first law_." Well, then, if the salvation of the people be the first law, the _salvation of life_ is really and bona fide the salvation of the people; and, if the ordinary laws may be dispensed with, in order to obviate a possible and speculative danger, surely they may be dispensed with, in cases where to dispense with them is visibly, demonstrably, notoriously, necessary to the salvation of _the lives_ of the people: surely, bread is as necessary to the lips of the starving man, as a new law could be necessary to prevent either house of parliament from being brought into _contempt_; and surely, therefore, _Salus populi suprema lex_ may come from the lips of the famis.h.i.+ng people with as much propriety as they came from those of the Lord Chancellor!

53. Again, however, I observe, and with this I conclude, that we have nothing to do but to adhere to the poor-laws which we have; that the poor have nothing to do, but to apply to the overseer, or to appeal from him to the magistrate; that the magistrate has nothing to do but duly to enforce the law; and that the government has nothing to do, in order to secure the peace of the country, amidst all the difficulties that are approaching, great and numerous as they are; that it has nothing to do, but to enjoin on the magistrates to do their duty according to our excellent law; and, at the same time, the government ought to discourage, by all the means in their power, all projects for maintaining the poor _by any other than legal means_; to discourage all begging-box affairs; all miserable expedients; and also to discourage, and, where it is possible, fix its mark of reprobation upon all those detestable projectors, who are hatching schemes for what is called, in the blasphemous slang of the day, "_checking the surplus population_" who are hatching schemes for _preventing the labouring people from having children_: who are about spreading their nasty beastly publications; who are hatching schemes of _emigration_; and who, in short, seem to be doing every-thing in their power to widen the fearful breach that has already been made between the poor and the rich. The government has nothing to do but to cause the law to be honestly enforced; and then we shall see no starvation, and none of those dreadful conflicts which the fear of want, as well as actual want, never fail to produce. The bare thought of _forced emigration_ to a foreign state, including, as it must, a _transfer of all allegiance_, which is contrary to the fundamental laws of England; or, exposing every emigrating person to the danger of committing _high treason_; the very thought of such a measure, _having become necessary in England_, is enough to make an Englishman mad. But, of these projects, these scandalous nasty beastly and shameless projects, we shall have time to speak hereafter; and in the mean while, I take my leave of you, for the present, by expressing my admiration of the sensible and spirited conduct of the people of STOCKPORT, when an attempt was, on the 5th of September, made to cheat them into an address, _applauding the conduct of the Ministers_! What! Had the people of STOCKPORT so soon forgotten _16th of August_! Had they so soon forgotten their townsman, JOSEPH SWAN! If they had, they would have deserved to perish to all eternity. Oh, no! It was a proposition _very premature_: it will be quite soon enough for the good and sensible and spirited fellows of STOCKPORT; quite soon enough to address the Ministers, when the Ministers shall have proposed a repeal of the several Jubilee measures, called Ellenborough's law; the poacher-transporting law; the sun-set and sun-rise transportation law; the tread-mill law; the select-vestry law; the Sunday-toll laws; the new trespa.s.s law; the new treason law; the seducing-soldier-hanging law; the new apple-felony law; the SIX ACTS; and a great number of others, pa.s.sed in the reign of Jubilee. Quite soon enough to applaud, that is, for the sensible people of STOCKPORT to applaud, the Ministers, when those Ministers have proposed to repeal these laws, and, also, to repeal the _malt tax_, and _those other taxes_, which take, even from the pauper, one half of what the parish gives him to keep the breath warm in his body. Quite soon enough to applaud the Ministers, when they have done these things; and when in addition to all these, they shall have openly proposed _a radical reform of the Commons House of Parliament_. Leaving them to do this as soon as they like, and trusting, that you will never, on any account, applaud them until they do it, I, expressing here my best thanks to Mr. BLACKSHAW, who defeated the slavish scheme at Stockport, remain,

Your faithful friend, and most obedient servant, WM. COBBETT.

NUMBER III.

_Hurstbourne Tarrant (called Uphusband,)_

_Hants, 13th October, 1826._

MY EXCELLENT FRIENDS,