Readings in Money and Banking Part 20

[57] Bulletin, Am. Econ. a.s.soc., Fourth Series, No. 2, 1910, pp. 46-52.

[58] _Ibid._, pp. 52-61.

[59] _Money and Credit Instruments in their Relation to General Prices_, 2d edition, 1909. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

[60] The pa.s.sages referred to are omitted.--EDITOR.

[61] Kemmerer, _Money and Credit Instruments_, pp. 9-18, 74-82.

[62] _Ibid._, pp. 82-8, 121-6, 145-8.

[63] _Ibid._, p. 9. [See Fisher: _Purchasing Power of Money_, pp.

175-180.]

[64] The value of gold bullion deposited at the United States mints and a.s.say offices increased from $87,924,000 for 1897 to $205,036,000 for 1907. Figures furnished by the Director of the Mint.

[65] It is noteworthy that the reserves of the New York a.s.sociated banks for example are usually kept very close to the legal reserve requirements. Cf. Sprague, _Crises under the National Banking System_, p. 222.

[66] Gold produced before 1492 represents an insignificant part of the existing supply.

[67] Useful tables summarizing all of these index numbers, except those of Canada, are given by Achille Necco, in his article on _La curva dei prezzi delle merci in Italia negli anni 1881-1909_, in _La Riforma Sociale_, Sept.-Oct., 1910.

[68] Comparison is for 1897 and 1906, figures for 1907 not being available.

[69] De Launay thinks that the industrial consumption averages somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent. of the annual output, but believes that for several years past the industrial uses have been absorbing a decreasing proportion, though an increasing amount. (_The World's Gold_, pp.

176-7.)

[70] Bulletin, Am. Econ. a.s.soc., Fourth Series, No. 2, 1910, pp. 59-61.

[71] _Ibid._, pp. 61-63.

[72] _Ibid._, p. 64.

[73] The quotation here referred to is omitted.--EDITOR.

[74] _Ibid._, pp. 64-65.

[75] _Ibid._, pp. 65-67.

[76] _Ibid._, pp. 67-69.

[77] Adapted from _The Purchasing Power of Money_, pp. 150-157; and Bulletin of the American Economic a.s.sociation, Fourth Series, No. 2.

Papers and Discussions of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting, December, 1910. p. 70.

[78] David Ricardo, _Reply to Mr. Bosanquet's Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee_, Works, pp. 326-328. John Murray.

London. 1888.

[79] The Bank could not on their own principles, then urge that most erroneous opinion, that the rate of interest would be affected in the money market if their issues were excessive, and would therefore cause their notes to return to them, because, in the case here supposed, the actual amount of the money of the world being greatly diminished, they must contend that the rate of interest would generally rise, and they might therefore increase their issues. If, after the able exposition of Dr. Smith, any further argument were necessary to prove that the rate of interest is governed wholly by the relation of the amount of capital with the means of employing it, and is entirely independent of the abundance or scarcity of the circulating medium, this ill.u.s.tration would I think afford it.

CHAPTER XII

THE GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD

It is an essential feature of the gold exchange standard as it exists in the Philippines, for example, that premiums charged by the Government in Manila for exchange on New York, and in New York for exchange on Manila are fixed at a point somewhat below the gold export points in each case.

Thus the would-be exporter of gold in the Philippines never finds it profitable to s.h.i.+p gold to New York. On the other hand, international bankers in New York never find it profitable to s.h.i.+p gold or currency to the Philippines, because the authorised agent of the Philippine government in New York always stands ready to sell in exchange for United States currency, drafts drawn upon Manila at a premium less than the cost of s.h.i.+pping gold or currency. Through a regulation of the supply of silver pesos in actual circulation in the Philippines they are maintained at a definite ratio to--not gold in the Philippines, but--gold, or its equivalent, in New York. The way in which the supply of local currency in the gold-exchange country is regulated will be made clear in what follows.

The gold exchange standard has not entirely escaped criticism. Professor J. s.h.i.+eld Nicholson has recently attacked this standard in India. (_Economic Journal_, June, 1914.) It is his contention that inflation may occur in India, if it has not already occurred, on account of the "impeded convertibility of rupees into gold." After a certain point is reached in the inflation the decline in the general purchasing power of the rupee must be followed, he affirms, by a specific depreciation as regards gold; and then the main object of the plan would be defeated. He offers no evidence, however, that prices have risen faster in India than in gold standard countries. With the exception of Mexico, where currency conditions have become extremely chaotic, the historical material here reprinted is in accord with the recent monetary history of the countries under discussion.

[80]When the Government of British India sought, in 1893, to give a fixed gold value to about 120,000,000 in rupee silver, it undertook an experiment of great importance to the financial world, and one which was naturally viewed in many quarters with grave misgivings. The experience of fifteen years which have followed that experiment has taught many lessons in monetary science. It may, indeed, be said to have blazed a new path in the principles of money--at least, in their practical application. The effort to raise the coins to a fixed gold value by scarcity alone was not successful, but it led to other devices, which, imitated or improved upon in Mexico, the Philippines, and the Straits Settlements, as well as in India, have created a new type of monetary system which has come to bear the t.i.tle of the gold exchange standard.

The gold exchange standard differs in several respects from the limping standard. It has been the product of definite purpose and plan in the Philippines and in Mexico and to a certain extent in India. While in British India it has been, like the limping standard, a compromise with existing conditions, it has there, as elsewhere, received a definite form and substance which separated it from the limping standard as evolved in France and in other countries which found themselves with a large amount of legal-tender silver on their hands when the metal had fallen below the official parity. There are two other essential differences between the limping standard and the gold exchange standard.

One is that the gold exchange standard contemplates a circulation of token coins of silver without any necessary concurrent circulation of gold or paper. The other is that the gold exchange standard contemplates definite and comprehensive measures to maintain the value of token coins at par with gold instead of relying purely upon custom and scarcity to give them value.

The essential principle upon which the exchange standard has been established is that the value of money is governed by the law of supply and demand. So long as supply was indefinite and excessive, as under the system of the free coinage of silver, there was no way of preventing safely and effectively the decline in the gold value of the coins to the bullion value of their silver contents. The moment, however, that Government undertook to limit the supply of coins to the demand for them, it took an important step to separate their value from that of their bullion contents and to give them a value based upon the demand for them as money signs required for carrying on exchanges. Strangely enough, while this principle had been in operation for many years in the case of subsidiary coins, its bearing upon the use of silver in countries where the standard had been depreciating was not clearly comprehended until within recent years. Those who understood the principle doubted its sufficiency to give a fixed value to silver coins as the sole medium of exchange, or they distrusted the ability of any government to judge accurately the number of coins required.

Upon the latter point they would have been correct if dependence had been placed upon guesswork or any empirical method of determining the amount needed. It remained to find the true solution of the problem by so regulating the quant.i.ty of the coins that it would respond automatically to the demands of trade. The correct method of doing this is through the system of exchange funds. As this system is operated in the Philippines, it is not possible to obtain gold coin for silver certificates in small quant.i.ties; but it is possible always to obtain drafts upon New York at par, plus the usual charges for exchange between gold standard countries. These drafts have to be purchased with actual silver coin or coin certificates. In either case the coins and certificates are, by the requirements of the coinage law, held in the Philippine Treasury. The law does not permit their deposit by the Treasury in current account at a bank, which would turn them back into the general circulation.

For practical purposes the volume of currency in circulation is contracted to the same extent as if a corresponding amount of gold were taken from the circulation for export. When the current turns and rates for money become high in the Philippines, Philippine currency can be released for local circulation by the purchase in New York from the gold standard fund of bills upon the Philippine Treasury. This rule of locking up the proceeds of the sale of bills is not rigidly applied to the funds in New York, because the influence of the Philippine purchases upon the local circulation there would be insignificant. On the contrary, the Government obtains a generous interest rate, which has at times been as high as 4 per cent., upon the deposit of Philippine funds with New York bankers. During the stress of the autumn of 1907 considerable transfers of capital were made from Manila to New York by means of the purchase of New York drafts from the Philippine Treasury.

The process, often repeated even under less serious pressure, clearly shows that the monetary system of the Philippines is linked to gold, and that capital can be freely transferred upon a gold basis between Manila and other markets.

The experience of fifteen years since the free coinage of rupees was first suspended in British India, of five years since the new system was established in the Philippines, and of nearly four years since it was in operation in Mexico, have settled most of the doubts which were felt when the experiment was undertaken in India. In the first place, it has been made clear that the value of the coins in exchange, as fixed by law, has not been influenced by variations in the price of silver bullion. This statement, of course, applies only to one side of the problem--the fall of the gold value of the silver in the coin below its face value. It would not be possible under any system yet discovered, except such uneconomic devices as prohibiting exportation, to prevent the disappearance of silver coins when the [bullion] value of their contents rises above the legal value in exchange. Both the Philippines and Mexico have faced this menace to their monetary circulation since their systems were inaugurated, but both have succeeded in removing it.

In the Philippines the contents of the silver unit--the peso--was reduced in 1906 from about 371 grains to 247 grains in pure silver. The amount fixed by the law of 1903 was practically the same as the contents of the old Mexican dollar. The adoption of a coin of this weight was caused partly by the desire to avoid the distrust which some feared might arise from reducing the weight. At the time of the pa.s.sage of the law, moreover, the price of silver was nearly at the lowest point in its history, having touched the minimum of 21-11/16 pence in January, 1903, and being at an average price of 22-1/2 pence in March. The adoption of so heavy a coin, however, was not in accordance with the original recommendation made by the present writer to the War Department in November, 1901. The weight then recommended was 385 grains, nine-tenths fine, or about 347 grains of pure silver.

In Mexico the rise of the silver coins above the legal gold value proved a blessing in disguise. It enabled Mexico to go almost to an absolute gold standard by selling her silver at a premium. From May 1st, 1905, to October 22nd, 1907, the old silver piasters were exported to the amount of $85,956,202, while gold coinage was executed to the amount of $71,646,500 (about 7,200,000).[81] The gold has gone chiefly into the reserves of the banks, which have in circulation about $95,000,000 in notes. Gold holdings of the banks, which were only $15,832,840 in January, 1906, were $54,165,483 in October, 1907, while silver holdings declined over the same period from $49,781,155 to $14,399,924.[82] This influx of gold came about because silver at 33 pence was above the Mexican coinage ratio of about 32 to 1, and much of it was sold by the Commission on Money and Exchange at a direct profit to the Mexican Treasury. In view of the subsequent fall in silver below 23 pence, at which rate Mexico is in a position to replenish her supply of subsidiary coinage, her statesmen may claim the credit of following the great rule of profit in the commercial world as well as on the stock exchange--to sell when things are dear and to buy when things are cheap.

The coincidence in the rise of silver and the adoption of the Mexican monetary reform in 1905 was in some degree accidental. It facilitated the reform, not only by introducing gold, but by removing the objections which would otherwise have been heard from the miners of silver to the rise in gold wages which would have accompanied a fixing of the exchange at a point above the value of silver bullion. It was the intention of the Mexican Government, however, to proceed resolutely, though deliberately, to a fixed exchange, and they would undoubtedly have accomplished this result, even if they had not been aided by the rise in the value of silver. Its subsequent fall has in no wise impaired the stability of the gold standard.

Some fears were expressed in the Philippines as to the willingness of the natives and of Chinese traders to accept a silver coin at a gold value fixed by law which was obviously above its value as bullion. This difficulty has proved almost negligible. Silver within less than three years has been above 33 pence per ounce and below 23 pence. It is doubtful if the Government officials in India or the Philippines have so much as taken note of the daily fluctuations since the price dropped below the legal parity of the coins, and it is certain that the exchange value of the coins has been in no wise impaired by their fall in bullion value. When the last reduction was made in the weight and fineness of the Philippine coins, lowering by almost 30 per cent. their silver contents, the precaution was taken of advising the public by means of an official circular, translated into the various languages and dialects of the Islands, why the change had been made, and that it would not affect the exchange value of the coins. Provincial and munic.i.p.al treasurers were also directed to carry on a campaign of education among the people by way of explaining the character and effect of the change. The greatest menace to the value of the new coins lay with the Chinese, for in China for many hundreds of years local bankers and merchants have adhered to the rule that a coin derived no value from the stamp, but was worth just what it would fetch on the scales. The Chinese traders at first undertook to discriminate in this manner against the new coins of the Philippines. In some cases they refused to receive them except at a discount varying from 20 to 40 per cent. They also offered 105 in the new coins for 100 in the old, evidently in the hope of exporting the old at a profit while they continued to be worth as bullion more than their legal gold value. The success of this discrimination was local and extremely short-lived. The first consignment of the new coins reached Manila on May 4, 1907, and when the Treasurer of the Islands prepared his annual report on October 15th, 1907, he was able to make the following statement of conditions:

At this time, October 15, the new coin is accepted without question in every part of the Islands, and no reports or complaints have been received for the past two months as to discounting it, and, so far as can be ascertained, no premium is now paid for the old coin. In fact, the demand for the new coin for exchange purposes has so far exceeded the supply that it became necessary to withdraw nearly half a million of the new pesos from the banks to meet the requisitions therefor from the provinces.

The hesitation which prevailed, therefore, in many quarters in regard to the ability of a government to overcome the conservatism of the East in its preference for coins of full bullion value has not been warranted by events. This demonstration is of importance if the exchange standard is to be considered for China. At present the Government of China is not perhaps strong enough and sufficiently centralised to a.s.sure its subjects that it can give a definite gold value to a token coin and maintain it honestly and efficiently. The trial of the system, however, in the Philippines, in British India, and in the Straits Settlements, in all of which there are many Chinese, has probably so far cleared the air upon this point that the Chinese Imperial Government would be able to establish the gold exchange system if it did so under sufficient guarantees to the financial world that it would be honestly and intelligently maintained.

Next in importance to the settlement of this question of native willingness to accept the new system may be considered the degree of difficulty in maintaining it. It is not surprising, perhaps, that when it was proposed in an incomplete form for British India, it should have been denounced as a "fair weather" device--"a leap in the dark," which would not stand the test of business depression, deficient crops, and an unfavourable balance of trade.[83]

The most serious difficulty which has been foreseen by critics of the gold exchange system relates to the sufficiency of the exchange funds.

Up to the period of the general panic of 1907 and the crop failure in India in the spring of 1908, it might fairly be said, perhaps, that the system had not been subjected to any but "fair weather" conditions. The experience of India, however, has thrown striking light upon the possibilities and limitations of the system in time of stress. The test in India has been of such magnitude, moreover, that its results are much more conclusive than any test which might have been afforded in a smaller country dealing with a less enormous ma.s.s of token coins. If the test had come before the exchange funds had acquired a respectable size, the system might have been allowed to break down, through timidity and delay in taking proper measures of protection, and discredit have thus been cast upon it before it had been fairly tried.

What happened in India was that the failure of the crops deprived the country of the usual means of compensating by exports the heavy imports of foreign goods which had been contracted for. It became necessary, under the settled principles of exchange, to find gold to fill the gap.

Usually the exchange account substantially balanced itself by the sale in London of Council drafts upon the Indian Government to obtain gold to pay the interest on the debt held in England. These drafts were purchased by importers in London, and used to pay for the Indian crops; but all through the spring of 1908 purchasers for drafts failed to appear, because there had been no considerable exports of Indian crops to be paid for. Hence Council drafts were without a market, and for a moment it seemed that the link which bound the Indian monetary system to the gold market of London had been severed, and that the silver rupee might drop as disastrously as the Mexican dollar before its free coinage was suspended. This would have added the influence of an appalling disaster to the burden already imposed upon Indian finance by the failure of the crops, for it would have compelled the Indian importer of English goods to find a greatly increased number of rupees to meet his gold obligations in London. Obviously, it was a disaster which, if it had occurred, would have invited the bankruptcy of the country, reflected lasting disgrace upon English financial foresight, and perhaps even have led to organised revolt.

The Indian Government had available for meeting the crisis about 18,500,000, princ.i.p.ally invested in securities in London. This fund, known as the gold standard reserve, was distinct from the currency reserve, consisting of gold received for currency notes, which amounted in the spring of 1908 to about 12,000,000. It was against the former fund that the Indian Government felt compelled to offer to sell exchange in India. Such offers were made for a time in limited amounts of 500,000 each, but they proved substantially adequate for meeting the demand, and by early summer the demand fell below the supply. The offer of exchange in this form for rupees maintained the value of the rupee coinage, contracted the amount of rupees in circulation in India, and enabled the Indian merchants to meet their obligations without the loss which they must have suffered if the currency had been allowed to depreciate in gold value. The actual sales of bills upon the exchange funds in London reached, between March 26th and August 13th, 1908, the considerable total of 8,058,000. Of this amount about 2,000,000 was taken from the currency reserve in gold, which was "earmarked" at the Bank of England, incidentally affording relief to the London money market which was keenly appreciated. Most of the remainder was obtained by the sale of securities to an amount which reduced such holdings from 14,019,676 on March 31st to 9,415,708 on July 31st.

The test to which the Indian system, as the most important example of the gold exchange standard, was thus subjected was perhaps of a higher importance than was realised by those in the thick of the conflict. It was plainly intimated, however, in the annual report on financial conditions for 1908 that, if necessary, the Indian Government would have issued short-dated securities in order to still further replenish the exchange funds in London. This would have been the true means of meeting the situation if the existing fund had been unduly impaired. The argument against it would have been that the demand was indefinite, and might become so large as to be unmanageable. The fact that the demand for exchange was met without the issue of new securities and without trenching upon the reserve funds beyond the amount of 8,000,000 out of 18,500,000 affords pretty strong evidence that there is a natural limit to such demands.